Friday News Roundup — March 4, 2022
A week that would have normally been marked with the State of the Union address continues to be defined by the vicious assault that Russia has unleashed on Ukraine. Russia’s growing brutality is shown in the suffering of the Ukrainian people and its recklessness in scenes of Russian soldiers firing on an active nuclear power plant. The Ukranians also show us the determination of a free people to defend their homes and their right to determine their future.
On the global stage, a great shift is underway. Europe’s commitment to rearm and strengthen NATO — if rhetoric is met with action — could reshape transatlantic strategic capabilities. Beijing finds itself choosing between the global system in which it has grown and prospered and its authoritarian friendship with Moscow, while it looks to the economic sanctions levied against Russia and the global outrage over the invasion as decisions are made regarding China’s economic future and that of Taiwan. Pressing questions remain. How can transatlantic strength serve as a foundation, rather than competition, for our strategic interest in the Indo-Pacific? How do the United States and our allies compete for influence — diplomatically and economically — across the developing world as Beijing and Moscow make their forays?
The return of warfare we once thought unimaginable requires us to reimagine the future of warfare, understanding what has changed, and what has not, about conflict. Diplomatic efforts will continue to be needed to work with existing allies and partners, while fostering new partnerships and pressuring adversaries. In the economic domain, the tools being levied against Russia are unprecedented, and assumptions about a global economy will be tested as we effectively disconnect Russia. At home, we will need an innovation ecosystem to ensure technology leadership, while also ensuring that our political system and institutions function both for the benefit of the American people and as an example to the world. It is a time to reevaluate our prior assumptions, set aside our partisanship, and realize we are at an inflection point in history. All of our tools of national power are needed for the challenge ahead.
In the media this week, CSPC President & CEO Rep. Glenn Nye (D-VA, ret.) wrote in The Fulcrum on how we can fix the incentives in our political system in order to restore American democracy. David M. Abshire Chair, Rep. Mike Rogers (R-MI, ret.), argued that China is watching the war in Ukraine closely and learning lessons that could well change its calculus when it comes to Taipei in a piece for Breaking Defense. For the Diplomatic Courier this week, Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs Director, Joshua C. Huminski, provided an overview of books on Russia, Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin to help readers better understand the war in Ukraine. Ethan Brown also wrote for the Diplomatic Courier about how the Ukraine crisis displayed the limits of the liberal order, while in The Hill, he calls on NATO to modernize in light of the crisis.
In this week’s very full roundup, Ethan covers the details of the invasion itself and how Russian forces have bogged down but are shifting their efforts. Joshua covers the nuclear brinksmanship and what the strategic implications are. Our visiting fellow Veera Parko looks at the unprecedented actions by the EU, while Wes covers the impact they are having on Russia. Robert Gerber covers how Switzerland has even moved to adopt sanctions on Russia despite its traditionally neutral stance. Hidetoshi provides an analysis of how U.S.-Japan alliance stands vis-à-vis Tokyo’s relationship with Moscow and understanding geopolitical realignment. As always, we wrap with news you may have missed.
An Invasion like no other
Ethan Brown
Contested airspace, failed logistics and sustainment plans, disaggregated offensive fires, centralized execution and decentralized control, there are too many items to list that force us to question exactly what the Russian military strategy for an invasion of Ukraine was based on. Was it a failure of intelligence which assumed the Ukrainian resistance would not be a factor? Was it the presumption of some popular uprising (something that failed Kim Il-Sung during the 1950 invasion of South Korea by the Peoples Korean Army) that never materialized? Was it a reliance on hybrid domains of warfare — cyber (hardly performed at levels we all assumed would manifest), Electronic warfare, disinformation and political pressure — that proved fruitless or short of expectations?
I would offer the most compelling question during this poorly organized invasion is why the presumption that Russia would indeed mow through Ukraine like a lawn-mower through dry grass. Perhaps Russian activities have been so effective in non-conventional domains in years passed — NotPetya and SolarWinds, the 2016 election interference, fortress economization, to name just a few — that our fear of Russian hard power was exaggerated (unlikely). But to amass a military force the size of the one attempting a bisection of Ukraine is no small feat, and indeed, something previously thought untenable in the 21st century.
Rather than poring into the policy and theory components of this invasion (plenty of ink being spilled there), I thought I would pick apart some of the most glaring missteps reportedly happening in Ukraine with many a shameless plug and borrow from Major General Mick Ryan (@Warinthefuture on Twitter).
Communications
Per a story posted by Nicholas Laidlaw, Russian forces are operating on a purely analog battle command and control system. In short, this means that all communications are performed from point to point, reliant on traditional radio antenna theories; making direction-finding, spoofing, jamming and all other forms of interference relatively easy to do at the lowest tactical level. Back in my cool-guy days, when we would be out on the bombing range training new controllers on operating in denied environments, we would jerry-rig a 9V battery to a empty coca-cola can with a small wide-band antenna soldered on, and hide it right next to the operator who was controlling aircraft. It worked like a charm against non-cryptologically keyed radio transmission…meaning the radio operator couldn’t get comms to work inside the small interference zone created by this anarchist EW-contraption. It can indeed be that easy to interfere with radios on non-secure channels.
