Friday News Roundup — June 7, 2024
This week saw world leaders gathering on the beaches of Normandy to mark the 80th anniversary of the D-Day landings on June 6. On that date in 1944, more than 150,000 Allied troops landed in France to begin the liberation of Western Europe from Nazi oppression. Several hundred veterans had made the long journey to France to commemorate the occasion and honor their fallen comrades. As the number of veterans declines, this year’s tribute may well have marked the last milestone anniversary celebrated in their presence. President Biden and a large Congressional delegation paid their respect to the assembled veterans, with the president calling it “the highest honor” to salute them in Normandy. In a moving moment, D-Day veteran Melvin Hurwitz, 99, addressed Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy as “the savior of the people”, a compliment the visibly touched Zelenskyy immediately returned by exclaiming: “No, no, no, you saved Europe.”
In his speech, President Biden then made the connection between D-Day and the current war in Ukraine, stating that bowing down to dictators “is simply unthinkable” and would mean that “we’d be forgetting what happened here on these hallowed beaches.” Warning of a reemergence of isolationist tendencies, he vowed that the U.S. would “not walk away” from Ukraine. The president’s words came during a week that saw Ukrainian troops use U.S. weapons to strike targets inside Russia for the first time in the conflict, after American officials had approved new guidance allowing for such moves under specific circumstances. According to news reports, U.S. policy now sanctions the use of American weaponry for counter-fire purposes in the Kharkiv region and to strike back at Russian forces preparing to attack. The U.S. policy change came amid signals from several key European leaders that similar restrictions on the use of arms provided by these countries might also be lifted or altered.
Meanwhile, Europe is awaiting the results of elections to the European Parliament as voters in 27 member states head to the polls over several days, ending on Sunday, June 9. Polls are indicating gains for European far-right parties in the 720-seat European Parliament, though political parties representing the political center should continue to claim a clear majority and thus largely determine the make-up of the European Commission, whose president, the German Ursula von der Leyen is seeking a second term. Still, depending on the exact outcome, results could reinforce the narrative of a seemingly ever-growing far-right movement on the continent and could thus alter the political calculus of domestic politics in several key countries.
Assessing Ukrainian SOF outside Ukraine
Ethan Brown
In the United States, we think little of headlines that state “US Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted a raid against a high-value terrorist in [country X].” It’s been happening for years, largely associated with the battlefields of the post-9/11 wars–Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the Horn of Africa, Philippines, and South America are all old-familiars American SOF operators abroad. Expansive authorities granted under Title X and Title 50 powers to interdict, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the capacity of threats to the homeland. (Obligatory plug about how I used to be one of those SOF operators).
Point being (and lede to follow), the world knows and expects American (and some allied) special forces to go abroad in search of monsters to slay and threats to deter. We expect these things from developed states who have strategic objectives and the logistical wherewithal to forward-stage such forces. Which is precisely why it struck me as startling to read the Business Insider exposé this week on Ukrainian Special Operations Forces operating inside Syria and the Sudan.
Briefly, the story recounts how Ukrainian SOF have been sent to fight Russian mercenaries (the Wagner variety, primarily) in Africa, as well as supporting anti-Assad rebels in Syria. The Ukrainian Directorate of Intelligence released a corresponding source video dated to March of this year, demonstrating these forces engaging in convoys, patrols, and “engaging Russian equipment and forces in Southwest Syria,” likely in the vicinity of Palmyra, a Russian hub on the Assad regime’s far flank (author conjecture, not stated in the Ukrainian press release).
It’s curious, first, owing to the fact that Ukrainian defense forces inside Ukraine are now facing the pitched battle of a resurgent Russian onslaught, an unexpected uptick in aggression which has erstwhile prompted Western states to give Ukraine the “green light” to engage targets inside Russia. Second, Ukrainian special forces have proven the efficacy and adaptability of SOF units in modern combat, taking the fight to the Russian invaders in new and novel mission sets. These include elite units such as Center 73, seizing key terrain across the Dnipro River, the Alpha Division who has engaged Russian radars and targeting systems through the tactical use of electronic warfare systems, and the Kraken Regiment who helped train, coordinate, and direct partisan and territorial defense units who resisted the initial invasion.
Each of these capabilities have proven to have an outsize impact on the Ukrainian battlefield, and I’d be remiss if I didn’t give an honorable mention to the “Aerorozvidka,” the Ukrainian “Nerds Angels” (my wordplay on ‘nerds’ and ‘Hells Angels’, unknown if they wore leather vests or not), who rode their dirt bikes to within drone-strike distance of Russian heavy convoys and proceeded to lay waste to the enemy using commercial drones and retro-fitted attack systems. These are the kinds of derring-do, sensational missions which showcase outside-the-box thinking necessary to facilitate and achieve the effects expected of special operations.
And most important: these missions were directly involved in shaping the critical battlefields where beleaguered Ukrainian conventional and territorial forces were outmanned and outgunned in the opening act of the conflict. This is the fundamental purpose of special operations: to have an outsized impact on the battlespace in ways which massed conventional forces cannot, to adapt to unique problem sets, and operate largely autonomously while enabling strategic objectives. Ukrainian special forces were pivotal in shaping the battlespace and turning back the initial probe deep into Ukraine and have continued to be the most effective ground force defending Ukraine’s sovereign territory. And while the Ukrainian SOF enterprise has necessarily grown in leaps and bounds over the past two years (thanks largely to Security Force Assistance which was provided by US SOF personnel), they remain critically low in numbers as extremely high-value assets for Ukrainian defense.
Conversely, Russian Spetsnaz were certainly not utilized effectively since the war began, although in some circumstances, they were conducting their prototypical and doctrinal mission sets. Among SOF charter profiles, there is the seizure of key terrain (high ground, airfields, infrastructure, high-payoff transit points), which Russian paratroopers attempted in the early hours of the war. Since then, having been concurrently devastated by casualties, Russian special forces brigades have often played second-fiddle, supporting echelon operations to Wagner Group mercenaries being employed as the primary spear of the Russian counteroffensive, rather than serving as the proverbial tip-of-the-spear in direct action raids or forward reconnaissance. Certain elements of Russian SOF were involved in decapitation operations, meant to kill Volodymyr Zelensky and other key Ukrainian leaders in the opening days of the conflict, but these has erstwhile given way to simply slogging out in urban combat, trench warfare, and losing to their Ukrainian special forces opponents.
All well and good that Russia has mismanaged the use of its elite forces, while Ukraine’s special mission units have proven their mettle, ingenuity and competence repeatedly in this war. But it begs the question (regaining the lede and focus here): why are Ukrainian SOF engaged abroad, in locales that have little–very little–to do with defending and retaking their sovereign territory, besides the fact that there are Russians to hunt in those unrelated locales?
Forward-staging personnel, especially elite, high-value, limited personnel like SOF units, is indicative of a first-rate power seeking to alter the balance of power or achieve outsized strategic effects that fit a long-term vision. In the case of American special operations, it is frequent and common usage to deploy such units to track down terrorists and national-level threats to the homeland, wherein the USSOCOM mission charter includes deterrence of weapons of mass destruction and terror plots to harm US citizens. Further, it is commonplace for American SOF to conduct training and integration with partners and allies in the aim to deepen ties, increase collaborative capacity, and establish framework for potential future operations and mission considerations.
Ukrainian SOF operating inside Sudan or Syria, however, is neither of those things. Those units are deployed abroad for one reason and one reason alone: kill Russians. A worthy mantra for a nation engaged in a fight for its very survival (with the future of European security largely hanging in the balance), but how well are Ukraine’s strategic objectives served in sending its best, most competent forces beyond its borders when the primary targets are plentiful–and regaining momentum–on its home turf? Ukraine needs its defenders are badly today as it did over two years ago; fresh troops (non-SOF) arriving to bolster the Ukrainian front are not always up to the task or ready for the rigors of combat, evidenced by unit commanders recent comments on the quality of new troops: “we have to re-teach them how to shoot after they arrive at the front lines.” Further, even though the West continues to flood Ukraine with technology and tools, no amount of artillery rounds or long-range missiles, not even F-16s, can offset the growing manpower shortage faced by Ukraine.
Ukrainian SOF can influence the recent Russian counter-offensive, because that is precisely what SOF do: influence and shape the battlefield. Sending those elite soldiers abroad for the sole purpose of hunting Russians isn’t a good strategy. Russian deaths (military or especially mercenary) in Syria, or Sudan, at the hands of Ukrainian special operations forces won’t force the new Russian defense hierarchy to withdraw its forces in Ukraine to replenish those lost abroad.
When those highly-trained Ukrainian SOF are desperately needed at home, their use overseas as if Ukraine were already a first-rate power is of questionable, dubious value.
Ethan Brown is a Senior Fellow at CSPC.
Fumio Kishida’s Last Gamble
Hidetoshi Azuma
The Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida responds to media questions at a press conference at the Kantei (Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons)
The Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has reportedly decided not to hold a snap election during the current parliamentary session expiring on June 23, according to multiple media scoops revealed in the wee hours on June 4. Following these scoops, Kishida himself was quick to affirm that a snap election was “not on my mind” and hinted at a possible cabinet reshuffle in the near future. While this was an entirely expected response by any leader of a parliamentary democracy singularly commanding the power to dissolve the parliament, it was essentially a repeat of his previous proclamation exactly one year ago. The only difference this time around is that time is not kind to the Japanese prime minister who braces for the impending party presidential election in September at a time the plunging public confidence in Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and his own administration is inexorable. In other words, he increasingly finds himself condemned to an inescapable dilemma: to sacrifice his own premiership for party unity or to weaken the LDP in exchange for his own survival. This emerging political reality confronting Kishida has severe implications for Japan’s future, especially in the event of a regional war.
An eerie sense of déjà vu surrounding Kishida’s present quandary is due to his seemingly similar lot exactly a year ago. In fact, he has been persistent in his pursuit of a snap election ever since his premiership began in October 2021. Indeed, he immediately held a snap election upon taking office and has invariably sought to utilize the prime minister’s prerogative to prolong his premiership. By June 2023, he had solidified his unrivaled track record of accomplishments, ranging from the double defense spending increase to the hosting of the Group of Seven (G7) summit in his hometown of Hiroshima, leading him to be increasingly ready to deploy the ace up his sleeve. He unexpectedly abandoned his own snap election agenda only after he found himself forced to pass the controversial LGBT legislation following the relentless pressure from the US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel.
Kishida’s aborted snap election in June 2023 threatened his premiership due to his perennial unpopularity. Indeed, he has never commanded solid public support unlike his predecessor, the former prime minister Shinzo Abe. Lacking Abe’s populist appeal, he had opted until June 2023 to demonstrate accomplishments to gain public confidence while astutely manipulating the LDP’s factional dynamics to undermine his rivals without sacrificing intra-party support for his administration. After June 2023, Kishida changed his strategy and began to gamble on his own survival by purging his LDP rivals. He launched his crusade against the LDP’s factions even by dissolving his own, the Kochikai faction. He thus struck the center of gravity of the LDP’s power, leading to the demise of all of its factions, conveniently except for the Shikokai faction headed by Kishida’s patron, the former prime minister Taro Aso. The upshot has so far been the unprecedented weakening of the LDP, even leading to its loss of influence in the party’s traditional strongholds in rural Japan in recent months. Ironically, Kishida’s Machiavellian plot has scarcely remedied the perennial issue of his unpopularity, despite paradoxically boosting his power thanks to the absence of alternatives within the LDP.
In other words, Kishida’s lot is now even worse than last year. To be sure, while he is powerful within the LDP due to the absence of peers, he is undeniably unpopular, a crippling setback threatening his fate in future elections. What’s worse, time is not even on his side this time. He has until September to reverse his fortune or face an all but inevitable exit from office. Indeed, the recent domino effect of the LDP being replaced by the Opposition in regional elections has caused a crisis of confidence in Kishida himself within the ruling party. This has led to the emerging possibility of the incumbent prime minister’s failing to secure endorsements by twenty party members for his candidacy in the September LDP presidential election. The emerging encirclement of Kishida led by his rivals, such as the former prime minister Yoshibide Suga and the prime minister hopeful former defense minister Shigeru Ishiba, has also contributed to the growing perception of the Japanese prime minister’s hopeless future.
Against this backdrop, Kishida has two stark choices to make between now and September: to hold or not to hold a snap election. Holding a snap election by September would almost certainly prove catastrophic for the LDP, even threatening its ruling status as in 2009. Indeed, the recent regional election outcomes suggest a possible surge of influence of the leftist Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP). Yet, it would provide Kishida with obvious benefits, such as the likely loss of seats held by his LDP rivals, such as the former Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Koichi Hagiuda and other party heavyweights. This would ironically enhance Kishida’s power at the expense of the LDP’s. By contrast, not holding a snap election by September would threaten both his premiership and political career itself. Kishida’s exit from office would provide his opponents with a much-needed opportunity to zero in on his dwindling fate.
Given Kishida’s survivalist track record, he will likely opt for a snap election before the LDP presidential election in September in a desperate attempt to salvage his premiership. His latest insinuation against such a possibility was likely a ruse designed to maximize the element of surprise. Gambling his way to another term would be better off than idly awaiting the inevitable of an unceremonious demise. He therefore finds himself in a lot eerily similar to that of his predecessor, General Hideki Tojo, the WWII-era prime minister who ordered the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor largely in hopes for cementing his power at home, apart from heeding Imperial Japan’s dubious theory of victory over the US. Interestingly enough, both men emerged as a result of political compromise and thrived in Tokyo’s power struggle due to the absence of peers while consistently failing to garner popular support.
Kishida may as well succeed in further consolidating his power with a snap election just as Tojo did after December 7, 1941. Yet, the cost of such a gamble would likely prove catastrophic for Japan in the long term, especially its wartime leadership in the event of a regional war. If history is any guide, Tojo’s gamble exacerbated the Army-Navy fratricide at home and on the fronts and ultimately ended in Japan’s unconditional surrender in 1945. Unity of command is an imperative for successful wartime leadership. Kishida’s relentless survivalist drive would be conducive to his long tenure but not necessarily to wartime leadership which requires political cohesion. The tragedy is that the incumbent Japanese leader is no Winston Churchill or even Rishi Sunak and increasingly bears uncanny resemblance to his disgraced WWII-era predecessor.
Hidetoshi Azuma is a Senior Fellow at CSPC.
U.S Restricts Visas for Chinese Officials for Persecuting the “Hong Kong 47”
By Daphne Nwobike
The U.S. Department of State (DoS) released a statement on Friday, May 31, responding to the guilty sentences imposed on 14 members of the pro-democracy group known as the Hong Kong 47. In its response, the DoS highlighted its current plans to “impose new visa restrictions on PRC (People’s Republic of China) and Hong Kong officials responsible for implementing the National Security Law, pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)© of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” According to the State Department, Hong Kong’s actions have led to the unfair treatment of innocent individuals who only exercised their rights to participate in political activities, leading the U.S. to place visa restrictions and sanctions on the involved Hong Kong officials unless they “immediately release these unjustly detained individuals.”
The Hong Kong 47 were arrested in January 2021 for allegedly promoting subversions against the PRC. They were convicted of hosting an unofficial primary election to determine who would run for city lawmaker elections. The National Security Law gave the government full authority to detain these individuals, who differ in age, occupation, and background and are primarily guilty of hoping to create a more democratic PRC.
Created in 2020 after a wave of “anti-government” protests in Hong Kong, the National Security Law targets all actions with characteristics of “dissent” and “sedition,” and it has predictably curtailed free speech and pro-democracy gatherings and protests. Many Hong Kong citizens who dare to speak out against their government or the PRC have been imprisoned under the new law, which also restricts trials by jury and denies access to bail. As a result, 32 members of the Hong Kong 47 have been imprisoned since 2021. Their trials were postponed for several years due to COVID-19 restrictions and were recently heard without juries.
Of the Hong Kong 47 arrested for democratic activities, 31 individuals pleaded guilty and 16 chose to fight the charges against them. In May, 14 of the accused were found guilty, and only two were acquitted. Currently, 45 members of the Hong Kong 47 are awaiting their sentences, which could range from 10 years to life in prison. Since the New Security Law went into effect, more than 300 hundred people have been convicted, and their ranks are sure to grow as long as this policy remains in place.
The United States has been vocal in calling out Chinese and Hong Kong officials for these infringements on human rights. The Chairs of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China have called for Congress to pass the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Certification Act, which would “shutter Hong Kong’s diplomatic outposts that are now simply reflexive purveyors of the Chinese government’s policies and propaganda.” U.S. officials have been joined in their public criticism by counterparts in Britain and Australia and organizations such as Human Rights Watch.
In response, Hong Kong government officials have characterized U.S. visa restrictions as “political manipulation to intimidate PRC and HKSAR officials who resolutely safeguard national security,” and have accused the United States of “interfering” in China and Hong Kong’s internal affairs while participating in the “malicious smearing” of its verdicts against the Hong Kong 47.
Meanwhile, university professors, journalists, democracy advocates, and other members of the Hong Kong 47 continue to undergo grueling conditions behind bars for the “crime” of advocating for more transparent and democratic governance. Their ordeal has dissuaded many other Chinese nationals from speaking out against the government for fear of becoming future victims of the National Security Law, which means that it is unfortunately having its intended effect.
Daphne Nwobike is a CSPC Intern.
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Biden Looks to Counter China’s Influence by Feting Kenya
By Daphne Nwobike
Recently Kenyan President William Ruto visited the United States and was greeted with a red-carpet welcome from the Biden administration. The grand reception was designed to rival and upstage China’s more transactional outreach to the East African nation.
President Ruto’s visit to the White House included extensive conversations with President Biden about the U.S.-Kenyan relationship, specifically focusing on how U.S. support for Kenya and other African nations could help them move away from over-reliance on China’s financial assistance and “debt diplomacy.” Last October, China loaned Kenya $1 billion to support its infrastructure initiatives, for instance, creating crippling debt that often comes with geopolitical strings attached.
During the visit of the Kenyan leader, Ruto and Biden thus announced the “Nairobi-Washington Vision,” which is designed to encourage sustainable lending practices and debt suspensions and restructurings. Examples of this approach to foreign assistance cited by U.S. officials include plans to build a roadway along the corridor from Nairobi to Mombasa and a years-long U.S. program to fund 1,000 paramilitary police officers to Haiti in response to gang violence there. The competition between the United States and China for geopolitical influence in the critical arena of Africa thus continues apace.
Daphne Nwobike is a CSPC Intern.