Friday News Roundup — December 16, 2022
Happy holidays to you from Washington, D.C., as we share with you the last roundup of 2022. The legislative year is coming to a close as the Senate cleared stopgap funding until December 23rd as well as the 2023 James M. Inhofe NDAA. Now all eyes are on the final push for the omnibus, which should be around $1.7 trillion and ensure funding through FY23.
As reported by Punchbowl News, we are also tracking whether the Senate legislation banning TikTok from government phones will be attached to the omnibus.
In terms of this broader technological competition, CSPC is proud to release our end of year 2022 geotech report. This report covers how the geotech competition is already underway, how we can build on our existing innovation leadership, and deepen cooperation with allies and partners.
This week, the Diplomatic Courier published Joshua C. Huminski’s — the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs — best reads of 2022 list. After reviewing more than 50 books for the Courier and other publications, Huminski selected a diverse list of books including works on Russia, Ukraine, China, intelligence, technology, and more. The week prior saw the Courier publishing Huminski’s review of Jessikka Aro’s “Putin’s Trolls”, the very personal account of the effects of Moscow’s propaganda campaigns, and how local actors raise the volume of these attacks.
SpaceNews also published Huminski’s latest op-ed on the need to reform the requirements of National Security Space Launch Phase Three ahead of the solicitation. Rather than artificially lock in requirements, Space Systems Command should create new pathways for entrants to ensure the military and Intelligence Community have the tools they need to put assets into orbit, particularly when China is aggressively moving forward in space.
In this week’s roundup, Dan Mahaffee reflects on 2022 with thoughts on 2023. Ethan Brown covers the year for the Pentagon. Veera Parko covers the scandal in the European parliament over alleged Qatari bribery. Hidetoshi Azuma assesses Japan’s security normalization in 2022 and its future implications.
Reflecting on 2022, Looking Ahead to 2023
Dan Mahaffee
When you write a regular column like this one, you have a record of predictions to look back to — as well as many recipes for eating crow. Just a year ago, I closed my look ahead to 2022 with the wisdom of Yogi Berra, “predictions are hard to make, especially about the future.” Looking back though we can see some hits, some swings and misses, and think about how we manage the upcoming innings.
While we noted the Russian military buildup at the end of 2021 into 2022, it was still unclear how far Putin would go. In building his throne of bayonets, he could not remain sitting on it. The Russian push for Kyiv and Ukraine’s successful defense accelerated a strategic rethinking that had been underway. The unity of the west and the rapid push for sanctions demonstrated strategic unity, ongoing energy and food trade disruptions still demonstrate our reliance on Russia. If 2022 brought about strategic unity, then 2023 will likely be the test of our collective will. The conflict looks to be one now of attrition and production, and the question remains how will NATO and the west continue to equip and fund Ukraine, as well as their own militaries?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought greater unity among the G-7 and other allies and partners, but India, Brazil, and others across the global south did not side as clearly against Moscow — nor are they necessarily choosing either side in U.S.-China competition. While Russia and China will be competitors for hearts, minds, resources, and data across the globe, our approach will need to be one of capacity building, not confrontation. We should also work with our allies — noting the example of Japan and its strategic shift and hike in defense spending — to build shared capacity and deter our shared adversaries.
In this strategic approach, let our adversaries’ actions speak for themselves, while we put forward meaningful partnerships. At the end of 2021, I suggested that China’s continued internal crackdowns and the consolidation of power under Xi Jinping would continue. What 2022 demonstrated was all this, along with the adherence to zero Covid and its economic costs — until the recent protests (public street protests and CEOs’ private complaints) prompted a U-turn. While Speaker Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan was hardly unprecedented and thoroughly telegraphed, the Chinese response further illustrated the risks and vulnerabilities of supply chains based in the region. As competition between China grows, we see the diversification of supply chains, but also the contours of a geopolitical and technical competition underpinned by economic interdependence. Creating alternative economic incentives will be important for this regional and increasingly global competition — either through a robust Indo-Pacific Economic Framework or, even better, long-term maneuvers for a U.S. return to the CPTPP.
In that competition, we will continue to see stronger measures from both the Biden administration and Congress. Measures like outbound investment review, as well as broader strategic reviews of the relationship with China will follow. Tightening of rules on advanced technologies will also continue, in line with how the Biden administration aims to control technological “chokeholds.” This will also need to be coordinated with allies, as we increasingly extend these restrictions to foreign firms’ own dealings with China.
