Friday News Roundup — January 21, 2022
Greetings from Washington, D.C., where, needless to say, it has been an eventful week. For President Biden and Democratic leadership, their push on voting rights legislation has stalled facing the reality of the 50–50 Senate and the recalcitrance of Senators Manchin and Sinema to reshape the current filibuster rules. In a two-hour press conference, President Biden also sought to highlight the successes of his first year, but the main headlines were about his remarks on what scope of Russian incursion would trigger an allied response. While he may have said the quiet part out loud, the reality of the limited options — and the Europeans valuing Russian energy and lucre over values and security — is seen in both the diplomatic salons of Geneva and the cold, harsh front lines where Ukraine could soon, again, be defending itself. Even as the focus is on Ukraine, President Biden meets, albeit virtually, with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, as the long-term competition with China vies for attention and resources with the near-term crises fomented by the Kremlin.
While a challenging week for the current president, the former president’s week included deepening investigations by the New York State Attorney General Letitia James, the 8–1 Supreme Court granting the January 6th committee access to Trump administration records, and growing pressure on both close confidants and family to testify in this and other investigations. After all, this intro barely scratches the surface of the week’s events, and there’s plenty covered in this week’s roundup.
Before we get to that, Mike Rogers Center director, Joshua C. Huminski, reviewed “Strategiya” by Ofer Fridman, a particularly timely edited volume exploring the evolution of Russian strategic doctrine through the words of Tsarist, Soviet, and exile writers.
In this week’s extended roundup, we open with CSPC President & CEO, Rep. Glenn Nye looking at whether there is hope for bipartisanship to ensure secure and legitimate elections. Our intern Evelyn Jimenez, joining us from the University of California, Irvine, follows up with details about these legislative proposals and grassroots’ perspective. Dan looks at how the back-and-forth over 5G and airline safety demonstrates shambolic interagency coordination on advanced technologies. Ethan covers the deepening military cooperation with Japan as Biden and Kishida meet. Covering the situation in Europe and the threat from Russia: Joshua looks at Britain’s rhetorical and material support for Ukraine; Wes provides the latest updates on diplomatic talks with Moscow; and our Visiting Fellow Veera Parko, joining us from Finland, provides perspective on how Helsinki and Stockholm see Russia’s threats and prospects for cooperation with, and even membership in, NATO. As always, we wrap with news you may have missed.
Any Hope for Bipartisanship on Voting Laws?
Glenn Nye
This week we witnessed an unusual event in the United States Senate, an actual substantive debate over various aspects of voting rights and procedures, as Americans have low faith in our fundamental democratic institutions. Unfortunately, the debate ended in a partisan stalemate over a very important topic, revealing just how difficult it is to find any common ground on voting rules and procedures — or even a common sense of where the real underlying problems exist in our system, the root causes of election-related anxiety. On the positive side, the debate itself provided some opportunity for the American people to hear the various arguments and begin to weigh their merits. It is too bad the debate was not held open for several more days to really allow for a fuller airing of the issue before moving to a vote with a predetermined and unsatisfying outcome. Elections involve a complex relationship between Congress and the states, and reforms efforts manifest an overlapping array of standards and procedures designed to address various aspects of interlocking problem sets. The complexity of the proposed reforms demand more time to make the case to Americans about each element of proposed reform and what might be the tradeoffs of each approach.
The proposals joined together into one legislative proposal in the Senate this week included:
Measures to prevent discrimination in voting rules, manifested in the John Lewis Act, including re-establishing and clarifying preclearance of changes to certain election laws to prevent changes to election procedures that would have a negative effect on minorities, necessitated by a history of racism against black voters in some voting laws;
Measures to ensure ease of access to voting for all citizens, including minimum standards across states for early voting and vote-by-mail options;
Measures that would change incentives toward cooperation and remove some of the most faith-destroying processes, like creating standards to limit the partisan gerrymandering common in many states, contributing to the vitriol and dysfunction in our governing bodies that further erodes faith in our politics
The joint bill, however, also contained a range of other changes, including novel small-dollar campaign finance mechanisms and disclosure rules, plus other requirements. Though the bill contained some very positive and needed reforms, that totality of the bill was complicated past the point of communicating a clear and simple understanding to the American people, especially over only one-and-a-half days of Senate debate. Some compelling arguments for elements of reform were aired during the debate, and this is a positive step for those who desire to see real change and are willing to invest the time and energy in convincing others of the merits of their arguments. The effort to change the rules of the Senate after a modest debate period, and for a Senate that is divided 50/50, did not seem likely, however, to change the minds of persuadable Americans. Perhaps a narrower focus on a single element, like the John Lewis Act, would have been a better foundation for a clear and compelling argument for expedited action.