For analog networks that are secured (with those cryptological fill keys), it takes a little more effort, which simply means flooding available frequency spectrums with traffic at varying — extremely powerful — levels (relatively easy to do from a civilian radio station, or by commercial radio hobbyists), power and volume are the key across all bandwidths. Making this situation even more unbelievable, reports have surfaced that Russian troops have resorted to civilian radios and cellular texting for battlefield coordination.
Digital networks, on the other hand, are like a chat room or access-restricted lobby, and something a modernized military is surely capable of doing. While expecting a massive force to operating solely in the digital spectrum is not entirely tenable yet for any state military, the primary command and control systems are certainly easier to sustain over secured digital networks which tie-in End User Devices into specific network protocols, meaning the more devices connected, the stronger the signal, and the harder to interfere with that network becomes.
So the possibility that Russian forces are not operating in a hardened or secured communications network would indeed be one of the most egregious failings of strategizing the Ukraine invasion.
Air Superiority
While unconfirmed by the Russian state or military, the story of at least one Il-76 cargo aircraft being shot down near Vasylkiv, a major hub south of Kyiv, is of absolutely critical significance. The presumed role of those aircraft is similar to the Joint Forcible Entry mission I trained to when I was direct support to the 75th Ranger Regiment, in short — airfield seizure. That mission requires a huge air package of cargo transports full of paratroopers to fly in low, jump en-masse onto a key piece of terrain, in this case, the airport in Vasylkiv, and secure a breach behind ‘enemy’ lines, enabling follow-on missions and increased sustainment footholds.
That mission, in both Russian and American military doctrine, is considered extremely high risk, which is why specialized airborne units like the Regiment and Russian paratrooper units train to no-fail standards on specific, achievable, prioritized objectives for this type of insertion. But it all hinges on one key facet of modern warfare: air superiority.
Whether one believes in the remarkable story of the #GhostofKyiv (and believe me, I want that to be real), what is known is that air defense has been a major discussion point for Ukraine in the months leading up to the invasion. While considered by nearly all experts as woefully underpowered against any Russian force, the Ukrainian air defense still boasts a plethora of Russian-made long, medium and short range surface to air munitions (SAMs), including the S-300, SA-6 “Gainful”, SA-11 “Buk”, and 9K330 “Tor” systems. Oh, there are also manpads, which are all but impossible to weed out short of firebombing an entire nation. It is possible that (poor) Russian airspace management has played a much more significant role in shoddy aerial dominance than any productive Ukrainian defense, after all, good military strategy involves tactical leaders “not getting in the way of the enemy making a mistake”. But the reality remains that without air superiority, the alleged attempt to conduct an airfield seizure, perform helicopter movement of troops, aerial resupply and logistical sustainment smacks of gross negligence by Russian strategists.
Offensive firepower
This is the closest thing to ‘expected’ seen from reporting on the Russian invasion, but the diversity of targets is baffling to say the least. Historically, Russia has been shameless in its targeting of civilians in Syria and Chechnya, but the reported use of cluster munitions (a weapon banned by the Geneva convention) on a hospital in Kharkiv, as well as the rumored deployment of thermobaric munitions call to question what the air and land offensive fires strategy is. Many of the airstrikes have appeared to target civilian infrastructure far more often than legitimate military targets, Ukrainian defense positions, or key architecture that enables a defense in depth against Russian columns inbound for key objectives.
Offensive fires serve one primary purpose in combat: shaping the battlefield and setting conditions for an operation to seize, defend, or influence decisive points in a broader campaign. The use of firepower to weaken Ukrainian defenses when the ground maneuver components are both logistically incapable of capitalizing on gains, even unaware that the invasion was occurring, speaks to a major failure of combined arms employment. Maneuver forces who operate without combined arms support to set conditions for that maneuver are merely fodder for any defensive force to pick apart with relative ease.
Civilians die in war. This is a tragic, barbaric and unfortunate reality and one which the immense inventory of the American war machine has taken great pains to avoid at all costs through precision weapons, deliberate and dynamic targeting cycles keyed on multi-source criteria and a rigorous approval process for offensive engagements. The Russian approach to this unfortunate reality, however, has been decidedly less humane. What is particularly odd here, is that while rhetoric from Russian leader Vladimir Putin seems to consider Russian actions as a defense of the Slavic brethren in Ukraine, civilians don’t seem to factor into that liberation. As the fight moves to urban zones (follow @RitaKonaev on twitter for expert analysis on that facet of warfare), more civilian casualties are all but certain to compound.
Summary
Very little of what Russian military forces have done to date makes much tactical, operational, or strategic sense when viewed collectively, and certainly none of its individual parts speak to sound military doctrine or operational planning. That the bulk of Russian forces remain held in reserve over the border while additional forces sourced from Belarus are rumored to be involved in the offensive is another curious facet, further indicating the fight is not going as intelligence preparation of the battlespace anticipated either. It is difficult to give much credible weight to the knee-jerk analysis that nuclear escalation remains a realistic possibility owing to Putin’s waning grip on reality either. That is a road into history from which the Russian leader cannot return. But it all makes little sense, and there isn’t much fodder for a rational explanation as to why…unless you give much credence to the chaos agent theory that Putin is playing 4D chess while the world is struggling with checkers.