In divided government, the competition with China is one of the few areas upon which the parties agree. That said, there can also be a temptation to show that each side is harder on China than the other. Let’s hope, that, as the chair of the China Select Committee Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) suggests, this can be a bipartisan effort.
Similarly, just as last year marked significant legislative efforts, many bipartisan, to address our supply chain vulnerabilities. We did note that this would be a major domestic focus — along with “Fed watching” interest rate hikes. The CHIPS Act and previous infrastructure legislation were bipartisan, while the “Inflation Reduction Act” was party-line. Now, much of the focus will need to be on the successful implementation (and oversight) of this legislation. If the United States is now implementing “industrial policy”, let’s make sure we’re doing it right.
These are the areas that we’ll continue to focus on in 2023, addressing the growing competition with authoritarian adversaries and cooperation with friends and partners; leadership in advanced technology from the digital to space domains; and conversations about our resilience in supply chains, cybersecurity, and pandemic preparedness. It may seem more than a full agenda, but to end with another Yogi-ism, “the future ain’t what it used to be.”
Rounding up the 2022 DoD highlights
Ethan Brown
2022 has been something of a wild ride for the U.S. military and defense enterprise writ large. While the DoD was still grappling with the aftershocks of the Afghanistan withdrawal and questions about what comes next, a war broke out in Ukraine, while China’s continual expansion into the Pacific rim continued apace. Iran and North Korea remain persistent threats to the regions of influence, and if anyone forgot that violent extremism and terror networks are still a thing, that’s likely from the 24-hour news cycle being constantly inundated with hot takes on Russian tanks, missiles, nuclear escalation, and other reactionary news. Meanwhile, the rest of the world occupies the concerns of the U.S. military, so this week’s roundup entry from me will examine some of the most significant events and policy implications for 2022.
“Wartime procurement powers” passes House NDAA vote
Ratification of the annual National Defense Authorization Act, among the rarest of bipartisan actions taken by congress, is underway. With the House passing it’s current draft of the defense bill 350–80, it now heads to the upper chamber in the Senate for continued haggling and an expected passage.
Several interesting components are included in this year’s bill, which bear examining in this space. First, some geopolitical context: Information warfare is criminally under-recognized in today’s strategic competition paradigm. How states frame their conduct in political, economic, and indeed, military functions matters more in a world where every action from every states’ federal government is readily available for review, analysis, and indeed hot takes. Ditto how aggressor and competitor states comport themselves in response. Calling actions something besides what they are, can indeed have an impact on competitor behavior.
The passage of the 2023 NDAA includes language and provisions which strike a curious and concerning tone, especially as escalation and deterrence of Moscow in an increasingly fragile endgame in Ukraine looms. The current bill appropriates $2.7 billion in additional funding over baseline ($5.9 billion for the Navy alone) for restocking munitions stockpiles, which have dwindled to alarming lows as the United States has been among global leaders in military aid for Ukraine. The concern — the information domain aspect here — lies in the expansion of Pentagon authorities, “wartime procurement powers”, to speed up the acquisitions process in that restocking process. Sen. John Cornyn (R — TX) made it clear that the provisions were intended to respond to defense industrial base challenges, but with an eye “to transfer weapons to Ukraine combined with the challenges [to] quickly replenish our own stockpiles”. “Wartime procurement powers” certainly benefits the Russian narrative that the West is seeking escalation, rather than efforting to contain the aggression from Moscow.
In other compelling/interesting bits about the NDAA, the draft being sent to the Senate managed to survive a lower chamber vote with the provision to repeal mandatory COVID vaccinations for servicemembers intact. This issue has impacted military retention and retention, according to key Republican lawmakers who have voiced staunch support for the provision. As of this writing, more than 8,500 active-duty service members were forcibly removed from the military for refusal to take the COVID vaccine. It remains unclear whether or not those separated personnel will be reintegrated into the service with back-pay and full reinstatement of privileges, but the baseline component of the bill is aimed to regain the talent loss of scores of pilots, special operations personnel, and a wide range of support members who refused the mandatory vaccine.
It is unknown whether or not President Biden will veto the bill — which has wide-ranging support from Democrats despite this COVID-vaccine provision — or sign it, should it survive the Senate vote and arrive on the Resolute desk, according to NSC coordinator for strategic communications John Kirby.
