Friday News Roundup — April 23, 2021
Europe & GPC; Russian Attack in Czechia; South Korean Fighter Jet Development; the European Super League
Happy Friday from Washington, DC. In what was remarkably normal politics by today’s standards, Senate Republicans released their own counterproposal to the President’s $2.5 trillion infrastructure plan. While it comes in at a much smaller $568 billion, Congress has the goalposts set on either side of the playing field. While there may be some agreement to be found on infrastructure, it looks like less so for the proposed hike to capital gains taxes. Markets reacted to that news, rather than the probability of Senate passage. Still, in a sign of the bipartisan agreement on great power competition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted out the “Strategic Competition Act of 2021” by 21–1 vote to support R&D efforts in critical technologies and address other aspects of competition with China. Finally, in another unfortunate reminder of the times, the Senate passed the “COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act” addressing attacks on Asian-Americans 94–1.
This week, CSPC Senior Fellow James Kitfield wrote about the difficult choices and messy answers underpinning President Biden’s decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan for Breaking Defense. Joshua reviewed We Have Been Harmonized: Life in China’s Surveillance State by Kai Strittmatter in Diplomatic Courier. Joshua was also quoted in Space News talking about China and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Worldwide Threats Briefing. With the latest developments on Russia, we’ve also compiled a briefing from Joshua out of our latest reports on the Russian Geotech challenge and latest developments with the Kremlin.
This week in the Roundup, Dan, Joshua, and Michael all talk about various types of foreign influence in Europe: Dan covers how Huawei was able to monitor the phone calls of millions of Dutch mobile phone users; Joshua investigates the story of Russian sabotage at a Czech munitions depot in 2014; and Michael wraps with a deep dive into the globalization of European soccer and the now-defunct European Super League. Amongst that, Ethan looks further afield and analyzes the new fighter jet unveiled by South Korea. As always, we finish with some news you might have missed. This week is also the last week of Miles Esters’s internship with us; thank you, Miles, for your contributions to these pages and all your help on the Policy Team.
Europe & Great Power Competition
Dan Mahaffee
This week, headlines from Europe spoke to the depth of Chinese and Russian influence and infiltration on the continent. The most sensational, of course, is the revelation of Russian intelligence involvement in a 2014 Czechian ammunition depot explosion that killed two. While Joshua covers that in more detail below, another story, from the Netherlands, discussed how Huawei had access to monitor the calls of 6.5m users of the Dutch mobile network provider KPN. The findings, in a 2010 report from a consultant to KPN about the espionage risks of Huawei, indicated that the monitoring could have even included the calls of Dutch government leaders. At the time, KPN kept the report internal — as it stated, “the continued existence of KPN Mobile [is] in serious danger … if it becomes known the Chinese government can monitor KPN mobile numbers” — while continuing to award contracts to Huawei for 3G and 4G equipment.
While the firm has now excluded Huawei from its core 5G network, and the Dutch government has opted for stronger vetting of Huawei equipment rather than a formal ban, this leaked report is a valuable reminder of the risks of Huawei equipment in telecom networks, as well as the broader challenges faced in addressing Russian and Chinese influence in Europe as part of great power competition.
Europe continues to be a mixed bag when it comes to approaches on 5G security, with the UK and Sweden leading the way in an outright ban on Huawei, while others have sought a more bureaucratic process, namely Germany’s two-step process requiring a unanimous ministry decision to ban the provider within 30 days. As that linked article described, it basically creates a roadmap for Huawei or other Chinese telecom providers to begin to work their way further into German and other European telecom networks.
While European countries may not go so far as to ban Huawei outright, policymakers can help to foster better competitors to Huawei. Supporting and promoting Open RAN architectures is one vital aspect of this, on both sides of the Atlantic. Harmonizing standards and ensuring equipment interoperability can allow U.S. and European firms to better compete on the global stage as well.
While the report on KPN and Huawei did not identify specific acts of espionage, only the capability, the technical access is only one part of it. Too often the Huawei discussion stops before citing the legal frameworks in China that compel the cooperation with state security agencies and the influence of the Communist Party over the business community. The former is clearly spelled out in the laws, while the latter is seen both in China — look to the recent experiences of Jack Ma, for example — as well as abroad, with KPN’s own burial of this report and continued business with Huawei as a glaring example.
