The CSPC Dispatch - Feb. 14, 2025
Welcome to The CSPC Dispatch!
This edition features contributions from CSPC President and CEO Glenn Nye on how to disrupt and modernize government without uprooting it. Senior Fellow Hidetoshi Azuma focuses on last week’s summit between President Trump and Prime Minister Ishiba. Maria Reyes Pacheco shares CSPC's new "Quarter Millennial Project" celebrating the country's upcoming 250th anniversary. Intern contributions from Caleb Mann focus on the upcoming budget reconciliation and Bridget Peach unpacks the transatlantic debate on defense spending.
As always, we hope that you will find the newsletter useful and would be delighted to receive your feedback or thoughts on how we can improve going forward.
The Right Way to Disrupt Government
By Glenn Nye
Djiboutian workers fill bags with wheat destined for Ethiopia, provided by USAID in 2013 (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Nicholas Byers/Released).
Americans have agitated over federal government spending long before the 2024 presidential elections, and an undercurrent of frustration with the status quo is clearly evident. Taxpayers deserve accountability and transparency in how their funds are deployed by federal agencies and for what purpose. They also deserve a thoughtful approach that weighs costs and benefits to deliver value with all possible efficiency. A regular assessment of government programs to identify duplicative, obsolescent, or wasteful spending is absolutely necessary to avoid the accumulation of forever programs whose value has long ago dissipated, an unfortunate trait inherent to any large bureaucracy. Yet there must also be an accompanying process to identify where the United States gets value, long term resilience, enhanced competitiveness, beneficial alliances, and service to its core values that are worth the investment. While a measure of disruption is warranted, a blunt over-reaction to government largesse is not the right solution.
This problem is not new, nor are many of the potential solutions. As a member of Congress, I proposed legislation in 2010 called the Stop Waste by Eliminating Excessive Programs (SWEEP) Act. The act proposed to establish a “Sunset Commission” to identify duplicative and wasteful spending and create a streamlined mechanism for Congress to vote to eliminate such spending as a package in an up-or-down vote. The initiative was centered in the Article One branch of government reflecting the constitutional responsibility of Congress in such decisions. Unfortunately, the bill did not become law, nor has a similar construct been implemented in the years since.
The situation has not improved over that time, and no one should question American citizens for being disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of the congressional budget process, but an alternate extreme also denies Americans the careful review of their federal programs that they deserve. Members of the nascent Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), acting on behalf of President Trump, have moved with great rapidity to summarily slash programs and entire departments. This approach also comes with great potential costs. For example, restructuring medical research funding to create efficiencies has logic, but bluntly slashing research support that undergirds American leadership in research and development of cutting edge medical technology, resulting in the departure of our best research scientists, would be counterproductive. It is worth taking the time to do this right.
No one is entitled to a government job, and performance in the service of American interests should indeed be a criterion for continued employment, yet many Americans made a faithful choice to serve American interests and values working for federal agencies. They make sacrifices including moving families overseas or working in places of danger or hardship. Sunsetting USAID programs the president no longer supports may be sensible; abruptly stopping the implementation of all programs, without a careful evaluation of what value each program might bring for the cost, is unnecessary and destroys hard-earned good will and relationships that often serve American interests and security.
Any newly elected president should take the prerogative to review government spending and carefully determine which investments are worthwhile and which are not, taking into account the president’s policy priorities in addition to broader measures of effectiveness. This might include proposing the abolishment of certain agencies. The Constitution requires that all this be presented in the president’s budget proposal and worked through the Congress. Given the current political disposition of the Congress toward the president, it is likely such a process would result in the president achieving most of his efficiency and priority proposals anyway.
There are several areas where the DOGE team could have a profoundly positive impact on the operation of the federal government. Their familiarity with technology could be used to streamline processes and make government services more efficient and user friendly. As a huge share of government funding goes to entitlements and defense, a robust focus on efficient deployment of defense dollars would be a high-impact focus area, one for which Elon Musk is well suited given his experience building various technology and hardware platforms, including rockets and satellites, used for national security missions. Musk’s experience at Space X, for example, resulted in our defense establishment achieving a dramatic reduction in launch costs for national security payloads. Leveraging private sector ingenuities and efficiencies would greatly benefit the effectiveness of defense investments, and a hidebound bureaucracy needs executive authority to break through some of its inherent internal process friction. Focus from the DOGE team on the interface between government and the private sector could bring the groundbreaking change our defense acquisition system has needed.