Increased cooperation with Pacific Partners and deepening the Quads military ties
This endeavor speaks greatly to the vector that strategic planners would see our future military efforts devoted to, at least before the Ukraine war began to dominate force posturing and readiness. Following the long-awaited release of the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy in its entirety in October — which prioritizes cooperation and shared, distributed defense and deterrence — focus on the Indo-Pacific theater remains the primary objective of long-term DoD planning. Part of that is the strategic answer to the ‘what’s next’ question following Afghanistan’s closure in American military history.
The ways/means of that ‘What’s next’ is increased integration with our closest partners in the Pacific, notably led by military training and collaboration with Australia. Where American Brigades once endured rotational deployments to Afghanistan for months and years on end in a recurring cycle, those efforts are now aimed at ‘deploying’ such forces to Australian shores to conduct training, exercises, rehearsals of crisis and tactics development. It is worth noting that Australia is one of two nations participatory in the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty with the U.S., which permits license-free exports of certain defense articles, including highly sensitive and classified technology.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin commented on the arrangement: “We committed ourselves to deepen our cooperation in both diplomacy and defense; The United States and Australia share a vision of [an Indo-Pacific] region where the countries can determine their own futures.” Australia has become a decided focus, at a time when the U.S. has already doubled-down on integration with Japan, and has recently stood up new capabilities in South Korea (two space-focused units). Further, the final member of the Quadrilateral Alliance(the “Quad”) — India — has closed ranks with the U.S. as those nations see a rising Beijing as an increasing threat to regional and global stability.
New tech and divestments — Bombers, helicopters, hypersonics and more
The B-21 alters the air power status quo on U.S. force projection in the Pacific, once it is fully operational. The futuristic flying leviathan — which I covered in last-weeks roundup following its rollout in California — is the most advanced flying machine ever built, and of course that means it is built for war, or preferably, the credible deterrent capability to prevent war from total outbreak. New technology will always garner the most headlines when covering/analyzing the DoD beat. So while the B-21 Raider is rightly being lauded as a major step forward for the defense enterprise in 21st century warfare, the Army and Navy have made decisions on new tech/airframes that, in many cases, are questionable.
The Textron-Bell V-280: the Army’s next helicopter (Jen Judson/Defense News)
The decision by the Army to replace its aging Blackhawk and fleet with the Textron-Bell V-280: a tilt-rotor design for the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) program. The program in total is tabbed at $7 billion for the entry-level cost tag, although the full extent of the FLRAA program is expected to exceed $70 billion by the anticipated full-operational phase gate of the year 2030. The V-280 is purportedly capable of ranges in excess of two-thousand miles, making it suitable for Indo-Pacific employment, troop movements, and other logistical support. Although the notion of being on a ‘helicopter’ of any type for that many miles of open ocean seems horrifying to someone like yours truly, who spent hundreds of hours on the trusty Blackhawk and still detests everything about helicopters.
Personal affectations notwithstanding, the Bell V-280 beat out the Sikorsky-Boeing “Defiant” prototype, which featured coaxial (twin) main rotors instead of the Bell’s tilt-rotor design. The pros and cons were certainly weighed by the Army in choosing its workhorse for the next four-plus decades, but tilt-rotor designs are notoriously unreliable, and tend to be less pliable in austere environments (read: clandestine and sensitive/undeveloped operational locales). The Marines and Air Force spent years trying to make the CV-22 Osprey — the most recognizable of the tilt-rotor aircraft — safe for flight, though often unsuccessfully. The promotional video for the V-280 alone should have discouraged the Army from choosing this platform, as it is rife with Afghanistan-isms and technical follies, but at least the Army knows what lies ahead for the next half-century.
And in some more wide-ranging news about new vectors of DoD efforts in airspace competition, the Air Force successfully launched and tested its first hypersonic missile: the Lockheed Martin AGM-183A ARROW (Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon). The feat was actually performed just last week at Edwards Air Force Base and testing grounds in California, launched from a venerable B-52H, where it departed the rail and promptly accelerated to five times the speed of sound before impacting precisely at the intended aim point, an undisclosed distance from the launch site. Per Brigadier General Jason Bartolomei, the Air Force’s Armament Directorate program executive officer, all test objectives were met and “the ARRW team successfully designed and tested an air-launched hypersonic missile in five years. I am immensely proud of the tenacity and dedication this team has shown to provide a vital capability to our warfighter.”
This launch occurred after three straight test failures in 2021, resulting in a $161 million reduction in congressionally-approved funds. Despite these setbacks, the engineers delivered on the first U.S. hypersonic test missile, which is now expected to move into more advanced phases of vetting, production, and acquisitions.
Parting thoughts
Every one of these initiatives from the DoD…even the controversial and inflammatory COVID-vax provision in the 2023 NDAA, are sure to have a profound impact on setting the defense enterprise on a path towards preparing for future confrontation. Such a future conflict can reasonably be expected to involve long-range maneuvering and force-shaping, and will rely increasingly on allies and security partners. The United States can not sustain the role of global police force, nor can it engage rising and known adversaries on its own, as it attempted to do for much of the Global War on Terror. 2022 proved to be a pivotal year for the national defense appratus, and these trend items mostly suggest that the DoD is actively organizing itself for that reality.
The European Parliament and the “Qatargate” corruption scandal
Veera Parko
This week, eurocrats in the heart of the European Union, Brussels, have been shocked to learn of the most serious corruption scandal affecting European institutions in years. Last weekend, Belgian police arrested four people connected with suspected payments and gifts from — allegedly — Qatar to members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and their staff. One of them is Eva Kaili, a member of the Greek left-wing party Pasok and one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament. Along with Kaili and European Parliament staffers, the Secretary-General of the International Trade Union Confederation was arrested, and a human rights NGO was implicated.
So far, the investigation by the Belgian police has revealed that the scale of the alleged corruption is unprecedented in EU politics: about 1,6 million euros in cash was found in police raids, some of it in the detained persons’ homes. The four people remain detained and are charged with participation in a criminal organization, money laundering and corruption.
One might wonder what a country like Qatar might have to gain from influencing members and staff of the European Parliament, the European Union’s legislative arm. It is widely known that Ms Kaili has been a vocal proponent of Qatar, most recently in connection with the FIFA World Cup. As the arrests took place, the Parliament was handling a proposal to give Qataris visa-free travel to the EU´s Schengen area and an EU-Qatar aviation agreement — understandably, all legislative processes involving Qatar have now been suspended.
The scandal is a very serious matter for the European Parliament, not least because it has built a reputation as a proponent of anti-corruption and pro human rights. For years, the EU’s multinational Parliament has been criticized for a lack of transparency in relation to lobbyists, especially those representing third countries. The President of the European Parliament, Maltese Roberta Metsola, said in a powerful speech on December 15 that there are people linked to autocratic governments seeking to subvert European democracy. She promised a reform of lobbying and transparency rules, and a restoration of trust in the European Parliament.
The European Parliament is a body in which EU member states are represented through European political party groups. It is worth noting that the people arrested are all linked to the left-center party in the Parliament, and their political opponents on the right might not be able to resist the temptation to gain political momentum. On a more general note also relevant for the US, the scandal highlights the perils of attempts by autocratic governments to influence lawmakers — maybe “Qatargate” might lead to meaningful lobbying rule reforms in Europe, and useful exchanges with Europe’s Western allies?
2022: A Watershed Year for Japan’s Security Normalization
Hidetoshi Azuma
The most consequential geopolitical development in the Indo-Pacific during the 2020s is Japan’s accelerating security normalization rather than China’s seeming rise. This contrarian proposition has gained even more significance this passing year as Tokyo drastically shed off Japan’s post-WWII security restrictions and expanded the country’s geopolitical influence even beyond the Indo-Pacific. By contrast, Beijing increasingly found itself besieged from almost every direction at home and abroad as Washington expedited its policy of targeted decoupling from China. Indeed, Japan’s rapid security normalization in 2022 unmistakably bolstered the US position in its great power competition with China thanks to Tokyo’s sweeping reforms ranging from the historic Economic Security Law to the defense spending hike. The year of 2022 thus signified the consolidation of Japan’s security normalization and merits sober reflections on its historical evolution to appreciate its long-term implications beyond China.
