Friday News Roundup — April 15, 2022
Greetings to you from Washington, where a solemn day for many is also a beautiful spring day — a reminder of the rebirth and growth of this time of year and welcome antidote to much of the news. Quiet as Friday may now seem, it was a busy week, with plenty of analysis in this week’s roundup.
CSPC President & CEO Glenn Nye participated in the recent Lexington Concordia Summit. He joined with CSPC Trustee Ambassador Paula Dobriansky in a discussion on what’s next in Ukraine, as well as a conversation on cybersecurity and resilience in an increasingly networked era.
CSPC also hosted a discussion on the intersection of national security and high-tech intellectual property with Deanna Tanner Okun, Managing Partner at AMS TRADE LLP, and Brian A. Pomper Executive Director of the Innovation Alliance.
This week Joshua C. Huminski, the director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs reviewed “How to be a Woman Online” by Nina Jankowicz for the Diplomatic Courier. A how-to guide for women to navigate online abuse, it is even more powerful for what it doesn’t say, forcing the reader to reflect on why society tacitly accepts a culture of abuse in the first place.
Huminski also reviewed Ido Levy’s “Soldiers of End-Times” about the Islamic State’s military performance in Syria and Iraq for George Mason University’s National Security Institute. A welcome contribution to the study of the Islamic State, Levy shows how the group “conventionalized” its tactics and overcame the military superiority (on paper) of Damascus and Baghdad.
In this week’s roundup, Joshua and Veera team up to look at Finland’s and Sweden’s moves closer to joining NATO. Ethan looks at what changes in command mean for both NATO and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Wes analyzes how the Kremlin is spinning the breakdown in negotiations and the upcoming offensive. Dan closes with a look at the Shanghai lockdown and concern over Chinese influence in the Solomon Islands to argue for a clearer strategic narrative for U.S.-China relations and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.
Finland & Sweden Closer to Joining NATO
Joshua C. Huminski & Veera Parko
Finland will decide “within weeks” whether or not to apply NATO membership in response to the changed security environment following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to reports. Sweden, for its part, looks closer to deciding on membership, as well. In a joint press conference between Finland’s prime minister, Sanna Marin, and her Swedish counterpart, Magdalena Andersson, Marin said “I think our process will be quite fast; it will happen in weeks”. On Sweden she added, “I would prefer if we made similar choices for the whole region, but it is up to Sweden to decide.”
Andersson was cautious about the prospects of Sweden joining NATO, saying she hasn’t ruled out NATO membership. According to Andersson, “This is a very important time in our history. There is a before and after [the Russian invasion]…We have to really think through what is really best for Sweden and our security and peace in this situation…we need to have a process to think this through.”
For its part, NATO has indicated that both countries’ membership applications would be fast-tracked in the event that the respective governments decide to proceed.
On Wednesday, the Finnish government adopted and submitted a report to parliament outlining the changed security environment as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine. While the report does not “include any conclusions or present new security policy guidelines” it is blunt in its assessment. According to the report, “The war started by Russia jeopardises the security and stability of the whole of Europe. Russia’s declared goal is to change the European security order.“ The report makes a clear point that joining NATO would improve Finland´s capacity to deter Russian aggression: “The deterrent effect of Finland´s defence would be considerably stronger than it is at present, as it would be based on the capabilities of the entire Alliance.”.
That both Finland and Sweden now appear on a course to NATO membership represents a notable shift in Europe’s security architecture and the domestic politics of both countries. The pace of the change has also surprised many and is indicative of the public’s response to the threat Russia is now seen to pose. Abstract, but nonetheless real, it is now visibly manifest on the battlefields of Ukraine.
Finland, which shares an over 800-mile long border with Russia and has a deep history with Moscow, not the least of which was the Winter War from 1939 to 1940 during the Second World War. The war ended with Finland ceding territory to Russia, but retaining its independence, and maintaining a balanced approach with Moscow, avoiding antagonizing Russia, but charting its own independent path. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Finland increased its cooperation with NATO, signing a treaty granting NATO troops support and transit through the country in times of crisis, and has been steadily and quite effectively modernizing its military — interoperability being a key pre-requisite for NATO membership.
Prior to the invasion, Helsinki, like Stockholm, was militarily non-aligned and politically neutral, but Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a sharp shift in popular opinion with increasing numbers of Finns supporting NATO membership. A poll this week showed that a quite astounding 68% were in favor of joining, up from 53% when the invasion began. With the exception of PM Marin’s Social Democrats, major political parties in the Finnish parliament have shown the green light for applying for NATO membership.