America does not need to face a binary choice between defaulting to status quo or summarily pulling the rug out from all federal programs. President Abraham Lincoln identified well the balance we should seek, observing that “there are few things wholly evil or wholly good. Almost everything, especially of government policy, is an inseparable compound of the two, so that our best judgment of the preponderance between them is continually demanded.” Lincoln understood that a persistent responsibility exists to review government programs using our best judgement, carefully and with a nuanced understanding of where the evil and the good lie. We have an opportunity to bring the right kind of disruption to government spending, a creative destruction that thoughtfully replaces moribund programs and processes with new structures connected clearly to the best long-term interests of the United States, without uprooting the good.
Japan’s Capitulation to ‘America First’
By Hidetoshi Azuma
The US President Trump and the Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba at the end of the joint press conference at the US-Japan Summit in February 2025 (Prime Minister’s Office, CC BY 4.0).
US President Donald J. Trump received the Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in Washington last week. While the storm of Trump’s domestic readjustments overshadowed his first US-Japan summit in his second term, Ishiba arrived in Washington against the backdrop of the towering legacy of his predecessor, the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who enjoyed a remarkable friendship with the incumbent US president before his untimely assassination in 2022. The summit largely showcased optics of rapport as the two leaders flattered each other, though it did not reach the level of the Trump-Abe bromance of the bygone era. As a result, the Japanese public largely recognized the first Trump-Ishiba summit as a success, leading to an immediate 5% increase in the Japanese prime minister’s support rate. Yet, the facade of friendship is scarcely a useful metric for understanding the real significance of the summit. When viewed in terms of deliverables, Ishiba surrendered to Trump’s art of the deal almost unconditionally, irreversibly shaping the contours of the US-Japan relationship in the reemergent age of America First.
The prevailing Japanese characterization of the first Trump-Ishiba summit as a success reflects the inescapable legacy of Abe’s bromance with the incumbent US president. Upon Trump’s election in November 2016, Abe became the first world leader to meet with the then-US president-elect, paving the way for a close friendship for the next four years and even beyondtheir time in office. In fact, achieving a close personal rapport was Abe’s Trump-proofing strategy for dealing with the first reemergence of America First in almost a century. He correctly understood that the isolationist nationalism cloaked in the America First slogan would almost inevitably put the US and Japan on a collision course as in the 1920s. His solution was to minimize the full-on impact of Trump’s America First impulse by bonding closely with the US president himself even if it meant becoming his loyal, yet seemingly subservient, sidekick.
Abe’s bromance strategy produced the desired effects of appearing to check Trump’s agressivedrive with a facade of inviolable friendship for domestic consumption. The spectacle of their frequent bonding over golf at Mar-a-Lago appeared so effective that it has ultimately produced the lingering myth in Japan that a close friendship between the leaders would be a prerequisite trait of subsequent Japanese leadership in dealing with Trump. However, Abe’s own track record ironically leaves a lot of questions as to the real effectiveness of his approach with Trump. For example, Abe’s friendly overtures did little to prevent US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trump soon imposed steel and aluminum tariffs on Japan. What’s worse, Trump ignored Japanese sensitivities and interests when he started to directly deal with Kim Jongun of North Korea much to Tokyo’s consternations. Nonetheless, Trump’s decision to incorporate Abe’s signature Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy agendas lent credence to the perceived success of their bromance.
As a result, when Trump secured his reelection last November, Ishiba faced enormous domestic pressure regarding his prospects for forging a similar friendship with the incoming US president. Ishiba was long known in Japan as a political outsider within his own ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in which he earned an unceremonious nick name, “internal pundit” for his unabashed criticisms of his own party and fellow party members. His reserved personality frequently put him at odds with even the senior most LDP lawmakers, including former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and former Prime Minister Taro Aso. Apart from his uncongenial personality, his quasi-leftist, pro-China outlook directly challenged the LDP’s longstanding conservative, pro-US orthodoxy, leading him to remain further isolated in the party with his own faction boasting only eight members before its dismantlement in early 2024. Ishiba’s surprise rise to the premiership in September 2024 was a product of the ongoing political instability left by the Abe assassination. Indeed, the LDP suffered a crippling loss of seats in the general election in October 2024 under Ishiba’s leadership. In this precarious position the new Japanese prime minister sought to emulate Abe by pursuing the then-US president-elect during the transition period in the US in hopes of demonstrating his credibility on the international stage to a domestic audience. Much to Ishiba’s dismay, Trump spurned his request for an in-person meeting in December 2024 putatively in deference to the Logan Act. As if to add insult to injury, Trump immediately proceeded to meet with other foreign leaders and dignitaries, such as Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and even Abe’s widow, Akie Abe.