More plausible, because military operations must be built on achieving a political end state (something that doomed Afghanistan…repeatedly) is something the Russian titan does best, and is now sacrificing some cheap elements of its largely-conscripted Ukrainian invasion force to accomplish: create crisis that the rest of Europe will ultimately respond to — the rebuild of a smoldering Ukraine while Russia slowly de-escalates the conflict and returns to the Kremlin to consolidate its lessons on the western response to the campaign while tightening its authoritarian domestic grip even further.
A word of warning though — American involvement via a drone war using vague authorities is probably a surefire way to escalate the conflict into all-out war between the east and west, not recommended by this author.
Nuclear Brinkmanship and the War in Ukraine
Joshua C. Huminski
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine took on a potentially alarming dimension when President Vladimir Putin put his nuclear forces on alert on Sunday. In a televised statement, Putin said that the weapons had moved to a vague “special mode of combat duty” status. Later, on Tuesday, Russia’s nuclear forces reportedly conducted a drill with submarines and land-based missiles. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov commented that a third world war would involve nuclear weapons and be destructive. It should be noted that it is unclear whether the drill was connected with Putin’s statement or part of a regularly scheduled exercise.
In response to the escalating tensions, the United States postponed a routine test of a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) out of concern the test could be misinterpreted. The United States has also declined, thus far, to elevate its own nuclear alert status.
Putin’s comments, the drill, and the administration’s response have brought the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons into stark relief. In the words of one senior British former diplomat with whom I spoke, this is the most dangerous crisis since the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is important to pause and reflect on the reality that, right now, the United States, NATO, and European allies are provided direct, lethal aid to Ukraine in its fight with Russia — weapons to kill Russian soldiers. Moscow knows the West is providing this aid and the West knows that the Russians know. There have also been increasing calls for the imposition of a no-fly-zone or other, more direct aid to support Ukraine. While the former is a non-starter (and potentially a partial stalking horse to secure more assistance from Kyiv), the possibility of the latter is increasingly being entertained.
Doctrinally, Russia has a preference to “leverage the risk and uncertainty of potential nuclear escalation to enhance its deterrence of adversaries”. With Ukraine and both Putin and Lavrov’s comments, this preference is on display. Right now, no one can be sure that Putin would not use nuclear weapons should some unspecified threshold be crossed or some other set of conditions be reached.
Up until the invasion of Ukraine, Putin could be seen as a canny tactical opportunist, more so than a strategic planner. That said, he was generally seen as calculating and making sensible decisions when it comes to Russia’s strategic interests. The invasion of Ukraine has, however, upset that consideration — thus far it appears to be a full-fledged “own goal” undermining the gains made across Europe in recent history, uniting both the EU and NATO against Russia, and effectively isolating the country’s economy, sending the currency and stock market into freefall.
This unpredictability factors directly into the nuclear threats, and at this point they remain threats. In an interview with Politico, Fiona Hill, a noted Russia expert, believes that we should take the threat seriously: ‘if anybody thinks that Putin wouldn’t use something that he’s got that is unusual and cruel, think again. Every time you think, “No, he wouldn’t, would he?” Well, yes, he would. And he wants us to know that, of course.’ Ultimately, one hopes never to find out the answer to that question.
The consideration of nuclear weapons filters into a more complex discussion about escalation when it comes to the Ukraine crisis and the West’s support of Kyiv. While an open secret, the arms and munitions sent to Ukraine have been of a tactical type — nothing that could strategically alter the balance of the war or be seen as, arguably, overstepping an undefined boundary. The introduction of NATO troops into Ukraine, the imposition of a no-fly-zone, or provision of American-made aircraft (even if operated by Ukrainian pilots) could well be seen as escalatory by Moscow, which would almost certainly respond in kind. Moreover, the risk of miscalculation is increased as weapons are placed on higher alert.
To date, Russia’s campaign in Ukraine has been very circumspect about effects crossing into NATO for this very reason. Arguably the reason we have not seen cyberattacks against the United States or NATO is for this very reason — an unclear line, the crossing of which could lead to Article Five and collective defense obligations within NATO. A cornered Putin, who has already demonstrated a measure of unpredictability, could well decide to cross that line or push the boundaries in an attempt to force the West to reconsider its own calculus.
In the near term, it is critical that the military-to-military communications are maintained and that the risks of escalation are considered when assistance to Ukraine is planned, especially when discussing any potential increase in such aid. Indeed, it was just announced on Thursday that the United States have established a deconfliction hotline to prevent “miscalculation, military incidents, and escalation.”
The European Union´s watershed moment?
Veera Parko
This week, many international commentators have described the European Union´s decisions to counter Russia´s attack in Ukraine as something not seen after the fall of the Berlin Wall and “tectonic”. Some have even said they have never seen the EU more determined to make major decisions and project unity. European, American and other like-minded partners have engaged in effective coordination to create a common front to deter Putin´s aggression in Ukraine. According to Tuesday´s Washington Post, the Biden administration engaged in a months-long process to press European partners, together with Canada and the UK, to prepare an extremely ambitious sanctions package targeting a single country. In his SOTU speech, President Biden emphasized US efforts in persuading European partners that Putin´s attack was imminent.
