Friday News Roundup — September 30, 2022
Nord Stream Sabotage & Further Escalations; Russia’s Arms Sales & Replacements; Building Pacific Strategy; Reflecting on Infrastructure post-Ian; Protests Growing in Iran; Outreach to Pacific Island Nations
This week, the focus has been on Hurricane Ian’s impact on Florida, and now, its looming second landfall in South Carolina. For now, despite talk of storm responses and 2024 politics, the focus is on rescue and recovery. Our thoughts and prayers are with all those afflicted. Here in Washington, the focus has been on a Senate deal to keep the government running until December 16, while also providing additional aid for Ukraine. The controversial proposals put forward by Senator Manchin to reform permitting for energy projects have been tabled for now. How we can ensure that construction moves quickly for needed green energy infrastructure remains to be seen. Events in Europe also dominated the headlines, as markets soundly rejected the economic proposals put forward by new British Prime Minister Liz Truss — leading to a rapid drop in the value of the pound. In the Baltic Sea, the sabotage of the Nordstream gas pipelines has precipitated economic and environmental concerns, while suspicious activity around other European energy facilities adds to tensions.
On Saturday, the Diplomatic Courier published Joshua Huminski’s–the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs–latest review: “Meme Wars” by Joan Donovan, Emily Dreyfuss, and Brian Friedberg, which explores why and how fringe figures online became normalized and the long-term consequences of that normalization. This week, Huminski also participated on a panel on foreign interference in U.S. elections convened by the National Citizen Leadership Conference.
CSPC hosted Dr. Bilyana Lilly, the Director of Security Intelligence and Geostrategy at the Krebs Stamos Group to discuss her new book “Russian Information Warfare”. Huminski reviewed Dr. Lilly’s book for the Diplomatic Courier last week.
At the Concordia Summit in New York last week, CSPC CEO Glenn Nye participated in a discussion on strengthening trust in institutions.
In this week’s roundup, Veera Parko and Joshua Huminski look at what signals might be sent by the sabotage of the Nordstream pipelines, and how Russia may further escalate. Ethan Brown covers how Russia continues to influence the world through weapons sales and our efforts to counter this.
Dan Mahaffee addresses the need for a clearer Pacific strategy, as examples from this week and demonstrate the growing challenge to American power in the region and the need for a better coordinated approach.
As Tropical Storm Ian batters Florida and moves up the East Coast, leaving behind massive power outages and flooding, intern Jordan Trusel looks back at the systemic problems in Puerto Rico’s infrastructure it recovers from last week’s devastating storm. These twin disasters remind us of the shortcomings in America’s flood mitigation and electricity infrastructure.
CSPC is pleased to introduce new intern Emma Hanson, who is a senior at the University of California Santa Cruz. She looks into both the human rights protests in Iran, as well as the outreach to Pacific Island partners, in this week’s roundup.
Baltic Sea Signaling — the Nord Stream Leaks
Veera Parko
The geopolitical importance of the Baltic Sea and the foreign and security policy implications of building a multi-billion Nord Stream natural gas pipeline has been apparent long before Russia´s war on Ukraine. This week, a possible scenario played out in real life.
On September 26, Swedish and Danish seismologists detected strong underwater explosions near the island of Bornholm, off the coast of Denmark in the Baltic Sea. The explosions caused altogether four leaks in Nord Stream 1 and 2 — the controversial natural gas pipelines from Russia to Germany. The pipelines, running about 70–90 meters below sea level, were not operational at the time of the explosions. The pipelines contained residual gas, causing significant environmental damage with large volumes of methane escaping into the atmosphere. Less than a month ago, Russia indefinitely extended the shutdown of Nord Stream 1 gas transport to Germany. Germany had halted the Nord Stream 2 project as Russia invaded Ukraine in February.
Swedish and Danish authorities immediately stated that the leaks were deliberate acts and could not have been caused by an accident. They added, however, that the leaks were not associated with military threats. Sweden’s security service said that it would investigate the incident as “aggravated sabotage”. On September 29, NATO explicitly called the leaks the result of sabotage and that attacks on its members´ infrastructure would be met with a collective response from NATO.
The Nord Stream leaks happened just before leaders of Norway, Germany and Poland attended a ceremony on September 27 to open a new gas pipeline, Baltic Pipe, from Norway through Denmark to Poland. The new pipeline is set to start operating on October 1 despite the Nord Stream incidents. The timing of the leaks as well as the assumption that only a state actor would have the capabilities required to carry out such an act has prompted suspicions that Russia might be behind the sabotage. Such grey zone or hybrid activities (about which more, below) are certainly a part of Russia´s toolkit — creating confusion, testing European unity, making false accusations, breeding divisive narratives, showing off capabilities to do more harm in the future, among others.
Not surprisingly, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said accusations that Russia was behind the explosions were “predictably stupid” and “absurd”. He also suggested the U.S. government was behind the leaks. At the request of Russia, the UN Security Council will meet on September 30 to discuss the explosions. On September 29, Russia further said that the leaks appeared to be a result of an “act of terrorism, possibly on a state level” — a message echoed in President Putin´s speech on September 30.
Many European countries have long been worried about the vulnerability of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region. Cutting off gas is one thing — underwater data cables could be next. Disruptions to maritime transport routes through the Baltic Sea would be detrimental to the security of supply of nearby countries, for example Finland. The Nord Stream leaks prompted many European nations to, again, take a serious look at the security of their critical infrastructure — the EU announced it would do a “stress test” on its energy infrastructure. The real stress test seems to be happening as we speak.
Russia’s Room for Escalation
Joshua C. Huminski
What the Nord Stream 1 attacks (if proven to be Russian responsibility) also shows, in practice, is the panoply of tools that Russia still has in its toolkit to influence or attempt to influence Western behavior. Indeed, Russia is already using the readily available tools from information warfare to conventional warfare, and may be finding itself increasingly in a position where it must resort to alternative mechanisms to signal and influence the West — mechanisms that could prove increasingly risky. While much attention is and remains focused on the poor performance of Moscow’s conventional forces in Ukraine and Russia’s associated nuclear threats, markedly less attention is being paid to capabilities that quite possibly were put on display in the Baltic Sea.
To be sure, Russia understands that threatening to use nuclear weapons and re-emphasizing that it is not a bluff is a sure way to get the West’s attention. Indeed, that is likely the reason that Russia continues to wave the specter of nuclear arms so vociferously — it gets the West’s attention. It is, however, worth noting, that as of right now there has been comparably little evidence of Russia moving to actually deploy or use its nuclear arms. In February of this year, Russia raised its nuclear alert status to “special regime of combat duty”. Here again, this was and remains a signal.
Russia has a robust doctrine of nuclear escalation, and while it is ultimately a political decision (one that can supersede any written doctrine), there remains comparably little that could be gained from the deployment of nuclear arms. The use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would have little operational impact — to be sure it would achieve a decidedly devastating effect on the target — it would not change the strategic considerations on-the-ground, vis-à-vis Ukraine, or more importantly in the global context of this conflict. Escalating to nuclear arms would almost certainly isolate Putin and Russia even more so than it already is at the moment — India and China would find it hard pressed to support Moscow tacitly or otherwise. Nonetheless, even a small percentage change of the deployment of nuclear arms is of critical concern given what it means in practice and the potential for escalation.
Looking beyond nuclear arms, Russia does possess considerable stockpiles of chemical and biological agents. The use of these assets on the battlefield could have as much of a devastating effect on Russia’s own troops and potentially lead to as much isolation as a nuclear attack, but remain part of Moscow’s toolkit. Russia has demonstrated its willingness to engage in nuclear terrorism (Alexander Litvinenko in 2006) and chemical assassination (against Sergei Skripal in 2018 and Alexei Navalny in 2020, among others). Here again, the potential impact of such an attack — direct or even through proxies elsewhere in the world — merely reinforces the necessity of preparedness and disaster response planning. Coordination across Europe and with the United States is needed to ensure that even in the low likelihood that an attack were to take place, its impact is minimal at best — is just as important as Western political signaling about the consequences of such an attack.
As with the incident in the Baltic Sea, Russia equally has the capability and likely intent of targeting undersea pipelines and data links. These offer ostensibly deniable ways of influencing adversary behavior, affecting the economic and political activity of adversaries, as well as signaling to the West, in particular, that Russia has the toolset to act should it wish to do so. These are not idle concerns. Admiral Tony Radakin, the then head of the UK armed forces, warned that Russia was targeting these cables and the Royal Navy was tracking their operations. Physical attacks on undersea critical infrastructure are less deniable than comparable cyber-attacks, but can be as if not more destructive.
