Friday News Roundup — November 17th, 2023
After a contentious, and even “chippy” week on Capitol Hill, lawmakers and many others are now preparing for the Thanksgiving holiday. Earlier in the week, House Speaker Mike Johnson reached a deal with Democrats, like his predecessor, to keep the government open with two new deadlines now in January and February of next year. Like his predecessor, he now faces the anger of far-right Republicans, and, like his predecessor, we will wait to see how this deal and any future deals could lead to a new motion to vacate. There is still plenty on the agenda between Thanksgiving and Christmas and then the new 2024 deadlines — with legitimate questions about what deals, if any, can be reached. Given the mood this week, a holiday break is needed before that business resumes.
Across the country, the Biden-Xi summit provided both better optics and a few tangible benefits as Washington and Beijing aim to slow rising tensions. The APEC summit serving as the backdrop for the Biden-Xi meeting was a reminder of the broader competitive playing field, yet the collapse of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework amid Congressional opposition again shows the geopolitical cost of our political mentalities on trade. Both Dan Mahaffee and Robert Gerber cover these summits for you in greater detail.
This week CSPC also released its 2023 Geotech report, available here. This report looks at the transition in the U.S.-China competition as we reach the “end-of-the-beginning.” As U.S. policymakers are aware of the China challenge, the private sector and allies and partners are also adapting to this new geopolitical reality. This report looks at how the innovation race, economic security tools, commercial competitiveness, and the shape of the U.S.-China relationship all shape leadership in critical technologies.
Returning from his travels to Europe for discussions on the conflict in Ukraine and transatlantic strategy, Joshua C. Huminski, director of the CSPC Mike Rogers Center, wrote for The Hill about how the NATO alliance is reinvigorated in the face of current threats, with more still to be done.
Dan Mahaffee and Robert Gerber cover the Biden-Xi summit, while Ethan argues that celebrating diversity is critical for military recruiting. Kory Yueh continues his naval competition series with a look at the capabilities of allies. Hidetoshi Azuma examines Japan’s emerging grand strategic doctrine, the Aso Doctrine, in light of the former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso’s recent call for Japan’s accession into AUKUS. Finally, Veera Parko covers updates to the evolving situation along the Finnish-Russian border.
The roundup will resume on December 2nd, and we wish you all a very happy Thanksgiving. Safe travels for those of you hitting the road to be with family, friends, and loved ones. We at CSPC are thankful for the opportunities we have to weigh in on important issues; the camaraderie of our colleagues; and, most importantly, the time, support, and feedback we get from all of you.
Biden-Xi summit marks next phase of U.S.-China relationship
By Dan Mahaffee
Photo credit: @POTUS on X
In the introduction of our newly released geotech report, we described the U.S.-China relationship as having reached the “end of the beginning” of what has become an interdependent rivalry. This week’s San Francisco summit between President Biden and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping illustrated just that, as both sides seek to “find a new floor” underneath the bilateral relationship and arrest growing tensions. Both leaders sought to find areas of cooperation, while neither yielded much. Better crisis management may yet be the best outcome. The business environment, and the relationship between U.S. companies and China, may ultimately garner more attention and have a greater impact on the trajectory of the relationship. At a time when neither side can afford to rush into conflict, how we approach the next steps to prepare militarily, de-risk our economy, and recalibrate our geoeconomics position are critical to deterring conflict.
That the leaders were able to meet in the first place was an accomplishment, given the growing tensions between Washington and Beijing — tensions that have been fueled by a range of security concerns, military encounters, and geopolitical risk as well as a novel paradigm of technological competition while in a state of economic interdependence. Of the myriad headwinds facing the Chinese economy, Xi also saw this trip as an opportunity to address the headwinds of the overall geopolitical risk environment and economic security measures led by Washington but increasingly joined by western allies.
The summit yielded agreement on dialogues regarding climate change and artificial intelligence. Both suggest that Washington and Beijing can and should find ways to address existential global challenges, while the former also demonstrates a foundation on which diplomatic efforts can pursue arms control and other stabilizing measures. More critically in the near-term, we see that the military-to-military hotline is to be reconnected. As tensions grow in the air and waters of the Indo-Pacific, this will be critical to preventing an incident from escalating into something far worse. Usual platitudes regarding support for Taiwan were exchanged, but Taiwan’s own domestic political realignments and what happens in its upcoming election have a greater potential impact on cross-strait tensions than anything discussed in San Francisco. Furthermore, neither side yielded on the economic and technological front: no relaxations of tech restrictions, export controls, or tariffs by the Biden administration, nor will Xi change course on his reshaping of the Chinese economy to his vision.