In contrast with the European Union´s handling of previous crises, for example the 2015 migration crisis and a somewhat watered down response to Russia´s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, EU member states now seem to share a common approach to the threat Russia poses. The common understanding in Europe is that the whole post-Cold War security architecture is at stake and, therefore, the response must be swift and strong. But will European political unity lead to concrete steps to strengthen the continent´s strategic autonomy and preparedness for the cascading effects of the Russian war in Ukraine? It is still too early to tell.
At least, the ongoing crisis has shown that the EU can use the policy tools at its disposal fully when there is political consensus and a common adversary. Over the course of a short time, the EU has agreed on tough sanctions on the Russian banking sector and individuals — including freezing President Putin´s and Foreign Minister Lavrov´s personal assets in Europe — but also on shutting the EU airspace for Russians and banning Russian state media. This is quite remarkable, considering that foreign and security policy decisions require unanimity from 27 member states.
While economic integration has traditionally been at the core of what the EU does, the policy range of the sanctions is proof that the Union is prepared to go much further than economic sanctions. Even though many have dismissed the bloc´s efforts to develop its defence policy arm, it is worth noting that the Union has consistently developed its common foreign and security policy, especially its so called strategic compass. The EU has created new defence cooperation structures and boosted cooperation in related civilian fields such as humanitarian aid and emergency management as well as responding to cyber and hybrid threats as well as threats to critical infrastructure.
The EU´s announcement on February 27 to send 450 million euros worth of direct military aid and equipment to Ukraine is exceptional in this regard. This was the first time the EU decided to fund lethal equipment to a partner country. To be precise, the EU´s founding Treaty prohibits funding expenditure linked to operations having military or defence implications. The new aid package is funded from an instrument outside the Union´s budget called the European Peace Facility adopted in March 2021. The fund has previously only been used to support peacekeeping operations and funding of military equipment or infrastructure to the EU´s partners.
While the European Union as an institution has evolved during the crisis, so have its Member States. The changes in Germany´s foreign and security policy have been particularly poignant: suspension of Nord Stream 2, substantial increase in military spending and sending military aid to Ukraine, to name a few new approaches mentioned in Chancellor Scholtz´s speech at the Bundestag on 27 February. Russia´s invasion has also resulted in Sweden and Finland making historic decisions to provide direct military aid to Ukraine — something quite unheard of in these non-NATO nations. There are, however, some cracks in the EU´s unified façade, for example Hungary wanting to “stay out of the conflict”.
Finally, European Union citizens have taken Russian military action in Ukraine very seriously. Citizen engagement in expressing support for Ukraine has been remarkable, and politicians feel the pressure. Even if foreign policy and military experts in Europe have long been acutely aware of the threat Vladimir Putin´s Russia poses to Europe, it was the reality of the Russian invasion that sparked a strong public response. Public pressure coupled with careful groundwork by officials has undoubtedly facilitated the swift decisions European leaders have taken. The resilience of the Ukrainian people — and the role they play in national defence efforts — has caused many European citizens to think about their own role in a similar situation. Societal resilience goes hand in hand with military defence.
Europe has to learn its lessons from the war in Ukraine. An alliance built on liberal democracy, rule of law and other common values seems to be strong now. However, the conflict in Ukraine and the consequences of the sanctions will stay with the European Union for a long time — as will Russia, no matter how isolated. Whatever the result of the war in Ukraine may be, the relationship between the EU and Russia will never be the same again. This means the EU will have to reinvent itself in a new geopolitical reality, also in relation to its transatlantic partners. It will also have to make long-reaching decisions on its relations with NATO and on enlarging further: Ukraine just submitted its application for EU membership.
In a speech at the European Parliament’s plenary session this week, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen laid out what is at stake for the European Union:
How we respond today to what Russia is doing will determine the future of the international system. The destiny of Ukraine is at stake, but our own fate also lies in the balance. We must show the power that lies in our democracies; we must show the power of people that choose their independent paths, freely and democratically. This is our show of force.
The Cutting Edge of Sanctions
By Wesley Culp
Russia’s continued prosecution of its destructive invasion of Ukraine has seen Western countries apply historically unparalleled sanctions on Russia’s elite, access to technology, financial system, and economy. While the long-term effects of these actions cannot be definitively quantified, preliminary shocks to Russia’s economy and foreign trade have already proved to be withering. The Russian people, whose knowledge of the war being waged in their name against Ukraine is varied, will inevitably pay much of the steep price that sanctions demand.
One of the consequences of sanctions which was immediately tangible for the Russian people was the sharp drop in value of the ruble. By the end of the day on March 2, the value of Russia’s currency had fallen to 110 rubles to the U.S. dollar. This drop, which represents a loss of more than a fourth of the ruble’s value at the beginning of the year, has triggered a rush to withdraw rubles and acquire foreign currency. Russians have seen the value of their savings accordingly slashed as sanctions on Russia’s Central Bank have essentially prevented it from taking necessary action to prop up the value of the ruble.