With cyber operations there is a risk of confirmation bias — that the West hasn’t seen substantial cyber-attacks from Russia does not mean they are not there now or that they could not emerge in the future. There are no shortage of examples of Moscow’s cyber operations globally from the 2007 attack on Estonia to the 2016 attack on the Democratic National Committee, and on to substantial operations against Ukraine including the NotPetya ransomware attack. Russian cyber operatives may be focused on the war in Ukraine, but that is not to say that they will remain so or that Russia has not pre-targeted Western critical infrastructure. Hack and leak operations, ransomware, DDOS, and other attacks are all well within Russia’s capabilities and Moscow has demonstrated a willingness to use these tools in a time of peace — there is little to suggest that Russia will remain as restrained during a time of war.
Russia also retains considerable kinetic and cyber counter-space capabilities. In November 2021, Russia demonstrated its capabilities by destroying one its own satellites with a direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) weapon. This created a debris cloud of some 1,500 trackable pieces with several hundred thousand of smaller pieces expected to develop. An accidental collision on orbit with one of Russia’s maneuverable satellites is not beyond the realm of possibility.
Russia has also demonstrated an ability and willingness to carry out destabilization operations and influence operations in its near abroad. Supporting separatist movements across Europe — Scotland, Catalonia, and Brexit — attempting to foment an actual coup in Montenegro, and maintaining relations with far-right and far-left parties, are things Moscow has done to undermine the stability of the continent and its unity. A recent report also suggests that Russia has spent at least $300 million as part of this influence effort in some two dozen countries since 2014 alone. Leveraging allies in foreign countries to foment instability is a possible course of action for Russia in the absence of an ability to directly influence adversary capitals.
If a threat is defined as a capability plus intent, then Russia has a threatening toolset of capabilities to escalate, distract, influence, and undermine. Whether Russia has the capacity to act in the near term remains to be seen. Russia’s battlefield performance notwithstanding, it certainly retains the force generation ability in space, cyber, information, and indeed nuclear domains. There are, of course, attendant drawbacks to each and while it is tempting to see Putin as unstable or irrational, there is nothing to suggest that he ultimately either — he is rational in his own context and barring an existential threat, his actions are likely to be far more circumscribed that many would assume.
Pressuring Russia through arms sales is ambitious, and unrealistic
Ethan Brown
The AK-47 is, without question, the most iconic weapon in human history. Not only have more variants of this weapon been manufactured than any other firearm, but its popularity as a reliable, modular, and functional platform have made it renown with Russian weapons importers as much as in popular culture (it still remains one of the most effective equips in Call of Duty).
It’s an odd lede for a column on grand strategy and defense policy, so allow me to unbury it: the rhetoric going around the policy mediums this week has been the “opportunities countries that have heretofore relied on Russian equipment are going to find it very difficult to get even basic supplies coming through because of this weakened defense industrial base” said Cara Abercrombie, coordinator for defense policy and arms control on the National Security Council this week. This of course is the result of myriad and unprecedented sanctions which the bulk of the world have levied upon Moscow following the Ukraine invasion back in February. Many of those sanctions explicitly and deliberately targeted that defense industrial base of the Russian economy, totalling as much as $13 billion in annual sales.
And now that those revenue streams have been disrupted, the policy apparatus see’s an opportunity worth seizing as Russia continues to work off its back foot. But the reality and the rambunctious rhetoric don’t match, and the United States is not exactly swimming in defense equipment surpluses in order to take advantage of that potential opportunity.
Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs Donald Lu testified to a Senate Foreign Relations subpanel that “it’s going to be very hard for anyone to buy major weapon systems from Moscow in the coming years, given the congressionally supported sanctions”, which means those states that have relied on Russia to supply its defense architecture could well be looking for a new supplier.
Russia, according to the Congressional Research Service, has accounted for 20% of global arms sales since 2016, with the five biggest customers being China, India, Egypt, Vietnam and Algeria; India, notably, has led all of those customers since that same year in weapons imports from Moscow, and African nations arms purchases have been 50% Russian-made since the year 2000. The Middle East and North Korea take up the remaining tally of Russian exports, along with the incursions into South American markets (it’s almost as if the Cold War never really ended, it just slowly emerged from a hiatus). Surface to air weapons systems (like the S-400 acquired by Turkey which led to states ouster from the F-35 program), small arms, tanks and trucks, and artillery serve as the main headliners. But Moscow’s single biggest commodity remains fighter jets, the MiG and Sukhoi familia to be precise, equally as iconic as the AK-47.