Missing from the debate were also urgent measures to prevent outright overturning of elections, leveraging the lessons of January 6th and the related effort to have partisan actors intervene inappropriately or illegally change a certified election outcome. This could focus on revisions to the Electoral Count Act, clarifying the role of Congress and the Vice President in electoral ballot counting. In this area also shines a ray of light on prospects for bipartisan cooperation in Congress. A bipartisan group of senators is currently negotiating changes to the Electoral Count Act, where there appears to be some common sense of the urgency and the problem. Perhaps some progress on this issue would open a small window for a next step on voting rules.
Lack of trust between Senators from the two parties was evident this week, and the partisan divide on display further complicates any hope of increasing faith among Americans in their election system. This is deeply troubling. Some good faith, bipartisan effort to achieve common ground and end the current scorched-earth war over voting rules — which serve to energize party bases but disillusion most everyone else — would be tremendously valuable to our politics. Such a truce and subsequent negotiations would probably require the intense involvement of some trusted nonpartisan actors, perhaps CEOs who represent an institution that still manages to enjoy a solid level of trust. Voting and election systems is a highly charged area of focus, but fixing some of the underlying incentives to partisanship as well as ensuring laws are fair and equitable for all citizens is no less important today than when this week of Senate debate began.
A New Era of Voting Laws
Evelyn Jimenez
While issues of COVID-19 continue to affect the nation daily, the Biden Administration has tried to take care of other pressing issues as well. As witnessed during the 2020 presidential election, there were many accusations of voter fraud and voter suppression. The Biden Administration has attempted to tackle these issues by creating a new bill that will protect voters’ rights and hold states accountable in instances of voter suppression.
Democrats in the Senate have developed two acts with the prime goal of updating current voting laws. This includes the Freedom to Vote Act and the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act.
Freedom to Vote Act
The revised version of the For the People’s Act was created with the intention for all Americans to vote freely and easily. This includes protecting the rights of minority groups who are disproportionally affected by voter suppression laws.
Currently, voter laws vary by state in terms of access to voting and registration. To ensure that all voters have the same opportunity to vote, the Freedom to Vote Act would require all states to have the same voter laws. This includes offering several forms of voting such as an increase in the availability of ballot boxes and the option to mail-in ballots.
In regards to registration, many citizens are uninformed in this area. Such as not knowing how or where to register, or simply not feeling obligated to. The Freedom to Vote Act would establish automatic voter registration once voters turn 18 and permit for same-day voter registration. This would allow for all eligible Americans to vote freely without having to worry about registration issues and accessibility. Citizens are more likely to comply to vote knowing they are automatically registered.
By only offering one day to vote in person, some voters may be unable to due to work obligations, child care, and other responsibilities. People of color (POC) and low-income individuals are especially vulnerable in this area who work long hours to support their families; they cannot afford to leave work to vote knowing they are losing money. The Freedom to Vote Act aims to alleviate voting pressure by offering at least 15 days of early voting, including weekends. Long lines on voting day will no longer be an issue and voters may plan accordingly when they choose to vote without worrying about outside responsibilities.
John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act
The proposed bill also includes updated criteria for the Voting Rights Act of 1965, where a historic ban of discriminatory election laws was placed. The main goal of the John Lewis Act is to ensure that voters can defend their rights if they experience any form of discrimination and/or voter suppression. Voters will now have the ability to sue under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, where its usage was very limited before. This is done to ensure the protection of groups who experience voter suppression, such as minorities and people with disabilities. Fear among these communities will decline knowing their rights are being protected; voter turnout is likely to increase within the POC community.
Native Americans have experienced forms of voter suppression such as limited access to voting. The proposed bill would require states to adopt the included Native American Voting Rights Act that aims to assist the Native American community to easily vote. Such implementations include states placing polling and voter registration sites on tribal lands. The Native American community will more likely express their right to vote under these circumstances.
Under the passage of the bill, states will have to receive clearance from the federal government if they wish to make changes to their state’s voting laws. By requiring this clearance states will be held accountable for proposing laws that are discriminatory and attack voter’s rights. This portion of the bill further ensures that all voter’s rights will be protected.
Republicans in the Senate
After to the bill’s passage in the House of Representatives, there were strong hopes it would pass in the Senate. Republicans however, had other ideas.
On January 19, 2022, Republican Senators voted in favor to maintain the current filibuster rule. This rule was used in an attempt to delay, and essentially prevent, the passage of the new voting legislation. The vote to keep the current filibuster rule was 52–48, where moderate Democratic Sens. Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema voted with Republicans. They claimed that their firm stance was to avoid a “deepening division” and avoid “uncertainty.”