The U.S. partnership with Europe is a vital asset in great power competition, but for that partnership to succeed, Europe must become better aware of the threats it faces. European political and business elites are often willing to shrug off Russian and Chinese provocations and schemes for the stake of business as usual, while discussions of strategic autonomy often focus on distance from Washington. (If only they reacted to Beijing and Moscow like they did the soccer proposals Michael covers below!)
While there is much to repair in transatlantic cooperation after the past four years, Europe must do its part to look ahead to the challenges of the future. U.S. policymakers and think-tankers need to work to better bridge the ties with their European counterparts who share a vision for transatlantic cooperation in the face of authoritarians. Engagement too with the European public will be necessary, though the overreach of Russian spies and China’s wolf warriors also speaks for itself.
These transatlantic ties have been a cornerstone of U.S. security and economic interests in the 20th century. While the Indo-Pacific will become relatively more important, the importance of partnership with Europe has not diminished. The paradox of globalization and great power competition is that we must still do business with our competitors, making holding to our shared values ever more important.
Russian Covert Operation Exposed in the Czech Republic
Joshua C. Huminski
Last week it emerged that Russian military intelligence — the GRU — was behind a 2014 explosion at the Vrbětice arms depot in the Czech Republic that killed two workers. It was originally believed to have been an accident, but the Prime Minister announced that Czech intelligence (the BIS) had “clear evidence” that Russian intelligence was responsible. The BIS believes that the explosion at the arms depot was unintentional, and that a device had been planted with the goal of exploding in Ukraine.
What’s more, the Czech police’s organized crime squad (NCOZ) disclosed that two of the individuals responsible for the attack were “Alexander Petrov” and “Ruslan Boshirov,” also known as Alexander Mishkin and Anatoly Chepiga — the two officers identified as being responsible for the successful poisoning and attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian intelligence officer. Mishkin and Chepiga are, perhaps, equally famous for their interview on Russian television in which they claimed to be merely visiting Salisbury, England, to partake in a bit of architectural tourism.
Open source intelligence group, Bellingcat, first identified Mishkin and Chepiga in 2018, and later implicated another officer Major General Denis Sergeev in the poisoning, and have also linked Sergeev to the bombing in 2014, along with other GRU officers. A Bulgarian arms dealer, who was negotiating sales of Czech arms to Ukraine at a time when weapons stocks were low was poisoned in 2015 by members of the same unit of Mishkin and Chepiga, Unit 29155. His initial illness was believed to be food poisoning, but received additional attention after the poisoning of Skripal, and he is now believed to have been poisoned with Novichok — the same nerve agent used on Skripal and, later, dissident Alexei Navalny.
Over the course of 2014, at least six blasts occurred at munitions facilities across Bulgaria also occurred. Charges were only filed in one case, but the defendants were later acquitted and there is no publicly available information about the other incidents. In light of what happened in the Czech Republic, there are calls for the investigations to be reopened and analysis by RFE/RL’s Bulgarian service suggests new evidence of a possible link between the bombings and Unit 29155. Last month, Sofia expelled two Russian diplomats, and, in response, Moscow expelled two Bulgarian diplomats.
The resulting tit-for-tat expulsions which began with 18 Russians being expelled from Prague — likely all intelligence officers — ultimately, saw Prague capping the number of staff allowed at the Russian embassy as the same number allowed at the Czech embassy in Moscow. The disparity in size (94 in Prague, 24 in Moscow) is a historical quirk. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the embassy in Prague, which oversaw all the operations in the Czech Republic, never downsized, nor did it shrink with the splitting off of the Slovak Republic. Russian intelligence uses the diplomatic cover of the embassy (as do all intelligence services) to conduct operations across the European Union and NATO countries.
On Friday morning, in solidarity with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania announced that they were expelling a total of four Russian diplomats, as well.
The fact that Russia felt bold enough to attack a NATO ally, detonating an ammunition depot that resulted in the deaths of two individuals, is a testament to just how bad relations with Moscow have become. Such a direct act would have been nearly unthinkable during the Cold War. To be sure, during the dark days of that period both the United States and the Soviet Union (and often its partners such as the East Germans) waged an aggressive and violent war by proxy with the former using terrorist groups to carry out destabilizing attacks in Europe and further afield. But a direct attack, carried out by the KGB would have been exceptionally provocative and risk open conflict.
