Friday News Roundup — April 8, 2022
While events around the world continue to draw our attention — and are well-covered in this week’s roundup — in Washington the news of the week is the historic confirmation of Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson in a 53–47 Senate vote. Judge Jackson will be the first Black woman on the court, the first Floridian, and the first public defender to sit on the court. The court’s leaning is unlikely to change, as she will replace Justice Breyer when he retires at the end of the current term, nor will she change the four Harvard, four Yale balance of the court — with only Justice Barrett from Notre Dame serving as proof that law schools do exist west of the Housatonic River.
In addition to the historic confirmation of Justice Jackson, before heading to the April recess, Congress has voted to strip Russia of trade status and ban oil imports and sent a Postal Service reform package to President Biden. Further COVID funds have been held up over a vote regarding the administration’s decision to end Title 42 public health restrictions blocking asylum claims at the U.S.-Mexico border, and we await details on what comes from the conference on the Bipartisan Innovation Act.
This week Joshua C. Huminski, the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs reviewed Erich Schwartzel’s “Red Carpet: Hollywood, China, and the Battle for Cultural Supremacy” for the Diplomatic Courier. A novel exploration of strategic competition, Schwartzel looks at how Beijing seeks both to co-opt and out-compete Hollywood to advance China’s image and global stature.
In this week’s roundup, Wes covers the massacres in Ukraine and international condemnation. Joshua looks at cyber operations in the conflict after the FBI announced taking down Russian malware and botnets. Robert looks at Russian influence in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, while Dan covers the economic tools being used and what they mean for future geoeconomic competition. As always, we wrap with news you may have missed.
Massacres in Bucha and Northern Ukraine Spark International Condemnation
By Wesley Culp
While the repositioning of Russian troops away from Kyiv and towards Ukraine’s east was first greeted with excitement by Ukrainians hoping to regain access to those areas which had been under Russian occupation since the early days of the war, clear evidence of mass killings and other violent reprisals has shocked Ukrainians and outside observers around the world.
Last week, following the announcement by Russian negotiators that Russian forces would significantly reduce their operations around Kyiv and Chernihiv in the north of Ukraine (ostensibly to build trust in negotiations, but more likely to reinforce Russia’s axis of advance in eastern Ukraine), Russian troops entirely withdrew from the environs of Kyiv and northern Ukraine. By April 3, it became clear that Russian troops had left a trail of mass killings in their wake, which sparked intense international concern. While many of the worst images were concentrated in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha, where satellite imagery appeared to show that killings had begun two or more weeks before Russia’s withdrawal, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warnedthat other towns in the area such as Borodyanka could have endured even more gruesome damages from Russian units in the area.
Images of dead civilians in Bucha who appear to have been executed by Russian soldiers drew significant condemnation from Western countries, which has translated into further Western sanctions on Russia’s economy and government. In response to what U.S. President Biden described as “major war crimes,” the United States applied a new round of sanctions on Russian financial institutions and members of the Russian elite. In particular, the major Russian banks Sberbank and Alfabank as well as family members of President Putin and members of the Russian Security Council were sanctioned on March 6. After the European Union and individual European national governments strongly condemned the killings near Kyiv, the European Commissionmoved on April 5 to sanction certain Russian exports by proposing the actions to the bloc’s member governments, despite German efforts to delay certain sanctions on Russian coal exports. These EU sanctions were joined by the joint announcement by G7 leaders that the powerful group’s members would work together to target “key spheres” of the Russian economy with sanctions, including its energy sector. Such measures would also include a broad ban on new investment in Russia, which is unprecedented in the West’s relationship with Moscow.
In the days after the mass killings became known, a range of European countries such as France, Italy, Germany, Lithuania, Sweden, Slovenia and others cumulativelyexpelled more than 200 Russian diplomats from their countries this week, including some believed to be Russian intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover. In his weekly audience at the Vatican, Pope Francis pointedly condemned the “massacre” at Bucha and Russia’s wider war against Ukraine, and kissed a Ukrainian flag brought from the Ukrainian town. Wide international condemnation for Russia’s actions reached an April 7 crescendo with a U.S.-led U.N. General Assembly vote to remove Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council in response to the human rights abuses of Russian troops in Ukraine. The flurry of retaliatory activity in the West as the human tragedy at Bucha began to filter out indicates how Western appetite for additional sanctions on Russia is deepening because of likely Russian abuses.