Therefore, it was largely Xi’s outreach to the U.S. business community that illustrated the complex interdependence that remains between the nations, as well as the reality of how we will have to compete while also continuing to do business in some fields while jealously guarding others. What we see in both Xi’s overtures as well as the applause of American business leaders, neither side can yet afford to break the economic relationship — even as the technology competition intensifies. While political leaders will ask hard questions of American CEOs about the relationship with China, our interdependence, and efforts to de-risk, those same questions will be met by another common question: what is my alternative to China? What is the alternative that is being offered or supported by our policymakers — not just in some subsidies but a broader understanding of the innovation ecosystem or the complexity of modern supply chains? It is the same question that Washington also often gets from foreign leaders and executives when we raise concerns about their dealings with and dependencies on China. Yes, we are taking some steps in promoting domestic innovation and manufacture, but within the Beltway the momentum has been behind restrictions: export controls and outbound investment review.
China’s greatest success this week is our failure with what we could not accomplish with the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Despite the Biden administration’s efforts to complete the IPEF trade pillar by the APEC summit, election year politics outweigh the strategic imperative of building trade connections in the Indo-Pacific. While IPEF was designed to bypass any Congressional opposition, it was still ultimately torpedoed by Congressional opposition. Thus, only Congressional leadership on trade can solve this problem of what our economic engagement is — and that is unlikely with an election on the horizon, let alone our broader political dysfunction and outdated preconceptions regarding trade.
We should not interpret this summit as a reversal in course or a sign that rapid improvement or a “return to the way things were” lies ahead in the U.S.-China relationship. As we have seen: the evidence of our military industrial unpreparedness; the difficulty aligning even close allies and our own companies on geotech matters; the continued interdependence of U.S. and Chinese economies; and the long-term challenge of de-risking and recalibrating the U.S.-China economic relationship, we are unprepared for the conflict to which the worst scenarios lead. China is also questioning the cost of its near-term policies, but nothing suggests a shift in the fundamental competition across politics, economics, and technology. Now is not the time to weaken our efforts, nor to provoke a worsening of relations or even conflict. Instead, as we start to utilize the policy tools for this new competition, we have now a chance to hone and carefully intensify them. Hopefully this can ultimately deter an unthinkable conflict in our lifetimes, perhaps until there is time for political change in China.
Until then, the underlying nature of the U.S.-China competition has not changed, only the point at which we find ourselves in the competition. Perhaps a racing analogy works best with the upcoming Las Vegas Grand Prix. The beginning of this competition required a lot of straight-line acceleration by the United States to recognize that we were in a race to begin with and what would need to be done to address the challenge presented by the CCP’s policies. Now the race is one of slaloms and curves, where speed is as important as steering and control. We want to lead ahead, but avoid collisions with competitors or spiraling off the track. How we handle things will demand more complexity and nuance, but winning the race is no less important.
Trade Disputes Largely Off the Table at Biden-Xi Summit
By Robert W. Gerber, Senior Fellow
The Biden-Xi summit in San Francisco, held on the margins of the APEC summit, did not produce breakthroughs on the economic and trade front despite the economic weight of this “consequential relationship” and the long list of grievances each country has about the other’s trade policies.
From the U.S. point of view, the PRC mistreats Western businesses, steals trade secrets, and tilts the playing field in favor of its state owned industries, among other sins. The PRC would like to see an end to Trump-era U.S. tariffs on many Chinese goods, elimination of sanctions against military companies, and fewer export controls on high tech components. President Xi apparently told Biden that U.S. export control, investment screening and unilateral sanctions seriously undermine China’s legitimate interests, but the White House did not respond to this protest — at least not officially. Lack of progress on these fronts at the Biden-Xi meeting may disappoint the business community and free trade advocates like The Economist, but it is by design: Beijing is unlikely to adhere to any agreements, and Beijing ultimately will do what is in its own interest. In fact, courting Beijing has its potential downside. It is not entirely clear what recent visits by high level U.S. officials — including USTR Katherine Tai, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellin — hoped to accomplish. Furthermore, these visits could embolden PRC leadership to seek unilateral demands from the United States. Perhaps the
White House concluded that it should take a different approach. It would arguably be a better use of time and effort for the United States to focus on protecting against Chinese economic aggression and taking meaningful steps to enhance U.S. national economic competitiveness, rather than courting the PRC. This process logically begins with restoring fiscal order in Washington so the U.S. economy can invest where it needs to. In terms of playing defense, the U.S. and its allies must fortify their cyber defenses against active PRC threats. China’s growing global network of data centers, communications infrastructure, and port facilities should also be a cause for alarm. The United States should also continue to prevent leading edge and dual use technologies from being transferred to state-affiliated Chinese companies. On the trade front, the United States and our allies should call out the PRC for its flagrant violation of international trading rules and market-distorting practices (shaming is more effective than pleading when it comes to China.) We should pursue trade agreements and friendshoring arrangements with like minded neighbors, partners, and allies with an emphasis on standards and regulatory harmonization. Helping developing countries establish transparent procurement and investment regimes will mitigate Chinese economic coercion.
