Friday News Roundup — February 16, 2024
This week the likely Republican presidential nominee became defendant Donald Trump, sitting in a Manhattan court room in one of the four criminal cases he faces. The judge set a March 25 trial date in the case related to 2016 hush money payments to an adult film star, placing the trial just weeks after the Super Tuesday presidential primary vote that could put Trump over the delegate threshold.
At the same time in Georgia, the district attorney who has charged Trump and many of his aides with election subversion in that state was testifying about her relationship with a special prosecutor in the case. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court is currently considering not one, but two cases involving Trump’s attempts to overturn the results of the 2020 election and block the peaceful transfer of power. All of the court activity foreshadowed a presidential election unlike any the country has ever witnessed.
On the eve of the annual Munich Security Conference that each year celebrates the durability of the transatlantic alliance, Trump also made headlines by once again characterizing NATO as a protection racket, and encouraging Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to allies who don’t pay up. The conference was further marred by the tragic news that Russian opposition figure and outspoken Kremlin critic Alexey Navalny has died in prison at age 47, the latest in a long line of critics of Russian President Vladimir Putin to meet an untimely death.
In related news, this week the U.S. Senate killed a bipartisan deal to address a crisis at the southern border and render aide to embattled allies overseas, before passing a stand-alone foreign aid bill primarily for Ukraine and Israel that House leaders declared was likewise dead on arrival. The partisan deadlock comes as a critical moment for Ukraine especially, whose forces are facing a renewed offensive by Russian invaders and reportedly running out of ammunition.
In what is fast becoming a tense relationship, President Joe Biden spoke this week with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and warned him not to proceed with a planned military offensive in Rafah without a credible plan to protect some 1 million Palestinian civilians who have sought refuge in that crowded corner of the Gaza Strip. It was the second such warning Biden has issued in less than a week as international pressure grows for a ceasefire in a war that began with a surprise Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, that saw terrorists kill more than 1,200 Israelis and take more than 250 hostages. According to the health ministry in Hamas-controlled Gaza, more than 28,000 Palestinians have been killed in the fighting thus far.
This week CSPC Senior Fellow Ethan Brown examines China’s growing calls on the West to cease military aid to Ukraine in order to facilitate negotiations for a ceasefire. CSPC Intern Kurt Johnston takes a deep dive into the unclear motives behind Hungary’s Viktor Orban’s efforts to turn the European Union into an illiberal alliance.
Examining China’s call for diplomacy in Ukraine
By Ethan Brown
Beijing’s representatives stood before the United Nations council and — siding with Moscow — called for Western nations to cease military aid to Ukraine in order to allow negotiations to proceed, “stop pouring oil on the fire and stop undermining the diplomatic efforts of the international community” as stated by Chinese ambassador to the U.N. Zhang Jun.
The irony, of course, is that China has provided its share of material and financial support to Russia, largely in the form of nearly all of the drone technology being used by Russian forces along the frontlines. It should be noted that, in October of last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin led a delegation to Beijing celebrating the 10-year anniversary of China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative.
China’s decry in front of the world’s representatives is, perhaps, a more blatant signal of the realities of this conflict than they would prefer to have let slip. Simply, the side that calls for negotiations is often the one with a) the most to lose, and seeks mediation to moderate the ultimate outcome in confrontation and b) a telling sign of the present circumstances which are not favorable. China may not literally have stake in this conflict (save for losing their top drone customer, as noted above), but Russia certainly does; Putin, after all told Tucker Carlson in last week’s peculiar interview that he was willing to negotiate and end to the war but blamed Ukraine’s President Zelensky for its continuation.
If Russia stood at its Eastern front and believed it had the absolute ability to end this conflict on their “Maximalist terms,” (as noted by our colleague Joshua Huminski in sharp analysis this week), then calls for negotiation wouldn’t be offered. The victors in warfare don’t ask to negotiate an end state with the opponent they are dominating: they demand capitulation or surrender. I’ll share some brilliant insights from Patrick Roberts and Ariel Ahram in a piece from War on the Rocks four years ago: “States expecting absolute victory are more likely to view openness to negotiation as a sign of weakness, and to view negotiations as a tool to get the other side to surrender.” Putin, for his part, is either capitulating (a few months after stating his will to “win” and military objectives remained unchanged), or employing double-speak in order to obfuscate policy.
Where then, does Beijing’s calls for diplomacy fit into this complex puzzle? In a most fascinating turn of events between these authoritarian bedfellows, that same Tucker Carlson interview has sparked some potentially upending public discourse within China about sensitive geography between Beijing and Moscow: the Vladivostok Sea Port in Russia’s far eastern provinces. Vladivostok became a Russian (Tsarist) possession in 1860 under the treaty of Peking. When Putin’s interview with Carlson aired, the former cited history as a bulwark to defend his illegal invasion of Ukraine, prompting the aforementioned public outcry on Chinese social media about the legitimacy of such claims, leading to calls for the seaports return to Chinese possession and control. Further, it should be noted that China’s August 2023 National borders map redrew international boundaries with most of its neighbors: annexing bits of India, the South China Sea, Japan, Taiwan (of course), and indeed, Russian geography. To boot, just this week, Chinese financial institutions such as Zhejiang Chouzhou Commercial Bank (one of Russia’s key Chinese lenders and dependent exporters) and the Bank of China (one of China’s largest financial institutions) halted all transactions in an attempt to avoid Western sanctions.