The Russian government’s reaction to the abuses likely conducted by its forces in Ukraine has been to deny culpability and instead blame the Ukrainian government and armed forces for staging so-called provocations to frame Russia. In addition to flat denials that Russian soldiers killed Ukrainians in areas they controlled near Kyiv, Russian state media and government sources have decried the proliferation of so-called “fakes” and have called evidence of the killing of Ukrainians “staged.” Russia officiallyrequested that the U.N. Security Council discuss “provocations by Ukrainian soldiers and radicals” as a means of deflecting attention away from its own culpability for the growing body of evidence of abuses by Russian troops around Kyiv. Present Russian attempts to deflect blame away from itself in Ukraine are reminiscent of Moscow’s provision of cover to Syria’s Assad regime despite its use of chemical weapons and other abuses. The actions of Russian troops in Bucha and other towns near Kyiv also evoke memories of Russia’s targeting of civilians during campaigns in Syria and Chechnya.
Russia’s allies have so far remained silent in the face of the evidence of Moscow’s abuses or have expressed support for Russia’s account of events. Chinese state media hasechoed Russian accounts of Ukrainian attempts to frame Moscow, while China’s U.N. ambassador urged restraint in assigning blame for the human tragedy in Bucha before a full investigation is concluded. Many countries who have previously been supportive of Russia’s invasion or otherwise deferential to its version of events such as Belarus, Syria, North Korea, and a variety of sub-Saharan African states have remained silent on the matter. India, whose previous refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion has vexed U.S. policymakers, tepidly condemned the killings in Bucha but refused to condemn any party while calling for an independent investigation. Kazakhstan, a traditional ally of Russia which has expressed rhetorical support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity in spite of its close relationship with Moscow, similarly called for an independent investigation into recent events in Bucha.
Public opinion is still forming around the still-unfolding evidence of human tragedy found in the wake of Russia’s withdrawal from the environs of Kyiv. While Russia’s war may still be far from over, the discoveries in Bucha over the first weekend of April have undoubtedly deepened concern among outside observers about the scale of human suffering in Ukraine resulting from Russia’s invasion, the effects of which are yet to be seen.
Law Enforcement, Cyber Operations, and the War in Ukraine
Joshua C. Huminski
On Wednesday the United States said that it had secretly removed Russian malware found on U.S.-linked computers. According to the FBI, the law enforcement agency, under a warrant, accessed firewall and network devices manufactured by WatchGuard and Asus to disinfect equipment compromised by the Cyclops Blink botnet. The malware, believed to be designed and distributed by Sandworm, an elite Russian hacking unit, was a replacement for a previous piece of malware identified in 2018 that infected some 500,000 U.S.-based routers. The FBI successfully dismantled that botnet, VPNFilter, and Cyclops Blink was believed to be an attempt to regain control of networking devices.
In recent weeks the White House and the FBI have worked to raise awareness of the threat of Russian hacking, advising companies to better protect themselves and inform law enforcement of any suspected hacks. The proactive removal of malware by the FBI is an interesting development. While this is not the first time that the FBI is believed to have done this, it nonetheless raises concerns about privacy and liability. In this instance the benefits of acting far outweighed the potential downsides, but where that line resides is unclear. Equally, what would happen if the removal accidentally compromised other software or caused unintended knock-on effects?
It is likely that this area of activity will receive additional scrutiny, particularly as the government struggles with how best to defend exposed networks it does not control, but on which the country is inherently reliant. While likely to be used only in the most exigent of circumstances, it could potentially be a slippery slope to increasingly widespread use of the tool to target malware across the spectrum — nation-state to criminal hackers.
The removal of the malware also focuses attention on the cyber aspect of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Prior to Moscow’s invasion, most analysts expected that a robust cyber campaign would accompany kinetic operations. For some analysts, that campaign has not yet materialized prompting an energetic debate as to why, what has happened, and what may come in the future. Thus far, the most high profile incident is believed to have been the hack of Viasat ground terminals, which Ukraine used for satellite broadband.
The lack of certainty around the use of cyber operations in war will raise questions about the assumptions of cyber operations full stop. The war in Ukraine is providing an active proving ground for questions about the utility of cyber tools in an active invasion. Is it possible that the utility of cyber tools is being overshadowed in active operations — why use a cyber tool when a 500lb bomb could prove just as effective and, perhaps, achieve success more rapidly?
Equally, are cyber operations better suited for long-run activities as opposed to the short parry and thrust of an active invasion? It could well be better to deny your adversary a capability than linger on their networks hoovering up information while your forces are advancing to an advantageous position. Indeed, it is possible that a lesson from Ukraine is that cyber activities are not necessarily suited for tactical activities in open hostilities within a given theatre, but better for intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), strategic strike, or perhaps operational/theatre-level activities.
Will Russia expand its cyber operations beyond Ukraine as its forces are driven back from Ukrainian fronts? An assumption was that the West would see itself the target of cyber activities from Moscow. Have these materialized or will they in the coming days are Moscow feels itself under increased pressure and incurring greater losses? If so, will that mean an expansion of the conflict from a “special military operation” or a limited war to a regional war, or perhaps something worse? The broad brush of what Russia could do online is known, based on previous operations, but their present capabilities and intent remain unclear.