Thus, few in Japan had a lot of faith in Ishiba’s outlook to repeat the Abe strategy vis-à-vis Trump before his visit to Washington last week. Well aware of the low expectations, Ishiba took extra pains to ensure the success of the summit. He reportedly spent more than 30 hours preparing for the summit by inviting senior officials virtually from every ministry to brief him on Trump at the Kantei. Some observers even saw his premiership on the line as the unspoken rule in Tokyo has long dictated that no Japanese prime minister could survive a loss of confidence by a US president. Meanwhile, Trump himself remained aloof from Ishiba’s plight, leading him to accidentally reveal a week before the summit that he did not know what to discuss with the visiting Japanese prime minister. Moreover, Japan was hardly a key priority only a few weeks into his second term dominated by domestic politics and the Western Hemisphere. The absence of a personal bond between the two leaders and Japan’s perceived irrelevance in Washington left the job of bilateral coordination largely in the hands of bureaucrats in Washington and Tokyo.
As a result of these circumstances, the first Trump-Ishiba summit opened and closed with the president inevitably controlling the initiative over his Japanese counterpart throughout. This was evident in the ways in which the two leaders interacted with each other on camera. At times, it seemed that Trump appeared to sense Ishiba’s weak position and graciously provided his Japanese counterpart with what could be interpreted as sarcastic flattery, such as his characterization of the Japanese leader as “tough” and even “more handsome” than the US president. Ishiba reciprocated by repeating carefully rehearsed praise and went as far as to portray Trump as being “chosen by God” in an apparent attempt to emphasize their shared Presbyterian faith. Meanwhile, Trump seemed careful not to appear too close to Ishiba by frequently addressing him as “Mr. Prime Minister” in sharp contrast to the familiar “Shinzo” for his old friend, Shinzo Abe, a name he repeatedly invoked throughout the summit. The two leaders event went as far as declaring their commitment to pursuing “a new golden age for US-Japan relations” during the joint press conference. However, this seeming climax was disrupted when Trump appeared to mix the message by abruptly ending the joint press conference and proceeding with his exit without turning to Ishiba to shake hands with him.
While the media in both countries mostly spun the latest US-Japan summit as a mutual success, such an assessment is premature in light of the lack of actual new deliverables the two leaders agreed on during the meeting. First, the US-Japan Leaders’ Joint Statement represents in essence the continuation of the established policies guiding the bilateral alliance in recent years. If anything, it is a bureaucratic patchwork of established talking points offering the reiteration of the basic framework agreed upon by Trump and Abe almost a decade ago. For example, Trump reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to honoring Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in its application to the Senkaku Islands, the group of islets in the East China Sea disputed among Japan, China, and Taiwan. Washington’s rhetorical commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands has been a routine exercise in historical US-Japan summits and is unsurprising at best. Moreover, in light of the overall uncertainty of an America First foreign policy such rhetorical promises no longer necessarily signify their delivery.
What’s worse, Trump essentially equated Japan’s security normalization efforts to business opportunities for the US military industrial complex. During the working lunch, Ishiba reportedly told Trump that Japan, not the US, would decide the size of its future defense budget. Trump’s rhetorical support for Ishiba’s agenda was evident in the US-Japan Leader’s Joint Statement in which the US “welcomed Japan’s commitment, underpinned by a favorable trend of its defense budget increase, to building capabilities by FY 2027 to consolidate its primary responsibility for defending Japan, and, building on this significant foundation, to fundamentally reinforcing its defense capabilities beyond FY 2027.” However, during the subsequent Q&A, Trump revealed the meaning of “favorable trend of [Japan’s] defense budget increase” when responding to a question on Washington’s expectations for Japan’s security normalization. He bluntly stated that he did not mind Japan’s “spending so much money on the military because we build it here. It's made in the USA, all made in the USA.” Ironically, the US president was absolutely correct in his understanding of the total dependence of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) capabilities on US defense technologies. The JSDF continue to remain the auxiliary forces of the US Forces in Japan (USJF), and Trump’s statement only reaffirmed Washington’s enduring paternalistic perspective on Japan’s security. In this sense, Ishiba found himself unable to escape Trump’s opportunistic approach to Japan’s defense policy.
Trump and Ishiba also struck a series of economic deals as part of “the US-Japan Cooperation for Growth and Prosperity” in the US-Japan Leaders’ Joint Statement. Despite the lofty declarations sprinkled throughout statement, the latest bilateral economic deals would decidedly favor the US potentially even at the expense of Japan. For example, the 1 trillion USD investment package promised by Ishiba was the largest economic largesse offered by any foreign power in recent US history. While it was clearly a victory for the US, questions remain on Japan’s actual ability to deliver on these promises and to boost its foreign direct investments (FDI) to such a level in the foreseeable future, not to mention the expected return on investment (ROÍ) for the country. As of 2023, Japan’s FDI in the US stood at 783.3 billion USD, and another 200 billion USD increase in FDI would inevitably require the USD-JPY exchange rate imbalance driven by strong dollar and weak yen in recent years. Perhaps the expected liquified natural gas (LNG) supplies from Alaska could boost Japan’s energy security. Yet, their actual economic benefits remain to be seen in light of Japan’s ongoing LNG imports from Russia via Sakhalin located only 37 km away from the country.
Despite the prime minister’s optimism for the Japanese private sector, Japan Inc may increasingly find itself at the mercy of Trump’s unbridled America First agenda. For example, Trump all but forced Ishiba to acquiesce in the newly proposed “investment” deal for Nippon Steel’s failed acquisition of US Steel following former US President Joe Biden’s surprise intervention earlier this year. While the two leaders touted the win-win nature of the new deal for both countries, Trump’s insistence on US Steel retaining the majority share may essentially force Nippon Steel to donate its money and resources to the aging American company without ownership benefits. Moreover, Trump wasted no time in readying tariffs on steel and aluminum immediately after seeing off Ishiba. When Ishiba landed in Tokyo, he thus already found himself grappling with Trump’s unsparing trade war targeting even Japan.
Therefore, a sober reflection on the actual deliverables the two leaders gained from the summit last week reveals that Japan surrendered on most points to Trump’s demands. Japan has gained nothing immediate other than an appointment with Trump while yielding more than it could. By contrast, the US has gained perhaps the largest economic deals in recent years decidedly benefiting the country in exchange for repeating bureaucratic platitudes for the US-Japan alliance ironically inherited largely from the previous US administration. Trump’s zero-sum driven pursuit of victory for the sake of victory even evokes the bitter memories of the troubled US-Japan relationship in the 1920s following the Washington Naval Conference by Trump’spredecessor, President Warren G. Harding. Suddenly, history appears to rear its ugly head, casting a grim prospect for Ishiba who now finds himself torn between the pressure of Trump’s America First agenda on the one hand and the imperative of saving his beleaguered premiership on the other.
However, while it is easy to blame Ishiba for his failings, the real problem lies with Japan as a whole. Japan has yet to unfetter itself from the effects of post-WWII pacifism imposed upon the defeated country by the US. Instead, pacifism has become Japan’s national dogma stifling largerstrategic thinking for the country and leading the Japanese public to erroneously judge Ishiba’ssummit performance merely on his perceived friendship with Trump following Abe’s example. In this sense, Ishiba was a prisoner of his own circumstances and launched himself onto an unwinnable gamble with Trump in his desperate search for political survival in Nagatacho. In this sense last week’s summit has emphasized Japan’s difficult and weak position in the US-Japan relationship, a reality which merits thorough meditation.
Quarter Millennial Launch: Exploring the Past, Charting the Future
By Maria Reyes Pacheco
From left: Calvin Fuller, Daryl Chapin, and Gerald Pearson operate a record player with their new invention - a sunshine battery that produces electricity - during a demonstration at Bell Laboratories.
As we approach President’s Day and prepare to commemorate our country’s leaders and the legacies they have left behind, the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress (CSPC) reflects on our continued commitment to applying lessons from the nation’s past to the challenges of today. In a new era of global competition, we are reminded of how American success has been grounded in innovation. From the launch of the first successful commercial steamboat in the 19th century to the modern-day discovery of CRISPR gene editing technology, American innovation has built the foundation for the nation’s prosperity.
These are the advancements that the Center is excited to highlight as we launch the first part of our Quarter Millennial Project, generously supported by the Richard Lounsbery Foundation. This multi-pronged initiative honors our nation’s history through the lens of innovation as we approach the 250th anniversary of the United States on July 4, 2026. This week, the Center released two centerpieces of the project on CSPC’s website, an interactive “Innovation Timeline” and a “Life in 1776” digital exhibit.
The timeline showcases over 50 key innovations in technology and science, spanning from the founding of our country to the present-day. It allows visitors to learn about major milestones and lesser-known achievements that have propelled the nation’s progress.
The timeline also highlights the people who came together to create these advancements and embody the American spirit of collaboration and perseverance. One example includes engineer Daryl Chapin, who in 1953 began developing solar cells at Bell Labs as an alternative energy source for telephone batteries in remote, humid areas. However, he found that selenium solar cells were inefficient as conductors. Down the hall, physicist Gerald Pearson and chemist Calvin Fuller were conducting experiments on the effects of impurities on semiconductors. By manipulating silicon with lithium they discovered that silicon could be used to conduct solar energy.
Having heard of Chapin’s experiments, the two scientists shared their findings with Chapin and the three began developing the first practical silicon solar cell. This invention was announced by Bell Labs on April 25, 1954. Within a few years, continued efforts would lead to solar panels that could power satellites. The collaborative efforts of these three scientists were possible due to the risk-taking innovation that an organization such as Bell Labs fostered. Throughout the timeline, American institutions and organizations bring together minds and ideas that have allowed the United States to push the boundaries of technological possibilities.
To truly appreciate the kind of progress that Chapin and his collaborators achieved, we must have an understanding of the roots of American innovation. The digital exhibit on “Life in 1776” offers a deep dive into early American society and the Revolutionary period. The modules feature photos, newspaper clippings, and videos that bring together the collections of museums, historical societies, and academic institutions. Visitors are able to explore nine modules on a range of topics including voting, education, and commerce.
In the module on city life, we uncover the beginnings of our medical system in America’s early cities. In New York, Bellevue Hospital was the first public hospital which opened in 1739 as a six-bed infirmary. Today, Bellevue stands as a leading medical center and is one of the largest hospitals in the country. In the module on communications, viewers are able to look at the earliest American newspapers that created networks of information. In 1775, there were roughly 35 newspapers in the colonies and most papers were published on a weekly or fortnightly basis. Today, there are around 6,000 American newspapers and journalism has evolved from printed communication to the digital space. These insights into early American life shine a light on how far we have come and provide a greater appreciation of the progress that has shaped the country’s trajectory.
As we collectively reflect on 250 years of history and look towards the future, this project aims to spark an exploration of the nation’s past that inspires the next generation of American innovators. We invite you to explore all the website has to offer and stay up to date with the full offerings of the Quarter Millennial Project by visiting www.thepresidency.org/america-at-250.
Budget Reconciliation 101
By Caleb Mann
President Trump celebrates the passage of the Tax Cuts Act with Vice President Mike Pence, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and Speaker of the House Paul Ryan on December 20, 2017 (Official White House Photo by Joyce N. Boghosian).
Elected on a platform promising deep cuts in federal spending, the Trump administration and Republican-led Congress are seeking to slash trillions from the federal budget. President Trump has also been adamant about expanding his Tax Cuts and Jobs Act from 2017 (TCJA). With sights firmly set on sweeping reforms and a crackdown on wasteful spending, a Republican-led Congress faces a complex web of fiscal responsibilities. To quickly advance legislation in the face of Democratic opposition, congressional Republicans have thus opted for the budget reconciliation process.
Budget reconciliation is a special process created decades ago that allows for the expedited consideration and debate of certain fiscal-related legislation. To curb federal spending and address the growing deficit, the 93rd Congress passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The landmark bill completely overhauled the way Congress addressed the federal budget, as well as strengthening their “power of the purse.” The Budget Act created the House and Senate budget committees, the Congressional Budget Office, and, most importantly in today’s context, the budget reconciliation process.
The Budget Act permits reconciliation bills for legislation related to revenue and spending changes and the federal deficit. Reconciliation can also be used to alter some mandatory spending programs such as Medicare/Medicaid, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Veteran benefits, and farm programs. However, reconciliation is seldom used to address mandatory spending. While the process allows for certain aspects of mandatory spending to be altered, it often requires amending previously established laws. The Budget Act does not lay out any specific prohibition for the reconciliation process’ ability to address discretionary spending. Discretionary spending, however, is determined by the annual appropriations process, and reconciliation has thus far not been used to expand or restrict discretionary funding.
The congressional budgetary timeline begins on the first Monday in February when the White House submits the President’s budget. Typically massive in size, the budget outlines the Executive’s policy and spending priorities, but it does not carry the force of law. Six weeks after submission of the President’s budget, Congress is supposed to draft a budget resolution. The budget resolution is the framework that outlines the federal government’s spending and revenue targets for the fiscal year. However, budget resolutions do not actually fund any programs or agencies within the federal government. That power instead lies within the 12 appropriations bills Congress must pass annually. By mid-April, Congress is supposed to complete drafting the resolution and pass complimentary bills in the House and Senate. Should the House and Senate finance committees include reconciliation directives, then and only then may the process be used. Though created with the intention of quickened deliberation, reconciliation bills are meant to be passed in late September, just before the fiscal year begins in October. However, this has only been accomplished with mixed results, as 15 of the 27 reconciliation bills ever written by Congress were passed after the fiscal year had begun.
While both chambers of the legislative branch must pass the same reconciliation package, the process and limitations on debate differ. In the House of Representatives, reconciliation bills are largely treated the same as any other legislation. They are not subject to limited debate or amendments unless specified by the House Rules Committee. The reconciliation process denies the Senate its most precious dilatory tactic, blocking the ability to filibuster reconciliation. Debate time is limited to just 20 hours, and unanimous consent is required to extend that timeline. Most importantly, reconciliation bills only require a simple majority in both chambers to advance. Thus, in recent times reconciliation has become a partisan asset, as the process has been used more frequently when one party remains in control of the legislative and executive branches. A valuable political tool, partisan-led reconciliation bills have frequently resulted in an increase in the projected deficit.
As reconciliation inherently makes it easier for legislation to pass, certain provisions to limit what could be considered during the reconciliation process were put into place. As a reaction to the initial reconciliation bills becoming cluttered with non-fiscal legislation, former Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) introduced a set of provisions. Adopted in 1985, the Byrd rule offers a set of provisions to limit the “extraneous matter” on reconciliation bills. The provisions notably prohibit any legislation or amendments that do not directly address the budget, and they must have a fiscal impact. The provisions further disallow any alterations to be made to social security through reconciliation.
Reconciliation bills cannot increase the federal deficit unless the increase is offset by separate spending cuts. Lawmakers prepare to advance reconciliation bills through a process known as the “Byrd bath.” Before a reconciliation bill is brought to the floor, the Senate Parliamentarian is consulted to determine if the bill contains any violations. This rule is unique to the Senate but is neither automatic nor resolute in its authority. For a provision to be considered in violation of Byrd rules, a point of order must be raised. Furthermore, the Byrd rule can be overridden by a 60-vote majority. A recent example can be seen in former President Biden’s American Rescue Plan, which aimed to stimulate the country’s economic recovery during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Byrd rules blocked Biden and the then-Democratic majority party from raising the federal minimum wage, citing ‘merely incidental’ budgetary effects.
As Congress faces critical fiscal decisions in the face of an expiring budget, the reconciliation process remains a significant, though often nuanced legislative process. While reconciliation offers lawmakers streamlined debate, it has in recent years fallen victim to partisan politics, often intensifying the polarization within the legislature. As congressional leadership faces ongoing pressure to reduce the deficit and deliver substantial tax cuts, the reconciliation process is at the very heart of the nation’s financial future. With an impending shutdown date on March 14, House and Senate Republicans have yet to agree on how best to proceed, offering up competing budget resolutions. As this era becomes defined by fierce political rivalry and fealty to party leadership, Congress must face the complex balance of their fiscal responsibility to the American people and the advancement of their own political agendas. How Congress chooses to navigate these challenges will determine the financial future of this country.
Caleb Mann is an intern at CSPC and junior at Virginia Tech majoring in History with a minor in Political Science.
Europe vs Trump: The Battle Over NATO Defense Spending
By Bridget Peach
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Secretary-General of NATO Mark Rutte at NATO Headquarters on Oct. 17, 2024 (DoD photo by Chad J. McNeeley, CC BY 2.0).
Since before his inauguration, President Trump has been calling for an increase in financial commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense spending budget. On January 7, 2025, Trump announced that the vast majority of members in the alliance were not pulling their weight in contributions to defense. Though the expectation of GDP contribution is currently set at 2%, Trump is calling for a more-than-double increase to 5%. While Trump cited a need for an increase as a response to Russia’s invasion into Ukraine, a number of NATO countries have been put off by Trump’s foreign policy with respect to Greenland, the Panama Canal, and Canada. However, Trump has made his goal with NATO clear: European countries need to be the leaders in defense spending to counter Russia.
This is not the first time that President Trump has tried to up the percentage. In 2018, during his first term, Trump suggested that the defense spending be raised from 2% to 4% of GDP. Currently, 23 of the 32 members have met the original 2% goal, and only one country—Poland—has increased spending to 4%. While this is a significant increase from 2021, when only six countries met the GDP percent goal, many are still struggling to set aside the adequate funds. On the contrary, countries like France and Germany, boasting the highest GDPs in Europe, contribute just over the minimum 2% toward defense spending.
Historically, and especially since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, the countries geographically closest to Russia have been the most concerned about NATO spending and appeasing U.S. demands for percent increases. Poland, facing security issues from Russia that grew significantly in 2014, has consistently exceeded the budget expectations and currently contributes the largest percentage of its GDP to NATO. The Baltic States, closer to Russia than most European countries, take three of the top six spots in GDP shares for defense spending. Furthermore, both Latvia and Lithuania have increased their contributions by over 300%. In addition, all countries seeking admittance into the organization are seeking safety and security from Russia in some form; Sweden and Finland joined in recent years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Ukraine and Georgia have similar motivations for applying.
In his December 2024 speech to NATO, Secretary General Mark Rutte reminded member countries that defense spending during the Cold War was higher than current GDP percentage levels, with European spending averages soaring north of 3%. U.S. spending also reached a peak in the Cold War, and at one point reached over 4.5% of its GDP. Defense spending for the United States spiked again in the early 2000s, during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but failed to reach Cold War-levels and has remained under 4% of GDP ever since. Rutte claimed that in order to win the war against Russia and accomplish the necessary defense goals, the spending goal must be higher than the current 2%.
European NATO countries are responding differently to Trump’s strong suggestions, and appear to be regionally divided. Just as countries geographically closer to Russia have been more likely to reach the 2% of GDP goal, the majority of Eastern Europe has reacted enthusiastically to an increase in defense spending. The Baltic States, specifically Lithuania and Estonia, have publicly agreed to raise their goals to 5% of GDP, while Poland and Sweden have acknowledged the importance of increasing defense measures. Those in opposition, however, are divided on the primary reasons for pushback. Countries like Bulgaria, along with past statements from Trump, are calling for all states to pull their weight before further increases are enacted. As nine members have not met the 2%, Bulgaria sees Trump’s goal as premature. Other NATO members, especially Western countries like Italy and Spain, are skeptical of how realistic the percentage jump would be. The Czech Republic, still reaching toward the 2% goal and hoping to achieve it this year, suggested the increase in defense spending be pushed to the future.
As Trump continues to increase pressure on European NATO countries and Canada to pull their weight in the alliance, the Baltic States and Poland are fearing an end of U.S. involvement. In 2024, of the $1,185 billion that NATO totaled in defense spending, the United States contributed $755 billion. Europe needs the United States as a key player in NATO, and may have to appease Trump to a certain degree in order to keep them onboard.
Bridget Peach is an intern at CSPC and junior at the University of Georgia majoring in International Affairs and Russian.