How large is this “consequential relationship”? The PRC is the United States’ third largest bilateral trading partner, although trade between the United States and the European Union is in fact larger. Over half of U.S. soybeans exports go to China. Members of the S&P 500 index generate 7.6 percent of their revenue in the PRC. One third of U.S. foreign university students come from China. Yet a majority of American companies are bearish on China and investors are fleeing due to a confluence of factors, including lagging Chinese economic growth, oppressive government policies, and overall geopolitical risk. And it is not just Western companies leaving mainland China — Chinese people are fleeing as well. This all means that Beijing does not have all the cards it once held that enabled it to convince foreign governments to accommodate the PRC. Given this new circumstance, it will be interesting to see if Beijing is willing to agree to any concessions in the upcoming APEC joint statement. The COP28 climate meeting that takes place later this month in Dubai will be another revealing marker.
Targeting the DoD recruiting crisis
Celebrating military diversity as a means of fighting the current recruitment shortfalls
By Ethan Brown
Above: Air Force recruits tour a C-130H (U.S. Air Force photo by SrA Gage Daniel)
It is not news nor startling that, in the wake and lull of the twenty year-long Global War on Terror, recruiting has irrefutably become a stark risk for the Department of Defense. An important aspect of this change in new volunteers for an all-volunteer military is the recognition and retaining the experiences of the generations of warfighters who came before. As such, this brief portion of the roundup is dedicated to our very own Robert Zackery III (“RZ3”), Senior Fellow and President of the Primer Development Group, who is among a group of diverse roster of veterans featured in an upcoming history project titled “BLK OPS — VHP”, a documentary about underrepresented voices in the U.S. Special Operations Command’s prolific and incredible history.
The “BLK OPS — VHP” (Veterans History Project) will feature multiple episodes across three seasons, showcasing men and women from underrepresented communities who have served with distinction and honor in myriad Special Operations roles. Season One will focus on Black Americans who have honorably faced combat with the most elite units of the U.S. Special Operations enterprise, including Force Recon (USMC), the 75th Ranger Regiment (U.S. Army), and Special Tactics (United States Air Force). Season Two will highlight Women, Asian and Arab Americans in US SOF, while Season Three will honor Latino and Native Americans from the Special Operations legacy.
RZ3, while contributing to a variety of discussions and research here at the CSPC as well as a prolific consulting career dedicated to optimizing organizational potential, devoted 26 years of distinguished military service in US Special Operations. During his service, he was no stranger to history. In late 2001, he arrived in Karshi-Khanabad (Uzbekistan) and embedded with an Army Special Forces A-Team (ODA542) who was sent into Afghanistan’s rugged far East hinterlands to organize and train the Afghan guerilla forces under the leadership of Warlord Zakim Khan. This “G-force” would be part of the momentous clearance through the Khost-Gardez Pass in early 2002, a critical set-piece for the showdown between coalition and Taliban/Al-Qaeda forces in the fateful OPERATION ANACONDA in March 2002. RZ3’s team were a critical part of the Southern blocking positions which prevented terrorist and insurgent forces from fleeing into Pakistan from the incoming coalition assault in the Takur Ghar mountains.
In 2003, Zackery was embedded with Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment (Fort Lewis, WA). This element was forward-staged at a classified location near Iraq in late March. In the opening hours of April 3–4, before coalition forces had even begun their approach into Baghdad, Zackery was part of a deep strike raid to capture Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein at the Presidential Summer Palace on Lake Tharthar, Northwest of the Capital. Though the capture mission was unsuccessful (as the Iraqi President had already fled Baghdad), the role of special operations forces demonstrated the resolve, capability, and sheer tenacity of the American war machine. The aforementioned events will be featured in the forthcoming book “Visual friendlies, Tally Target (Vol. I): Invasions,” out in June 2024.
Not only is the showcasing of RZ3 important for highlighting the contributions of underrepresented voices and demographics in the SOF enterprise, but at a time when the Department of Defense faces a crisis of manpower and recruiting, the efforts of those veterans who came before — from all walks of life — could be a critical tool as the DoD continues to adapt and evolve into a post-GWOT paradigm which faces the rise of strategic threats and increasingly complicated actors abroad. It is no mystery that military recruiting has fallen short regarding diversity outreach — the American South provides 40% of recruitment numbers on average — but societal changes have progressed where DoD recruiting efforts have not, and it’s not merely a diversity issue; the generational disconnect between younger Americans and military service has never been more stark. Yet highlighting the achievements of diversity groups, men and women like RZ3, Major (ret.) James Capers, USMC, 1SG (ret.) Shirley Baez (US Army), and others, through heritage efforts like the BLK OPS — VHP project could indeed inspire the next generation of Americans from all walks of life to answer the call of a nation in transition in a changing world.
At the very least, celebration of those underrepresented voices from military service, even a week after Veterans Day and beyond, is a worthwhile item which should be highlighted and celebrated.
Part IV: U.S. Allies in the Indo-Pacific
By Kory Yueh
“Integrated deterrence will be the cornerstone of our approach […] Consistent with our broader strategic approach, we will prioritize our single greatest asymmetric strength: our network of security alliances and partnerships.”
U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, 2022.
The Pacific Ocean covers over 60 million square miles. As the Pacific War and the Battle of the Atlantic demonstrated during World War II, the logistical scale of navigating and conducting naval operations across an entire ocean is daunting, especially when your operations are contested by a determined enemy. In previous articles I have examined the industrial and political dynamics behind the competition between the U.S. and Chinese navies, but we now move to the next strategic level of this potentially deadly game of three-dimensional chess — the Pacific nations that lie between China and the U.S. bases and assets in the Indo-Pacific.
In the Pacific theater during World War II, the allies focused on capturing islands that brought their forces closer to the Japanese Empire. The engagement with local actors such as the Philippines, Malaysia and others was critical to threatening fortified Japanese positions in their respective territories. Regional bases and logistical hubs were essential in terms of gathering troops and supplies, protecting supply lines, and extending the range of bombers and fighters in their attacks on Japanese forces. Naturally, this strategic rationale worked both ways — Tokyo fought fiercely to retain islands like Okinawa, Guam, Guadalcanal, and Rabaul precisely because they extended the reach of Japanese forces.
The antecedent today in considering a potential conflict between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the U.S. Navy is the essential role of local partners and actors in the Indo-Pacific. For the past 11 years, the Chinese have asserted their claim to the South China Sea by building artificial islands at an astonishing rate, significantly extending their anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the event of a military conflict. A quick inspection of a map makes clear that the first island chain outside Chinese territory will be hotly contested in any conflict between China and its neighbors such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan, to name a few U.S. treaty allies. Other alliances and cooperative partnerships in the Indo-Pacific would also come into play in any potential conflict with China, including the Quad (the United States, Australia, Japan and India) and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States).
Despite long historical memories and tensions in the Indo-Pacific — many tracing back to Japan’s conquests before and during World War II — fears of the rise of a domineering China have prompted new partnerships to form as counterweights. Earlier this month the Japanese Prime Minister met with the President of the Philippines, for instance, and agreed to negotiate a bilateral security pact to help bolster Filipino coastal forces in their increasingly frequent confrontations with encroaching Chinese naval forces. For similar reasons, U.S. military forces have established closer cooperation with their Vietnamese counterparts in recent years.
China’s provocative actions in asserting claims to contested islands and international waters thus obviously come with a hefty cost. Every sortie the Chinese military flies into contested airspace, every ship or cutter they use to harass local fishermen, and every artificial island they build in international waters serves to strengthen the resolve of neighbors to form alliances as counterweights. At Camp David in September 2023, for instance, Japanese and South Korean leaders expressed joint condemnation of the PRCs “aggressive behavior” in the South China Sea. While Japan’s imperialist aggression in the first half of the last century has not been altogether forgotten by South Korea and the Philippines, Beijing’s bullying behavior has helped override those historical animosities. Put simply, the more forcefully China’s military imposes its will and ignores international law and boundaries in pursuit of Beijing’s expansionist agenda, the more regional neighbors will unite in resistance.
The United States has long recognized its strategic advantage over China in the Indo-Pacific is the close network of alliances in the region. Strengthening that network is now a top priority for Washington, D.C. In April 2023 the United States thus announced plans, under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), to increase its naval and air base access in the Philippines from five to nine bases, thus strengthening military cooperation between the two countries. As mentioned earlier, the United States has also bolstered its diplomatic and military-to-military relationship with Vietnam, another prominent regional power suspicious of Chinese intentions and bullying. Beyond diplomacy, the U.S. Navy has actively trained and drilled with its Indo-Pacific partners: Japan in April, Australia in July, South Korea in August, and the Philippines most recently in October.
Naturally, the creation of AUKUS is another a critical pillar of the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. In anticipation of acquiring nuclear submarine technology from the United States and Great Britain, Australia very recently passed a law restricting the sharing of defense technologies with other foreign parties. The implementation of this law is intended to accelerate the speed of nuclear submarine deliveries to the Australian Navy, and further streamline joint operations within AUKUS.
With the Department of Defense continuing to identify China as the “pacing challenge” of the future, the fiscal budget for 2024 has clearly outlined future investments intended to strengthen Indo-Pacific security and deterrence. Despite the fact that the competition between the United States and China for regional influence is likely to define the Indo-Pacific for decades to come, however, there are also signs that both Washington, D.C., and Beijing want to avoid that competition veering towards military confrontation. After the recent meeting between President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping, for instance, the two leaders talked of areas of cooperation that included mitigating climate change, dismantling fentanyl networks, and reestablishing military lines of communication to reduce misunderstandings and potential miscalculations.
There is an old Chinese proverb which posits that it is better to be a warrior in a garden than to be a gardener in a war. In the natural evolution of geopolitics in which great powers rise, fall and constantly jockey for position, there will always be a need for preparation for conflict as a means of deterrence. As part of that churn the United States is wise to nurture and strengthen numerous alliances in the region as a hedge against potential Chinese aggression. Simultaneously, as the proverb goes, both sides need to embrace restraint and cooperation to avoid an escalation that would be in neither side’s national interest. Only time shall tell if these efforts ultimately stabilize the Indo-Pacific — or else push the region towards the brink of war.
Kory Yueh is a student intern for the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress.
Enter the Aso Doctrine
Hidetoshi Azuma
The former Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso’s official portrait in 2017 (Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons)
Earlier this week, the former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso visited Canberra where he called for Japan’s accession into AUKUS, the trilateral military alliance among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Aso’s declaration in Australia was the latest in the series of his provocative remarks on Japan’s security strategy during his long political career which had previously culminated in his clarion call for Japan’s “will to fight” while in Taiwan this past August. Despite the inevitable domestic backlash against his rhetoric, Japan’s foremost elder statesman has invariably remained unwavering in guiding the country’s post-WWII security normalization and has even accelerated it for the last few years under his top protégé, the incumbent Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Against this backdrop, the real significance of his latest declaration in Australia was that he essentially unveiled an alternative to the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan’s long-held Cold War-era security doctrine ironically introduced by his own grandfather, the former prime minister Shigeru Yoshida.
The Yoshida Doctrine initially emerged as a temporary solution to Japan’s fragile geopolitical position during the early days of the Cold War in the early 1950s. While the post-WWII Allied occupation of Japan under General Douglas MacArthur initially aimed to dismantle any of the country’s remaining war potential, including even the military itself, the Soviet Union’s growing threat around the world led Washington beginning in 1947 to transform the former adversary into a military ally serving as Asia’s bulwark against communism backed by economic might. Washington thus aimed to do away the liberal legacy of democratization and demilitarization implemented before 1947 and sought to resurrect Japan’s full war potential as a key regional US ally. By contrast, Japan under Yoshida sought to minimize, if not negate, its military commitment and sought to focus almost exclusively on economic reconstruction by relying on the US Forces in Japan (USFJ) for its own national security. For Yoshida, Japan’s security minimalism was a national security imperative at the time due to the prevailing domestic fear of militarism rearing its ugly head with the institution of another standing army. The upshot was a bilateral compromise solution consisting of a peculiar, if not unequal, division of labor in which Japan delegated its own security responsibilities to the US in exchange for economic reconstruction.