Republican Senators claimed that an updated version of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was unsuitable and that voting laws should be left to individual states to decide. They have also claimed that the new bill was created with the intention of a Democrat power grab. Due to the high voter turnout of the 2020 election, Republicans observed this as evidence that Americans had no issues exercising their right to vote; therefore, new voting laws are unwarranted.
However, several state governments have taken action to create new restrictive voter laws. Gov. Greg Abbott of Texas signed into law Senate Bill 1 in September of 2021, which implements new voting rules for the purpose of “election integrity.” If voters wish to submit their ballot via mail, they must provide their driver’s license or social security number; this was not a requirement before. If the numbers on the submitted ballot do not match the numbers on the registration information, the ballot will be rejected and uncounted for. Critics of the bill contend that it specifically targets people of color and those with disabilities; thus limiting citizens right to vote.
Necessity for a New Voting Legislation
New voting rules, such as those in Texas, will strongly affect the POC community and those of low income. Without the passage of new federal voting legislation, states will continue to have the ability to freely pass laws that limit Americans’ right to vote without any repercussions. After the 2020 election, Arizona and a handful of other states introduced measures that would allow the state legislature to overturn the results of the popular vote; however, these measures have so far not become law. The Freedom to Vote Act was created in part to prevent states from adopting such measures.
The Democrats, and especially the American people, experienced a tragic loss in the Senate this week with the defeat of voting rights legislation. Democrats and Republicans spent numerous hours debating this legislation, but further engagement with the American public would help build understanding of the importance of new voting rights legislation. It remains to be seen how Democrats and Republicans will proceed after the turn of events on January 19. If Democrats wish to continue to fight for voting rights, they must either persuade a portion of Republicans in the Senate of the importance of voting rights legislation, or convince Democratic hold-outs to vote in favor of changing the filibuster rule. Without this change, any bill developed by Democrats is unlikely to pass the Senate. What is at stake here is bringing more Americans into the political process and ensuring that minority voters know their voting rights are protected.
Airlines-vs-5G Debacle: Black Eye for American Technology Leadership
Dan Mahaffee
With each successive 5G deadline and the increasingly public back-and-forth between airline and telecom executives, the failings of our technology deployment and policymaking are laid bare. Where the world once looked to U.S. leadership in aviation, telecoms, and setting standards for advanced technologies, today, our leading telecom and aviation corporations squabble, regulators appear blindsided, and questions about American competence and leadership only grow.
The issue with 5G and aircraft operation involves the radio altimeter, which uses radio signals bounced off the ground to determine an aircraft’s altitude with greater precision than barometric altimeters, which are set and adjusted according to the ambient air pressure. These radio altimeters are used for instrument-guided approaches using airplanes’ onboard equipment and ground-based radio beacons that constitute instrument landing systems (ILS). These systems allow for landings in low-visibility and other types of inclement weather, while also helping with pilots’ workload in busy airspace and feeding data to other automated systems.
In the technical weeds, these radio altimeters operate at 4.2–4.4 GHz, while the 5G networks to be activated by AT&T and Verizon operate at 3.7–3.98 GHz. Despite the “guard band” frequency gap put in place by the FCC between those bands of spectrum — and myriad questions remaining about any real-world examples of interference and which models of altimeter might be affected — FAA, aircraft manufacturers, airplane sensor manufacturers, and the airline industry have all continued to voice their concerns.
How this shambolic situation came about reflects bureaucratic breakdowns, as well as the impact of regulatory capture of key agencies. First, it must be acknowledged that the safety margins for operating aircraft exist for a reason and have contributed to making U.S. air travel among the safest in the world. Second, alongside our prioritization of safe and efficient air travel, policies to promote and speed the deployment of 5G have also been pursued by successive administrations and FCC leadership from both parties. Finally, as both the FCC moved ahead with spectrum auctions, the FAA noted concerns from both Boeing and the ICAO (the UN’s international aviation authority) as early as 2018 — though the FAA says these concerns were not relayed to the FCC by the NTIA (the body responsible for resolving spectrum disputes.)
What this reveals is a breakdown in the process around advanced technologies. In 2020, as AT&T and Verizon were spending billions on spectrum to roll out important 5G networks and expand coverage, the interagency process for proactively addressing this issue failed. While the FAA points at the FCC and NTIA, it hardly has a strong track record to point to, from the ultimately deadly failings of the Boeing 737MAX safety certification to the continued delays in modernizing U.S. air traffic control. Leadership at the FAA was also an issue over the past years — as former President Trump sought to install his personal pilot at the head of the agency in 2018, only acting administrators were in place until late-2019.
Furthermore, while 5G deployment was moving ahead in 2020, U.S. airlines were laser-focused on surviving the pandemic. Yet, as taxpayer dollars kept airlines flying, little attention was paid nor were actions taken to modernize systems vulnerable to 5G interference. While new radio altimeters or added filters could address interference concerns, airlines balk at shouldering new costs. (A late-night comedy writer could easily imagine some U.S. carriers charging passengers a “5G safe landing fee.”) Still, as U.S. airline fleets on average rank among the oldest in the world — second only to fleets in Africa — and U.S. air traffic control lags modern systems in Europe, Asia, and Canada, we have to acknowledge how increasingly dated aircraft and air travel infrastructure interface and conflict with new technologies and infrastructure.
Thus, at best, we have our regulatory bodies failing to coordinate on technological and transportation issues of national importance. At worst, they are failing to do their job as they are beholden to the interests of their respective industries rather than the national interest and a strategic path forward. We see a breakdown in leadership and interagency coordination resulting in the future of key technologies being determined in CEO’s dueling public letters, brinksmanship around last minute deadlines, and threats of disruption to vital transportation networks. And these problems will not end when this issue is resolved. As wireless innovation continues, spectrum allocation will face even greater demands, while modernizing transportation infrastructure will require vision, and the commitment of resources, from all stakeholders involved.
From this experience we see, first, the need for more real-world testing and interoperability checks before deployment takes place. This is not only an issue for wireless telecom and aviation, but also future technologies. Future 5G and networked technologies will incorporate software and hardware from many vendors in connected technologies from autonomous vehicles to networked factory floors. Standards of interoperability and non-interference are vital for these technologies to meet their potential. Breakdowns in the regulatory process also reflect both the risks of leaving important positions unfilled, or with only acting administrators, as well as the need for better interagency coordination — likely from the White House — to resolve stakeholders’ interests and potential conflicts long before eleventh-hour fixes. If American standards in fields like technology and aviation — as well as perceptions of our general technical and administrative competence — are to be an example to the world, this 5G and aviation brouhaha is hardly a positive one. Hopefully, in Washington, it can be a learning experience for future technology deployment and infrastructure modernization vital to our technological and economic competitiveness. Beyond, it is a reminder that our debates over the size of government—and increasingly a focus on political and cultural identity that trumps competence—fail to give us the needed functions of government.
Deepening ties on the Pacific Rim
Ethan Brown
Cooperation, not provocation, is a delicate line to walk for states in the modern world of strategic competition. As recent events in eastern Europe and Central Asia have shown, security cooperation between states amidst security challenges often serves as a petri dish for instigative rhetoric and indecision on those who are reactionary. Through a certain perspective, The United States and Japan agreeing in principle and future signatory agreements to deepening military cooperation and mutual support should give Beijing the same reactionary pause that European states and NATO face amid the Ukraine crisis. Already garnering attention is the virtual summit this week between President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, which serves as the headlining context for this improved military cooperation, and expectations are extremely high. Deterrence takes on a new flavor and weight in the security climate of today, where open conflict between states is seemingly always on the brink, but unlikely based on the costs of warfare between great powers.
Notably, this new pact between Washington and Tokyo is squarely concentrated on deterring Chinese aggression against Taiwan, where Japan’s fiscal support to U.S. forces and activities will reach the $1.82 billion mark, ending a Trump-era pause on U.S. engagements abroad regarding the American investment in forward-staging military forces and capabilities on foreign soil. The increase in Japanese military spending will also look to increase technological development, systems interoperability, data sharing and research, as well as bolster infrastructure critical to forward-staging electronic warfare, missile defense, and human capital in locations pivotal to deterring (and responding) threats inherent to a Taiwan invasion.
The military of any nation serves as a critical tool in diplomacy and integration, and with regards to cooperation, few examples demonstrate the same level of resolve and collaboration as the relationship between the U.S. and Japan, where 50,000 personnel denote the single largest body of internationally-placed DoD forces anywhere in the world. Further, the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, the largest and most densely-packed maritime task force on earth, calls the Japan region it’s ‘home’. Beyond the diplomatic and cabinet-agreements of recent news, U.S. Indo-Pacific commander Admiral John Aquilio re-affirmed the U.S. military commitment to the Pacific region when he assumed his post over the summer. It’s worth mentioning the military posturing because signatory agreements work great for headlines and talking points, but defense forces living the message speaks volumes.
While relations between Japan and the United States fall in the ‘status quo’ bin, Tokyo has not stood pat in its efforts to broaden and deepen Indo-Pacific security. On similar timelines, a mutual cooperation and access agreement was signed between Japan and Australia to enable reciprocal access for military exercises between the Quad members. This agreement is a first for Tokyo, who hosts the American military under a status-of-forces agreement, but has not entered into a similar binding agreement on military cooperation with another state until now. The common thread, naturally, is Chinese aggression and a free and open Indo-Pacific, and while Japanese and Australian defense forces have cooperated in military training exercises in the past, such as the highlight-reel Talisman Sabre exercise, the new agreement institutionalized intelligence sharing, equipment transfers, and cross servicing equipment like aerial refueling, logistical support and service interoperability development.
This move to create a unified front along Chinese ambitions in the Pacific, the east and south China seas, and along the Strait of Taiwan are critical steps in checking Beijing aggression. Further, India-U.S. cooperation has already been working beneath the headlines, but no less notable, where Defense Minister Rajnath Singh called the deepening relationship “a determined [attempt] to realize the full potential of comprehensive global strategic partnership”. Difficulties abound in certain respects, where the Indian possession of arms imports from Russia, such as the S-400 surface to air defense system create a vulnerability that already caused U.S. cooperation problems elsewhere (Turkey and its ouster from the F-35 program). India’s concerns are decidedly more regional, and less strategic than those of the United States and Japan, with particular concern for its rivalry with Pakistan (hence it’s rapid acquisition of the Russian systems over U.S. offerings), but common adversaries have a funny knack for changing the security calculus, which is precisely what Beijing offers in this complex arrangement of partners.
The motivations of India to pursue its own security guarantees should not overshadow increased cooperation with an eye towards Chinese aggression in the region. Overarching these recent developments is and should be focused on the Quad building its cooperation at grand and tactical scale, which is the best method of bringing lesser states into the fold of the Quad’s regional influence.
While these steps are only the early moves to deepen defense ties, they remain significant as the U.S. leads coordination efforts in the Pacific to unify like-minded states to protect sovereignty and prevent continued expansion of Chinese absolutism abroad. By strengthening the security of the region’s biggest and most advanced states into the fold, an incentive is thus provided for other players of less certain security postures to join the party, particularly those who feel the weight of Chinese pressure more acutely than those on China’s immediate flanks. Again, the challenge here is to demonstrate resolve against aggression, and not create a dynamic that provokes the aggression from Beijing which no Quad member wants, but resolute cooperation is necessary at the onset, and Japan’s recent moves are a clear signal of deepening ties across the Pacific rim.
The United Kingdom, Ukraine, and Hard Power vis-à-vis Russia
Joshua C. Huminski
Great Britain announced that it was supplying several thousand light anti-tank guided weapons to Ukraine in response to Russia’s build-up along its border. The Secretary of Defence, Ben Wallace`, said that the decision comes in light of “the increasingly threatening behaviour from Russia”. He added, “We have taken the decision to supply Ukraine with light anti-armour defensive weapons systems.”
According to Wallace, “Let me be clear: this support is for short-range and clearly defensive weapon capabilities; they are not strategic weapons and pose no threat to Russia; they are to use in self-defence.” A small number of UK troops would accompany the weapons, commonly known as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) to train their Ukrainian counterparts. The next generation light anti-tank weapons (NLAWs) are not as powerful or as capable as the American-made Javelin missile system, but do pose a threat to armored vehicles including Russian main battle tanks.
The provision of the ATGMs is a departure from London’s support to Kyiv. Last year the two capitals signed an agreement for two minesweepers and for the joint construction of eight ships for Ukraine’s Black Sea Fleet — a deal worth £1.7bn (~$2.32 billion).
It is interesting to note that the delivery of the missiles flew around German airspace leading to speculation as to the reason for the roundabout flight path. Some speculated that it was in response to potential objections from Berlin (which has thus far declined to send military aid to Kyvi), or simply a matter of expediency to avoid the legal issues of the necessary clearances and approvals for flying munitions over Germany.
Wallace also penned an essay on NATO, Ukraine, and Russia, published by the Ministry of Defence earlier this week. It is a surprisingly well-written piece in that it is a cogent deconstruction of the present situation, and not a typical policy document or set of talking points. In it, Wallace attacks Moscow’s claims about NATO aggression, dismantles Putin’s ahistorical understanding of Kyiv, and presents a strong case for what is at stake in the present crisis.
That the UK is stepping up where its European counterparts appear reluctant to do so is interesting and worth note. To be sure there is a very muddied and muddled domestic picture and one could argue that London’s greater involvement in the Ukraine crisis has a touch of the “wag the dog”. Were that the case, one would expect the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, to be more out front and he is decidedly not. Rather Wallace is very much point on Op Orbital (started in February 2015 by the Minister of Defence), and this engagement preceded the prime minister’s present precarious political position. It is interesting to note that given the Prime Minister’s political difficulties, the shipment of arms to Ukraine and support to Kyiv is receiving considerably less political coverage than it otherwise might.
That the UK is much more forward-leaning and involved in the present crisis, and is backing Ukraine more forcefully than other NATO members, is not surprising and is in keeping with London’s interest in the alliance — an involvement that goes back to the end of World War Two and the formation of the British Army of the Rhine, which involved some 80,000 troops at its peak. Then, as now, the UK gets received much greater benefits from NATO engagement than other countries, gaining outsized involvement and influence in European continental affairs than it otherwise would. This is particularly important post-Brexit and post-Integrated Review where London is scrambling to find its role in the world.
Will several thousand ATGMs turn the tide against the expansion of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine? Likely not. It will certainly raise the cost for Moscow, but it is an insufficient tactical deterrent to what is ultimately a strategic challenge and threat. It is a low-cost signal of the UK’s (and by extension the U.S.’s) support to Ukraine, and is done in a manner that does not give Moscow a reason to pull the trigger.
By contrast, the deployment of long-range precision fires, advanced air defense systems (such as the Patriot missile) or other capabilities could be seen as escalatory by Moscow and trigger action. Indeed, the U.S. Intelligence Community warned that Russia may seek to use a “false-flag” act to justify the expanded invasion of Ukraine.
The present crisis reflects the effects of under-investment in and under-prioritization of hard power and conventional deterrence in Europe. The end of the Cold War may have yielded a decrease in hostilities over the 90s and early 2000s, but Putin’s increasingly hostile actions and behaviors, did not prompt a reevaluation of NATO’s power and purpose. Increased unit rotations and joint training exercises are not a substitute for real, substantive investment in conventional deterrence.
For its part, Washington announced this week that it would provide an additional $200 million in defensive military aid to Kyiv. It has also emerged that the CIA is providing paramilitary support and training to Ukraine’s military in anticipation of a possible post-invasion insurgency. The State Department also cleared the Baltic states to send U.S.-made Javelin anti-tank weapons and Stinger air-defense systems to Ukraine. The administration also is preparing to send five Mi-17 helicopters to Ukraine, as well. The reality is that whilst the shuttle diplomacy and negotiations are to be welcomed, there is little Washington and the West can do to dissuade Putin from acting.
Nearly all of the options on the table, at least hard power options, are post-invasion responses — responses not helped by President Biden’s comment that a “minor incursion” wouldn’t prompt a severe response. Whether or not it was said out of turn, or subsequently walked back, it reflects a broader situation whereby Washington isn’t setting the pace or terms of this dynamic. Needless to say, these own-goals are not helping, especially when allies like the UK are attempting to do something, however empty that something may be in the end.
United States and Europe Engage in Eleventh-Hour Diplomacy Over Ukraine
Wes Culp
After last week’s talks in Geneva and Brussels failed to reconcile the distant positions of Moscow and the capitals of the West, a new flurry of diplomatic activity kicked off this week in order to stave off the prospect of a renewed Russian military incursion into Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia threatens to extend its threatening deployment of troops facing Ukraine into Belarus with exercises announced on Tuesday. As tensions continue to mount, and while the desire to avert a renewed land war in Ukraine is firm across the West, messaging and coordination among different capitals and decision-makers has begun to fragment.
American Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s shuttle diplomacy trip to Europe to meet with key decision-makers in Ukraine, Russia, and the European Union represents a significant push to both avert the outbreak of large-scale war in Ukraine as well as to provide clear messaging on what the United States’ response would be in the event of a renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine. In a press conferences held with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, Secretary Blinken sought to emphasize America’s support for Ukraine in its standoff with Russia and to consult with Ukraine’s leadership on his upcoming negotiations with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. On Thursday, Secretary Blinken met with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock as well as representatives from the United Kingdom, France, and the European Union to help cement a common response to Russia’s pressure campaign against Ukraine. In their joint press conference, Secretary Blinken sought to highlight that the United States and its allies will be uniform and united in their response to any Russian foray into Ukraine.
In his press conferences with President Zelensky and Foreign Minister Kuleba, Secretary Blinken also sought to reinforce unity of messaging with Ukraine regarding the threat from Russia. However, although Zelensky has spoken frequently on the threat of war from Russia, he has also appeared to downplay the threat over the concerns of Washington and the West, while also being embroiled in intrigues surrounding his predecessor as President, Petro Poroshenko. Former President Poroshenko’s high-profile return to Ukraine on Monday to face charges of high treason saw the court refuse to hold him in pre-trial detention against the wishes of the prosecution while also confiscating his passport. President Zelensky’s public messaging that the latest buildup on Russia’s border with his country is not particularly unusual contrasts sharply with the American and Western position that the buildup is anything but usual.
While some daylight existed between the positions articulated by President Zelensky and Secretary Blinken on the threat presented by the Russian buildup, Zelensky was quick to react to President Joe Biden’s framing of the issue in remarks to the press Wednesday evening. While President Biden said that Russia would be “held accountable” if it invades Ukraine, he also appeared to say that an American response to a “minor incursion” would be different than other types of offensive action. In return, Zelensky responded on Twitter to remind “great powers” that there are no “small incursions.” Biden attempted to clarify his Wednesday remarks by reiterating that Russia would face stiff penalties in the event of any overt aggression against Ukraine.
Secretary Blinken’s efforts notwithstanding, messaging from the United States’ European allies suggests that a united response to any future Russian aggression will be difficult to secure in practice. Such efforts have come into conflict with a wider, preexisting debate in the European Union about the bloc’s role in foreign policy and security dynamics of Europe. As the current holder of the European Union’s rotating presidency, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed in an address to the European Parliament that the European Union should build a “new order of security and stability” in Europe to be negotiated with Russia. While European Union and French leaders sought to explain that Macron’s proposal was not meant to undermine the American-led approach to negotiations with Russia, it nonetheless demonstrated that messaging remains fragmented on the subject.
While today’s talks between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary Blinken in Geneva did not bridge the gap between the positions of the United States and Russia, the door was left open to future negotiations on the topic in the near-term future. According to Lavrov, the American side agreed to respond in writing to Russia’s security demand guarantees, after which Moscow will decide on how to proceed. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov (who led negotiations with Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman in Geneva) additionally attributed sole blame for the current situation in European security affairs to the United States and NATO, which reinforces the position that Russia is unwilling to compromise on its proposals. Ryabkov furthermore raised the prospect of escalation by describing Russia as unwilling to wait “endlessly” for an American reply to its security proposals. However, the fact that both sides agreed that talks were “frank and substantive” is an optimistic note among a variety of negative signals coming from Moscow and the Russian-Ukrainian border.
With Russia presenting itself as inflexible in its demands to the United States and the West regarding Ukraine, building a cohesive message from the United States and its European partners is an extremely high priority in Washington. This is no easy feat, as American policymakers will need to balance a multitude of different perceptions of the crisis at hand from Kyiv to Paris against each other. A lack of a coordinated approach from the United States and Europe on Russia’s threatening stance towards Ukraine risks hampering the effectiveness of Western conflict deterrence efforts while also emboldening Russia to enter Ukraine if it perceives that there is no coherent Western stance on such an action. Since Moscow has likely not made up its mind on its future course of action, the value of Western coordinated diplomacy at this moment in time cannot be understated.
Finland and Sweden discuss ties with NATO amidst rising geopolitical tensions in Europe
Veera Parko
On Tuesday this week, President Biden spoke with Finland´s President Sauli Niinistö, discussing, according to the White House, “the importance of Finland´s close defense partnership with the United States and with NATO to ensure security in northern Europe”. On Wednesday, President Biden made further comments, saying that “And, you know, we’re talking about concern on the part of Finland and Sweden about what Russia is doing. The last thing that Russia needs is Finland deciding to change its status. They didn’t say they´re going to do that, but they´re talking about what, in fact, is going on and how outrageous Russia is being”. On Friday, President Niinistö also spoke with President Putin, emphasizing the need for dialogue and pointing out that “Finland exercises full sovereignty over its security policy”.
Geopolitical tensions in Europe have mounted over recent weeks. Not surprisingly, discussion on Russia´s actions, the worsened security situation and NATO has picked up in Europe´s Northern flank, in Finland and Sweden. Both countries are European Union member states with a long history of military non-alignment and a well-established Enhanced Opportunities Partnership cooperation with NATO. Russia has demanded, as a “security guarantee”, that NATO should commit to not enlarging towards the East, as well as warning that Finland and Sweden´s efforts to join the Alliance would have “serious political and military consequences”.
Looking at the current domestic discussion in both Finland and Sweden, Russia´s recent rhetoric seems to have resulted in something that might not, in the end, be in Russia´s interest: two geostrategically relevant, prosperous democracies with significant military capabilities around the Baltic Sea strongly asserting their right to make up their own minds about joining any military alliance. Moreover, lively discussions in both countries may result in more, not less, popular support for credible national defense or even military alignment, with increased citizen awareness — and societal resilience to support military efforts.
