Friday News Roundup — January 6, 2023
Happy new year from Washington, D.C. What was supposed to be a week of getting back to business has been a week of paralysis, as Republican Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy has failed to achieve the 218 vote majority needed in 11 rounds of voting prior to this morning. Discussions about negotiations seem to be yielding very little in the way of shifting votes, and whether this continues into the weekend remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that as the still Representatives-elect continue to vote, the House of Representatives is out of business. This week Dan Mahaffee reflects on what this means for governance at home as well as the geopolitical challenges overseas.
Today, we also remember the 2nd anniversary of the insurrection at the Capitol and the attack on Congress, Vice President Pence, and law enforcement. Our thoughts and prayers continue to be with those who have sacrificed and suffered on and since that dark day — and that such a moment in our history is never repeated. Thus we also salute the work of those who have sought to shed light on the events leading to and during the insurrection, as well as those who work to bring those involved to justice. Congress passed clarifications to the Electoral Count Act at the end of last year to raise the bar for Members to oppose legally submitted electoral votes, but the fix feels a bit like closing the barn door after the horse escaped. It does not address how to handle a president who instigates violence for the purposes of stopping that same process of election certification. That lack of resolution, similar to the underlying dynamic that empowers the most extreme elements of our politics driving the inability of the House to select a speaker, increases the urgency to reform our electoral system to reward more cooperative, pragmatic behavior rather than promoting discord.
Leading off the year, Joshua C. Huminski, the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs, penned an op-ed for Breaking Defense about the need for NATO to seize upon Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to plan for the future of the defense alliance. “Now is the moment to consider what changes may be needed to ensure the alliance is strong, healthy and focused on its core task of keeping alliance members out of Russia’s grasp,” wrote Huminski.
Just prior to the holiday break, Huminski also looked at the online social media movement “NAFO” or North Atlantic Fellas Organization for the Hill. An ad hoc collective of open source researchers, activists, and ordinary citizens working to push back against Russia’s propaganda and wage an information war against Moscow. Huminski asks what lessons can be drawn from NAFO’s success for future conflicts.
Turning his attention to the “special relationship” Huminski outlined what the U.S.-UK relationship would look like in 2023 for the Council on Geostrategy. He noted the challenges (brought about by Brexit) and the opportunities to reshape Euro-Atlantic security, but also the constancy that will inevitably occur at the operational levels amongst the military and intelligence professionals.
Huminski’s writing was not restricted to terrestrial issues. For the Diplomatic Courier he reviews “Original Sin” by Bleddyn E. Bowen. A well-argued look at the realities of security and war on orbit, Bowen’s book, Huminski argues, is undone by a post-modern fixation on the titular “original sin”, that all of space activity is inextricably linked to military affairs and nuclear activity.
In this week’s roundup, there’s a lot of looking forward to 2023. As mentioned, Dan Mahaffee provides a strategic view; Ethan Brown covers what is ahead for the year in the Department of Defense; our Senior Fellow in Tokyo, Hidetoshi Azuma, covers what 2023 will mean for our close ally Japan; and Robert Gerber offers a snapshot of where Europe stands on decoupling its energy sector from Russia in the year to come.
Our Politics, and the Geopolitics, of 2023
Dan Mahaffee
While turning the page on 2022, it appears that 2023 will mark the continuation, if not acceleration of many of the trends we’ve seen. The invasion of Ukraine and Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power plus COVID turnabout have made clear what the strengths and weaknesses of Moscow and Beijing are. They, however, are not the only actors on the geopolitical stage — allied capacity building and relations with other powers will be key to our advantage or disadvantage. So too will be the technological competition and how we manage our growing efforts to foster and protect innovation. Amid all the tumult of this week, it is clear too that how we manage these challenges will be framed by a divided government with narrow majorities — all while planning and posturing for 2024 takes place.
Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine, combined with growing tensions with Beijing, have at least shocked western policymakers into a realization of a “return of history” — even though it never truly ended. The valiant resistance of the Ukranians and the mismanagement of COVID-zero and subsequent 180-degree policy shift have reshaped, respectively, narratives of Russian military dominance and Beijing’s ability to “authoritarian its way out” of the crises that face democracies. On one hand, much of what was the case in 2022 will be the same in 2023 in Ukraine: on one hand the performance of the Russian military and its seemingly slow adaptation to the realities of modern warfare versus the sustainability of western support, logistically, economically, and politically. In China, it will be the return to normalcy, and the likely terrible human cost, that defines 2023. Why are Russian conscripts being sent to a meat grinder? Why has China failed to vaccinate and prepare for reopening? In both instances, the weaknesses of authoritarianism have been on display, not the strengths.