Japan’s security normalization has been the country’s single most important geopolitical trajectory ever since the signing of the US-Japan security treaty in 1951. The bilateral security pact allowed the defeated nation to join the US-led rules-based world order within which Tokyo began the process of security normalization without fretting over international reactions. Tokyo’s strategy revolved around the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution in order to exempt its right to self-defense from constitutional restrictions. The immediate upshot was the partial revival of Japan’s military capabilities in the form of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) under the doctrine of the “exclusively defensive self-defense (senshu boei)” in 1954. From there, Tokyo expanded the scope of its security policy largely in response to Washington’s changing geostrategic imperatives in the region during and after the Cold War. Indeed, the end of the Cold War spurred Washington to demand Tokyo to drastically widen its area of security responsibilities beyond the Japanese archipelago, leading the JSDF to increasingly appear in the world’s geopolitical flashpoints ranging from East Timor to even Iraq. As great power competition increasingly began to overshadow Japan beginning in the 2010s, Tokyo under former prime minister Shinzo Abe was quick to respond to Wasington’s emerging geostrategic imperatives in Asia by introducing the 2015 security legislation enabling the JSDF to use force for collective defense. This was a milestone legal development which dramatically expanded the scope of self-defense and enabled the JSDF to become an active component of the US military’s forward presence in the region.
Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida built upon Abe’s legacy and upgraded the country’s efforts at security normalization to a whole new level. Unlike Abe who almost single-mindedly sought to overcome constitutional restrictions ultimately to revise the Japanese Constitution itself, Kishida has so far focused on adding substance to enable Japan to prevail in today’s great power competition. Indeed, Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 generated a renewed sense of urgency in Tokyo for countering great power challenges. He has therefore laid the foundation for Japan’s renewed security posture by delineating new contours of its security normalization. The new Japanese prime minister began by further expanding the scope of Tokyo’s security policy by introducing economic security as its new priority dimension. This was a much-needed undertaking in light of Japan’s entrenched economic dependence on China despite its significant position within the rules-based world order. In particular, Japan’s technological reliance on China continues to be a significant cause for concern given the rise of hybrid warfare crisis-crossing multiple domains of war from land to cyberspace to even the electromagnetic domain. Moreover, Japan continues to remain Washington’s key logistical hub for the US military’s forward presence, and the entrenched economic ties to China would be the single most important obstacle to the implementation of integrated deterrence between the two allies.
Kishida’s solution was to empower Tokyo in its ability to pursue geostrategic imperatives even in the economic domain by launching a renewed industrial policy for a new era. The Japanese prime minister began by introducing a series of new initiatives focused on reforming key strategic industries directly affecting Japan’s economic security, especially the semiconductor industry. His strategy was twofold. First, he pumped lavish government subsidies to bolster Japan’s semiconductor industry to reduce its dependence on China. This has so far led to the construction of a major foundry in Kumamoto in partnership with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and the launch of a state-funded semiconductor manufacturer joint-venture, Rapidus. Second, Kishida led the enactment of the Economic Security Promotion Law to lay the foundation for empowering Tokyo in its role in the economy by providing it with government mandates for interventions in instances deemed to have national security significance. While the law itself is merely the first step toward a more comprehensive policy, its enactment signified Kishida’s enthusiasm for boosting Japan’s economic security as the groundwork for its security normalization in a new era.
While economic security is all but synonymous with Kishida in Tokyo nowadays, the real highlight of Japan’s security normalization so far has been his defense policy. First, Kishida has expanded Japan’s security alliances beyond the US. Indeed, he has been essentially seeking to incorporate Japan into the broader Anglo-American world order by forging semi-military alliances starting with Australia and later Britain. The expected reciprocal access agreement with Britain later this December would consummate the process, even evoking delightful memories of the heydays of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance. This is a significant grand strategic maneuver on the part of Kishida as the emerging democracy-authoritarianism dichotomy increasingly sows divisions across the world. Moreover, drawing Britain into the Indo-Pacific would be a significant boost in implementing the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept given its geographical expanse spanning across the southern rimland of Eurasia. The emerging Anglo-Japanese alliance would also be a boon for Tokyo’s perennial agenda of intelligence reform and would be a much-needed steppingstone for eventually realizing Japan’s long-held desire to officially join the Five Eyes.