Beyond the collapse of the ruble, some of the most perceptible and immediate effects of the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been the flurry of decisions by Western companies to suspend their operations or participation in the Russian economy. In the days after the invasion, Western consumer companies such as Apple, Ford, Daimler Truck, Volvo, and Disney have all announced that they will halt operations in Russia and cease distribution of their products in the country. By March 2, most Western-supported cashless payment methods had stopped working in Russia, as Apple Pay, Visa, and MasterCard announced the suspension of their services in Russia and the blocking of Russian banks’ access to their services where applicable. In a country where more than half of all transactions are conducted in a cashless format, this is a significant disruption to the Russians’ daily life. Decisions by large shipping companies such as Maersk, MSC, and CMA CGM to suspend bookings to Russian ports threatens to further disconnect Russian consumers from Western imports. Microsoft’s Friday announcement that it will suspend sales of its products and services in Russia will further disconnect Russia from Western technology, the effects of which will become increasingly visible over time. Additional Western companies are expected to suspend their Russian operations in the future.
Actions which are specifically targeted at the ability of Russian nationals to access the outside world have already elicited some disappointment from Russians. The exclusion of Russian participants from international events and bodies continues to proliferate, as seen in the International Olympic Committee’s recommendation that Russian and Belarusian athletes be excluded from international sports competitions, including the ongoing Beijing 2022 Paralympics. A combination of U.S. and EU bans on Russian flights from their airspace promises to restrict an important link Russians enjoy with the outside world. The accelerating pace which the Russian people have begun to be separated from the rest of the world has even prompted many Russians to leave the country before Russia’s isolation becomes insurmountable, or make plans to do so in the near term.
Russian financial authorities have struggled to stop their economy’s freefall, even though Moscow entered its invasion with a sizeable “war chest” of $630 billion with which it hoped to prop up the Russian economy against Western sanctions. Russian bank leaders such as Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina have expressed significant concern at the emergent economic crisis afflicting Russia. In an effort to stop the flight of foreign capital from Russia, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, who has served as a point person for economic issues by President Putin, announced a temporary ban on foreign investors selling Russian assets, as well as a scheme to spend more than a trillion rubles from the Russian Sovereign Wealth fund to buy shares in Russian companies. The Russian Central Bank also raised its key interest rate to 20% as a stopgap measure in response to the ruble’s sinking value.
The near-term future is likely to be marked by significant hits to the living standards of Russians of all social classes. Inflation is likely to continue to spike in the short term, eroding the purchasing power and savings of Russians. As the effect of sanctions became known at the beginning of this week, Russians began to form long lines at ATM machines in an effort to secure cash while it is available. In response, major Russian banks such as Sberbank and VTB raised saving rates to a towering 21% in an effort to discourage Russians from withdrawing their cash, which was enabled by the Central Bank’s interest rate hikes. This rapid loss of access to a variety of goods from the world market, combined with significant decline in purchasing power and living standards promises to upend the lives of ordinary Russians.
Many Russians have already taken to the streets to protest Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and quiet alarm has spread as its economy rapidly deteriorates. As Western companies continue to show no signs of halting their withdrawal from Russia regardless of the Kremlin’s measures to ban divestment, with Swedish furniture giant Ikea and apparel retailer H&M among the most recent exits, Russia’s economy will become increasingly insular. Recent races to secure cash or to leave the country indicate a growing trepidation among Russians in the future of their country, regardless of their feelings on the Kremlin’s attack on Ukraine. The effects of sanctions will likely compound the splits which have already emerged in Russia’s underdeveloped civil society and political sphere as a result of the war. While polling conducted between February 25 and 27 by the state-affiliated pollster VTsIOM suggests that 68% of Russians support Russia’s war in Ukraine, this support will certainly be influenced by home front conditions and war casualties as time goes on.
As the unprecedented unlinking of Russia’s economy from the world proceeds in response to Moscow’s war in Ukraine, the Russian people will continue to enter a new reality of their relationship with the Kremlin. Even as the flow of information into Russia is distorted by government clampdowns on independent outlets such as TV Dozhd or Ekho Moskvy, the undeniable effects of sanctions on the daily lives of Russians will become impossible to ignore. While these processes play out, it is important to note that no country with an economy the size of Russia’s has ever been shut out of the world economy before. Such a shift will undoubtedly produce effects and outcomes which are unforeseeable at this stage. Time will tell if the Russian people see the sanctions applied to them as attacks on Russia’s population from external enemies, or if they will blame Putin for triggering such sanctions.
Whatever the outcome of recent sanctions on Russia’s economy may be, the Russian people’s relationship with their government has been significantly altered. The attempts of the Russian people and their financial institutions to mitigate the fallout of sanctions indicates that it is widely known in Russia that the country’s economic reality has already begun to enter a hazy and unprecedented future. Whatever the future may hold, the rapid disconnection of Russia from the world economy will reverberate in Russia and the rest of the world for years to come.
Switzerland: Adopting EU Sanctions on Russia Does Not Violate Our Neutrality
Rob Gerber
On February 28, the Swiss Federal Council adopted the full set of EU sanctions on Russian institutions and individuals. This is a significant development because: a) Switzerland is neither a NATO member nor an EU member state; and b) there are $12 billion of Russian financial assets in Switzerland (2021 numbers). Swiss President Ignazio Cassis said his government had examined the question of neutrality and concluded that, “Playing into the hands of an aggressor is not neutral.” Cassis further commented, “We are witnessing a war on our continent. The attack on Ukraine is an attack on the freedom, democracy, civilian population, and institutions of a free country. This is unacceptable under international law, politically, morally.” He added that other democracies should be able to rely on Switzerland. The Swiss government also approved an initial shipment of 25 tons of humanitarian supplies to Ukraine. The government noted that Swiss sanctions do not preclude Switzerland playing a mediation role, if called upon to do so. Newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung predicted Switzerland could soon host a few thousand refugees from Ukraine.