For its part, many on the left in Sweden are suspicious of America’s security agenda and the NATO alliance with its reliance on nuclear deterrence. Sweden, whilst cooperation with NATO has been on-going and deepening, political neutrality and keeping Sweden outside military conflicts has long been part of its political identity. Stockholm has long been an advocate of nuclear disarmament. Like Finland, public opinion in Sweden hasshifted in the wake of the invasion — a Swedish poll found that 51% were in favor of joining, up from 42% in January. Within Sweden’s parliament, it appears that politics are also changing with the Social Democrats, the third largest party, reconsidering its position on membership, which could give the government the necessary majority to push through to joining Sweden will hold parliamentary elections in September, which might also push the government to make swift decisions.
In response, Russia’s former president and current deputy chair of the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev warned that “If Sweden and Finland join Nato, the length of the alliance’s land borders with Russia will more than double… Naturally, these borders will have to be strengthened.” As a result, “If this is done, no non-nuclear status of the Baltic will be possible…The balance must be restored.” This threat is unsurprising and made many times over in the past. Threats to move missiles or bombers closer to Finland and Sweden is largely spurious. Arguably, there is little material difference between a missile sitting in Kaliningrad versus one sitting in Murmansk or the North Sea — it is merely a matter of minutes in terms of launch to impact, and missiles are already assumed to be in place.
At a macro-level it is interesting to reflect the extent to which Putin appears to have scored an own-goal and manifested a self-fulfilling prophecy in one fell swoop. He succeeded in not only unifying NATO, which prior to Ukraine was suffering “brain death” in the words of France’s president, Emanuel Macron, but also creating conditions for its potential expansion. Yet, at the same time, he’s also managed to fulfill his own nationalist argument that the West is against, or appears against, Russia — in actuality the Russian government, not the country or the people. Putin will almost certainly point to Sweden and Finland’s dalliances with joining NATO, whether they actually join or not — as indicative of the West’s animosity toward Russia. It had expanded in the past and now it was expanding again. When looking at a Russian map of the world, the argument of encirclement is understandable. The last sliver of European border would now be part of the lengthy NATO front.
Much political wrangling in both Finland and Sweden remains to be done. Moreover, whether the rhetoric and political impetus remains is also unclear — should the war be resolved in the near future, one wonders whether the political inertia will sustain itself through to full membership in NATO. Finland, especially, will likely have to endure further pressure from Russia during a possible application process (with NATO´s Article 5 not yet in effect), trying to influence its decision-making and resolve. It is by no means a guarantee that either Helsinki or Stockholm will fully cross the line, but it is nonetheless reflective of just how much has changed in so short a period of time. While it remains to be seen whether both countries join the alliance, but in either case the deepening and strengthening of the ties between both countries and the alliance over the course of this crisis will prove to be invaluable in the future.
Military leadership turnover in Europe
Ethan Brown
This week, significant changes occurred in the hierarchies of European military powers, both in NATO and the Russian offensive in Ukraine. Normally, turnover hardly raises many eyebrows or garners attention when it happens, unless the politically-critical roles like Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Service Commanders are under congressional review. But the timing and unique historical context of the two appointments in this week’s analysis deserve closer inspection and review for how they stack up to one another.
For the former, U.S. Army General Christopher Cavoli, currently the Commander of U.S. Army Europe, has been tapped by President Biden to assume the role of NATO forces in Europe. This new role oversees roughly 100,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in the European theater, as well as the 40,000+ personnel commitment from NATO partners beholden to collective security. Gen. Cavoli assumes the reins from Air Force General Ted Wolters, previously President Trump’s nominee for the NATO command, whose tenure had been extended temporarily as the Ukraine crisis escalated over the previous few months. Gen. Cavoli has served since 1987, leading and commanding maneuver forces at all levels of the U.S. Army including 3rd Brigade Combat Team, the 1st Armored Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division.
Where Gen. Cavoli differs from other NATO commanders, however, lies in his unique experience in policy and staff roles, and for the current crisis dynamic in Europe, there may not have been a better candidate to assume this pivotal role. Gen. Cavoli is an academic expert in a variety of national security vectors, having held fellowships at the National Defense University, the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, and the Army Chief of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group. Further, as an experienced Foreain Area Officer (a carefully cultivated technical expertise accrued in addition to his commission as an infantry officer) with a regional concentration in Eurasia, Gen. Cavoli speaks Italian, French and Russian, and is a degree-holder from Yale and Princeton.