Working with allies and partners will also be an area where we can build on strengths that we enjoy. Churchill described it best that the only thing worse than fighting with allies was fighting without them. Sure it will be fits and starts in the process, but we also see the commitment, especially from Tokyo, of an allied recommitment to building defense capacity. Working with allies to sustain Ukraine and strengthen ourselves will require investments in the defense industrial base and production capacity, while also continuing to invest in cutting-edge technology. It will also be important to work with these allies in diplomatic and economic coordination ranging from international bodies to coordinating controls on strategically critical technologies. Beyond our allies, there will also be the challenge of working with the broader global community that does not neatly align — and to their credit, many seek the advantages of playing one power off another. Therefore, we must continue to focus on demonstrating the advantages of our political and economic system — and its openness — while demonstrating that we are not the provocative actor.
We have spoken often of “great power competition”, but I now prefer to call it “systemic competition”. First, it reflects the nature of this competition between systems of government: authoritarians, the west, and many others either “up for grabs” or seeking their own path. Second, it reflects that the competition will truly be systemic, across all aspects of national strength. We need to foster our strengths and address our weaknesses in a competition that will play out on frozen battlefields and in corporate boardrooms, inside the digital domain and in the financial world, from the depths of the ocean floor to the highest reaches of outer space.
How we plan and organize for this competition will determine our success or failure more than the decisions of Putin or Xi. Already we have bipartisan agreement on committees to develop grand strategies towards China. So too did lawmakers unite to support innovation at home, while also moving to protect critical technology secrets. Building on this requires continued investments in defense, technology, and diplomacy, while also acknowledging that we are embarking upon industrial policy for key technologies and supply chains. Thus it is important that we do this correctly. How can we also make sure that we tackle sclerotic programs and counterproductive policies — one of the most egregious being the continued failure to restore tax credits for the R&D that underpins innovation.
Therefore, it is the political challenge at home that will continue to be the most defining factor in the future of this competition, and the one that we most control. Of course, there are deeper systemic challenges of the incentives in our politics that need to be addressed — and the main actors will increasingly be focused on 2024 — but this week’s events are also demonstrating the real and damaging effects of our domestic politics. Perhaps there is a slim hope that the chaotic process to select the speaker will demonstrate the importance of building working, bipartisan coalitions — but neither our politics nor the House rules work well for such a construct. Does it bode poorly for things like the debt ceiling, future government shutdowns, or arriving on deals for needed defense spending and other programs? Recent memory suggests that there will be more confrontation to come before a compromise, if possible, is reached. With that memory in mind, hopefully our leaders can also recognize the challenge ahead, and demonstrate the leadership needed to ensure our success.
Changes Coming for DoD in 2023
Ethan Brown
As with the rest of society, the Defense Department employs the changing of the Gregorian year as a phase gate for initiating changes to how it trains, equips, and organizes its force. Some stoic wisdom to impart on this first Roundup offering of the year from Epictetus: “Why is it that we wait to demand the best for, and of ourselves?”
2023 is already too late for some of these changes from the DoD, but the next best time for making changes from before is now, and as such, the DoD has a variety of new programs, initiatives and force-shaping constructs which it aims to implement in full this coming year. All of these changes have an enduring theme: force readiness, improving retention, and
so using that as a primer, let’s examine some forecasts for the defense enterprise for the year 2023:
Air Force to implement new deployment dwell-time model
The Air Force will be implementing it’s AFFORGEN (Force Generation) deployment model going into 2023, having used the past year — notably the first ‘post-Afghanistan’ year — to develop and codify a new timeline for ensuring airmen and their families enjoy some measure of respite and reset before being on deck for the next rotation. The new model is a four-phase timeline, each phase consisting of six-month intervals in sequence: post-deployment reset — basic preparatory training — advanced/specialty training — mission availability/execution. The intent is for airmen and their families/dependents to have relative certainty of an 18-month interval between deployments.
For manning overseas and contingency assignments, the Air Force and its airmen have long labored under the “Tempo band” model. Under this construct, multiple units within a single command may be subjected to short-notice assignments requiring individual specialists, flights, and sometimes entire squadrons to fill Combatant Command Requests for Forces (RFFs) on short notice. This would often occur regardless of the “dwell time” accrued by those units.