It should be noted here that the world’s biggest arms exporter is in fact, the United States. One way to build partnerships and loyalty is to be a better resource than the competition. As Moscow finds itself forced into more stark and severe postures of “escalation”, “hybrid war”, and nuclear possibilities, the loss of its weapons revenue streams serve as one more option for isolating Russia. And one more option for garnering new and flagging partnerships with states who have been under Moscow’s shadow.
India remains the most compelling and interesting candidate for increased U.S. interests in weapons exports. The United States and India have come together in recent years, particularly with the growing influence of China which lurks at the fringes of the crisis of the moment (Ukraine). Take the words this week from External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar: “I am very bullish about the U.S.-India relationship”, a positive note amidst the discord over a recent American decision to provide a $450 million support package to Pakistan. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken made every effort to distinguish the two American initiatives here, stating that America’s relationship with the two rivals stands on their own.
So then, moving to subvert Russian weapons exports is going to prove to be tricky with the regional dynamics at play for India, who should rank as the most critical potential candidate in arms purchasers. But it’s one worth exploring (alongside Security Force Assistance efforts alongside these Title 22 Foreign Military Sales) without a doubt.
The risk inherently lies in the flagging defense industrial base in the United States, one which is presently struggling to keep up with its own demand signals, as well as the seemingly monthly cycle of support packages being shipped to Ukraine (another one — $1.1 billion — was approved by congress during the writing of this column). And as this space covered last week, Ukraine isn’t the only focus of the defense enterprise and its commercial providers — Taiwan is now steadfastly in the mix for where those weapons sales might support. But there is no certainty that the United States is capable of finishing that fight, though it is closer now to jumping in if China decides to start it.
All of this to say that the potential to further isolate Russia and force a political solution to the crisis in Ukraine is bolstered by seizing the opportunity in weapons exports. But until the United States sorts its supply chain, its own stockpiles, its organization and relationships with regional partners, new and old alike, then the theory that we can bludgeon Moscow by swooping in and selling M-16s instead of AK-47s is ambitious…and unrealistic.
Coordinating a Pacific Strategy
Dan Mahaffee
It has been more than ten years since the Obama administration announced the “pivot to Asia”. Despite a general disdain for everything involving his predecessor, former President Trump generally continued a reorientation towards the region. His high-profile withdrawal from the Transpacific Partnership demonstrated the limits of U.S. economic engagement. We must remember, that despite the bluster surrounding withdrawal from the agreement, there was still little likelihood that Congress would approve such an agreement. Still, rhetoric about pivoting to Asia — or now the Indo-Pacific — is one thing, building an actual strategy is another. In surveying some of only this week’s developments in the Pacific, the scope of the challenge is clear, as is the need for a more strategic, rather than piecemeal approach.
First, there is the struggle for influence. As Emma covers in greater detail below, the United States’s efforts to push for closer ties with Pacific Island nations — small but strategically located — were rebuffed by some of the region’s key leaders. These efforts come as the United States and our regional allies have become alarmed at Beijing’s forays into the region, seeking economic and security partnerships that could lead to a growing Chinese naval presence along the key sea lines between the continental United States, Hawaii, Guam, Australia, and Japan. The Solomon Islands’ growing closeness with Beijing should be of particular concern, as its significance in World War II is no less for strategy today. The current situation demonstrates how we are playing catch up. Even as we roll out efforts like the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum, there are limits on what we can offer considering our political inability to grow trade — even though there is still public support for trade, despite how isolationists and labor lobbies try to influence the public and politicians.
Another matter of competing influence comes from Canada, where reporting has now revealed that Chinese police have been operating on Canadian soil to influence the Chinese diaspora and those working and studying abroad. These units have been involved in forcing Chinese citizens to return to China to face punishment, often using threats against family still in China as leverage to force a return. This is not the first time that Chinese police have been found operating like this. They have done so in Europe, Australia, and the United States — including painting cars to look like Chinese police to intimidate students. Doing so, they aim to stifle political and academic debate amongst the Chinese diaspora and restrict the values we hold dear — on our own soil. In addressing China’s operations on our territory, too often our efforts whipsaw from excesses in enforcement to willful blindness. It is not an overreach to focus on those in the private sector and academia — mostly Americans — who turn a blind eye to facilitating China’s theft of our secrets, but we should be making it easier, not harder, for Chinese dissidents to find their way to the west and join in countering Beijing’s informational narratives.
