Friday News Roundup — February 12, 2021
U.S.-Europe Relations in Great Power Competition; B-1Bs Deploy to Norway; What’s Next for the Pentagon’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control?; American Political Party Realignment
Good morning to you from Washington, where the week has been dominated by the historic second impeachment of former President Donald Trump. Merely over a month since the day it was invaded by insurrectionists, the Senate will soon render its verdict whether President Trump incited the insurrection — and if he should be barred from holding future office. With the outcome likely pre-determined by partisanship, however couched in procedural rhetoric, the House impeachment managers laid out their case as much for the public and posterity as for the politicians. Today and into the weekend, the former president’s team will lay out their defense.
As they did to their benefit during the campaign, team Biden has remained focused on their agenda, COVID relief, while attempting to ignore the focus on President Trump and January 6th. This is a matter of metrics: thousands of cases of mutated variants, millions of doses of vaccine, and billions of dollars of relief. In terms of the relief package, it looks likely that a party-line reconciliation vote is the path forward, raising questions about whether progressive attempts to raise the minimum wage will be possible.
This week, Joshua reviewed Nicole Perlroth’s This is How They Tell Me the World Ends, which looks at the ongoing struggle in the cyber domain and U.S. vulnerabilities. CSPC will be hosting an online conversation with Ms. Perlroth on February 17th. Register here to join us.
In this week’s roundup, Dan looks at transatlantic relations as both the United States and Europe find their way in an era of great power competition. Joshua looks at what deployments of U.S. bombers to Norway signify. Ethan provides the latest on Joint All Domain Command & Control. Sarah Naiman, our intern from Oberlin College, has her inaugural roundup piece looking at the historical realignment of U.S. political parties and what the current shifts and QAnon influence in the GOP mean for another realignment. As always, we wrap with news you may have missed.
The Transatlantic Relationship in Transition
Dan Mahaffee
If Josep Borrell, the current High Representative of the European Union, the EU’s top diplomat, probably thought that his recent trip to Russia would demonstrate Europe’s foreign policy heft. Instead, a hostile reception and shambolic response have done more to undermine Europe’s heft than establish it. Even when dressed down by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and conned into speaking about sanctions on Cuba and Catalan independence, instead of focusing on the arrest of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, the peak of Borrell’s humiliation came when diplomats from three EU nations — Germany, Poland, and Sweden — were expelled during his visit.
While pleasing Moscow and prompting finger pointing in Brussels, this incident gives transatlanticists in Washington another case of heartburn. Their hopes were buoyed by the arrival of the Biden administration — which would certainly be a U-turn from the Trump administration’s approach to Europe — and restoring and strengthening partnerships with allies is a bipartisan goal, especially in an era of great power competition. While shocking, Borrell’s visit should serve as a reminder of the transition underway in transatlantic relations, as politics on both sides of the Atlantic reshapes the partnership.
For the EU, Borrell’s trip to Moscow was not the only embarrassment so far in 2021. Brussels has borne the brunt of criticism about the European vaccine rollout. Beyond questions of competency, concerns about vaccine export prompted Brussels to briefly restrict trade on the inter-Irish border, another reminder of Europe’s own post-Brexit issues. The cringe-worthy moments do not solely come from the bureaucracy of the EU. The approach of many European leaders, not just Borrell’s, have raised questions about Europe’s approach to Putin.
See, for example, German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s claim that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was needed given Germany’s World War II aggression towards Russia, and nevermind Germany’s aggression toward the Eastern European countries, particularly Ukraine, now harmed by Nord Stream 2. Given that Steinmeier was chief of staff to former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder — who is now affiliated with Gazprom and Rosneft and manages Nord Stream 2 — there might be concerns other than idealism. Europe’s approach to Moscow is not the only concern, as questions abound in Washington about Europe’s pending trade and investment agreement with Beijing. Will Europe truly stand up on human rights, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, if it threatens Volkswagen’s joint ventures and the return of Chinese tourists to the Champs Elysees? Does the European public feel different about China than its elites? Do Europeans see Australia’s example (and warning) of what a trade deal is “worth” after all when China, oh so easily slighted, applies sanctions and tariffs?