For example, a security forces squadron billeted as direct support to US Central Command (CENTCOM) force posturing may perform a standard six month deployment to secure the air base at Al Udeid, and then return home. In ideal circumstances, another high-tempo SF unit would be available to backfill that first unit, allowing for the critical reset. Yet as the “A” or Red band — being those units with the highest demand by COCOMs — means that the first unit in this exercise may well be assigned to fill an RFF by another COCOM long before an equitable dwell time has been accrued.
This rotational tempo band model was even more demanding for special mission units and flying squadrons; where aircraft and enabling functions/units would never leave the short-notice/on-demand tempo band. Ideally, these units were entitled to a “1:1” ratio — meaning every night spent away from the servicemembers literal home was supposed to earn a night on their own pillow — but contingency operations and RFFs would be submitted and those units would be forced to fill such contingency billets regardless of any unit or individuals dwell time. I can vouch for the grueling demands of this rotational cycle, having spent the last six years of my time in the Air Force spending on average 300+ days a year away from my home in Georgia. This time would be spent both overseas in combat and conducting spin-up training for the predictable, or ‘on-schedule’ rotations, while being short-notice assigned to contingency operations. Few things affect troop retention, morale, and performance more than being away from families and stability for extended periods. The War in Afghanistan made this kind of rotational construct necessary, but the operational environment has changed.
This new model will allow service members to actually be home with their families, focus on career progression, and be better trained to maximize their time and presence ‘downrange’ going forward, rather than simply abusing the availability of units based on arbitrary tempo band assignments.
All service members to receive 12 weeks parental leave
As usual, the DoD has been well behind societal norms for family fostering and growth, and that includes maternal/paternal leave for new children being welcomed into the world. A new policy signed into law on December 29th will authorize both the parents of newborn children — not simply the mother should she be the service member — 12 weeks of leave for the expansion of their family units. This is of particular interest to someone like myself, again owing to my experience with this situation under old policies: when my wife and I welcomed our two sons into the world, I was authorized 10 days — yes, a week and a half — of time off to help my wife bring our newborns home. For the younger child, I had to adjust surgery dates in order to combine paternal leave with convalescent leave in order to get 21 total days off to be home with my family.
My situation was one of the fortunate cases, but in many other examples, servicemembers could not secure any time off or be excused from ‘critical training’ as the non-birthing parent despite the introduction of new life into the family. Imagine the impact of service members’ plans to stay in the service when leadership could not, or would not authorize any time off, or when the expected availability was less time than it takes to enjoy a normal vacation? Such were the demands placed on service members living under the shadow of the War on Terror, and there is a clear correlation between service demands and divorce rates in the military — the highest rates of any profession in the United States.
Force readiness is impossible to achieve or even consider organizing for when the family unit is disregarded with this kind of treatment. The focus on ensuring stable family growth and development during those early critical weeks is an irrefutable positive sign for the Defense Enterprise going forward.
Financial incentives for low-income service members
The military does not offer particularly competitive pay rates when compared to the civilian sector. Of course, the benefits (health care, education, job stability, and desire for service) are intended to outweigh those financial components, but the stark reality is that money remains one of the most reliable indicators for human certitude in staying at one type of job or another. The military is a contractual obligation, meaning you can’t just leave. But the impact of personnel who have large families or extenuating circumstances (like specialty medical expenses and other hardships) with regards to finances cannot be overstated. This dynamic is made worse when the promotion of a service member is often constrained by time in service, and increases in the pay scale are exclusively beholden to pay-grade, location, and job-specific special bonus pays…components which are sometimes outside of the individual’s control. When it comes to retention, financial incentives are the second-most cited reasons for individuals leaving the military.
As a result of this dynamic, the Pentagon has implemented a new program to aid low-income, high-volume families within those lower pay-grades, who are often most dramatically impacted by the fixed pay-scales used by the federal pay system. This pay-benefit is called the Basic Needs Allowance, agreed on a bipartisan front by both the House and Senate in the National Defense Authorization Bill last year. The defense hierarchy estimates there are roughly 300 families in the DoD who are living well below the 130% threshold for poverty guidelines, and another 2400 living under the 150% threshold, both of which equate to the very mean of lower-middle class income increments.
Those programs would cover the affected families until promotion and pay adjustments grew in accordance with forward progress in the service members career, but the important point to take from this support program is that the DoD has accounted for the needs of its lowest-ranking personnel who are often in need of the most help. It is less frequent that the only demographic of new and young personnel are single, unmarried and lacking dependents, due to the appeal of stability and reliable pay from military service. But as more family units become integrated into the broader DoD demographics, programs like this one will help ensure retention of those service members which is certain to improve both recruiting and retention, and therefore, increase readiness of the force.