It is here that there is a fundamental disconnect between the way the West views the world and the worldview from Moscow. Prof. Mark Galeotti argues that Russia (at least its security and intelligence services) is very much on a “war-footing” and has been since the Euromaidan protests of 2013–2014 in Ukraine, and certainly since the annexation of Crimea. With that frame of reference, it is much easier to understand why Moscow would be so bold in its actions and, equally, care so little about when these covert operations are exposed. If you believe you are at war and are encircled by adversaries, you will act accordingly.
At the same time, the West, and in particular the United States, has repeatedly failed to act with any alacrity to push back on Moscow’s aggression. Under President Obama, the United States issued sanctions, expelled diplomats, and closed a consulate and two trade missions in response to 2016 election interference and the seizure of Crimea in 2014. In response to the recent SolarWinds hack, the United States issued additional sanctions, more expansive, to be sure, and expelled diplomats but has done little else. There has been little, if any, concerted response or resistance to Moscow’s activities and, as such, President Putin clearly feels emboldened.
This is naturally more complex than the quote attributed to Lenin, “probe with bayonets — If you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw.” War is about moves and countermoves. If you act and your adversary does not, you continue to press the attack. If you find resistance, you either use overwhelming force, or change the direction of the attack. Russia is unlikely to use overwhelming force — such an act would certainly be war — but until it finds some resistance or push back, it’s unlikely to change its behavior.
For further analysis on U.S.-Russia relations, please read our briefing, “Relations with Russia: “Post-Solarwinds & the Biden Administration”
South Korea’s Next-Gen Fighter Jet
Ethan Brown
The Republic of Korea continues to expand its defense production footprint amidst the compounding insecurities of the Pacific hemisphere. Last week, President Moon Jae-In presided over the rollout of the Korea Aerospace Industries KF-21, a $5.2 billion dollar program which aims to produce 120 total aircraft by 2032. Ground and flight testing have already concluded on the Boramae (Korean: “young hunting hawk”), and the first three prototypes are expected to be complete by the end of this year, with the next three initial-phase platforms complete by 2022.
The Boramae is a joint venture between South Korea and Indonesia, with an 80–20 split of shares between Seoul and Jakarta. Originally announced in 2015, the aircraft development has only taken six years, which is an incredible feat indicative of the technology revolution in aircraft manufacturing, an important facet discussed previously within the great powers paradigm. The RoK Air Force currently runs a mix of 3rd generation F-4s/F-5s, some 4th-gen F-16s, the F-15K, and received their first order of 40 F-35s beginning in 2018, but the homegrown development of South Korea’s own advanced fighter jet signals significant changes in the power brokerage winds, the arms producers have largely shrunk in the 21st century, and the KF-21 offers an airpower alternative that so many mid-tier power states are in need of that isn’t of American, Chinese or Russian origin. While the KF-21 is not on par with the 5th-gen stealth aircraft in U.S., Russian, and Chinese inventories, it offers a unique short-term filler option for the 4.5-generation attack aircraft.
Eerily similar in design to the vaunted F-22 Raptor, the Boramae comes in at a reduced price tag compared to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Additionally, the Boramae does not feature the thrust-vectoring engine design of its American progenitors, instead utilizing the General Electric F414 engines found in the F-18 fighter aircraft, although the body design incorporates the same Raptor body typecast with canted vertical stabilizers, angular intakes, and large wing surface area — designs that capture the low radar cross-signature that made the F-22 revolutionary. Where the low cross-signature is lost, however, is the absence of an internal weapons bay, where the F-35 and F-22 built their stealth capabilities around internal stowage.
Weapons technology on the KF-21 has been outsourced entirely, purportedly eyeing the BAE Meteor ramjet missiles (the first of their kind), Saab’s Taurus cruise missile for air-to-ground engagements, and the General Electric M61 Vulcan 20mm cannon found on many 4th-gen U.S. fighter aircraft. Now, the M61 is a weapon I never had much luck with when employing in a close air support capacity, but unfortunately, not every platform (read: none but the A-10) can sling the GAU-8 that has been used to great effect over the last 60 years.