That Europe finds itself balancing its ideals and commercial interests is nothing new. However, coming at a time where liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes vie for influence and power, these actions raise questions about Europe’s position as a reliable U.S. ally. Yet, a significant part of the challenge for the transatlantic relationship, as well as the role of Europe on the global stage, remains internal to Europe. There are more novel challenges, like defining Europe post-Brexit, addressing anti-democratic governments in Hungary and Poland, and determining the post-Merkel dynamic — with Macron as the senior leader of the Paris-Berlin core (though polls show LePen again threatening from the far right). There are also the eternal challenges of balancing national and collective interests, bridging divides north-south and east-west, and answering the classic “Kissinger question,” “who do I call if I want to call Europe?”
Post-Trump, there is also a new dynamic in the transatlantic relationship, where Europeans now have legitimate questions about the health of the U.S. political system and its reliability as an ally. As Michael pointed out in a CSPC policy team meeting this week, that Putin and Lavrov would antagonize Europe at a time when it may be seeking greater strategic autonomy seems counterproductive; though I would posit that the internal dynamics of Russian politics and diplomacy preclude such diplomatic dexterity when thuggishness rules the day. Still, that is a reminder to us here in Washington that the nature of the partnership with Europe, while still underpinned by institutional ties, can hardly be taken for granted in an era of great power competition.
If Europe does seek greater strategic autonomy, then there will need to be some hard discussions about the security guarantees that the United States provides and the sharing of the defense burden. A stronger, more capable Europe can be a strong partner for the United States, even if it’s foreign policy does not dovetail neatly with ours. Both geography and economy shape differing approaches from Washington and Brussels to Moscow and Beijing.That said, on both sides of the Atlantic, one hopes that the shared values and interests prompt renewal and reform of the ties that promote alliances and partnerships.
B-1 Bombers to Deploy to Norway, Signaling to Russia and Europe alike
Joshua C. Huminski
According to reports, the United States Air Force is preparing to deploy a detachment of B-1B bombers and roughly 200 personnel to Norway. This is seen as the latest in a series of signals to Russia and another indicator that the United States is pivoting to the increasingly important Arctic region. It is unclear when the bombers will arrive, but reports suggest the first deployment of Air Force personnel are already in Norway from the 7th Bomb Wing at Dyess Air Force Base in Texas. The B-1s will operate from Ørland, which is just 300 miles from the Arctic Circle and roughly 650 miles from the Russian border. The base often hosts NATO E-3 AWACS early warning/command and control aircraft and is home to Norway’s F-35A fleet.
Commenting on the deployment the Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Africa, Air Force General Jeff Harrigian said, “We value the enduring partnership we have with Norway and look forward to future opportunities to bolster our collective defense.” Hitherto, most deployments of Air Force bombers have been to the United Kingdom, but this has been changing in recent years. In 2019 a B-2 Stealth Bomber (Mighty 22) arrived in Iceland for the first time and in August of 2020 a flight of six B-52H bombers conducted a joint flight with Norwegian F-35A and F-16AM fighters.
This deployment is just the latest in a string of deployments of U.S. military assets to Norway, which has seen both Air Force aircraft and Navy vessels operating from and around the Scandinavian country. In August 2020, the Navy released photos of the U.S.S. Seawolf operating off the coast of Norway and there is speculation that the submarine and others like it could be based in Norway’s cavernous naval base. The Seawolf was operating near Tromsø, in the far-northern part of that country near where the Norwegian Sea meets the Barents Sea — a common transit point for Russian submarines operating from Murmansk. Two years earlier and for the first time in nearly 20 years, the Navy deployed the U.S.S. Harry S. Truman, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, to support Exercise Trident Juncture, a NATO exercise designed to test the alliance’s ability to defend Norway.
The deployment of the B-1s as well as the other recent activities is in line with the United States’ increasing attention to the Arctic region. In July of last year, the Air Force released an Arctic strategy calling for an increased presence in the region to counter Russian threats. In January of this year, the Navy released its “Blue Arctic” strategy, providing for operational changes noting that “Encompassing about six percent of the global surface, a Blue Arctic will have a disproportionate impact on the global economy given its abundance of natural resources and strategic location.”