Taking care of the troops with common sense
And finally, let’s make an example out of U.S. Army Colonel Ryan Kranc of the 16th Cavalry Regiment (Fort Benning, GA). With the flux and breakdown of airline travel over the holidays a few weeks ago, thousands of flights were disrupted and delayed, impacting countless service members and their families who almost always never enjoy being stationed near their extended families.
The expected guidance from leaders of large units, and one tragically experienced by countless service members for years, was that leave was inviolable with regards to timelines, and if there were problems that occurred during the journey, it was the members fault and they should have planned more. This may seem far-fetched and hyperbolic, but it is simply the reality that leadership billets would be more inclined to restrain personnel from personal travel and time off rather than risk leave overages, missed deadlines for accountability, and other impacts to rosters. These metrics could often doom commissioned officers responsible for unit leadership, meaning the lower-ranking troops would be curtailed from well-deserved time off rather than risk a bad monthly accountability report.
Not so for Col. Kranc and the 16th Cav, whose public affairs unit tweeted in the Commander’s voice that service members traveling and impacted by the airline debacle needed to focus on safety, and not meeting leave deadlines. “My number one priority is to make sure our team, Soldiers, civilians and families are safe,” Kranc said in a tweet. “Do not worry about leave dates or what’s chargeable — we have accommodations and authorities for situations like these, and I intend to exercise them in the best interest of our troopers.”
The fact that this kind of conduct from a commander has generated headlines and is the subject of highlights in this column reflects the unfortunate state of affairs the DoD has operated under in years passed, but let’s not miss an opportunity for a feel-good/positive example by our military going into the new year.
2023: A Year of Great Reset for Japan
Hidetoshi Azuma
The year of 2023 began with a paradoxical sense of optimism and anxiety for Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida. Having barely survived the vicissitudes of politics at home and abroad in the previous year, he declared in his new year address on January 4 his desire to address many of the lingering challenges from last year, particularly the enduring influence of the Korean Christian cult, the Unification Church, on the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Simultaneously, Kishida vowed to resume his unfinished agenda of achieving a fundamental reset of Japan for a new era. While the vicissitudes of geopolitics, especially Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine beginning in February 2022, proved to be favorable to Kishida’s reformist agenda, the political upheaval following former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s assassination last July continues to this day to impede his progress. Indeed, Kishida’s repeated use of the word “challenge(s)” even totaled 30 times during his speech, underscoring the growing predicament constraining his leadership. Looking to 2023, the struggling Japanese prime minister will likely succumb to the emerging political order in Tokyo, further spurring the ongoing transformation of domestic Japanese politics.
Kishida finds himself hopelessly constrained this year precisely because of the way he rose to power in October 2021. His rise was largely a product of the unique consensus-based politics which emerged after Abe’s resignation in August 2020. Abe was a singular figure who virtually transcended factionalism and enjoyed unprecedented political longevity. His exit from the office paved the way for the rise of kingmakers, including himself as well as other LDP stalwarts, such as former prime minister Taro Aso and former Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) Akira Amari. The so-called “3A” coalition laid the foundation for the intro-party consensus on the need for cross-factional unity in endorsing Kishida’s premiership. The upshot was the rise of the Kishida administration founded on a delicate balance of power in cabinet appointments. While internal disagreements occasionally arose, such as on fiscal policy, the shock of Russia’s war in Ukraine prevented them from disrupting the very intra-party consensus mandating the Kishida administration.
The July 2021 assassination of Abe proved to be a political earthquake disrupting even the foundation of the LDP’s power. In fact, Abe’s demise would have been a windfall opportunity for Kishida to reform the LDP by undermining the slain prime minister’s faction, the Seiwakai, which had virtually wielded monopolistic hold on power since 2000 ironically thanks to its questionable ties to the Korean cult. Instead, he sought to maintain party unity by repeating the strategy of consensus-building despite Abe’s demise. His status-quo approach paradoxically invited a backlash from the Seiwakai elements, leading to the undoing of the very consensus he sought to prop up. Moreover, the growing public scrutiny of the cult influence on the LDP led to a series of exits of Kishida’s own ministers, even threatening his own administration.