The RoK’s KF-21 will join the ranks of a few other nations with advanced aircraft, where the United States, Russia, China, Japan, France, Australia, and a collective development partnership between the U.K., Germany, Italy and Spain are the current players in the next-gen category. However, the KF-21 comes in at a reduced capability when stacked against comparative systems, at the convenience of a lower price tag. A tale of the tape shows how the KF-21 stacks up against fighter offerings of current global current notoriety:
So the KF-21 offers some alternatives that its American counterparts lack: a relatively ‘cheap’ price tag, generally on par with the Russian and Chinese offerings for advanced fighter technology. The Boramae isn’t built on the grounds of being an air-defense world beater like the Raptor or Joint Strike Fighter, nor is it being promoted as such.
At present, the international arms export markets are dominated by the big three: the U.S., Russia, and China. Per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, South Korea’s share of the global market was 2.7%, spurned on by a 200% increase in its production and exports before the 2016–2020 period. The goal: join the top 7 states in the aviation industry by the end of the KF-21’s production lifecycle. The KF-21 is on brand for other RoK efforts, which include the homegrown development of a light aircraft carrier.
For the geopolitical and national security impact of the South Korean fighter, the option of a low-cost multi-role aircraft that features many modernized features is certainly an appealing one to those mid-tier states who are often unable to afford the expensive American models. South Korea and Indonesia are already partnered on the development and distribution of the initial bank of KF-21s, but with an export economy built on Samsung, LG and other well-known brands, Seoul is certainly looking for candidates to flesh out their respective flying inventories with the Boramae. Notably, the Philippines are a primary target audience for the Korean manufacturer, while other mid-tier powers under China’s shadow (Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand) are well within the purview for export. Taiwan may be a bridge too far, so that export candidate bears close watching. Turning to those customers who’s concerns reside in Moscow, many European states might well consider the Boramae, and even Iraq could be a leading client based on their previous patronage of KAI’s FA-50 light attack fighter.
While the short-term could result in a loss of potential U.S. exports for its fighter technology, in particular, the F-15EX (which aims to achieve the same concept of bridging generational fighter gaps), this is good news for those states engaged in competition with China and Russia alongside the U.S., and seeking to modernize their inventories with friendly options, thereby avoiding the ledgers in Beijing and Moscow. It demonstrates that allied capabilities in warfighting and force projection are on the rise, lessening the burden of American forces of having to be everywhere all the time, and supporting the capabilities of partner nations to boot.
Credit goes to outgoing intern Miles Esters, for bringing up this topic during the weekly policy team discussion.
European Super League Grand Opening/Grand Closing
Michael Stecher
I sometimes write things in these pages that have the capacity to ruffle feathers: I have written about race and policing, Israeli politics and relations with the Palestinians, and repression and active conflicts. Every few weeks, Dan will suggest that I tone something down to make sure that my point comes across without unnecessarily getting readers’ hackles up. Naturally, then, I am setting my caution aside and writing about the recently-announced-and-quickly-disbanded European Super League (ESL). Soccer seems far afield for my usual international politics and economics beats, but the creation and destruction of the ESL is a story of globalization and its discontents. Looking back at its smoking wreckage, it is easy to say that the ESL idea was foolish or doomed, but the future is very cloudy for the “traditional” organizational forms of the beautiful game.
Forgive me if you are already well versed in these details, but the key element to understand about the organization of European soccer leagues is promotion and relegation. The leagues you might be familiar with like the English Premier League, Italian Serie A, and the German Bundesliga actually sit atop vast pyramids of teams in subordinate leagues. If a team finishes high enough in its league, it gets promoted to the next league up; if it finishes low enough, it gets relegated to the league below. Soccer fans love to sing the virtues of this meritocratic mobility as the key to the sport — Leicester City F.C. went from England’s League One (confusingly the third tier in the national pyramid) to winning the Premier League in seven years!