Second, Japan is set to acquire second strike capabilities on Kishida’s watch. This is a paradigm shift in Tokyo’s thinking about defense. The so-called “counter-strike” capabilities are essentially a euphemism justifying Japan’s emerging strategy of cost imposition on China, which Tokyo’s latest national security strategy document designated as “the most significant challenge” topping the list of the country’s hypothetical enemies. “The real significance of Japan’s acquisition of such capabilities is to be found in the finesse with which Kishida steered domestic politics toward acceptance. Indeed, the introduction of second strike capabilities would de facto end Tokyo’s long-standing doctrine of senshu boei and could open up various possibilities for Japan’s security normalization, including even the acquisition of full-fledged first strike capabilities. Indeed, the 2022 national security strategy document unveiled the concept of “active cyber defense” based on which Tokyo could launch offensive cyber operations, or first strikes in cyberspace to eliminate would-be attackers in case of perceived impending cyber attacks threatening Japan’s national security. Tokyo’s opaque definition of “active cyber defense” underscores the emerging trajectory of Japan’s security normalization beyond the “counter-strike” capabilities. These are undoubtedly controversial developments in a country supposedly espousing pacifism, but Kishida’s political maneuvering has certainly defied expectations amidst the ongoing scandals threatening his tenure itself.
Third, Kishida has decided to double Tokyo’s future defense budget by 2027 to support its military modernization efforts. This is another significant departure from Tokyo’s traditional approach to defense. Historically, Tokyo upheld parsimony over defense spending and committed itself to 1% of Japan’s GDP to fund the JSDF despite its expanding roles. To be sure, Japan had already ranked among the top countries in terms of defense spending size even despite its 1% ceiling. Moreover, the expected defense budget increase is set to incur enormous burden on the public due to Kishida’s preference for levying additional taxes over issuing bonds. Yet, the traditional defense budget restriction demonstrated limits in the face of Tokyo’s growing list of new military imperatives. Tokyo’s expanded defense budget would allow the JSDF to implement fundamental reforms to achieve military modernization which is long overdue. Indeed, the JSDF’s latest doctrine of cross-domain operations would require seamless capabilities spanning across various domains, especially space, demanding lavish investments in the extraterrestrial capabilities. Bolstered by the coming defense spending hike, Japan’s air force is set to be rebranded as “the Japanese Aerospace Self-Defense Force” boasting cutting-edge space surveillance capabilities to meet emerging challenges, such as hypersonic missiles.
While Japan’s growing security normalization especially during Kishida’s tenure is certainly a welcome development for the future of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the US must ensure that its foremost Asian ally be perfectly aligned on Washington’s key geostrategic imperatives in the region. Indeed, Japan’s security normalization is a product of Tokyo’s steady reinterpretations of its constitutional restrictions while China and other hypothetical adversaries are more to be exploited for domestic acceptance than pose existential threats to the nation’s survival. The formula of constitutional reinterpretation has so far produced enormous results, allowing Japan to remain Washington’s arguably most faithful ally despite the changing geopolitical landscape over time. Yet, both the Japanese Constitution and China are impermanent, and domestic Japanese politics may question the continued rationale for the US-Japan alliance absent familiar security constraints. For a country already boasting an army larger than the British Army and a world-class blue water navy, any fundamental change in domestic politics could inadvertently lead Japan to challenge Washington’s geostrategic imperative of preventing the rise of a regional naval power. However unlikely such a scenario appears today, the history of the US-Japan relations in the 1920s remains a salutary reminder of the importance of bilateral dialogue.
2022 has been a watershed year for Japan’s security normalization. Contrary to his popular image as a national security dove, Kishida has proven to be an exceptional leader who introduced a series of fundamental security reforms in a short span of time. Indeed, Tokyo has finally consigned the Cold War-era doctrine of senshu boei to the dustbin of history and achieved an about-turn in its defense policy with the introduction of Japan’s second strike capabilities. The growing domestic criticisms of Kishida’s defense reforms, especially the defense spending increase sourced from a planned tax hike, mask the real significance of his agenda possessing long-term implications for Japan beyond China. History is seldom kind to common sense as its guide and would ultimately require consistent dialogue to achieve shared understanding for the common future. Former Japanese prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone declared the US and Japan to have a “common destiny” after years of painstaking efforts with former US president Ronald Reagan to upgrade the alliance in prevailing over the Soviet Union. Nakasone’s experience imparts the perennial importance of dialogue between the two allies in guiding Japan’s security normalization to once again achieve a shared destiny for years to come.
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The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.