For all the political bluster and public hand-holding between Russian and Chinese tyrants, the latter is looking much further into the future than the former. The political expediency of aligning grand narratives against the United States and the West writ large is a useful short-term tool for Beijing as it would exploit any opportunity to be seen as the world’s singular power broker: calling for a negotiated settlement in Ukraine would seemingly make China the calming, rational voice on the world stage. But we must consider the conditions that led to such remarks and in doing so, will understand why continued aid to Ukraine is so important for the sake of global democracy.
Winning a war is not an incentive for the winning side to urge negotiations. China is just as likely concerned that a Russian victory in Ukraine could spark similar ambitions with Vladivostok or other now-disputed territorial claims by Beijing. Chinese media has thus far been mum about the growing public discussion about territorial claims after Putin’s public remarks with Carlson last week. But those in the West should recognize China’s calls for negotiations for what they are: a realization that sustained conflict in Ukraine is only going to further erode any chance Moscow and Beijing had at being effective, functional actors on the world stage. Sustaining this conflict will only deepen the growing international opposition to authoritarian ambitions. China, for its part, would seem to be just as wary of Russian maximalism while efforting its patient, expansive policies for international influence too.
Thus, Chinese calls for a negotiated settlement and diplomatic resolutions to this crisis reflect that Beijing’s alignment with Moscow is more about immediate expediency, but with longer-term objectives and strategy in mind, China would be just as glad to rid itself of the increasing burden of aiding its Northern authoritarian neighbor so it can focus on global ambitions in its own idiom.
The Unclear Motives Behind Viktor Orbán’s European Revolt
By Kurt Johnston
Viktor Orbán has embraced being the European Union’s voice of rebellion. Despite his lack of E.U. allies, Hungary’s populist prime minister continues to rebuff and rebuke Brussels’ pleas for legislative unanimity. At a time when Europe looks to unite against Russian aggression, Orbán has openly embraced Putin while blocking funds to Ukraine. His defiant international image only boosts his domestic popularity, contributing to an overwhelming Fidesz majority in the Hungarian parliament.
The juxtaposition between Orbán’s vilification abroad and adoration at home threatens the E.U.’s reputation. While a recently approved aid package to Ukraine is a positive sign, Orbán’s veto — on issues from foreign aid to accession — is a constant barrier to European action. An E.U. response is required, but a path forward is unclear.
Orbán has forced Brussels’ hand through his recent threats of legislative vetoes. In December, the E.U. announced it would open preliminary accession negotiations with Ukraine and Hungary. Orbán surprisingly left the room as voting commenced, but has promised to reject the proposal at his next opportunity. A similar saga transpired earlier this month, when the E.U. passed a $50 billion package to aid Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure. Following weeks of posturing, Orbán dropped his veto after the E.U. conceded to periodic budget reviews.
Orbán has attempted to foment anti-E.U. sentiment across the continent. According to the Financial Times, “Orbán associates” sent funds to France’s National Rally, a populist far-right party best known for its anti-Muslim rhetoric. This month, Orbán voiced his support for Europe’s farmers’ protest, a backlash against E.U. emissions regulations and pro-Ukraine laws that allegedly undercut domestic production. He also has a history of printing anti-E.U. advertisements in European newspapers, and recently unveiled billboards attacking European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
Hungary’s rebellion in Europe also extends to NATO. Orbán’s government briefly delayed a vote on Finland’s status, ultimately approving their membership last year. However, Sweden’s bid — submitted concurrently with Finland — is yet to be ratified by the Hungarian parliament, which has become the last governing body to block Sweden’s accession after Turkey’s approval last month. Although Orbán has spoken publicly in favor of Swedish membership, his party’s unwillingness to vote is a true signal of his opposition, with no clear endgame in sight.
Several E.U. officials have guessed at Orbán’s motives. One explanation is that Orbán is leveraging his veto to force the E.U. to release billions in funds withheld from Hungary. The E.U. decided to freeze the money in 2022 due to concerns over antidemocratic legislation pushed by Orban. While about $10 billion was granted to Hungary in December on a technical dispute, over $20 billion remains with the European Commission — with further investigations and potential freezes looming.
Hungary is reliant on E.U. aid, receiving the third-most benefits behind only Poland and Greece. Its economy has also lagged behind its continental peers: Hungary’s December 2023 inflation rate fell to 5.5% but remains over two points higher than the E.U. average.