General Cavoli’s nomination comes at a time when the role of a major military commander exceeds the simple fire and maneuver of troops, personnel management, and readiness. Rather, the selection demands a unique guiding hand at leveraging cooperation between allied partners, sensitivity (meaning aptitude) to the politicking of escalation and fragile partnerships, and a keen eye for the aggressor/adversary his region of responsibility forces him to contend with. Not that Gen. Wolters didn’t also appreciate or execute this same dynamic, but Europe of 2019 is dramatically different from the Europe of today, to understate the point.
And now for the other end of the military turnover, we turn our attention to the Butcher of Syria, who was appointed to take over the Russian invasion of Ukraine by President Putin. General Aleksandr Dvornikov has a lengthy, unpleasant history as a major player in the Russian military. According to a military analyst in Moscow, who went unnamed in a recent Yahoo News profile, Dvornikov is described as “a ruthless commander and will deploy tactics in Syria now in Ukraine. He was in Chechnya 20 years ago. It is about liberating cities by reducing them to rubble”.
It’s not an idle assertion about rendering cities to rubble either. During Russia’s air campaign in Syria from 2015–2017, aimed at suppressing opposition forces in order to bolster and stabilize the al-Assad regime, Dvornikov directed thousands of airstrikes in Aleppo and Homs, two major Syrian cities which were under rebel control during that time. Those airstrikes included deliberate attacks on hospitals and water sources, two targets that immediately and credibly smack of war crimes with no room for debate. He was the first Russian commander involved in the Syrian Civil War, and his actions overseeing that operation ultimately garnered him the ‘Hero of the Russian Federation’ citation for his efforts and atrocities.
General Dvornikov previously served as commander of Russia’s Southern Military District, and is reported to be in the running for replacing Chief of General Staff Valerie Gerasimov who, along with General Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Defence, are both facing potential heat for the flawed and costly Ukraine invasion resulting in unanticipated Russian casualties and a slow, grinding occupation rather than a swift, lightning strike seizure. By his very nature, Dvornikov all but ensures some change to the current stalemate and grind in Ukraine, as White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki and national security advisor Jake Sullivan have both warned of certain atrocities in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region under the Butchers direction. Psaki’s remarks included that “we should have no illusions that Russia is going to adjust their tactics and make them less brutal”, but that the leadership change will not “erase the fact that this is a strategic failure for Russia”.
For all intents and purposes, there likely are no two major military leaders more diametrically opposed in personality and professionalism than these two newcomers to the Eastern European crisis. One might be seen as liberalism’s poster-child — cooperation, understanding the competitors/adversary, diverse and academic; the other has made a military career of brutality, more blood spilled than blood lost, and even the latter doesn’t matter so much. It serves as the microcosm of the Russia-versus-West dynamic to boot — how the two powers develop leaders and the influences on their manifestation along the way.
Now of course, these two are not scheming maneuver plans against one another in World War Two style-campaigns, and reasonable minds still hope for a peaceful end to this conflict where Russian forces cease aggression and NATO needs never engage in such an ordeal. But the appointment of these two Generals to such pivotal posts tells us a few important things about the potential future of the European theater. First, Dvornikov’s rise to this post (or lateral movement, if we were to place Syria and Ukraine on par) should tell us that Putin is doubling down on his gambit to embroil Eastern Europe into disarray. Perhaps not even to escalate to conflict, but to keep NATO and the EU occupied while Putin pursues political objectives we don’t fully understand (and definitely check out our colleague Wes’ piece in the Hill this week to learn about the discord within Russia’s political machine). Second, the United States is picking its leaders and delegating responsibilities unique to the crisis, with an eye on pivoting towards new arenas of competition that will demand Europe takes ownership of its own backyard. Yes, the might of the American military remains engaged and integrated into Europe’s security posture, and the new hierarchy/commander of NATO forces is fully invested and uniquely suited to this role, but Ukraine is but one pressure button on a large keyboard of American interests abroad.
Ceasefire Negotiations Break Down as Russia Prepares to Launch New Offensive
By Wesley Culp
As Russia continues its repositioning of troops away from positions in northern Ukraine and towards battlefields closer to Donbas in the east of Ukraine’s territory, negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv appear to have stalled out. Despite previously encouraging signals from both the Russian and Ukrainian negotiation teams that meaningful progress was being made in talks, it appears that the highest levels of the Russian government have poured cold water on future prospects for negotiation. Put together, this likely indicates that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will be entering a new phase shortly where negotiations are not as valued, at least in the eyes of Russia’s leadership.