While in theory the teams in a national pyramid exist in a continuum, the financial system of European soccer is marked by discontinuity. Last August, Fulham F.C. played Brantford F.C. in the playoff game to determine who would be promoted from the second tier to the Premier League. According to an estimate by Deloitte, winning that game was worth £135 million for Fulham, and that will double if they can manage to avoid relegation this year (which looks pretty unlikely at this point). There are other discontinuities as well — making the UEFA Champions League, the top club tournament in Europe, is worth €15 million, and winning it is worth substantially more. Teams invest knowing that these discontinuities exist. You could spend a king’s ransom on players in order to earn promotion to the Premier League: if you win, you would earn all that money back and more; but if you lose, you might find yourself in a difficult financial situation.
As soccer has become a global phenomenon in recent decades, a group of teams have emerged as the elite within the elite. My nephews are big Lionel Messi and F.C. Barcelona fans, an omnipresent global brand, while in reality they should be fans of A.F.C. Richmond, an underappreciated team that will begin its quest to win promotion back into the Premier League on July 23, but I digress. Teams like Manchester United earn hundreds of millions of dollars from sponsorship deals and can even have wholly owned broadcast and streaming networks of their own that earn subscription fees from around the world. Based on its 2019 financials, United broke even even before they sold a single ticket or concession.
Within this elite of the elite, however, is a mega-elite. This includes Manchester City, which is owned by a member of the royal family of Abu Dhabi, and Paris Saint-Germain, which is owned by the Qatari sovereign wealth fund. It also includes Chelsea, which is owned by Russian/Israeli oligarch Roman Abramovich (who also owns the world’s third-largest yacht, the Eclipse, which is about the size of the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke class of destroyers). They are global brands with enormous revenues, but they are also freed of the need to make much money. Bill Simmons once wrote that what motivates Ambramovich is that he “stands and waves to the delirious crowd [at home games] like Caesar.” Keeping up with teams like this is a struggle, even for clubs with more revenue, which is why F.C. Barcelona, the highest grossing club in the world, is al borde de la quiebra (on the brink of bankruptcy).
The concentration of economic power has resulted in a concentration of soccer power. Across Europe, leagues have become more imbalanced over time — the winningest teams win more often and by more goals than in the past — and, according to the International Center for Sports Studies, the differences track the economic disparities within leagues and are more pronounced in higher-revenue leagues.
ESL was an attempt to address the problem of declining competitiveness and bring in new revenues. 11 of the 14 highest-grossing clubs in Europe would band together, plus AC Milan who have fallen on some hard times, and everyone sort of assumed that the other 3 teams would come along once the process got rolling. They would be able to sell the broadcast and streaming rights to some extremely high-profile games, helping them all stay solvent and formalizing their status as the sport’s top tier. 5 other teams could fight their way in on a yearly basis for a share of the spoils, but none of the core members could be relegated out for 23 years.
When this was announced, the European soccer world went ballistic. The Union of European Football Associations, which runs the Champions League, viewed this as a direct assault on their status as the organizing body of European soccer, which it was, and a cynical money grab. FIFA and various national governments were also appalled and promised retaliation and sanctions. It is hard to lose a public relations battle to FIFA, though now that it is run by people who are not under federal indictment in the United States for corruption, it is apparently possible.
Fan pressure was also overwhelming. One side effect of the globalization of European soccer is that the game is less accessible to local fans. European fans have a vision of soccer in the state of nature in which games were affordable and convenient for local fans, rather than targeted to a global TV audience. These days, they now complain, Southampton has to play in Newcastle on a Monday night, meaning that attending that game would require an overnight hotel stay … in Newcastle. After the ESL news broke, protests blocked the Chelsea team bus on its way to a game and, in Manchester, a group of United fans broke into the team’s training facility.
Within hours, Chelsea (who do not really need the money from the ESL setup) headed for the exits, followed quickly by Manchester City (ditto), and most of the rest of prospective teams followed. Only Real Madrid, financially strapped Barcelona, and AC Milan and Juventus, two teams that combined to lose nearly €350 million last year, remain in the rump of the league. In the English press, this has been presented as the unpopular, American owners of Arsenal, Liverpool, and Manchester United conspiring to ruin soccer by making it like one of the North American major leagues (NBA, NFL, MLB, etc.), and local, English heritage winning the day.