Absent the intra-party consensus, Kishida is virtually subordinate to the dictates of the other two 3A leaders, namely Aso and Amari. In particular, Aso has reigned as Kishida’s foremost patron in Tokyo and has succeeded in having the incumbent prime minister advance his long standing agenda of tax hike. Aso’s agenda eventually became a policy when Kishida promised to double Japan’s defense spending by 2027 by sourcing it from increased tax earnings. Aso’s factional deputy, Amari, has also succeeded in influencing Kishida’s signature agenda of economic security policy, underscoring the enduring influence of the post-Abe 3A coalition. Indeed, Amari even went as far as to declare the demise of the Seiwakai faction after Abe ahead of the slain leader’s state funeral in September 2022.
Despite Kishida’s continued patronage by two of the LDP’s foremost kingmakers, his future looks grim precisely as the Japanese prime minister himself is not in control of his own administration. Indeed, while Kishida achieved the historic task of defense policy overhaul, including the defense spending increase and the new national security defense strategies documents, he finds himself in an inescapable political crisis stemming from the growing opposition to his decision on a tax hike. Such opposition is increasingly palpable from among the Seiwakai lawmakers to the general public at large. The issue of tax hike now overshadows Japan as the most significant political fault line dividing the country still reeling from the lost decade of the 1990s. Against this backdrop, Kishida has been reportedly mulling the possibility of a snap election after the upcoming Group of Seven (G7) summit in his hometown of Hiroshima in May. In other words, he has already seen the writing on the wall as he continues to do the bidding of others just to maintain his premiership for the next five months.
Naturally, many of those in Nagatacho have already sensed the shifting fortune of the Kishida administration, and a new political order is in the offing in Tokyo. It is currently taking shape in the form of an emerging factional triad consisting of the Kishida-Aso faction (the Kochikai and the Shikokai), the ex-Abe faction (the Seiwakai), and the Nikai-Suga faction (the Shisuikai and the independents). The significance of this development is the possibility of a reversion to factional bipartisanship within the LDP following potential mergers among the above factions. Indeed, Aso has been seeking to create a grand coalition of the Kochikai and its off-shoots, including his own Shikokai, to consolidate the classical liberal wing to the LDP. Yet, such a move would almost inevitably invite at least an unofficial alliance between the beleaguered Seiwakai and the Nikai-Suga faction led by former LDP secretary-general Toshihiro Nikai and former prime minister Yoshihide Suga, spurring the revival of the party’s neoconservative wing. The likely upshot would be a bipartisan gridlock within the LDP, potentially leading to another years of political inertia spawned by inevitable factional strife.
In fact, the above trajectory is consistent with the long-term decline of the LDP. Indeed, Abe’s long tenure obscured the LDP’s organizational decay, and his demise left behind Kishida a simmering political crisis now overshadowing Japan. While Kishida has declared his will to confront the crisis with renewed energy, he will not likely beyond May, a fate tacitly acknowledged by the Japanese prime minister himself. Whoever may come after Kishida, whether the LDP secretary-general Toshimitsu Motegi, Digital Minister Taro Kono or even Suga, the next prime minister would find himself constrained by the same forces now beleaguering Kishida. The possible ensuing political inertia would only consolidate the LDP’s devolution. Looking beyond 2023 and even this decade, Japan will undoubtedly undergo a fundamental political transformation in which the LDP’s continued hold onto power is increasingly in question.
Kishida has kicked off 2023 with a mixed feeling about his own future. Yet, if the reports on his decision to resign after the G7 summit in Hiroshima in May are true, he has essentially resigned himself from leadership to the will of his LDP patrons for the next five months. His successor will most likely find himself in a similar fate given the unrivaled internal power held by kingmakers within the LDP. The uncomfortable truth is that such kingmakers are not immortal as Abe’s assassination aptly demonstrates. By extension, the same truth applies to the US-Japan alliance for which the Japanese political establishment continues to expect American patronage. The tragedy of domestic Japanese politics is that its consensus-based culture is not kind to robust leadership at a time Japan finds itself in multiple crises at home and abroad. Kishida’s real imperative for his great reset agenda for Japan would be to lead the nation toward its finest hour rather than to leave it adrift into the abyss of political inertia.
A Thing to Watch in 2023: Europe Energy Independence
Robert W. Gerber, Senior Fellow
Sanctions are biting Russia’s energy sector. A ban on Russian oil just took effect in Europe. Natural gas prices are dropping. Russia can’t do much with the foreign currency it earns from natural gas sales, and it can’t import equipment to maintain or expand production due to sanctions. But wait — Europe hasn’t banned Russian natural gas, and Russia could continue to use gas as a weapon. And Russia has other markets for its vast energy industry too, right?
Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia was the top foreign supplier of the EU’s natural gas, oil and coal needs. Russia supplied 24% of the EU’s energy mix, including 40% of its natural gas needs and 1/3 of its oil imports. Europe paid dearly for this dependence in the form of a full-blown energy crisis in 2022 — with price spikes, shortages, and rationing.
Reducing reliance on Russian energy in 2023 is a de-risking strategy that will help Europe manage inflation and the recession that looms on the horizon. It will also put pressure on Russia’s war economy. There have been some positive developments on the EU’s decoupling from Russia. As of December 2022, the EU now prohibits crude oil imports from Russia by sea (Bulgaria and Hungary get waivers), and it set a price cap of $60 a barrel to be enforced by insurers and financiers. In February the EU will implement a ban on Russian refined fuels as well. To be sure, Russia will still be able to sell oil on world markets but at reduced prices and with higher costs due to international sanctions.
Some observers have called for a ban on Russian natural gas. But that’s unrealistic at this juncture given European dependence on Russian gas. In early 2022, the European Commission put forth a plan to cut reliance on Russian gas by two-thirds by the end of the year. Overall, European purchases of Russian gas appear to have dropped in 2022 but final tallies are not available yet. We know that by December 2022, supplies via pipeline had fallen to 25% of pre-war volumes, but this was mainly due to Russian throttling of gas delivery (although Russia blamed sanctions for reduced production) and disruptions to the Nord Stream pipeline. (Incredibly, gas continues to flow to Europe through Ukraine, albeit at much lower volumes, which shows how important the commodity is for both Europe and Russia. Meanwhile, there has been a surge in European liquid natural gas (LNG) imports from Russia.) But this surge does not compensate for the drop in Russian pipeline gas imports over the same period, according to CNN Business. An interesting fact is that the majority of the Russian LNG imports come from Novatek, which operates the Yamal LNG project on Russia’s northwest Arctic coast. Novatek is an independent publicly traded company, which means it is less subject to government manipulation and profiteering than state-owned Gazprom, which controls gas pipeline resources.
Western sanctions appear to be seriously hurting Russia’s energy sector by reducing its ability to import equipment and investment capital. At a recent conference, a Gazprom official said the company had a “very, very difficult” year with a 45% decline in exports by volume outside former Soviet states — although export drops were partially offset by price spikes mid-2022). It has been hard for Gazprom to steer exports from Europe to China, where there are no pipelines. Meanwhile, Japan has decided to sign LNG agreements with Oman, which will reduce its dependency on Russian gas supplies from Sakhlin in the Russian Far East.
Europe got a lucky break with a record-setting warm spell in recent weeks that reduced energy demand and pushed prices down. This avoided the winter catastrophe that some experts had predicted and also allowed EU countries to stockpile natural gas. Europe needs to continue to diversify its energy imports. This is starting to happen, with increased supplies of LNG coming from the United States, Qatar, and other non-Russian sources. Finland recently opened a floating LNG terminal. Europe will also have to boost its renewable and nuclear energy mix — not purely for reasons of a lower carbon footprint, but because renewable energy is locally produced. These measures will be gradual and expensive, and will require that the European Commission overcome divisions within the Union over what is always a politically sensitive topic. But these efforts will help Europe in the long term “de-risk” its energy sector: giving Europe more energy flexibility and independence, protecting against inflation and forestalling a severe recession, while also raising the costs of war for the Kremlin and its backers.
News You May Have Missed
Arrests Made in Christmas Electrical Substation Attacks
Arrests were made in Washington state where a Christmas Day shooting attack on an electrical substation left 15,000 without power. 2 were charged in the attack, and it was revealed that their motive was to cut power to facilitate a theft of cash. Investigations continue into other attacks on electrical infrastructure around the country.
Kenyan Designer and Activist Edwin Chiloba Found Brutally Murdered
The body of designer and LGBTQ rights activist Edwin Chiloba was found dumped in a metal box near the Rift Valley city of Eldoret. Chiloba was known for his success in fashion design and support for LGBTQ and other marginalized communities. Police have yet to comment on a motive, but rights groups in Kenya, where homosexuality remains outlawed, are already claiming that it was due to his sexuality and activism.
Iranian Reporter Who Interviewed Families of Condemned, Arrested
Amid the ongoing crackdown on dissent, Iranian authorities arrested journalist Mehdi Beik. Beik was known for interviewing the families of those Iranians sentenced to death by the Islamic Republic’s regime. Pro-reform sources tally the arrest of at least 73 other journalists since unrest began following the September death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of the regime’s morality police.
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.