While U.S. media made a banner headline of Switzerland’s adoption of EU sanctions on Russian institutions, Switzerland actually has a history of implementing UN sanctions on Iran and North Korea. Furthermore, after Russia’s 2014 incursions into Ukraine, Switzerland declared it would not let Switzerland be used to evade EU sanctions, and it banned imports from Crimea and other areas controlled by Russia’s proxy forces. Swiss law in fact allows the military to participate in UN or OSCE-mandated international peace operations. Switzerland participated in its first NATO-led peace-support operation in 1999, when it joined the Kosovo Force (KFOR), a multinational force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Swiss military personnel also participated in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, sending a handful of advisors to the German-run Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz. Switzerland joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1996 and became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997.
Switzerland’s action this week could offer a roadmap for other non-NATO, non-aligned, or “neutral” democracies to support Ukraine in its time of urgent need. We can hope that other global financial centers — as well as off-shore banking havens — will likewise be inspired to take action.
The Specter of Russia over the US-Japan Alliance
By Hidetoshi Azuma
Russia’s launch of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24 immediately invited a backlash from around the world, including Japan. The Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida demonstrated international solidarity against Russia by denouncing Moscow’s aggression and unveiled the most severe set of sanctions ever introduced by Tokyo. His latest move occurred against the backdrop of decades of Tokyo’s wavering Russia policy following the end of the Cold War. As Moscow renews its aggression and threatens the rules-based international order, Russia once again overshadows Japan and its alliance with the US. Indeed, the apocalyptic spectacle of Ukraine’s tribulation is a vivid reminder for the new Japanese prime minister of Moscow’s perennial territorial expansionism as well as Japan’s similar fate as a country with a frozen conflict with Russia over the four southern Kuril islands. Therefore, Kishida finds himself at a historic crossroads to reset Japan’s questionable policy of rapprochement with Russia and bolster the US-Japan alliance by realigning the bilateral strategic objectives in light of the inexorable ascendancy of authoritarianism worldwide.
Historically, Japan has played a pivotal role in shaping Russia’s geopolitical thrust to the Far East in search for warm water ports and an exit to the Pacific. Tokyo’s shifting Russia policy significantly influenced Moscow’s geostrategy for its eastern flank. For example, Japan’s alliance with Britain effectively checked the Russian encroachment on the Far East, culminating in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 and the Siberian Intervention of 1918–22. By contrast, Japan’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union in 1941 allowed Moscow to freely swing its resources between Europe and Asia during WWII, even facilitating the Soviet entry into the Pacific theater after the fall of the Third Reich in May 1945. The US victory in the Pacific and its subsequent occupation of Japan emerged as another obstacle to Moscow’s enduring geopolitical agenda for the Far East with the vanquished Asian empire born again as Washington’s regional bulwark against communism.
The advent of the Cold War led Japan’s wavering Russia policy to enter a hiatus thanks to Washington’s de facto hostile takeover of Tokyo’s grand strategy following WWII. In fact, the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 incorporated Japan into the US Cold War grand strategy against the Soviet Union, even freeing up the Asian country’s sovereign territories for use by the US military. Yet, this seemingly humiliating security arrangement provided the best solution to Japan’s perennial geopolitical problem with Russia. The Japanese signer of the treaty, the former prime minister Shigeru Yoshida, soberly recognized the significance of Japan’s newfound position under the US security umbrella and even excluded the Soviet Union from the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 while ensuring the longevity of the alliance under the guidance of his eponymous Yoshida Doctrine. In other words, the geopolitical origin of the US-Japan alliance was fundamentally about checking Russian influence in the Far East.
Therefore, the US-Japan alliance has reigned since its inception as the ultimate fail safe device preventing Japan’s rapprochement with Russia with a proven track record of its effectiveness. In 1956, Japan came closest to a full-fledged rapprochement with Russia when the then-prime minister Ichiro Hatoyama, Yoshida’s arch nemesis, rushed for a peace deal largely for his personal legacy by offering Moscow compromise on Tokyo’s territorial claims. The then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles intervened and even threatened to permanently withhold the expected return of Okinawa, effectively thwarting Hatoyama’s agenda. Dulles’ intervention only proved the strength of the US-Japan alliance while the Yoshida Doctrine came to dwarf other schools of Japan’s grand strategy. The trauma from the Dulles affair dominated Tokyo’s thinking about Russia throughout the Cold War, even leading the former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to offer his American counterpart, Ronald Reagan, to use Japan as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” for Washington’s rollback strategy against the Soviet Union.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led the post-Cold War euphoria to immediately overtake Tokyo, which began to seek a thaw in its frozen peace talks with Moscow. Strangely, Japan missed the golden window of opportunity for retrieving the four Kuril islands when Russian power was at its historic low following the Soviet collapse. This was largely because Tokyo failed to appreciate the importance of hard power in its engagement with Moscow. What ensued was a series of attempts by idiosyncratic Japanese leaders to secure a diplomatic breakthrough with Moscow through summitry, an approach which essentially emulated Hatoyama’s. For them, the end of the Cold War eliminated the Russian threat from the equation and invalidated the very principle of non-engagement enshrined in the Yoshida Doctrine. Moreover, dialogue alone appeared to be capable of securing peace with the newborn Russia freed from the shackles of communism. As a result, a peace deal with Russia became the ultimate diplomatic prize for Japanese leaders seeking to cement their personal legacies.