Is absence of evidence, evidence of absence? Almost certainly not. In the main, it is likely far too early to assess Russia’s cyber performance in the war in Ukraine. The war, now in its sixth week, is far too fluid and dynamic to determine what is happening now let alone what has happened in the past. Cyber operations are designed, in most cases, to be opaque and to make their attribution difficult. There is both far too much and far too little information — speculation in the case of the former, and verifiable data in the latter.
Putin Loses Support But Retains Leverage in the Balkans
Robert Gerber
In Borisova Gradina, a lush, expansive park in Sofia, Bulgaria, there is an obelisk dedicated to the Soviet Army’s liberation of Bulgaria in World War II. Last week during a walking tour of the city we saw graffiti on the monument that read “Death to Putin.” The word “liberator” had been replaced by “oppressor” in yellow paint. Before Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, 55% of Bulgarians had a favorable impression of Vladimir Putin. This number dropped to 32% after the invasion. As always, there are two ways to look at this data — Putin’s popularity has nosedived, but Moscow still has enough influence in the region to play the role of spoiler against pro-West, pro-EU, pro-NATO initiatives.
Bulgaria straddles the East-West divide: it’s a NATO and EU member wherein Russia enjoys economic and political influence. Bulgaria is the poorest country in the EU. Gasprom and Lukoil dominate the oil and gas sector, including petrol stations, Rosatom runs the nuclear power sector, and Russian FDI plays a sizeable role in the finance, transport, telecommunications, and media sectors. The Foreign Policy Research Institute wrote in 2020 that “Pro-Russian political parties… continue to publicize pro-Russian propaganda, undermine pro-Western political factions, and fuel Soviet nostalgia (in Bulgaria).” This makes the job of pro-west Prime Minister Kiril Petrov unnecessarily difficult: while Bulgaria stands firm with Ukraine and is welcoming Ukrainian refugees, the pro-Kremlin Bulgarian Socialist Party opposed NATO deployments in Bulgaria. Bulgaria is currently blocking the EU application of its neighbor, North Macedonia, based on a claim that the Macedonian language is not separate from Bulgarian. This action has the hallmarks of an influence campaign on the part of pro-Russian actors seeking to undermine EU expansion. In fact, in 2018, Moscow worked behind the scenes with Macedonian nationalists to undermine the government’s referendum on changing the name of the country to North Macedonia, which was a precondition for NATO and EU eligibility insisted by Greece. Like Bulgaria, the government of the Republic of North Macedonia officially stands with Ukraine and supportes EU sanctions, but a handful of politicians from the far left and far right have expressed solidarity with Russia.
After his landslide reelection on April 3, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić affirmed that Serbia planned to maintain “friendly and partnership relations” with Russia and received a nice congratulatory telegram from President Putin. Serbia has long balanced its relationship with the EU, which it seeks to join, and its close historical-religious ties with Russia. Former Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić said that imposing sanctions against Russia would be political suicide. Serbian opposition party members said Russia’s war against Ukraine actually strengthened Vučić because it provided a convenient excuse for his government’s economic failings. (Notably, both Vučić and Hungarian President Victor Orban won reelection under a banner of “peace and stability.”) Russian actions against Ukraine appear also to have emboldened Serbian nationalists in their unrelenting campaign against Kosovo’s right to exist as an independent nation. For example, Serbian media recently ran false stories alleging Kosovo police had beaten up Serbs. When Kosovo refused to allow Serbia to open polling stations on Kosovo’s territory, Belgrade called the move a “dangerous provocation.” These incidents echo Kremlin tactics in their attempt to subjugate Ukraine.
So what does this all mean? Putin’s popularity has taken a hit in the Balkans, but Russia retains significant leverage by virtue of its economic, cultural, media, and political ties. It will continue to use these tools to undermine EU and NATO goals, including progress toward democracy, rule of law, good governance, and transparency. Keeping the region exploitable, corruptible, and off-balance serves the interests of Russian power brokers and enterprises (China would not mind either) and has the added benefit of irking the West. The antidote is to insist on sunlight and transparency, combined with a doubling down on meaningful engagement on the part of the West with those who seek to move forward, rather than backwards.