It does seem to be the case that the globalization of elite soccer hit a stumbling block this week, but the pressures that caused it to come into being are only going to get worse in the years ahead. The idea of the top tier of soccer teams separating themselves from the hoi polloi is not new: it is exactly how the Premier League started when the top English clubs split off to be able to get a better broadcast deal in 1992. Even the idea of a super league has been around for decades; it was first brought up by a former owner of AC Milan you may have heard of, a guy named Silvio Berlusconi.
There are things that can be done to stem the tide. Germany, for example, mandates that teams be majority-owned by associations of their fans. Fans hated the ESL idea, so Borussia Dortmund and Bayern Munich declined to join. As a result of this, however, the Bundesliga is very staid: Bayern Munich is about to win its 9th consecutive title after a dry spell in which it only won 10 of the prior 20 years. The leadership of Barcelona and Real Madrid are elected by fans and the candidates make wild promises in order to win, including dramatically overpaying for players and other outrageous promises. Neither of these is exactly a long-term strategy for success for clubs or fans.
Soccer fans, and really sports fans — and actually all humans of all stripes — have a sense of “tradition” that blends changes that took place over years and decades into a single, static world. “Syracuse moving to the Atlantic Coast Conference cheapens college basketball,” they said about an event that upset a balance that had existed for 8 years. “The Founders intended the filibuster as a check on power,” they say about a practice that dates to the middle of George W. Bush’s first term.
All of this is to say that if the leaders of the ESL teams had made a few better tactical decisions, they would have been able to ride out this first wave of public indignation. For a year or two they might have had to deal with some upset die-hard fans at home. Within a very short amount of time, however, everyone would have adjusted. Other teams would have joined and the generally accepted leaders of European soccer would have become the de facto organizing body of the sport. They would gain the money and prestige that goes along with it. That prize is still out there; the ring of power that comes is too seductive, and it is only a matter of time until someone else reaches for it.
News You Might Have Missed
Indonesian Navy Submarine Goes Missing North of Bali
Miles Esters
On Wednesday, an Indonesian submarine went missing off of the northern coast of Bali. It has been identified as a “44-year-old [1,395 ton and 195 foot] German-made submarine, KRI Nanggala-402” with 53 sailors on board. According to Indonesia’s Defense Ministry, the KRI Nanggala-402 was conducting torpedo drills and failed to relay the results as expected. Additionally, the ministry stated that an aerial search found an oil spill near the submarine’s dive location and has requested additional assistance from the United States, Australia, Singapore, and India. There os a large search underway with numerous aircraft and ships racing to locate the vessel before its oxygen supply runs out. It is believed that the submarine sank to a depth of around 2,000 to 2,300 feet, which is much deeper than its estimated crush depth of 656 feet. Furthermore, the submarine could be at a depth too dangerous for any rescue vessels that are able to dive at a maximum of 1,969 feet safely. Indonesia maintains a small fleet of five diesel-electric submarines consisting of three newer South Korea vessels and two German-made Type 209 vessels. These submarines along with its surface combatants are critical for the Indonesian navy’s ability to patrol the waters of its 17,000 islands. Moreover, in recent years, the country has begun a process of military modernization to replace much of its Cold-War era military platforms. These modernization efforts are driven by shifting risk and threat perceptions to safeguard its maritime sovereignty as a means to continued economic development and concerns over China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.
US Commission Recommends Diplomatic Boycott of Beijing Olympic Games
Sarah Naiman
This week, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom issued its annual report recommending targeted sanctions and an official-level boycott of the 2022 Beijing Olympic Games in response to China’s genocide of the Uighurs. Combined with the recent Human Rights Watch report that found China’s actions qualify as crimes against humanity, these recommendations demonstrate that the international community is becoming more awake, if not responsive, to the situation in Xinjiang region. While President Biden has indicated that American athletes will not be prohibited from participating in the 2022 Olympic Games, a diplomatic boycott appears to be a likely solution, as it permits the U.S. to compete on the world stage while also reproving China’s actions. Following the Commission’s release of its report, Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT) introduced its boycott recommendation as an amendment to the legislation aimed at countering China mentioned in the introduction. While human rights activists would urge for a stronger American response, the Commission’s recommendations offer, at minimum, proof that the U.S. is displeased with China’s abhorrent treatment of the Uighurs and open to retaliatory responses.
The views of authors are their own, and not that of CSPC.