In a joint event with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko at Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Russian Far East, Russian President Vladimir Putin explained his belief that bilateral negotiations between Russia and Ukraine were at a “dead end.” In particular, Putin complained that Ukrainians had abandoned understandings reached in negotiations in Istanbul over the status of Crimea, Sevastopol, and Donbas. The Russian president also claimed that the discovery of massacres perpetrated by Russian troops around the Kyiv suburb of Bucha was a “fake” designed to derail negotiations with Russia. President Putin also promised that Russian goals in Ukraine would be achieved in full, indicating that Russia’s leadership remains intent on pursuing an end to the conflict on its terms, regardless of the significant setbacks faced by Russian troops in the opening stages of the invasion.
Putin’s negative assessment of future prospects for negotiations make more sense when considered in the context of Russia’s likely strategic repositioning of operations toward Ukraine’s east. Once in place, Russian forces are expected to attempt to encircle a portion of the Ukrainian armed forces in Ukraine’s east. Western intelligence servicesnote that many of the units being repositioned from northern Ukraine will need to undergo substantial refit and replenishment before they can be sent to Donbas. This would likely require thrusts from the Russian-controlled city of Izyum in Kharkiv Oblast southwards towards the larger cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk as well as a northward offensive by Russian forces grouped between the city of Volnovakha in Donbas and the Dnieper River.
While this repositioning takes place, the battlefield continues to evolve. Ukrainian troops in the center of Mariupol continue to resist Russian attempts to occupy the city in full despite Russian claims that 1,000 Ukrainian servicemen had surrendered in Mariupol and that the city’s port had been captured. Russia’s siege of Mariupol was further complicated by the claim by Ukraine’s Azov regiment that Russian forces haddropped an unknown chemical substance on Ukrainian soldiers trapped in the city. While the Pentagon has said it is monitoring reports of Russia’s use of chemical weapons in Mariupol, U.S. leaders have been unable to conclusively say whether or not the weapons were actually used. In the information space, initial Ukrainian claims that the Russian cruiser Moskva had been struck and sunk by an anti-ship missile dominated reporting on the ongoing campaign. Late on April 14, Russian state media sourcesconfirmed that the cruiser had sunk “while being towed to port during a storm” following the “detonation of its ammunition,” avoiding any mention of Ukraine’s claimed strike.
A telling indication of shifting perceptions of the future of the war is the return of several foreign embassies to Kyiv after leaving ahead of Russia’s then-impending invasion. The recent announcements by several European countries that they would return their embassies to Kyiv in the near-term future indicates how even external observers are beginning to settle into the prospect of the war continuing, but contained to eastern Ukraine. At the same time, the State Department has not committed to return the U.S. embassy to Kyiv on a specific timeline, only promising to make the shift back when it was “safe and practical” to do so. Citizens of Kyiv have reached similarconclusions as a sense of relatively normal life returns to the Ukrainian capital.
As casualties continue to mount, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appears to be in a moment of flux and transition. Russian reshuffling of forces in and around Ukraine’s east indicates a change in strategy, and potentially a change in objectives for Russia’s armed forces in Ukraine, at least in the short term. The weeks following Moscow’s likely imminent offensive into eastern Ukraine will be very telling indication of the future of Russia’s invasion.
A Narrative for the Pacific
Dan Mahaffee
While Moscow’s brutal assault on Ukraine has rightly drawn much of our attention, it does not mean that developments in the Indo-Pacific have paused. Across the region, the effects of the pandemic, growing geoeconomic rivalries, and the response to Ukraine have accelerated trends regarding what we’ve been tracking in strategic competition and the dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship. Two major stories in the headlines are illustrative of this, as well as the need for the United States and its allies to better articulate a strategic vision, or at least desired narrative, for the region.
The first story, and one that has been well covered, is the Shanghai lockdown and its impact. Over the past two weeks, the phased, and eventually wholesale, lockdown of Shanghai has illustrated the Chinese Communist Party’s strict adherence to the zero-COVID mandate, even in the face of growing public opposition, breakdowns in food supply, overcrowded quarantine centers, scenes of pets being murdered by officials on social media, scientific evidence to the otherwise, and the economic impact on a financial, manufacturing, and hub — not only for China but also the world.
Now it is premature to write of an impending crackup in the Chinese regime, but the current COVID response demonstrates the inflexibility of the authoritarian system and nationalism and hubris trumping science. Chinese and global scientists have warned that the Chinese population — especially the elderly — were undervaccinated, that Chinese vaccines were ineffective against omicron variant, and the mRNA vaccines needed to be utilized. However, the mRNA technology is not “Made in China” and the CCP has also long promoted Traditional Chinese Medicine for many ailments, including COVID. The prospect of mass illness and death overwhelming the Chinese health care system, particularly among the unvaccinated elderly were and remain legitimate concerns — yet China has not adopted more targeted approaches, taken up mRNA vaccination, nor mass distributed counter-covid antivirals (also not “Made in China”).
The inflexibility of the approach, along with how Xi has spoken himself about how the zero-Covid policy demonstrates China’s superiority to the Western democracies in fighting the pandemic suggests higher political imperatives rather than those focused solely on virus control. Combined with the other crackdowns on entrepreneurs and high-flying companies, a powerful message is being sent by simply locking down a global financial center like Shanghai. For those in the party, and broader Chinese society, who see commerce, trade, and engagement with the west as something from which China benefits, Xi’s current path is a threat to those prosperous ties.
The second story has received more attention down under, as Beijing has moved to cement ties with the Solomon Islands, reaching an agreement on economic development and Chinese military access that one outspoken Australian commenter referred to as “Australia’s Cuban Missile Crisis” and thusly demanding Canberra embark on a regime change operation in the Solomons. Is the invasion necessary? No. Is the strategic comparison correct? Yes. The Solomon Islands sit astride the sea lines of communication between Australia’s east coast and the U.S. west coast, as well as sitting east of access to the Indonesian archipelago. Thus, it was the site of some of the earliest and most brutal amphibious and naval battles between the Allies and Japan during World War II. While Hollywood may like sequels, the prospect of one for the Battle of Guadalcanal frightens defense planners. Now, Washington, Canberra, and other allies are continuing to scramble in outreach to the Solomons — e.g. China has moved ahead with this pact while the United States is just getting to re-opening an embassy closed in 1993.
What both these stories demonstrate is the lack of a narrative or strategic vision for the United States and its allies to engage both those in China opposed to Xi, as well as the many smaller nations in the Indo-Pacific who are increasingly finding themselves forced to choose between Washington and Beijing — no matter what policymakers may have previously claimed. The China model is clear across the developing world, and the Solomon Islands are no different. At CSPC, we are looking at how the geoeconomic tools can be applied to this challenge, but we need to be better about clearly communicating — and delivering on — the benefits of aligning with the west.
In dealing with China, we are certainly right to respond to the growing threat and recognize how the CCP is wielding its power and influence. Yet, we have not provided a clear counternarrative of what can be gained, if possible, to arrest China’s current trajectory and possibly avoid the costly arms races and rivalry that we appear embarked upon. It is a costly path, and one that could lead to China as a global pariah. The costs of that path should be made clear to China. We cannot be naive about the competition that likely looms, but we would be unwise to stop communicating an alternative path by Beijing that can rebuild a modicum of trust for matters ranging from strategic stability to climate to continued trade.
This requires strategic thinking and vision for the region. Some of the details of the administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework are promising. Still, there is warranted skepticism of just what such a framework can deliver for potential partners absent a formal trade deal. Beyond mere policies, there needs to be the clearer articulation of the perils of the current course, the benefits of alignment with the west, and the vision for both the bilateral relationship with China and the broader partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific.
News You May Have Missed
Putin Announces Resumption of Russian Moon Landings
Over the course of a wide-ranging joint press conference with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko at Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would once again plan to conduct moon landings. Under a new timeline, the much-delayed Luna 25 mission would land a rover on the moon in the latest iteration of Luna missions which began in the Soviet era. President Putin also announced that Russia would invest in future space exploration and would prioritize the development of a “next-generation spaceship” and nuclear space technology. It is unclear if appropriate funding for such ambitious projects is to be allocated or is available at all, especially as Russia wages an expensive war in Ukraine.
WHO Director-General asks If “the World really gives equal attention to Black and white lives”
WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus made the controversial statement in a press conference on Wednesday, as he contrasted the response to the invasion of Ukraine with that to the ongoing crises in Syria, Yemen, Tigray, and elsewhere in the developing world. Dr. Tedros made these comments specifically highlighting the reported atrocities in Tigray, Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has previously criticized Dr. Tedros for comments on the conflict.
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC