Friday News Roundup — July 5, 2024
Happy Independence Day from all of us at CSPC! We hope that you had an enjoyable, safe, and pleasant holiday.
The news this week was dominated by electoral politics. While speculations about the future of President Joe Biden’s presidential campaign continue to dominate discussions in Washington, citizens in both the United Kingdom and France went to the polls. In a historic victory, Labour Party leader Keir Starmer was elected as the new prime minister on July 4, after fourteen years of conservative rule in London. As a result of the United Kingdom’s first-past-the-post voting system, Labour will control a nearly two-thirds majority of seats in the House of Commons despite winning around 34 percent of the vote share. Such political clarity seems increasingly out of reach across the Channel. After French voters went to the polls on June 30th in the first round of snap elections for the National Assembly called by President Emanuel Macron, this Sunday will see the second round of voting. With only 76 of the 577 seats being directly decided in the first round, a vast number of seats are headed for two- or three-way run-offs. While the far-right Rassemblement National is projected to represent the largest bloc in the new parliament after receiving 33 percent in the first round of voting, the exact seat share is difficult to predict due to tactical voting in the second round. The parties of the left-leaning New Popular Front and President Macron’s centrist Ensemble movement could well block the far right from achieving an outright majority. Parliamentary gridlock thus seems a likely outcome.
CSPC President Glenn Nye and Senior Democracy Fellow Jeanne Zaino meanwhile are taking a closer look at a not-often discussed feature of the U.S. electoral system in an article for The Hill. In the low-probability but high-impact scenario of a tie in the Electoral College, they show that the decision about who the next president would be could come down to eight decisive Congressional races.
Peter Sparding is the Senior Vice President and Director of Policy
The Future of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (2024–2029)
Hidetoshi Azuma
The Liberal Democratic Party headquarters in Nagatacho, Tokyo (Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons)
While the United States finally enters a celebratory mood on Independence Day following the surreal drama at the recent presidential debate, Japan scarcely finds a respite from the simmering race for the next premiership amidst the country’s inhospitable summer. Scheduled this coming September, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s presidential election will determine the country’s next leader for the next three years. Its outcome will be crucial for the future of the LDP as it will directly affect its longevity as a party in terminal decline. Kishida has so far proven to be perhaps the most effective administrator in the history of the LDP, successfully implementing seemingly impossible policy agendas one after another. In other words, he is an unrivaled force of stability despite the chaotic facade surrounding his administration. The LDP’s leading kingmakers, the former prime minister Taro Aso and the former prime minister Yoshihide Suga, astutely recognize this, leading them to seek to support and undermine the incumbent Japanese prime minister, respectively. Given Washington’s solid support for the Aso-Kishida alliance and Aso’s enormous influence within the LDP, Kishida will likely weather the ongoing tumult at home and enjoy a long reign at least until the expiration of his potential second term in September 2027, if not well until the end of this decade.
The upcoming LDP presidential election in September 2024 will be an important turning point in shaping the ruling party’s future course. While there is still a possibility of a snap election in Japan prior to September despite Kishida’s repeated denial, the LDP’s current internal dynamics as of July 2024 would favor the incumbent prime minister regardless of another general election in the immediate future. In fact, holding a snap election before September would bring obvious benefits as it would almost certainly undermine Suga’s influence with a likely domino effect of numerous defeats among his allies. Not holding a snap election would essentially maintain the status quo, leading Aso and Suga to focus on mustering support for their respective candidates in the September LDP presidential election.
Aso will almost certainly endorse Kishida for another term. Indeed, he even allegedly revealed his intention to support Kishida for the second term during his meeting with the Republican US presidential candidate Donald J. Trump in April 2024 and expressed his desire to assist the Japanese prime minister with forging friendship with the potential next US president. Aso has been working with Kishida and Motegi to prepare for another Trump presidency since late 2023 and has been laying the necessary domestic groundwork for Kishida’s possible second term. With 55 factional members from both chambers of the Diet and numerous non-factional allies behind him, the former prime minister could easily muster support for Kishida’s reelection. Aso’s support for Kishida would also serve his own interests as he rapidly nears 85 (84 in 2024), the age at which he has been reportedly considering retirement as his grandfather, the former prime minister Shigeru Yoshida, did. In other words, Kishida’s likely second term, ideally coinciding with a second Trump presidency from 2025, would cement Aso’s legacy and allow him to yield his place to his son or daughter with grace. Kishida has so far proven to be Aso’s loyal protege fulfilling the kingmaker’s wishes one after another unquestioningly. Therefore, Kishida is Aso’s last legacy project which he must continue to support regardless of the incumbent prime minister’s popularity. To borrow Aso’s words, “support rates mean nothing.”
By contrast, Suga will likely struggle to deliver a decisive blow to the Aso-Kishida alliance ahead of the September LDP presidential election and even beyond. His best bet as of June 2024 is the former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, but Ishida’s intra-party influence is limited at best despite his popularity among the population. Indeed, while Ishiba continues to top the list of prime minister hopefuls among the voters, his now-defunct Ishiba faction only had seven lawmakers, and his recent rise is inextricable from Suga’s patronage. In other words, while Ishiba may secure enough party endorsements to compete with Kishida over the LDP presidency in September, Suga’s patronage alone would be no guarantee for victory. Suga’s other proteges, such as Katsunobu Kato or even Shinjiro Koizumi, the son of the former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, could fare hardly better than Ishiba given the growing divisions in the aftermath of the ongoing political funds scandal and the 2022 assassination of Shinzo Abe.
Assuming that Kishida will secure reelection as the LDP President in September 2024, three consequential events will likely shape the course of his second term between October 2024 and September 2027. First, the most immediate event awaiting his possible second term will be the US presidential election on November 5, 2024. Kishida is already prepared for a new era of the US-Japan relationship regardless of who becomes the US president in January 2025. However, Trump’s reelection would boost his premiership as well as his power in Tokyo. Indeed, he has been working closely with Aso to prepare for a second Trump presidency, and they shot their opening salvo by sending Aso to meet with the Republican presidential candidate in New York in April 2024. Fortunately for Kishida, Trump is already eager to forge a friendship with the incumbent Japanese prime minister and shared with Aso his high expectations for their future relationship. A second Trump presidency would allow Kishida to rebrand himself as a conservative patriot, shedding off his previous image as a liberal sympathizer who acquiesced in Washington’s woke agenda, such as the controversial LGBT legislation he was forced to pass in June 2023 after the relentless pressure from the US Ambassador Rahm Emanuel. Even if the incumbent US President Joe Biden secures another term, Kishida will remain poised to lead the bilateral relationship with the Democratic president. In short, Kishida is ready to work with whoever will occupy the Oval Office from January 2025 and will almost certainly thrive in dealing with the new US President. Kishida’s ability to forge strong ties to Washington would be a boon for his possible second term, especially as skepticism toward the US global power proliferates among the Japanese population.
Second, if Kishida does not hold a snap election by the LDP presidential election and secures another term in September 2024, he may organize one prior to the expiration of the current phase of the House of Representatives in October 2025. He has been floating the idea of a snap election ever since early 2023 and had repeatedly aborted it whenever he found himself embroiled in domestic crises, including the ongoing political funds scandal. Contrary to the popular perception of indecision, his frequent postponement of a snap election has ironically had the Fabian effect of wearing out his rivals. Indeed, the continuous delay in Kishida’s snap election agenda has curiously coincided with the inundation of political crises one after another undermining the LDP’s power, especially his opponents. The only cost of Kihida’s dilatory attitude toward snap election has been the accelerated weakening of the LDP. However, he is acutely aware of this and has recently been working with the centrist and conservative elements of the Opposition, such as the National Democratic Party and the Japan Innovation Party. This suggests the possible emergence of a grand coalition building on the LDP-Komeito alliance or even replacing the Komeito as the LDP’s coalition partner.