In addition, the redeployment of assets to Norway serves three additional purposes. First, and most clearly, it sends a signal to Russia. While the bombers themselves are in and of themselves unlikely to upset the balance. Indeed, Northern Europe and the border with Russia serves as one of the most heavily defended territories in the world with multiple overlapping missile and missile defense systems. It is the signal more than the substance that matters. Forward-deploying B-1s and other assets to Norway demonstrates America’s commitment to the defense of Europe, this after questions were raised during the Trump administration.
It is here that the second purpose becomes apparent. After four years of relative uncertainty at the presidential level of Washington’s commitment to NATO and its European partners, the Department of Defense is continuing to reassure its counterparts with presence, participation, and posture. This deployment was certainly well underway before President Trump’s departure, signaling that while the White House may tweet contrarian policy, the Pentagon remained committed to Europe and NATO. President Biden is certainly more Europhile than his predecessor and it should be expected that these and other deployments will continue in the future, but backed by a more solid commitment from the White House to the European relationship.
Finally, at an operational level, this deployment signals the Department of Defense’s interest in diversifying its basing posture. Hitherto, much of the forward deployment of American air assets has been to either the United Kingdom or Germany, with bombers almost exclusively flying out of RAF Fairford. As with the Iceland visit by the B-2, the Pentagon is keen to diversify the bases from which it can operate, challenge the calculus of the Russians, and here Norway fits nicely.
Taken together the deployment represents a reaffirmation of the United States’ commitment to Europe, a signal to Moscow that it is committed, and offers a chance for increased joint training to increase interoperability and operational capability. Will it upset the strategic balance? Certainly not especially as the B-1s are not nuclear-capable (as of now), but it is an important signal and demonstration nonetheless.
JADC2 Approaches critical lifecycle phase-gate
Ethan Brown
The DoD’s new warfighting paradigm faces its most important scrutiny to date as the next few days will find the program and its five-pillar strategy on the desk of Joint Chiefs Chairman General Milley. All-Domain Operations, collectively the Joint Warfighting Concept and its Joint All Domain Command & Control (JADC2) actioning architecture, face mounting pressure to demonstrate the capacity to supercharge DoD capabilities for an information driven operational environment.
As a brief refresher, the Joint Warfighter Concept under ADO is the new DoD paradigm that prioritizes information sharing and intelligence-driven decision-making for tactical leaders, strategic commanders, and policy makers. The JADC2 is the literal architecture that aims to host the defense enterprises pseudo-5G/IoT that will link sensors-to-shooters all over the world.
The briefing, classified Top Secret, serves as the executive summary prepared by Lt. Gen. Dennis Crall (USMC), the DoD’s J6 lead, for the Joint Chiefs, who may then concur with the review and greenlight the next phase of development. The findings of the J6 review will, for all intents and purposes, determine whether or not the new-era of battlefield decision-making will continue as planned, or be sent back to the stratego drawing board. Conducted under Lt. Gen. Crall’s directorship (not unlike a misunderstood visionary of Galactic Empire infamy), the review was done at the behest of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, a key cross-functional body that presides over such pivotal strategic endeavors as ADO. The JROC exists in order to validate the billions of appropriated funds over the last three years for JADC2, by ensuring developmental approaches are keeping the strategic goals of various programs in line with the policy that gave them life.
Notably, and on brand for our work on accountability and government efficiency here at the Center, the Cross-Functional Team that brokers ADO implementation between JROC and the various Services has made it clear that this strategy is much more than a line-item inventory on requirements and acquisitions. The strategy proposal heading to Gen. Milley is purported to navigate ADO development through a five-to-ten year horizon, with recommendations for achieving data standardization (remember last year when I explained how F-22’s and F-35’s couldn’t talk until the JADC2 on-ramp), shortening decision-chains and increasing situational awareness. Engaging and literally “plugging in” allies and coalition partners are another key facet of this briefing as it moves to higher headquarters for review.
Should the JROC review fail to win the support of the Chairman, a start-from-scratch or checkpoint respawn portends a risk to modernizing our defense capabilities at a time when the Pacific and European theaters are far from settled in the post-Trump administration era. In the recent news cycle, China has continued its strategic growth by testing new ballistic missile interception capabilities, amid the sustained rhetoric and aggression against Taiwan. North Korea has erstwhile doubled-down on nuclear development ambitions with an eye on increased foreign policy influence. Myanmar continues to reel from the military coup and ongoing human-rights crisis, representing another powder keg of volatility. These events occurred in just the past week in the Pacific theater alone.
Now is not the time to short-change a network that will finally unify warfighters in an information era of competition and potential conflict. I wrote a few months ago on some of the talking points that could very well doom JADC2 from taking flight, despite the tremendous successes that the on-ramps have demonstrated over the last calendar year. Even though congress never seems to find responsible budgeting in vogue, the unmistakable reality is that the recent COVID relief bills have swollen the deficit to unprecedented highs, which means that something has to give at the appropriations level. A new administration means a pendulum swing away from the last crew, and as the Trump administration built much of its brand on a strong military with big budget surges, the likelihood of DoD programs getting severely curbed is possible, if not probable. This is just one challenge that (recently retired General) Defense Secretary Austin Lloyd faces, despite his uniformed service keeping his professional expertise from being as involved in budget allocation as his forebears.
With budget and program cuts serving as the context for this critical ADO gateway, one thing in defense strategy is becoming more and more clear: warfighters need to be prioritized, while shelling out funds for every shiny new defense toy is likely to cease. In order to maximise existing capabilities without pouring imaginary dollar signs down a defense industry drain, the ADO program can achieve modernization in a way that previous attempts to unify information sharing never could. Future battlefields and crisis centers are certain to be driven by data-sharing, at a level not seen in historical examples. Thus, opting to continue the program that solves communication shortfalls and aligns DoD strategy against threats and environments abroad is one budget cut that should not be taken. At least, that is what this analysis suggests General Milley relays to Secretary Austin and the appropriators that be.
The Future of the American Party System
Sarah Naiman
Last month, The Economist/YouGov released a poll indicating that nearly a third of Republicans have a favorable opinion of a conspiracy increasingly associated with far right politics: QAnon, “a wide-ranging, completely unfounded theory that says that President Trump is waging a secret war against elite Satan-worshipping paedophiles in government, business and the media.” This type of ideological shift within a party is not unprecedented — American political history is defined by Party Systems, eras in which two dominant parties characterized by their unique coalitions and stances compete in statewide and national elections. These political eras endure until significant forces rupture a party and make its candidates unelectable.
As GOP leaders and constituents continue to endorse and identify with QAnon, it appears that the U.S. may transition from its Sixth to its Seventh Party System, featuring the Democratic and QAnon Parties. However, until the GOP sees repeated electoral defeat, the Sixth Party System will reign, albeit with an alt-right-leaning Republican Party where moderate and/or principled voices are becoming increasingly scarce.
The future (or lack thereof) of the GOP is epitomized by last week’s votes on Rep. Liz Cheney (R-WY), a member of the House’s GOP leadership team who criticized President Trump for inciting the Capitol insurrection, and Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA), a freshman congresswoman and public QAnon supporter who has been criticized for her racist, antisemitic, and violent posts on social media. The majority of House GOP members voted both to keep Cheney in her leadership position and against removing Greene from her committee assignments. The simultaneous endorsement of Cheney and Greene reflects the party’s gamble that it can appease both fringe and center Republicans. Consequently, in its desire to unify both factions, it seems probable that the GOP will bend, not break.
Rightwing legislators and QAnon supporters will move the party further toward the (alt-) right, thereby extending the definition of “Republican.” In some ways, the GOP could fulfill Minority Leader McCarthy’s (R-CA) prophecy of a “big tent” party; by moving to the conspiratorial right, it will welcome a diverse constituency of white supremacists, antisemites, xenophobes, and more. As long as the party continues to win elections, there is no deterrent for the GOP to halt its rightward expansion. Given the statistics from The Economist/YouGov poll, it seems likely that alt-right leaning candidates will continue to succeed electorally in local and House races.
The founding fathers feared the power of political parties — Federalist 10 cautioned against them even before the Constitution’s ratification; similar warnings were a focal point of Washington’s Farewell Address. However, this advice was ignored and, by the 1790s, the First Party System emerged. Americans in favor of powerful national institutions created the Federalist Party, while those who envisioned a decentralized, agrarian future became Anti-Federalists. Westward expansion, slavery, and the Civil War upset the political alignments that underpinned the First, Second, and Third Party Systems. Immigration and industrialization created the conditions for the Fourth Party System, which ended during the Great Depression with the creation of the New Deal Coalition. The Sixth Party System saw the rise of the conservative movement and the culmination of the GOP’s “Southern Strategy.”
The possibility of a Seventh Party System is considered during every presidential transition. What makes the possibility more relevant this year? Last week, Speaker Pelosi’s (D-CA) office published a press release entitled “McCarthy (Q-CA) Fails to Lead, Hands Keys to Party to Greene.” While the “Q” designation was intended to be provocative, one must question whether the U.S. is on the precipice of a Seventh Party System. After all, American history has demonstrated that political parties are not immutable.
Some might say that the Republican Party’s rightward shift within the last few years will be counterbalanced by stalwart moderates like Mitt Romney, Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, and others. Unfortunately, such figures appear to be part of a dying breed. Between the 92nd and 112th Congresses, the number of general moderates fell from 198 to 12. Moreover, since the Capitol insurrection, over 140,000 voters have left the GOP to register as Independents or Democrats. As the Republican Party makes room for more voices like Greene and Rep. Lauren Boebert (R-CO) and elevates figures like Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR), the moderate exodus from the GOP will accelerate. Given that it will lose some moderate constituents, party leadership will have to work diligently to appeal to the alt-right and maintain a base sufficiently large to win elections.
Is the U.S. headed toward its Seventh Party System? Likely not. For now, as demonstrated by the Greene and Cheney votes, GOP leadership plans to appease both factions of the party and rely on cultural fears to unite its constituency during election season. In a world where leaders like McCarthy possessed stronger resolve, perhaps QAnon followers would be exiled and forced to create their own third party. However, this is not that world. Evidently, it will take a stronger force than populists and conspiracists like Greene to rupture the status quo and catalyze a new party system.
News You May Have Missed
Myanmar Military Imposing Internet Restrictions
Jaqueline Ruiz
Supporters of deposed Burmese leader Aung San Suu Kyi are responding to the military coup through civil disobedience by banging on pots, hanging banners, wearing symbols of defiance, and refusing to work. Supporters of Suu Kyi’s party have tried to appeal for international support by using social media, trending #SaveMyanmar and #SaveOurVotes on Twitter, and holding up the three-finger symbol that was used in the book The Hunger Games to show their resistance. The military responded to their opposition by ordering mobile operators and internet providers to block social media websites like Twitter, Instagram and Facebook in order to “ensure stability of the nation” and “stop the circulation of fake news.” While the military continues to engage in an unconstitutional seizure of power, the public will continue to denounce the coup and military rule.
North Korea and Iran Cooperation on Missile Development
Miles Esters
According to a United Nations report, last year the DPRK and Iran continued their collaboration on long-range missile development. According to an independent panel that’s monitoring sanctions on North Korea, the cooperation involved the transfer of critical parts of ballistic missiles. Though there is no public evidence to suggest that both countries have engaged in nuclear-related trade or coordination, the two nations have had a decades-long “secretive [and] mutually beneficial relationship” that began in the 1980s. It started with North Korea exporting Scud missile technology to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and through time has evolved into a mutually beneficial relationship where both countries have developed credible ballistic missile capabilities. This can be demonstrated with North Korea’s continued advancement of its ICBMs and SLBMs despite years of heavy economic and financial sanctions by the international community. Additionally, in the past decade, Iran has developed the largest and most capable arsenals of ballistic and cruise missiles in the Middle East. Both of these adversarial nations’ growing missile capabilities have created “a credible threat to the United States and partner military forces in the regions” that is not going to diminish for the foreseeable future. Iran and North Korea will continue to pose a foreign policy conundrum for U.S. presidential administrations.
The views of authors are their own, and not that of CSPC.