The former prime minister Shinzo Abe epitomized such a Japanese leader and indefatigably sought a diplomatic breakthrough by combining peace talks with Moscow and economic cooperation in Siberia and the Russian Far East. Indeed, Abe met Putin a whopping 27 times between 2012 and 2020 while mobilizing Japanese firms to pour billions of dollars across Russia’s eastern flank. His assumption was that a solid personal bond with Putin backed by economic cooperation would be a necessary condition for peace with Russia. In fact, Japan’s economic largesse was an offer even Putin could not refuse, but the Russian leader hardly reciprocated Abe’s vision for mutual bromance, let alone peace.
In fact, Abe’s diplomatic waltz with Putin signified a period of inertia in the US-Japan alliance. Despite the veneer of friendship and solidarity, the former US President Barack Obama’s foreign policy significantly undermined Tokyo’s confidence in Washington’s commitment to the alliance, especially when he declared a red line over Syria in 2013. Tokyo’s suspicion about Obama’s commitment only bolstered Abe’s questionable policy of engagement with Putin. Indeed, Obama confined himself to expressing concerns about Abe’s Russia policy, a move ultimately ignored by the Japanese prime minister. Toward the end of Obama’s presidency, Abe unveiled his “new approach to Russia” and signaled his willingness for territorial compromise. The former US president Donald Trump’s peculiar fondness of Russia emboldened Abe to even de facto withdraw Tokyo’s claims to the two larger Kuril islands in 2018 by reverting to the terms of Hatoyama’s 1956 Joint Declaration with the Soviet Union. Absent during Abe’s tenure was Washington’s paternalistic intervention thwarting Japan’s foreign policy anomalies whenever necessary.
Nonetheless, such American paternalism itself may no longer be a sound premise for the alliance. After all, long gone are the days when Japan needed American military protection for postwar reconstruction. In fact, the alliance has evolved into a technocratic machinery virtually functioning on autopilot without much thought given to latent perception gaps stemming from the vicissitudes of geopolitics. Abe’s policy of appeasement of Russia epitomized the alliance’s veiled torpidity. Kishida now finds himself overshadowed by his legacy, and the new US ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel’s recent diplomatic duel with his Russian counterpart in Tokyo might have been a godsend allowing the new prime minister to force a course correction. However, Tokyo’s expecting yet another American reprimand on Russia in 2022 would not be conducive to the enhancement of the alliance at a time when today’s hyper-connected, hybrid environment requires seamless, timely bilateral cooperation. The present imperative for Kishida is to achieve full alignment with Washington on key strategic objectives of the alliance especially in light of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Ironically, the resurgence of Russia’s belligerence would offer the new Japanese prime minister a timely opportunity for fulfilling his newfound imperative for bolstering the alliance. As Moscow’s military assets from the Eastern Military District head for Ukraine in earnest, Japan in fact holds an important card in checking Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine. Indeed, as if to reaffirm this point, Putin offered Japan an olive branch early January, expressing his desire for the continuation of peace talks with Kishida all the while escalating the tension with Ukraine with Russia’s overwhelming military forces encircling the ill-fated country. The Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov followed up by confirming his upcoming visit to Tokyo in spring to resume peace talks with the new administration in Japan. These gestures by the Kremlin only underscore Moscow’s desire to secure its eastern flank in order to concentrate its resources on the invasion of Ukraine. Emanuel’s recent intervention in the Russo-Japanese peace talks reflected Washington’s growing concern about Tokyo’s conciliatory attitude toward Moscow. His combative stunt also signaled Washington’s eagerness to cooperate with Tokyo in addressing the Russian elephant in the Far East in light of the war in Ukraine. In short, the ball is now in Japan’s court whether or not to confront Russia as a global security threat.
Yet, Kishida has largely been sending mixed signals on his Russia policy. In fact, he had been mostly parroting Abe’s rhetoric of appeasement since taking office in October 2021 and only demonstrated his support for Ukraine during his summit talks with the US president Joe Biden last month. Indeed, on the Day of Northern Territories on February 7, he confirmed his commitment to the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration on the question of the four Kuril islands, perpetuating Abe’s questionable policy of rapprochement. During his phone summit with Putin on February 17, the Japanese leader condemned Russia’s coercive military deployment near the Ukrainian border, but simultaneously resumed peace talks and discussed economic cooperation. Kishida’s foreign minister, Yoshimasa Hayashi, even resumed bilateral dialogue on economic cooperation with the Kremlin on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine despite the administration’s repeated pledge to boost Japan’s economic security.