Despite its tumultuous origin, post-WWII Japan’s first grand strategy guided by Yoshida proved to be a perfect solution to the country’s perennial sense of economic insecurity. Indeed, Imperial Japan’s rise and fall was inextricable from its indefatigable pursuit of economic security to remedy its resource-scarce geography. Pre-WWII Japan once prospered as one of the world’s preeminent maritime powers allied with the British Empire after having defeated both China and Russia by 1905. In a matter of a few decades, the same country had become a semi-continental power with its growing sphere of influence across China and even went to war with other maritime powers, including Britain and the US, in 1941 to its catalysmal end. The common thread binding these two opposing geostrategic behaviors was Imperial Japan’s permanent resource problem. Ironically, Japan’s unconditional surrender in 1945 and subsequent US-led occupation removed geostrategy from the country’s strategic calculus and, by extension, its resource scarcity. Japan’s resurrection as a de facto American protectorate firmly anchored the newborn nation as a maritime power by virtue of the US military’s forward presence. Yoshida merely solidified what was accidentally accorded to Japan in 1945 and later consummated it with the 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty.
The original sin of the Yoshida Doctrine was paradoxically that it was perfect. Indeed, it even removed the need to think about geostrategy or security in general. As a result, it spawned a culture of security aversion only to be boosted by Japan’s US-drafted pacifist constitution. Yoshida himself was acutely aware of the pacifist byproduct of his own grand strategy and reiterated during his late years in the 1960s the importance of normalizing Japan’s security toward ultimately restoring its full war potential as a US ally. He hoped that Japan’s future generations would effect a course correction someday, if not even during his lifetime. While the subsequent generations of Japan’s political leaders have attempted to upgrade or even undo the Yoshida Doctrine, none of them have succeeded in overcoming Yoshida’s legacy, let alone providing an alternative. This was largely due to the constitutional and treaty restrictions binding the doctrine. The upshot was the emergence of legal reinterpretations in an effort to respond to Japan’s changing geostrategic imperatives over time.
One of such efforts was the former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s sweeping security reform during the 2010s. One of the most pressing issues confronting Abe when he began his second term as the prime minister was the growing obsolescence of the Yoshida Doctrine’s security minimalism. Therefore, he channeled enormous political energy to the passing of the 2015 security legislation which recognized the constitutionality of the right of collective self-defense, thereby allowing Japan to legally participate in foreign conflicts in defense of its allies. Moreover, unlike his predecessors, Abe also unveiled a geopolitical vision for the Indo-Pacific, which later became the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). While these efforts appeared to be a departure from the Yoshida Doctrine, Abe ultimately failed to undo its lingering pacifist legacies, such as the non-combatant status of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel and the rejection of offensive capabilities. Indeed, despite Abe’s seemingly global outlook, he offered no solution to the inevitable question of combat deployment of JSDF personnel in foreign wars. Moreover, he revived Imperial Japan’s continentalism by seeking a rapprochement with Russia, thereby deviating from the maritime orientation consolidated by Yoshida. In retrospect, although Abe challenged the Yoshida Doctrine in an attempt to provide his own alternative doctrine, he eventually failed and even almost compromised Japan’s fundamental geostrategy.
Ironically, Japan’s security normalization accelerated after Abe’s tenure, especially his tragic assassination in July 2022. It occurred on Kishida’s watch, leading to the historic 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) backed by the double increase in defense spending. The 2022 NSS officially recognized Japan’s de facto first strike capabilities under the euphemism of “counter strike capabilities.” In other words, a single executive action essentially dismantled Japan’s decades-long embrace of pacifism overnight and resurrected military interventionism. Kishida also expanded the scope of security to include economic security, which now seeks to address the growing global technology competition beyond the traditional issue of resource scarcity. Moreover, the incumbent Japanese prime minister has been expanding Japan’s alliance networks beyond the US-Japan alliance by signing multiple reciprocal access agreements with the UK, Australia, and, most recently, the Philippines. All these developments occurred in rapid succession while Japan revived its maritime orientation this time with the possibility of a two-front war with Russia and China in mind. The Yoshida Doctrine thus reached its final demise in 2022 on Kishdia’s accidental watch.
Yet, the real credit of undoing the Yoshida Doctrine belongs to Aso, not Kishida. In Tokyo’s bizarre power dynamics, Kishida is merely an implementer faithfully taking cues from Aso, his kingmaker behind the throne. In fact, Aso is in many ways the originator of most of Japan’s security initiatives for the last two decades. For example, Aso unveiled the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity (AFP) vision in November 2006 during his tenure as the Foreign Minister under the first Abe Cabinet. AFP was post-WWII Japan’s first geostrategic vision reminiscent of the US Cold War strategy of containment and laid the foundation for Abe’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) introduced in 2007. Kishida’s 2022 defense reform was also originally Aso’s agenda. Moreover, Aso is one of the few politicians in Japan who can afford to focus on national security and frequently utter incendiary remarks with impunity due to his unrivaled electability. Therefore, he has been leading Japan’s grand strategic shift by declaring “Japan will be [Russia’s] next target”, “A Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency”, and “Japan must be ready to fight” to name a few.
The then-Foreign Minister Taro Aso’s conception of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity unveiled in 2006 (Photo Credit: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)
Against this backdrop, Aso called for Japan’s accession into AUKUS while in Canberra earlier this week. His latest declaration signified the advent of Japan’s new doctrine, the Aso Doctrine. It marked a radical departure from his grandfather’s in that Japan seeks alliances with countries other than the US and a proactive role, now including military interventions. In other words, Japan is rapidly becoming a regional power willing to use force to defend the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision along with other like-minded allies. In this sense, AUKUS would be an important medium through which Japan could expand its regional influence. Indeed, AUKUS is largely a technological alliance focused on cooperation on nuclear submarine capabilities and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence. While the US-Japan alliance remains important, today’s global technology competition demands region-wide cooperation to which AUKUS is particularly suited.
Aso’s vision for what he called a “JAUKUS” ultimately betrayed his growing anxiety over perceived US retrenchment. Indeed, many in Tokyo increasingly grow unsettled by recent US approaches to wars in Ukraine and Israel which they perceive to be leaning to isolationism. Aso himself has remarked many times in the past that alliance obligations must be enforced instead of expected but stop short of doubting US commitment. What has changed between now and then is that the former Japanese prime minister is now increasingly thinking outside the traditional paradigm of the US-Japan alliance in search for a multi-vectored grand strategy to perpetuate Japan’s maritime orientation in its geostrategy. This by itself is an undeniable admission of the obsolescence of the Yoshida Doctrine founded on the premise of perennial US security commitment.
The emerging Aso Doctrine awaits consolidation. The initial trajectory is one of military interventionism in defense of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision with AUKUS allies, although blurred by Tokyo’s pacifist rhetoric. The new doctrine will likely be evolutionary in nature given the growing fluidity of the emerging new world disorder as opposed to the static bipolar system during the Cold War. In other words, it is a work in progress requiring readjustments and refinement over time. Yet, Aso has laid the groundwork founded on a premise which is radically different from that of his grandfather’s. Despite the differences, Aso inherited the core legacy of the Yoshida Doctrine: Japan’s maritime geostrategy. As long as this fundamental geostrategic orientation remains unaltered, the Aso Doctrine will likely evolve into a new foundation of Japan’s grand strategy in the 21st century. Given Aso’s unrivaled power in Japan, he appears to have both time and resources to nurture his nascent grand strategic doctrine for Japan to fully blossom into what the Japanese call “a strategy for 100 years.”
Trouble at the Finnish-Russian border
Veera Parko
On Thursday November 16, Finland’s government announced it would close all four border crossing points on the country’s southeastern border with Russia. The dramatic-sounding decision was made in response to a marked change in Russian border authorities’ actions. In the past, Russian authorities have not allowed people to attempt to enter Finland without proper documentation. From August onwards, asylum seekers without appropriate documentation have begun to arrive at the Finnish border — in recent weeks, many have arrived on bicycles. According to Finnish authorities, there are indications that “foreign authorities” and other actors have played a role in facilitating the illegal border crossings.
Based on similar experiences in 2015, Finland has long prepared itself for the possibility of Russia using instrumentalised migration as a tool to destabilize or send signals to its neighboring country. After the war in Ukraine began, many Eastern European countries have encountered migrants from third countries crossing their borders from Russia.
The Finnish government has reacted with determination. On Thursday, Finland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Elina Valtonen said that Finland “does not tolerate hybrid operations in any form”. Preparation pays off: Finland’s Border Guard Act was recently amended to counter similar situations, enabling the closing of the border if the situation poses a serious threat to public order and national security. Even if the actual number of asylum seekers seeking entry from Russia to Finland has not been very significant (around 280 people since September), the change in Russian authorities’ policy and the obvious organized nature of the border crossings has prompted a serious response from Finnish authorities.
The evolving situation at the Finnish-Russian border is proof that as a new NATO ally, Finland will continue to face pushback from Russia. On Wednesday, Finland’s President Sauli Niinistö said he believed Russia’s actions at the border are retaliation for Helsinki’s plans to sign a bilateral defense cooperation agreement with the United States.
News You May Have Missed
Hungary’s Orban Says That Negotiations on Ukraine’s EU Membership Should Not Move Forward
By Julian Mancillas
On Friday November 10th, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban signaled that he does not support Ukraine’s European Union (EU) membership negotiations. EU leaders are scheduled to decide in mid-December whether or not to extend a formal invitation to Ukraine to begin membership negotiations. While the European Commission recommended that negotiations could begin once Ukraine addressed a couple of shortcomings, Orban was adamantly against the idea, stating “Ukraine is in no way ready to negotiate on its ambitions to join the European Union.”
With unanimity required from all EU member states to allow Ukraine entrance into the bloc, Orban’s opposition presents a formidable obstacle to Ukraine’s European aspirations. Hungary’s refusal to support Ukraine’s EU membership bid comes as no surprise. In the past Hungary has threatened to veto EU financial aid to Ukraine, and the close relationship between Orban’s government and Russia has caused concern in the United States. Hungary is also engaged in a struggle with the EU over the Orban administration’s violations of the rule of law and human rights, resulting in the EU withholding billions of euros in funding. Orban himself has sought to dispel any suspicions that Hungary’s opposition to Ukraine’s membership negotiations is connected to the release of EU funds. Regardless of Orban’s motives, Hungary’s opposition remains a roadblock to Ukraine’s future integration into the EU.
Polish Parliament Selects New Speaker, But President Duda Delays Transfer of Power
By Julian Mancillas
Following the victory of Donald Tusk’s pro-European coalition in the October 15th general election, EU-member state Poland has begun to face a contentious transition of power. Despite Tusk’s coalition winning a majority of 248 seats in Poland’s lower house of parliament the Sejm, Polish President Andrezj Duda, who is allied with the ruling right wing Law and Justice party, appointed outgoing prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki leader of a caretaker government. This greatly angered the victorious majority coalition, which accused President Duda of acting against the will of the voters by permitting Morawiecki to remain in power for four more weeks, thus granting his government time to push through advantageous political appointments. The coalition argues that since it has a parliamentary majority Duda should have appointed Tusk to form a government instead. In response to the president’s actions, the Sejm voted to elect Tusk’s ally Symon Holownia as speaker of the Sejm. One of Holownia’s first actions was to remove barriers put up around the Sejm following protests, stressing that the Sejm will no longer pass controversial laws like it did under the Law and Justice party. For his part, President Duda has warned that he will utilize his presidential veto against any “controversial” solutions passed by the parliament. Such a dispute between Tusk’s coalition and President Duda creates concern about the future of Polish democracy. Even if a smooth transition of power occurs there is likely to be a protracted confrontation between parliament and the President in the foreseeable future.
Philippines Joins Japanese Led Naval Exercises Amid Continued Disputes With China In The South China Sea
By Julian Mancillas
On Saturday November 11, the Annualex naval exercise began off the coast of Japan, with the United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan participating. The exercise is meant to promote cooperation between the navies of the four nations, while confirming their commitment to a “free and open” Indo-Pacific. Notably, the Philippines attended the exercises as an observer nation for the first time. This comes as the Philippines faces an increasing number of confrontations with China in the South China Sea due to a dispute over territorial waters. China claims the entire South China Sea as its own, putting it at odds with the territorial claims of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei.
Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is also a key factor in American-Chinese confrontations in the Indo-Pacific. Commenting on the Philippines participation in the exercise, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force Commander-in-Chief Akira Saito stated that “The Philippines is an extremely important country for Japan, and we hope to cooperate with the Philippine navy at every opportunity in the future.” Future cooperation definitely appears to be on the table as Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. agreed in early November to start negotiations on a security pact that would allow each nation’s armed forces to enter the other’s territory for military exercises.
Julian Mancillas is a student intern at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.