The potential expansion of the LDP’s coalition government could be a precursor to a historic constitutional revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Indeed, one of Kishida’s key agendas is constitutional revision during his tenure. While many of his predecessors held similar ambitions, Kishida has proven capable of implementing even the most insurmountable policies, such as the double defense spending, and finds himself surrounded by global crises which could sway public opinions in his favor. In fact, Washington’s perceived retrenchment vis-a-vis Ukraine and Israel, a major US ally, has cultivated a sense of uneasiness among the Japanese population. Another potential Trump presidency between 2025 and 2029 could further exacerbate such a national anxiety over the US. All these possibilities would be a boon for Kishida’s agenda, and the LDP’s potential new coalition partners, such as the Japan Innovation Party, would support the incumbent prime minister’s ambition. In this sense, the next general election and the third consequential event, the Upper House election in July 2025 would be a de facto national referendum on the need for constitutional revision.
While Kishida pursues constitutional revision, it is the US president who has the actual say on the issue. As of July 2024, Washington seeks to strengthen Japan by promoting its security normalization largely because the US cannot afford to fight another major war overseas due to the growing internal divisions. Such a policy trajectory will most likely remain unchanged, if not enhanced, under the next presidency, especially under Trump. Indeed, constitutional revision would most likely be realized under a second Trump presidency due to his unpredictable style of politics. Unlike under Biden whose inaction drives regional countries into action, goading Japan into revising its constitution would only require a provocative statement from the White House under Trump. In other words, constitutional revision could be negotiated with the US president. The US and Japan could jointly work to create a favorable political situation conducive to overcoming the seemingly insurmountable hurdle of Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution consisting of securing two-thirds majority followed by a national referendum as the requirement for amending the constitution.
Although constitutional revision remains nothing more than an ambition as of July 2024, Kishida is increasingly leaning towards his ultimate agenda as he scrambles to prop up his position in the twilight of the LDP’s power. Moreover, geopolitics is increasingly driving Japan to shed its pot-WWII pacifism and accelerate its security normalization. While achieving constitutional revision this year or next would be an impossible proposition, the next five years will likely witness a fundamental shift in Japan’s perception of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution as skepticism over US security commitment grows deeper. Indeed, Tokyo has been pursuing the difficult task of leading the US-Japan alliance by picking up the slack left by the growing internal divisions in the US. In other words, Japan needs a leader who can guide whoever wins the presidency in 2024, 2028, and beyond. In this respect, the next LDP presidential election will determine the course of Japan’s security normalization culminating in constitutional revision. Despite his undeniable unpopularity among the general public, Kishida presently appears to be the only candidate mustering enough intra-party support to fulfill the seemingly impossible imperative of becoming the best sidekick of future US presidents and mobilizing Japan for a historic constitution revision.
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Bolivia in Political Turmoil: Coup Attempt Sparks Doubts and Political Infighting
By Saakshi Philip
In Bolivia, confusion and controversy surround a recent coup attempt against President Luis Arce, raising doubts about the event’s authenticity and intentions. On June 26, 2024, military forces stormed downtown La Paz, allegedly attempting to overthrow the government. Gen. Tomás Peña y Lillo, leader of Bolivia’s retired service members, was drawn into the situation by army chief Gen. Juan José Zúñiga, who called for help in “defending democracy.” However, the rapid resolution of the mutiny and Zúñiga’s previous close relationship with Arce have fueled skepticism.
Former President Evo Morales, initially condemning the coup, later accused Arce of staging a “self-coup” to boost his dwindling popularity amid economic turmoil. Morales claimed Zúñiga had informed colleagues and family about the plan and quoted Arce as saying the situation required a dramatic move to raise his popularity. This theory, quickly adopted by Arce’s political enemies, further complicated the narrative.
The Bolivian government has strongly denied these allegations, with Presidential Minister María Nela Prada accusing Morales of becoming a tool of external forces. The accusation of a self-coup is supported by right-wing Argentine President Javier Milei, who called the coup attempt “fraudulent.”
This incident has exacerbated tensions between Morales and Arce, former allies of the Movement for Socialism (MAS). Their relationship soured after Morales returned from exile and announced his intention to run against Arce in the 2025 elections. The feud has polarized Bolivia, leading many to question the true motives behind the events of June 26 and further eroding trust in the government during an economic crisis.
Saakshi Philip is a CSPC Intern.