These attitudes signify that Tokyo fundamentally views Russia largely as a bilateral issue which a policy of appeasement would ultimately resolve. The problem is that the perception of ambivalence which Kishida’s Russia policy seeks to generate is hardly reciprocated by Moscow, which in turn views the Japanese leader’s attitude as weakness. Indeed, even after Russia’s launch of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Kishida largely confined his response to parroting the existing policy of economic sanctions already implemented by other western capitals, including the freezing of private assets held by Putin and his billionaire associates as well as disconnecting Russia from the SWIFT banking network. Meanwhile, he has avoided freezing the bilateral peace talks and even decided to preserve the ministerial post for economic cooperation with Russia, although his imposition of economic sanctions against Putin itself would effectively eclipse the last remaining hope for a diplomatic breakthrough. Washington’s frustration with Tokyo’s lingering reluctance toward Moscow was palpable when the US State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki singled out Japan in welcoming international solidarity against Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
A more responsible approach to Moscow would consist of bidding permanent farewell to Tokyo’s dubious policy of rapprochement and fundamentally realigning bilateral strategic objectives within the US-Japan alliance in response to Russia’s naked aggression against a sovereign country. Now is the time for Tokyo to suspend its failed peace talks with Moscow and cooperate with Washington to create a united front against Russia as a global security threat. In fact, such an approach would ultimately address China’s geopolitical challenges as well. Given Japan’s entangled economic relations with China, Tokyo has been reluctant to tackle Beijing’s unrestricted warfare against the country. By contrast, Japan is still without a peace treaty with Russia with which its economic stakes are marginal. Kishida could exploit this lack of entrenched bilateral interdependence by adopting the policy of peace through strength backed by enhanced Japanese hard power.
Such an effort would begin by allowing the US to deploy intermediate-range missiles, including ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles, in the Misawa Air Base in the Japanese mainland’s northernmost prefecture of Aomori, which is right below Hokkaido, Japan’s northern borderland facing Russia. The geopolitical significance of the Misawa Air Base is that it is under the jurisdiction of the US-Japan Status of Force Agreement, whose extraterritorial status would facilitate smooth deployment of intermediate-range missiles without distraction by domestic backlashes in Japan. Moreover, deployment in Misawa would allow the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to potentially share the use of the US intermediate-range missiles provided that domestic Japanese politics favors such an arrangement. Just as Reagan’s deployment of Pershing II missiles and BGM-109G Gryphon cruise missiles in Europe in 1983 stoked fear within the Soviet leadership under Yuri Andropov, introducing American intermediate-range missiles, including hypersonic missiles, to Misawa, would send a strong bilateral signal to the Kremlin and disrupt its aggressive designs around the globe. Of course, while the putative targets of American intermediate-range missiles would include Russia’s major military outposts in the Far East, such as Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, the range from Misawa would encompass Beijing and other strategic locations in China.
As the Kishida administration leads the domestic discourse on Japan’s strike capabilities against enemy bases, Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine merits sober attention to the geostrategic potential of Misawa as a suitable site hosting US intermediate-range missiles. In fact, such capabilities in Japan would allow Kishida to simultaneously check Russia and China from the position of strength. Abe’s recent proposal for nuclear sharing with the US merits sober reconsideration despite Kishida’s antinuclear support base in Hiroshima. Indeed, Ukraine’s forfeit of its nuclear capabilities by 2012 in compliance with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum largely induced the ongoing Russian aggression which originally began in 2014 when it forcibly annexed Crimea. Since taking office in October 2021, the new Japanese prime minister has undeniably cultivated an image as an indecisive leader failing to effectively address the country’s mounting geopolitical issues ranging from China’s geoeconomic challenges to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Even his signature economic security agenda is still nascent without a clear strategy and is already losing its momentum due to scandals and special interests. Yet, geopolitics is unkind to timidity. Russia’s resurgent aggression is truly a wake-up call for Kishida and would be a catalyst for fundamentally revamping Tokyo’s national security policy in service of an enhanced US-Japan alliance in which Japan plays a proactive role in realigning its strategic objectives with those of the US.
Putin’s flagrant disregard for the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s last-ditch offer of an olive branch on February 23 presents profound implications for Japan, which has been seeking peace with Russia for decades to no avail. Moscow’s launch of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine immediately following Zelenskyy’s dramatic plea only confirmed the perennial threat of Russian aggression from which Japan is also inescapable. The ideal of peace with Russia should not delude Japan about its unwitting complicity in facilitating Ukraine’s troubled fate. The specter of Russia once again overshadows Japan and its alliance with the US, which originally began as an anti-Soviet united front in the Far East. The silver lining is that Kishida appears to have discarded the policy of rapprochement with Moscow at least temporarily by joining the international community in its condemnation of Russian aggression against Ukraine and unveiling the most severe set of sanctions ever introduced by Tokyo. However, Japan holds an important card over Ukraine’s tribulation in the military dimension as well, and these diplomatic moves alone would not be substantial pressure against Moscow. The next imperative for Kishida is to fundamentally realign Tokyo’s strategic objectives with Washington’s to bolster the US-Japan alliance, beginning with the deployment of US intermediate-range missiles in Japan with an eye toward ultimately achieving nuclear sharing. Such a move would significantly help transform Japan into Asia’s bulwark against authoritarianism, a much-needed new role for the country ultimately in service of Washington’s struggle against Beijing’s growing geopolitical challenges.
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The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.