Russia, China, & the Geoeconomic Toolkit
Dan Mahaffee
If Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reshaped globalization, or even ended it, it has accelerated the efforts to understand the geoeconomic and geotech tools that policymakers already have — as well as what they will need for the competition of the future. Discussions surrounding supply chains, sanctions, export restrictions, etc. have accelerated from the theoretical into hard discussions regarding: their implementation; building economic and tech coalitions with allies and partners; and addressing our reliance on adversaries and competitors for key commodities and economic inputs. When these issues were mainly the domain of discussion, competition with Beijing was seen as the impetus. Now, confrontation with Moscow drives their implementation. From this, we see the early examples of how these tools are used, and what will need to be addressed if this is indeed the beginning of a longer competition and confrontation between liberal societies and authoritarian regimes.
The headlines of the recent weeks have demonstrated just how important supply chains are for energy, key commodities, and industrial inputs. Europe, especially Germany, faces hurdles in reducing their reliance on Russian energy — a reliance about which they had been warned since the days of the Cold War. At home, the impact on energy markets prompted an unprecedented release from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), with allies abroad also releasing crude from their strategic reserves. While no silver bullet solution exists to speed domestic production nor provide a seamless transition to carbon-free energy, cost, security, and greenery must all be considered when addressing future energy portfolios that reduce our reliance on the world’s worst dictatorships for our energy needs.
Even that low-carbon future is not immune from the concerns of geoeconomics and supply chains. While also releasing from the SPR, the Biden administration also announced that the Defense Production Act (DPA) would be invoked to promote American production of key minerals for electric vehicle batteries, in order to reduce reliance on Chinese suppliers. For batteries, and many other high-tech products, these critical minerals are an achilles heel, and another reminder of the many minerals, chemicals, and other precursors upon which we rely on overseas suppliers — and often in unfriendly countries.
But it’s not just about the future of energy, of course. The ongoing semiconductor shortage has hit automakers particularly hard. Ford announced a 17% fall in sales in the first quarter of 2022 due to the shortage of semiconductors. While we have covered much in terms of supply chains for these important components and the need to secure U.S. and allied leadership in the development and supply of critical microelectronics. If by now we have not realized that these are the backbone of modern technologies and their criticality to our national security, then I am not sure when we will. Even as Congress finally moves to conference on competitiveness legislation that includes the CHIPS Act support for the semiconductor industry and R&D in this field, it will take years before new fabs come online — and its not just facilities, as you also need the trained, educated workforce.
In these and other areas we find ourselves living with the echoes of decisions made long ago. Years of CEOs seeking cost savings for shareholders, the deindustrialization of North America and Europe, and turning a blind eye to pollution in Russia and China have contributed to bringing us to where we are today — alongside the many warnings about security that were brushed off. Ironically too, the Defense Production Act and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, dating to the Korean War and 1970s oil crisis respectively, continue to be of relevance today. What are the government purchasing powers for semiconductors and other inputs that could be implemented today for future needs? What would strategic reserves for critical minerals that we need in the future look like? How, like we have done with the release of crude, can we coordinate these tools with our key allies and partners to strengthen the performance and resilience of what will increasingly become the western economic sphere that competes for global influence? These are all questions that we must consider and evaluate as these tools are used to address Russia’s aggression and compete with China.
Finally, we need our leaders to communicate why this matters, and to steel the public for the sacrifices that it entails. All of these shocks to supply — and the eventual cost of securing our supplies — are clearly inflationary. Interruptions to business and the impact on economic well-being are real, but this is the cost if we want both to send a message to China about our resilience and, more importantly, quickly cease our payments that fuel Moscow’s brutal war machine.
News You May Have Missed
Liberal Democratic Party Of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovsky Dies at 75
According to an April 6 announcement by the Russian State Duma, the notorious leader of Russia’s not-so-liberal democratic Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) died at the age of 75. Zhirinovsky had reportedly been struggling with the effects of COVID-19 prior to his death, despite his claim that he had received eight separate vaccine doses against the disease. He was a founding member of the LDPR, which frequently acted in Russia’s controlled political system as near-cartoonish means for the Presidential Administration to test the waters for new initiatives as well as to present the ruling United Russia party as a moderate, responsible choice in comparison. Zhirinovsky was known for his blunt and aggressive rhetoric, and appeared to presage Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February in his final public appearance in the Duma, when he promised that Ukraine would feel Russia’s “new policy” in the early morning of February 22nd, two days off of the actual invasion date.
Macron’s Projected Second Round Lead over Le Pen Narrows
In France’s two-stage presidential elections, much of the focus is on the likely re-match between centrist President Emmanuel Macron and the leader of the far-right Front National Marine Le Pen, who are seen as the most likely to gain the top-two of the vote share in round one. Macron’s lead over Le Pen has continued to narrow from a 10-point lead to the margin of error, raising concerns about the Front National and Le Pen’s ties to Moscow — which the Macron campaign has seized on with the invasion of Ukraine and ads showing Le Pen as a stand in for Putin.
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.