Friday News Roundup — December 15, 2023
Friday greetings from Washington, D.C., where the House has recessed for the holidays following passage of the NDAA while the Senate continues to debate aid to Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and policies at the southern border. The complexity of immigration negotiations combined with growing frustration with foreign conflicts, makes any deal before the holidays difficult. Speaker Johnson, already facing anger from the far right over the deals in the NDAA, will have to balance this with other deadlines shortly after recess returns. Combined with the rejection of aid by the EU — though the Europeans will now find ways to aid Ukraine despite Hungary’s pro-Putin intransigence — Ukraine is feeling far more alone and this is reflected in Putin’s recent rhetoric.
Economic news continued to illustrate that the Federal Reserve may in fact have pulled off a “soft landing“. Continued strong job numbers along with price numbers remaining stable, Fed Chair Jay Powell suggested rate hikes were off the table and that some committee members were considering rate cuts next year. Markets responded positively, but the question for politicians is how and when the economic mood will match the metrics.
At the Diplomatic Courier, Joshua Huminski provided the thirteen best books of the year, perfect for last-minute gift ideas.
In this week’s roundup, Dan Mahaffee looks at what can be done to improve industrial policy making. James Kitfield covers the Egyptian response to the Gaza war and Ethan Brown peers into the crystal ball for 2024 defense issues. Our final roundup of 2023 will be next week.
What’s needed for industrial policy-making
By Dan Mahaffee
Sec. Raimondo speaks at the Reagan National Defense Forum
While the United States has taken major leaps in building industrial policies and strengthening economic security, we are comparative newcomers when it comes to having the bureaucracies for this complex interaction between industrial innovation and government policy. In many ways, this modern complexity suggests that government management of the technology is ultimately impossible. It is also unwanted and to suggest such a management role would ultimately stifle American enterprise and innovation. In reality, we see the government stepping in now is the development of technologies and their manufacturing capacity, as well as the protection of technology secrets. As the government role becomes greater in both fostering and protecting innovation, it is important to consider the resources and know-how needed for industrial policy.
First and foremost, there are the resources afforded to the U.S. Department of Commerce. Just recently at the Reagan National Defense Forum in California, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo spoke of the need for a larger budget and more staff to handle the expanded mission of the department in handling economic, security matters such as export controls, as well as its duties in overseeing the CHIPS Act. Our Department of Commerce has seen significant expansion in its importance and role and is no longer considered the sleepy cabinet agency it once was. Still it pales in comparison to some of the larger economic, commerce, or trade ministries in other countries. With proposals also underway to give more responsibility to the treasury department, the bureaucracies there reviewing inbound investment, and soon outbound investment, will also require greater resources and staff. Part of it will be necessary to ensure the security of our economy, while also making sure that these measures do not slow or delay commercial activity.
Given the greater complexity of economic policy making as well as the various diplomatic and national security elements involved, coordination of policy becomes all the more important. In the executive branch, a question for any victor in 2024 is how they plan to organize their administration to continue to address this competition. This requires White House level coordination, but it also taxes the bandwidth of already busy defense and security advisors. At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, many of these issues cross the traditional lines of Congressional committee jurisdiction, and therefore it falls upon leadership to balance these priorities and proposals. The Select CCP Committee has demonstrated a focus on raising awareness of some of these issues, and its recent report on economic security starts to lay out some of their proposals.
While this committee has demonstrated its ability to dive deep into these issues, there is a longer-term question about the research support for Congress on matters of technical issues. Many Members of Congress and their staff do try hard to stay abreast of technological developments. Some members do have understanding from their time in the private sector. Think tanks like ours and others also try to fill-in requests for advice. However, this is no substitute for in-house research and advice. The Congressional Research Service has been a gold standard for their work advising Members of Congress, but the body still misses the Office of Technology Assessment shut by Republicans in their 1995 takeover. Bolstering the CRS tools and staff for looking at these technologies of importance is a good first step, along with considering research entities or committee structures to focus on these technology questions.
These questions about capacity building for industrial policy in our government should be framed in terms of national security and competitiveness. There is a bipartisan consensus behind the importance of these measures at a time when we are facing the competition from China. These are no longer debates about the role or size of government, especially given the agreement around understanding and fostering US leadership in advanced technologies. Policies will need to be strengthened, adjusted, and sometimes replaced; at the same time, we need a qualified workforce for handling the policies as well as researching new ones. The danger now is that we have embark upon the early stages of building this industrial policy only to have political dysfunction derail what is needed to hone and bolster these efforts. This will be important for policy makers to consider not only as they try to make deals for the budget and government spending in the coming months, as well as how they present their visions for what they would do should they win in 2024.
Dan Mahaffee is CSPC’s Senior Vice President
Egypt’s View on Israel-Hamas War
By James Kitfield
The deadly war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip recently passed the 2-month mark. The fighting began with an October 7 attack on Israel by the Hamas terrorist group that claimed more than 1,200 Israeli lives, most of them civilians. To date, Palestinian deaths attributed to the fighting are estimated at more than 18,000, many of them also civilians. To get an Arab perspective on the fighting, destruction and tragic loss of life on both sides, the Aspen Security Forum recently hosted Sameh Shoukry, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs. His “fireside chat” was moderated by Steve Clemons, Founding Editor at Large for Semafor. The following excerpts have been edited for clarity and length by CSPC Senior Fellow James Kitfield.
What is the official Egyptian stance on the Israel-Hamas conflict, and who do you see governing Gaza when the fighting stops?
Shoukry: “We have been clear at the highest levels of government that we condemn any form of attack on civilians. That is totally unacceptable, and we made that clear at outset. So it is a complicated situation, and it needs to be addressed from various perspectives. We have to recognize the current conditions for Palestinians in Gaza. Remember that Hamas deposed the Palestinian Authority in Gaza [many years ago], and has governed by strength of arms to maintain that status. What the future of governance in Gaza will be should be up to the Palestinians to decide. It’s up to them to decide who is legitimate to govern.
Did the Egyptian government see the Hamas attack coming?
Shoukry: “I can’t comment on intelligence, but I can say that this attack is not so strange, though it’s different in terms of its intensity and repercussions. But there have been many conflicts between Hamas and Israel over the years. There’s also been an ongoing relationship between Hamas and Israel. So whether or not Israel should have seen this attack coming depends on the status of that ongoing relationship, and I’ll leave it there.”
The Biden administration has said the only viable, long-term solution to the conflict is a two-state solution. Does Egypt agree?
Shoukry: “We’ve been dealing with stagnation in the two-state process for a very long time. Various Israeli governments have departed from an endorsement of two-states, and some have advocated for an outright refusal to consider two states. And that vacuum was filled by Hamas. And yes, [Israeli Prime Minister Bibi] Netanyahu has stated in the past that he is not an advocate for the creation of a Palestinian state. So giving lip service to the idea of a two-state solution right now distracts from the gravity of this conflict. Israel is already a recognized state by regional players. It’s the creation of a Palestinian state that we have to contend with. What’s needed is the political will. [Former Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat always said that the United States represents 99 percent of the solution, because only the United States can convince both Israel and the Arab world to embrace it.”
How do you respond to those calling for Egypt to accept refugees from Gaza who are threatened by the ongoing conflict?
Shoukry: “A cessation of hostilities is the better solution. There’s been lot of talk that Israel would like to send the Palestinian people of Gaza [to Egypt], but that is inappropriate under international law. Displacement of people is not recognized as a way to deal with any conflict. There is no reason that Palestinian civilians should be penalized for [Hamas’ attack] on October 7. So we will continue to advocate for the Palestinian people, and try and help them any way we can.”
How dire does Egypt view the situation in Gaza?
Shoukry: “We believe the situation is very grave from a humanitarian perspective. That’s why the Secretary General of the United Nations invoked Article 99 of the U.N. Charter, and referred the situation to the U.N. Security Council, on the premise that the humanitarian situation in Gaza could collapse. He used his moral authority to draw the attention of the Security Council. I’m constantly in touch with U.N. officials in Gaza, and they convey to me the totally inhumane conditions for the inhabitants of Gaza. So this is an issue that international community has to deal with based on the value of protecting human rights, and a basic right to life.” [Editor’s note: since the interview, the United States vetoed a U.N. Resolution calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza].
Does Egypt view the United States as having a particular responsibility in ending the conflict given the amount of military aid it has provided Israel?
Shoukry: “This is issue for United States to contend with. The United States has a responsibility as the sole superpower in the world. It has the resources to influence the situation, and it should be actively engaged in advocating for a cessation of hostilities. That’s always how the international community has reacted to conflicts in the past, by insisting they are resolved diplomatically. To not do that raises issues of U.S. credibility, and charges of double standards.”
Do you believe the Palestinian Authority should govern Gaza once Israel’s conflict with Hamas is over?
Shoukry: “I don’t believe it’s appropriate to consider the `day after’ until we have a definitive ceasefire that allows us to assess the situation and all its components. So Egypt won’t engage in ‘day after’ talk, because that would make us complicit in what is happening right now.”
How has the Israeli-Hamas war affected prospects for a reconciliation between Israel and Arab states that the United States has advocated through the Abraham Accords and follow-on diplomatic efforts?
Shoukry: “Temporarily that prospect is ruined. The conflict has put constraints on regional integration. But I believe that is temporary in nature. There is wide recognition that the only way forward for all of us in the region is increased integration. But first we have to end this conflict, and create an environment conducive for investment. Conflict is certainly not complimentary for investment.”
James Kitfield is a CSPC Senior Fellow
Defense outlook for 2024
By Ethan Brown
2023 had no shortage of highlights and lows for defense considerations; Ukraine continued apace, Hamas discovered a sequence of structural security vulnerabilities within Israel and decided to make it everyone’s problem, and the United States military had its own series of impactful (though not necessarily positive) events. This last roundup column of mine for the year will consider the impacts of some of those banner events for the Defense Department, and look ahead to some of the concerns facing the DoD in 2024…none of which loom larger than the upcoming election.
In 2023, the U.S. military faced some particular struggles, not least of which was the hold up of officer promotions thanks entirely to Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-AL) for the sake of protesting the Defense Department’s policy on abortion rights for its service members. Fortunately, the Senior Senator from Alabama finally absolved his position allowing for the Senate’s confirmation of promotion for nearly 500 senior officers across the U.S. military. While those suspended promotions were in their fervor, the U.S. Marine Corps dealt with multiple aircraft crises, not least of which was the F-35 which went missing shortly after takeoff in September due to a technical issue; losing a stealth jet is a head-scratcher until the greater context is put into place. Further, American warplanes shot down a Chinese spy balloon, which shook the sanctity of our skies with the same gusto as the old Sputnik satellite panic of the 1950s. Another moment worth mentioning which will factor into 2024 forecasts later: in January of 2023, the DoD rescinded the COVID vaccine mandate for service members, clearing the way for potential reinstatement reviews for thousands of personnel who were discharged under the vaccine mandate.
So 2023 was tumultuous for the DoD in no uncertain terms. Each of those highlight events carried no shortage of politically charged rhetoric to go along with the national security and defense implications of real world crises. Therein is the lede for this end-of-year column and look ahead: the potential crises and politically-charged influences facing the DoD in the coming year.
Arguably the single greatest issue facing the DoD remains the ongoing recruiting crisis. Since the end of the War on Terror, which of course includes impacts of the COVID pandemic degrading the ability to enlist new personnel, the DoDs component services have failed to meet recruiting goals year to year, with only the Marine Corps and Space Force approaching their recruitment goals (this likely due to those services being the smallest). In 2023, the Air Force was projected to be approximately 10,000 recruits short, while the Army was 15,000 short of new soldiers entering service, and the Navy failing by nearly 6000 new personnel. The Marines with a far smaller personnel footprint were able to skate by, while the Space Force largely recruits specialized operators from across the other service branches, and the newest branch speaks of recruiting in terms of hundreds, not tens of thousands.
Among the issues facing the recruiting problem are the lack of competitive pay, substandard living conditions for junior enlisted, the atrocious healthcare afforded to active duty and veterans alike, and perhaps most damnably, the widespread issue of political issues facing the department of defense which garner hyperpartisan positions: the dismissal and lack of action against the sexual assault epidemic facing DoD personnel, and the highly charged notion of “wokeness” dominating military policy and practices (which is, in a word, absurd).
Recruiting is always going to be a major challenge following a major conflict; GWOT ignominiously ended on December 31, 2022, and now American’s (and immigrants considering nationalization through honorable service) face the question of “why” when passing by the recruiters office. Why indeed, when the issues of politics and political identities dominate so much of our daily life, conversations, and feeds?
The next great issue facing the Military in 2024 is going to consist of remaining apolitical in our increasingly charged politicking society. The cries of wokeness from one side against the fears of possible military coups from the other side and all manner of politicization in between is the single greatest challenge facing the DoD in the coming year. It isn’t the fault of the all-volunteer service member force who, admittedly, are entitled to their own political opinions so long as they do nothing from official positions to promote such beliefs. The problem, like so much else in our society, comes from this issue being used as a political tool in government discourse and as talking points along party lines.
2024, as we all know, is an election year. And the prospects are bleak, to be blunt and putting it mildly. American allies are bracing for the potential of another Trump administration, “hedging themselves against it” to be frank, while enough backlash has been lobbed at the Biden administration for its efforts to promote diversity and evolution within the DoD so as to simply serve as the antithesis to the risks of Trump resuming his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. All of this at a time when the world order is continuing to teeter on the precipice of American primacy on the world stage, when China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and other malicious actors are actively working to reset that world order.
The U.S. military is the supreme tool for preventing such an event from occurring (one which must be integrated with diplomacy and increased cooperation abroad, of course), but so long as it faces the kind of divisiveness and politicization amidst recruiting and readiness challenges, while pressed on all sides by adversaries who seek advantage, 2024 will be even more difficult for the U.S. military, and remaining constitutional and apolitical must remain its top priority.
Ethan Brown is a CSPC Senior Fellow
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.