Finally, there are the naval developments, as China continues to demonstrate the reach and breadth of its capabilities to challenge U.S. power and prepare for an invasion of Taiwan. This week, the U.S. Coast Guard operating in the Bering Strait intercepted a combined Sino-Russian flotilla, demonstrating both countries’ growing naval cooperation and designs for the Arctic. The naval flotilla’s arrival with cruisers and destroyers being met by a Coast Guard patrol cutter demonstrates the need for greater capabilities in the far north. Furthermore, satellite analysis revealed this week shows that in late August the Chinese navy conducted an exercise where one of the massive Bohai civil ferries — usually used to transport civilian cars — were used to carry armored vehicles for transfer onto military landing craft. One of the factors under consideration in any cross-strait invasion of Taiwan has been China’s capacity for sea lift. Using these massive ferries, the PLA can carry greater numbers of equipment onto a Taiwanese beachhead, while complicating the prewar calculus by using civil assets in a military mission.
In each of these areas, we are finding ourselves responding to situations where, of course with the benefit of hindsight, we wish we could have done more in the past. Developing the economic ties with the Pacific community that can cement our influence will take time and require our politicians to speak plain truths about the future of trade, globalization, and how the American workforce and its considerable talents fit into the future. Developing the counterintelligence tools to secure our secrets and our people demands a workforce of talented agents, skilled in languages and cultures, and a mindset that lets investigations unfold, sources develop, rather than a flashy press conference and a lengthy charge sheet that gets picked apart in court. And building and maintaining naval and coast guard assets requires long term planning and support that have been woefully missing from how we’ve approached the Navy. Again, heeding the lessons of history and reading Craig Symond’s fantastic biography of Admiral Nimitz, I am struck by the fortunate fact that the great leadership of an admiral like Nimitz came simultaneously with the Congress’s leadership in creating the “Two Ocean Navy Act” of 1940 — which guided an astonishing growth in American shipbuilding before and during the war. Now we find ourselves with an overstretched Navy, munitions running low as we support Ukraine — a CSIS analysis shows how important defense equipment production lines are limited or shuttered — and little in the way of strategic vision for long-term competition and conflict.
We cannot go back and un-ring the bells. In many ways, we regret have missed ringing bells of our own. But we can pick new directions, and move quickly. If we have missed out on this generation of naval construction due to a loss of leadership and vision, what is that vision for the future? How do we attract talent and secure our secrets? How can technological advances and quality again meet the advantages in quantity our adversaries now enjoy, or soon will? And, most importantly, how are we communicating the threat and the challenge to the American people?
White House Summit Aims to Strengthens The Relationship Between the United States and the Pacific Islands
Emma Hanson
President Biden invited representatives from the Pacific Island nations as well as the “Partners in the Blue Pacific” (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK) to a summit at the White House September 28–29. The goal of the summit was to strengthen relations with the region as China seeks to expand its influence in the Pacific. The governments of Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu took part in the summit.
Participants signed a declaration that includes 11 points of focus, including the strengthening of the partnership between the United States and the Pacific Islands, deeper economic ties (“linking our economies more closely for the benefit of all our peoples”), the importance of cooperation to tackle climate change, and a statement from the United States that it would assist the Pacific Islands in responding to natural disasters. Notably, the declaration also includes a commitment to promoting peace and security and a recognition of the importance of international law, including freedom of navigation. Signatories also condemned Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine.
According to the Australian Broadcast Corporation, the Solomon Islands had initially refused to sign the declaration. The Solomon Islands entered a controversial security pact with China earlier this year and refused to allow port access to a U.S. Coast Guard cutter earlier this month, Politico reports. In the end, it appears the Solomon Islands withdrew their objections to the declaration.
Reflection on Infrastructure in Puerto Rico
Jordan Trusel
Puerto Rico suffered the impact of Hurricane Fiona last week, and as of today, 750,000 people are still without power on the island. Hurricane Fiona delivered severe rains and flooding, leaving communities under water, bridges washed out, and an abundance of people and businesses without power or running water. Just five years after the devastating Hurricane Maria, multiple failures across physical infrastructure systems have once again highlighted the weak foundations of Puerto Rico’s electrical system. In June 2022, FEMA put out a report, announcing progress on Puerto Rico’s power grid, and designating more than $11 billion dollars to projects related to further developing the island’s energy infrastructure. In 2021 a private company took over the operations of Puerto Rico’s power authority, which had struggled with blackouts, bankruptcy and overall corruption, and the company took on the responsibility to serve the island’s nearly 1.5 million clients and spend billions of dollars in upgrading the fragile system with most of the funding coming from FEMA. However, this week it is apparent that efforts have fallen short. A policy director at a think tank based in Puerto Rico, Sergio Marxuach, shared with the Washington Post that, “what we are seeing right now is a direct consequence of that failure to act.” Puerto Rico’s status as a territory gives it a unique position, providing both opportunity and challenges to its economic prosperity. Structural challenges in Puerto Rico’s economy, combined with labor outmigration, capital flight, public debt, and low participation in the labor force have hampered economic development. In 2018, Congress called for the governor of Puerto Rico to produce a plan for “economy and disaster recovery” with the insight that the economy of the territory would need to be reformed in order for outside assistance and efforts to be most effective and long-lasting.
Truly developing a strong infrastructure in Puerto Rico is essential to its transformation and sustainability. Considering the chance of future natural disasters affecting the island there needs to be a focus on rebuilding, strengthening systems, and maintaining transparent control over assets.
Protests in Iran
Emma Hanson
Protesters have been gathering in Iran since news spread that the Iranian morality police had murdered a young woman named Mahsa Amini for wearing her hijab improperly. Iranian people are asking for their basic human rights to be respected by the Iranian government. They have been chanting “Women! Life! Freedom!” throughout the protests. These protests have inspired demonstrations in the United States, England, and France.
The morality police in Iran are a key instrument of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces. The morality police claimed to have taken Mahsa Amini to an educational and orientation course at police headquarters on September 14. On that same day, she was transferred to the hospital in a coma. Mahsa would die from the injuries she sustained two days after being transferred to the hospital, according to the U.S. government.
Since the beginning of the protests, authorities have killed at least 76 protesters and arrested hundreds, international NGO Iran Human Rights (IHR) reports. IHR also stated that families have been forced to quietly bury their relatives due to threats from Iranian authorities that they would face legal charges should they attempt to publicize their deaths. Videos online have shown Iranian authorities firing live ammunition at protesters. It has become increasingly difficult for witnesses to report events on the ground, as there have been disruptions to internet access throughout the country, affecting Iranians’ ability to use WhatsApp, Google Play, Signal, and app stores.
President Biden has expressed support for the protesters in Iran. He stated at the UN General Assembly last week that “We stand with the brave citizens and brave women of Iran, who are demonstrating to secure their basic rights.” Biden has since imposed sanctions on the morality police and seven specific leaders of Iran’s security organizations. Canada will be following suit, as Prime Minister Justin Trudeau expressed in an address that the nation will be imposing further sanctions on Iran. Trudeau stated “Unfortunately, Iran doesn’t respect human rights, and that’s nothing new” in the address, according to globalnews.ca. He also shared, “‘To the women in Iran who are protesting and to those who are supporting you, we stand with you.’” International experts have said while this is the largest protest in Iran in a decade they doubt that the protests will produce major social or political reforms in Iran, as Iran’s leadership has been adept at withstanding protests in the past.
News You May Have Missed
Treatment of Inmates in Alabama Prisons Under Scrutiny After Protests
Inmates in Alabama prisons are protesting the poor living conditions in facilities that are overcrowded and under-staffed. Prisoners who are responsible for providing food, laundry, and janitorial services refused to show up both Monday and Tuesday leaving staff to fill in. Despite the work stoppage, the department of prisons maintained that “facilities are operational and there has been no disruption of critical services.” This event comes after a video surfaced showing a corrections officer in Alabama beating a distressed inmate causing the officer to be placed on leave. Public concern and outcry has also been directed at Alabama facilities as a result of viral videos when the sister of another inmate posted a picture of her brother appearing malnourished in the Elmore Correctional facility saying “get help.” Since then, his authorities have released his medical records. The Alabama Department of Corrections have responded by assuring the media that they are handling matters appropriately.
Concern Grows Over Physicians’ Burnout
Following a decade-long survey of American doctors and their mental well-being, rates of burnout among physicians have spiked following the pandemic. While the field had been known for the mental pressures and rates of burnout higher than other fields, the rate has grown with the stresses of pandemic healthcare, pressures on staffing, increased paperwork and record keeping requirements. As experts have moved away from antiquated thinking that burnout was simply a process to “weed out the weak”, these surveys have focused on metrics related to burnout, notably: emotional exhaustion, depersonalization from work, and sense of personal accomplishment. With burnout linked to suicide, substance abuse, and medical errors, concerns grow about what this burnout will mean for the health of doctors and the quality of American health care.
The views of authors are their own, and not that of CSPC.