Let´s look at the map. Finland shares a 830-mile (1340 km) border with Russia. It only takes 3 hours by train to travel from Helsinki to St. Petersburg. (For those interested in Finnish history, this is it in a nutshell). After the Second World War, Finland has conducted a careful foreign policy balancing act between its powerful Eastern neighbor and its Western partners. The policy is supported by national consensus and is based on strong national defense. Finland continues to invest considerably in a credible national defense, with a wartime strength of about 280,000 personnel and a recent acquisition of 64 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets. Like Sweden, Finland entertains a close Enhanced Opportunities Partnership, bilateral defense cooperation with the US, a high level of interoperability with NATO and a commitment to bilateral Swedish-Finnish defense cooperation. At the same time, Finnish political leadership has consistently maintained a pragmatic dialogue with Russia. Finland´s current President Sauli Niinistö regularly speaks with President Putin, and bilateral grassroot level cooperation between the two countries, for example on border control and emergency preparedness, works well.
After Russia´s recent proclamations on NATO enlargement, remarks made by Finland´s President Niinistö and Prime Minister Sanna Marin in their respective New Year´s Speeches, have been seen by some international commentators as a shift towards applying for NATO membership. Indeed, President Niinistö´s message was clear: “Finland´s room to maneuver and freedom of choice also include the possibility of military alignment and applying for NATO membership, should we ourselves so decide”. However, it is worth noting that this is not a departure from existing foreign and security policy doctrine.
As far as NATO is concerned, Finland is consistently cautious in its official statements. While Finland´s partnership with the Alliance has developed and recently deepened in many ways, official positions on the option of NATO membership are always carefully worded. In a 2020 Government Report on Foreign and Security Policy, Finland emphasizes its national room for manouvre and freedom to choose its own alignments, including an option to join a military alliance and applying for NATO membership.
Like Finland, neighboring Sweden´s commitment to military non-alignment has deep roots linked to political history and culture. After 2014, Sweden has reinvested considerably in its national defense with a 2020 defense bill increasing defense spending by 95 per cent compared with 2015, including a new Institute for Psychological Defense launched in January 2022. Unlike Finland, Sweden has no explicit foreign and security doctrine with an option to join a military alliance. This principle was challenged in late 2020, with a parliamentary majority supporting including an explicit “NATO option” in Swedish doctrine. Swedish political leadership has recently emphasized that Sweden changing its position now would create more uncertainty on the country´s foreign and security policy priorities. Swedish top politicians have, however, been very vocal in pushing back Russia´s recent demands on NATO not expanding to the East.
Domestic discussion in both Finland and Sweden on NATO has not been this active for a long time, at least since 2014. In Finland, prominent politicians in both government and opposition have voiced their support for applying for NATO membership, fueled by Russia´s provocative actions and statements. According to recent polls, public opinion seems to be shifting as well — but nothing dramatic here either, still with around 40 per cent of Finns opposing and around 30 per cent for NATO membership. In Sweden, top politicians such as Foreign Minister Ann Linde and Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist have been clear in that Sweden has no plans to apply for NATO membership anytime soon — but that the decision is Sweden´s and Sweden´s alone. On Wednesday, Finland´s Prime Minister Sanna Marin said in an interview that it is unlikely that Finland will join NATO during the term of her current Government but maintains the option to apply for membership and is ready to stand with its European allies and the US by imposing tough sanctions on Russia if it attacks Ukraine.
In recent days, the concerning security situation around the Baltic Seas has sparked domestic discussion on Finland and Sweden´s military capabilities and readiness. Here, the approach of the two countries has been slightly different. Sweden has made a point of publicly announcing that it is deploying troops to the strategically important island of Gotland, while Finnish officials have stuck to their longstanding tradition of scarce communication on such issues, merely stating that the security situation is highly concerning.
Finland and Sweden have a long-standing history of military non-alignment. Recent statements by political leadership seem to stay well in line with this existing doctrine. The international interest Finland and Sweden´s recent statements have received shows that for a small country, clearly stating one´s doctrine is important amid international tensions. However, the doctrine needs support to be credible. In Finland, non-alignment has been supported by strong and credible national defense arrangements, pragmatic cooperation and dialogue with Russia, public opinion and parliamentary consensus as well as deepening cooperation with EU, NATO and other international partners. Sweden has recently visibly ramped up its defenses, and both countries are known for their expertise in countering hybrid influencing and involving the whole society — citizens, the private sector and other actors — in efforts of national security and preparedness. Domestic discussion and heightened citizen awareness, as well as intensified cooperation with international partners such as the US and NATO, can add to these countries´ resilience and ability to withstand threats from outside. This can have a stabilizing effect in the region surrounding Finland and Sweden, allied or non-allied.
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The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.