A second possibility behind Orbán’s obstructionism is that he is seeking to maximize Hungary’s negotiating power. He has successfully positioned his country as a key player in Europe, for instance, even if it is seen as an agitator. Similarly sized states, such as Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Austria, garner far fewer concessions (and headlines) than Hungary. Orbán’s fame — or infamy — has risen to a level commensurate with the most recognized leaders in the world. While this position has isolated Orbán within Europe, he counts Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Donald Trump as allies.
Yet it is European isolation that threatens Orbán’s Hungary. In February, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told reporters that Brussels has “Orbán fatigue,” and that E.U. leaders would no longer tolerate the Hungarian’s blackmail tactics. Some members have even floated using Article 7 of the Treaty of European Union, which, if passed, would strip Hungary of its E.U. voting rights. This so-called “nuclear option” is unlikely to gain enough support to succeed, but it represents a severe punitive threat against Orbán’s government.
Orbán claims blocking E.U. measures is an attempt to reform the organization internally. Unlike some other right-wing parties, Fidesz has no intention of leaving the European Union — likely due to Hungary’s aforementioned reliance on E.U. aid. Instead, Orbán hopes to unite a growing nationalist bloc within the European Parliament after this summer’s elections.
There are two major factions within the European Parliament that are to the right of the European People’s Party (EPP), the primary center-right alliance. The first is Europe Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), a populist group that seeks to shrink E.U. influence. The coalition includes Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, Poland’s Law and Justice, Spain’s Vox, and the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats. Orbán has signaled he wants his party to join ECR, yet has faced opposition from the Swedes over Hungary’s NATO rejection. To the right of ECR lies Identity and Democracy (ID), an avowed nationalist coalition. It includes parties like National Rally and Alternative for Germany (AfD), both of which have roots in fascism.
A poll from Europe Elects projects ID to win 91 seats and ECR to win 80 seats in June, which would make them the third and fifth biggest alliances within the European Parliament, respectively. If they were to unite, this coalition would surpass the Social Democrat group, and trail only the EPP. Orbán, who is slated to hold the European Council’s rotating presidency after the election, could suddenly find himself surrounded by allies in a largely Eurosceptic E.U. parliament.
Until then it is unclear how the relationship between Brussels and Hungary will evolve. If Orban’s primary goal is the release of Hungary’s E.U. funds, he will likely lift his veto of Sweden’s NATO membership. If Orbán is seeking instead to enhance his reputation as a nationalist power broker, his rebellion will probably continue. He recently threatened that Hungary would not ratify Sweden’s NATO membership until Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson visited Budapest, providing a photo opportunity that would boost his domestic power and prestige. Depending on the outcome of June’s E.U. Parliamentary elections, Orbán could even emerge as the figurehead of a vocal Eurosceptic minority. Orbán’s veto saga thus illustrates the potential dysfunction coming to the European Union this summer.
Kurt Johnston is an intern at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress
News You May Have Missed
South Korea and Cuba Establish Formal Diplomatic Relations
By Greyson Hunziker
The two states have had no formal relations since Fidel Castro’s rise to power in 1959. South Korea, a strong ally of the United States and Japan, and Cuba, once dependent on the Soviet Union, have largely been on opposite sides of the geopolitical landscape. The most significant factor inhibiting formal ties between them has been the close relationship between Cuba and North Korea, two ideologically aligned countries with histories of authoritarianism and isolation. However, South Korea may have been motivated by what its presidential office called the “political and psychological blow” that the new relationship would deal to North Korea, which has few allies.
Furthermore, there have been growing economic incentives for diplomacy between Cuba and South Korea, including mutual interest in one another’s cultures. Cuba, still under an American-imposed embargo, wants to interact with major economies, and South Korea seeks to expand further in the Western Hemisphere. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Cuba hosted around 14,000 South Korean visitors annually. A 2022 festival in Seoul featured Cuban films, while there is a group of roughly 10,000 fans of Korean popular culture called “ArtCor” in Cuba.
2024 Election in Pakistan
By Greyson Hunziker
Pakistan held elections last week with no clear winner. Independent candidates won 93 seats, followed by the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) with 75, and the Pakistan People’s Party with 54, of the 264 up for reelection. The vast majority of the independents were backed by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insak party (PTI), the party of imprisoned ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan. Mr. Khan and the PTI were barred from running, so PTI candidates ran independently, making them ineligible for a portion of the 70 seats reserved for non-Muslims and women. These seats will mostly go to the PML-N and PPP, who will likely form a coalition government and re-nominate former PML-N Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to the premiership.
However, the PTI-aligned candidates and Mr. Khan allege widespread vote-rigging, and 100s of PTI-aligned candidates are appealing the results. A PML-N document shared on X listed more votes received than voters [for some candidates], while 14 independents had not received any votes at all, meaning they did not even vote for themselves. A minor party candidate gave up the seat he was said to have won, saying the election was rigged in his favor against his PTI-aligned opponent. Other countries are concerned about the reports of rigging and voter suppression. This election thus creates a cloud of uncertainty that has settled over Pakistan’s democracy.
Greyson Hunziker is an intern at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress