Friday News Roundup — April 28, 2023

Happy Friday to you from Washington, D.C. This week’s focus was on President Biden’s Tuesday re-election announcement and the House GOP’s successful, albeit narrow passage of the “Limit, Save, and Grow Act” which would raise the debt ceiling until March of 2024 in exchange for significant spending cuts. As the White House stands firm on any negotiations over the debt ceiling and questions remain about whether Speaker McCarthy could bring his caucus to approve any compromise, House Republicans can say to the public that they have a negotiating position as the deadline looms. This looms too over President Biden’s 2024 re-election, as concerns about the economy continue to weigh on his approval rating and the message to voters is about making deals and cooling the temperature in Washington.

Also looking to 2024, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis traveled abroad, with stops including Japan and Israel, highlighting relationships with key U.S. allies, pursuing opportunities for Florida, and burnishing foreign policy bona fides. In this week’s roundup, Hidetoshi Azuma delves into the governor’s visit to Japan in more detail. Meanwhile, back home, the legal battle with Disney escalated, prompting criticism from other 2024 candidates, including former South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley’s suggestion that Disney move to the Palmetto State.

National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan delivered an address at the Brookings Institution on Thursday, further outlining the Biden administration’s approach to China. Combined with Secretary Yellen’s recent remarks, which Robert Gerber analyzes in this roundup, we can see the contours of the Biden administration’s approach to protect national and economic security, while managing the deep interdependence of the U.S.-China relationship. Dan Mahaffee also covers how the Chinese are approaching their relationship with Europe as the transatlantic consensus towards Beijing remains elusive. While Xi Jinping phoned Volodymyr Zelensky to discuss the war, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko visited Washington and continued on to Denver to address the World Summit of Mayors.

For the Diplomatic Courier this week, Joshua C. Huminski–the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs–reviewed “Russia in Africa” by Dr. Samuel Ramani. An extensively researched deep volume on Moscow’s interests across the continent under Putin, Ramani explores the ecosystem that generates the Kremlin’s policies, but also the diversity of tools used to pursue those policies. It also smartly seats contemporary interests amongst Russia’s long-standing relations with the countries of Africa.

As the world awaits the long-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive, Huminski wrote in The Hill asking how we define success or failure for what is to come, and how political leaders need to communicate better what is at stake in the conflict.

In this week’s roundup, Ethan Brown looks at the issues of senior defense leaders consulting in the private sector, and Veera Parko covers the latest from Europe on regulations of digital services and intellectual property — including critical standards essential patents (SEPs).

Deciphering Secretary Yellen’s Remarks on the U.S.-China Economic Relationship

Robert W. Gerber

Photo: Secretary Janet Yellen meets with Ukraine Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal (Credit: U.S. Department of Treasury)

Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen’s long speech at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on April 20 had two intended audiences. The first audience were global marketeers. Markets have been both lethargic and jittery in 2023 because of increased global risks stemming from U.S.-China tensions, Russia’s war against Ukraine, uncertainty of the health of the financial sector, and inflation and recession risks. Yellen sought to reassure investors that America’s economy is on solid footing and the Administration does not seek to disrupt the deep trade relationship between China and the United States (aka “decoupling”). Second, she aimed to communicate a message to the government and people of the People’s Republic: that the United States does not seek to undermine China’s growth, per se, and that there are in fact areas where we seek to cooperate including in “constructive and fair trade.” Yellen hinted she would be willing to travel to China, likely to restart the bilateral strategic dialogue. Yellen was clear, however, that national security would preempt economic interests. Furthermore, Yellen explained that U.S. unilateral measures like export controls were grounded in legitimate national security interests, not designed for commercial advantage. Such U.S. measures would be appropriate in scope, transparent, coordinated with allies, she commented.

Calming the atmosphere, explaining U.S. policy, and identifying common interests is the essence of diplomacy itself and this approach has its role to play under the right conditions. In taking this approach, Yellen places her in the role of “good cop.” Certainly, this overture contrasts with words and deeds coming from Beijing and its ambassadors recently (further described in Dan’s piece in this week’s Roundup). There are however several realities that impair the chances of success of this approach. The first is that the Chinese Communist Party sees its competition with the United States as a zero-sum game. It leverages every instrument of its economic and military power — concurrently and concertedly — to undermine U.S. success for Beijing’s gain across all vectors: domestically within China, within the United States, in third countries, in cyberspace, and in outer space. The idea of collaboration for mutual benefit is alien to this philosophy.

Second, decoupling is already happening in a number of select areas. The U.S. and its allies are blocking transfer of key technologies to China; we are funding domestic production and nearshoring of critical minerals and EV batteries; and the White House is drafting new rules to regulate U.S. companies’ investments in mainland China. At a hearing of the House Ways and Means Committee last week, several committee members expressed interest in the idea of doing an annual review of China’s most favored nation status in response to China’s unfair trading practices. Even European Union leaders are embarking on policies to de-risk and rebalance the EU’s lopsided trade relationship with China.

Third, the global economic risk that the Treasury Department is trying to assuage stems not as much from Washington’s actions but from Beijing itself. For example China’s government is tightening rules against private companies operating within its borders. It favors its state enterprises and flaunts international trade rules, creating imbalances in global markets. Its treatment of trading partners and debtors rings of coercion. China’s GDP growth has slowed, dragging down global growth.

Some experts have argued that the trillion dollar bilateral U.S.-China economic relationship is in some ways a bulwark against direct military conflict between the United States and China. On the other hand, aspects of the bilateral economic relationship — notably forced joint ventures and certain types of investment — can serve to strengthen China’s civil-military apparatus. This is why Western countries must be open to shutting down economic channels that pose risks to their national interests. Yellen has put the ball in China’s court to respond to her overture of economic cooperation (with caveats for U.S. national security interests.) A recent Wall Street Journal editorial correctly assessed that “Seeking such dialogue makes political sense, but it risks lifting U.S. pressure on China without achieving real gains in return… until the United States addresses China’s economic aggression, it can expect neither fair competition nor security.” The Yellen approach also may be at odds with a congress that has been increasingly motivated to go the other direction.

Baltic Blunders & a Call to Kyiv: Broader Lessons from EU-China Relations

Dan Mahaffee

PRC Ambassador to France, Lu Shaye (Wikimedia Commons Photo)

In the previous weeks, this column had noted how the visit by European leaders to Beijing — French President Emmanuel Macron and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen — was followed by the contretemps over Macron’s remarks regarding a war over Taiwan and European strategic autonomy from the Americans. Macron’s remarks had overshadowed what had been a more cautious tone from von der Leyen as well as the current complicated relationship between Europe and China. There is a varying perception of the security threat posed by China, though it is growing. Concerns about the global economic disruption of a conflict over Taiwan are registering, but many in European big business still see their economic future tied to China. Finally, Europe must cautiously accept any role that Beijing could play in a Ukraine ceasefire, even if for now it rejects China’s current approach.

Given the sense that Europe is more “in play” as it were, you think that Beijing would heed the more cautious approach towards the Europeans. Pandemic perceptions and the overreach of wolf warrior diplomacy affected the European perception of China, as well as a broader sense of economic unease not shared by the business leaders. In relations with Europe, it is perhaps where China has best been served by Deng Xiaoping’s advice to bide time and hide capabilities. When China is at its most forceful is when it alarms the European public, and eventually, their leaders.

Last week, China’s Ambassador to Paris, Lu Shaye, found himself stoking European outrage, with Beijing ultimately disowning his remarks to a French channel that questioned the sovereignty of the post-Soviet states. Anger was particularly felt among the Baltic States, as well as Ukraine. The governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania summoned their Chinese envoys to discuss Ambassador Lu’s remarks. Lithuania and China had already been locked in a trade conflict, with Beijing blocking most trade with Lithuania following the opening of trade ties between Taiwan and Lithuania. This is also not the first time that Ambassador Lu has courted controversy, as he had previously insulted the French over their handling of Covid, as well as his pride in the “wolf warrior” mantle.

Following this controversy, this week, Xi Jinping held a long-awaited call with Ukranian President Volodymyr Zelensky. While the Chinese had put forward their plan for negotiations to end the conflict, Xi had yet to call Zelensky. European leaders had encourage Xi to do so, including during Macron and von der Leyen’s visit. Certainly, the Chinese read out took aim at the U.S. support for the war, while Zelensky and Xi will be exchanging envoys. Zelensky has appointed former minister Pavlo Ryabikin as an ambassador in Beijing while Xi will be sending a special representative on Eurasian affairs to visit Kyiv and neighboring capitals.

While the near-term details of the 12-point Chinese peace plan are certainly unworkable, Xi Jinping is making this part of a broader push to be seen as one of the key global leaders. Coming off the Chinese-fostered diplomatic deal reached between Saudi Arabia and Iran, China continues to push to be seen as an alternative to U.S. leadership. In this case, Beijing frames the United States as stoking the conflict rather than trying to end it. How receptive is a world weary of high food and energy costs to this message?

At the same time, how is the west showing resolve at a time when the outcome of the conflict is uncertain and so much rests on the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive. As my colleague Joshua Huminski has pointed out, what we define success or failure to be remains unclear, nor have our leaders explained the importance of this to the American and European public. Certainly China’s diplomatic antics can put it on the back foot, but we cannot ignore where China is demonstrating leadership and espousing its vision — especially when our leaders have not yet made ours clear.

Perhaps that is the opportunity for both the Biden administration and a Congress that is united around “tough on China” rhetoric. In Secretary Yellen’s recent remarks — which Robert broke down — the administration seems to be delineating what are the areas of competition with China and legitimate national security concerns, versus where are the areas where we can co-exist and even pursue mutual interests. That is certainly a more pragmatic approach that many allies could continue to embrace. The Select CCP Committee represents Congress’s opportunity for a longer-term strategic approach to this competition. While the earlier efforts, as chronicled last week, have focused on the prospects of a Taiwan conflict, the military needs of the island’s defense, and a conflict’s severe economic impact.

Beyond prospects of and preparations for a conflict that we hope to ultimately deter, the broader challenge is coordinating the range of military, economic, and diplomatic platforms, tools, and authorities needed for this competition. If the United States can develop that strategic vision, it can at least present a hopefully attractive vision for allies to follow — making it harder for Beijing to weaken transatlantic solidarity. If the United States develops this strategic vision in concert with allies — a complex but not insurmountable challenge — then it will be nigh impossible for the CCP to weaken western resolve.

The “Revolving Door” of Defense Contracting

Defense Contractors are a necessary evil, but losing defense expertise to foreign governments should rate much higher in public reporting

Ethan Brown

(Wikimedia Commons Photo)

Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren’s office posted a damning report this week highlighting a major national security concern: far too many government officials, legislative personnel, and former military officers have left public service and entered the “revolving door of defense contracting,” a whopping total of 672 in 2022 alone.

Senator Warren, who holds a pivotal and influential seat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, took issue with the high volume of carryover from the public to (this particular) private sector, and with good reason. While the practice of defense industry businesses hiring former military personnel — one wouldn’t recruit brain surgeons unless the candidates come from neurosurgical specialties after all — the sheer numbers from last year are reasonably concerning. Those 672 hires in this revolving door all belonged to the top 20 defense contractors, so this wasn’t simply a prodigious turnover across the full defense industry.

More pressing from the Senators’ report was the issue of those former public servants primarily functioning as lobbyists, and not as requirements experts for new tech, or program managers on emerging deliverables for defense contracts. Lobbyists (which still carries a dismissive stink but permeates the policy community writ large in any industry) are the apparent task and purpose of many, nearly all, of these identified individuals from the past years hiring cycle. This discovery is neither new, nor particularly revelatory — Sen. Warren’s report points to a Politico investigation which addressed this rampant poaching of defense personnel post-retirement as well as many public servants from congressional and legislative haunts, an investigation which dates back to 2016.

Amidst the findings in the report include a common public decry from the Senators office: the consolidation of defense industry businesses — ’megacorporations’ as her policy language has often defined these entities — making these personnel “abuses” far more likely and rampant. From the report: “DoD is the largest federal contracting agency — of the total $692.3 billion in contracts awarded by the federal government in FY 2021, 61 percent were awarded by DoD, with almost 40 percent going exclusively to 10 defense contractors.” 61% of $692.3 billion is $422.1 billion dollars awarded to those top ten defense businesses, for those who aren’t interested in doing the math but wanted to know.

It may be worth noting that I expressed certain concerns about building administrative cabinets from the Pentagon’s roster over two years ago.

But of more pressing concern from the report includes gathered information on the amount of former defense personnel who took up employment with foreign governments following their military service. According to the Emoluments Clause in the U.S. Constitution, retired military personnel must receive written approval from the Secretaries of State and Defense prior to beginning employment with a foreign government, in order to ensure no conflicts of interest or implications to U.S. national security.

In a letter sent to the Defense Secretary’s office from Senator Warren and Chuck Grassley (R-IA), the Senators expressed their concern after their offices determined that 95% of such requests submitted to Secretary Austin were approved. It remains unknown how many retired military officers began overseas employment without seeking secretarial approval.

That issue should be made a much more pressing congressional issue, especially at a time when foreign governments, particularly strategic competitors like China, have made such flagrant use of stealing intellectual property and other efforts to infiltrate, usurp, and otherwise manipulate the intellectual capacity of the United States. The risks inherent in former U.S. military personnel showcasing, selling, and otherwise offloading their valuable intellectual capacity to foreign governments, especially those with any questionable commitment, loyalty, or trustworthiness to American and allied interests, are monumental.

This becomes a prototypical quandary of two evils, and how to go about choosing the lesser. There is certainly a viable justification in Senator Warren’s expressed concerns about the personnel turnover between public posts and the growing defense industrial complex, but in that regard, at least the lobbyists and their defense-minded intellectual horsepower remains firmly entrenched in the labyrinth of American policy-making. Sure, corruption is reasonably inferred, although none of those aforementioned 672 former public servants were found of any legal wrongdoing (a perk of not always having to register as a lobbyist in our system I suppose).

But the loss of defense expertise for foreign powers, and the overwhelming concurrence of the defense secretaries office in these specific instances, is of much more pressing concern both to the integrity of the defense, state, and congressional institutions. Especially in the cases where such exodus were allegedly covered up from public awareness.

The European Union moves to regulate Big Tech…and patents

Veera Parko

European Commission (Wikimedia Commons Photo)

This week, the European Union has come out with essential EU internal market legislation the US should keep an eye on.

New EU rules on Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines

The aim of the European Union´s sweeping Digital Services Act (DSA) is to make platforms and search engines more accountable for illegal and harmful content such as disinformation and hate speech. The legislative package entered into force in November 2022, but, as with most major EU legislation, the rules take effect gradually. On April 25, the European Commission announced the first “designation decisions” related to the DSA. The Commission designated 17 so called Very Large Online Platforms (for example Google, Apple, Facebook/Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, TikTok, and Twitter) and 2 Very Large Online Search Engines (Bing and Google Search) that will be subject to new restrictions, reaching at least 45 million monthly active users.

The bureaucratic-sounding designation has real-life consequences for the Big Tech companies on the list. The companies will have to comply with the full set of DSA rules within 4 months. The new obligations include providing more information to users about recommendations and content, protecting sensitive user information, “completely redesigning” systems to better protect privacy and content targeted towards children, and stricter content moderation and risk assessment of illegal content disseminated through these platforms. The rules also aim to increase transparency by obligating companies to, for example, publish content moderation decisions and risk assessments related to DSA rules. The companies will also be obliged to release more information to researchers.

It remains to be seen what kind of an effect the new rules will have on policies of the designated Big Tech platforms and search engines, and, by February 2024, on all other platforms. The Commission intends to supervise compliance with a framework of national “Digital Services Coordinators,” to be established in all EU Member States. In addition, the Commission’s in-house experts and the European Union’s new Centre for Algorithmic Transparency in Seville, Spain will add traction to oversight. EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton warned Big Tech companies of severe sanctions including fines up to 6 percent of a company’s global turnover, or even a ban to operate in the EU in case of non-compliance with the new DSA rules. “Today is the D(SA)-Day for digital regulation,” he said, rather dramatically.

What about international implications of the EU’s new regulatory framework? The need to regulate Big Tech platforms to curb harmful content and disinformation online is recognized by many Western governments, but solutions vary greatly. It is noteworthy that on Tuesday, also the UK proposed a proposal for a Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers bill containing similar regulations. The impact on the discussion in the United States remains unclear, but it is safe to say that both the US and the EU would benefit from aligning their policy agendas on regulating digital services. With the new set of rules and the designation of Big Tech giants to comply with the rules first, it is evident that the EU is striving to set a global standard in regulating digital services. This will certainly influence business strategies of Big Tech companies — and, perhaps, in time, U.S. lawmakers as well?

New proposed regulation on standard essential patents

On April 27, the European Commission proposed new rules on standard essential patents (SEPs), compulsory licensing on patents in crisis situations, and the revision of the EU legislation on supplementary protection certificates. EU member states and the European Parliament still must agree on the legislation.

SEPs are patents that protect technology that “has been declared essential for the implementation of a technical standard adopted by a standard developing organization”. In non-EU-jargon terms, this can mean, for instance, 5G, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or decompression standards. Users of the standards are usually producers of telecoms equipment, mobile phones, computers, tablets and increasingly “the Internet of Things”: makers of connected cars, drones, payment terminals and other smart devices.

The European Commission sees the current system of SEPs as fragmented, lacking transparency, and prone to lengthy litigation. The proposed SEP licensing framework seeks to ensure that those with a monopoly over these essential standards do not impose unreasonable terms, such as overcharging royalty fees. Moreover, the Commission proposes to streamline and centralize the registration process for national patent certificates via a single application assessed by the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and national examiners. The EUIPO would also oversee a process to determine fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) royalties within 9 months.

A number of legal experts and former trade officials in the United States have voiced concerns about the Commission’s SEP rules, calling it a “price control scheme” that hurts innovators (including European companies Nokia and Ericsson) and favors implementers — many of whom are large firms operating in Asia. They warn that China would be eager to replicate the Commission’s SEP rules, which would advantage its own companies, many of which are already heavily subsidized, creating an unfair market. Former White House economic advisor Clete Willems wrote, “the European Union is considering a policy that would undermine U.S.-EU cooperation on advanced telecommunications and harm our ability to provide a true Western alternative to Huawei.”

The reaction of European stakeholders has been ambivalent. Industry group IP Europe, whose members include Nokia and Qualcomm, has criticized the proposal for delaying processes for patent holders. However, carmakers Mercedes-Benz and Volkswagen have reportedly said the proposed system would offer more transparency and balance in licensing negotiations.

An interesting piece of the legislative package has to do with compulsory licensing in times of crisis, such as another pandemic. According to the European Commission, the new rules foresee a new EU-wide compulsory licensing instrument that would allow a government to authorize, if no voluntary agreements are available, the use of a patented invention or technology without the consent of the patent holder. The new instrument would complement existing instruments such as HERA regulations and the CHIPS Act. The proposal also includes a new supplementary production certificate to extend a patent by five years for pharmaceutical or plant production products.

Mr. Desantis Goes to Tokyo

Hidetoshi Azuma

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida receives Florida Governor Ron Desantis for a courtesy call at the Prime Minister’s Office in Tokyo on April 24 (Photo Credit: The Prime Minister’s Office of Japan)

Florida Governor Ron Desantis visited Tokyo on April 24 as the first leg of his global trip spanning from Japan and South Korea to Israel and the United Kingdom. While in Tokyo, the Republican presidential hopeful met with the Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida and other key figures ranging from the Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Toshimitsu Motegi to senior business executives of the Keidanren (the Japan Business Association). While Desantis’ Japan trip was widely touted in the US as his presidential campaign agenda of building his foreign policy credentials, it was simultaneously a culmination of Tokyo’s persistent efforts at the cultivation of the next US presidential leadership and revealed its emerging vision for the future of the US-Japan alliance.

In fact, Tokyo’s hand in historical US presidential elections is nothing new. One of Japan’s key strategic imperatives has been to perpetuate the US-Japan alliance under an interventionist American president committed to it in both rhetoric and practice. This is because American power is the very foundation of Japan’s national security due to its post-WWII pacifist constitution. In this sense, Tokyo’s worst nightmare would be an isolationist US president uninterested in the defense of Japan. Such a deep-seated fear drove Tokyo to aim its influence operations almost exclusively at the then-Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton during the 2016 US presidential election while virtually disregarding her rival, Donald Trump. It took the former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s ingenuity for Tokyo to finally approach Trump at Trump Tower after his surprise victory in November 2016 consolidated the emerging political reality in the US.

Abe’s historic Trump Tower meeting with Trump and their subsequent budding bromance underscored Tokyo’s resolute efforts to pursue its strategic imperative of preventing the US president from yielding to the allure of isolationism. Such an imperative is both apolitical and impersonal. Indeed, Abe’s successor, Kishida, chose the incumbent US president Joe Biden as the first world leader to meet with after forming his cabinet in October 2021. Kishida even signed onto Biden’s liberal agendas, ranging from the democracy-vs-authoritarianism rhetoric to even the promotion of LGBTQ+ rights despite the risk of alienating the LDP’s conservative base. The significance of Kishida’s alignment with Biden is that it is accelerating in both foreign policy and even domestic politics, which remains largely dominated by conservative, if not reactionary, elements resisting progressive values.

In reality, however, Kishida’s cultivation of Biden is increasingly becoming a liability for him. As the regional elections in April aptly demonstrated, the LDP has suffered a humiliating setback largely because Kishida’s Biden-like liberal agendas have invited a considerable backlash from his predominantly conservative constituents. More significantly, there is abiding skepticism in Tokyo of Biden’s security commitment to Japan as China’s aggression looms over Taiwan. This is largely because of the perceived hypocrisy of the Biden administration in its approach to Ukraine’s troubled fate. The irony is that Kishida’s efforts to woo Biden have not ameliorated Tokyo’s fundamental anxiety over American power under the current leadership in Washington.

In this context, Desantis is emerging as the perfect would-be US presidential candidate for Tokyo. Indeed, Tokyo’s enthusiasm for Desantis was evident in its lavish spending on the Florida-based lobbying firm, Ballard Partners, culminating in Kishida’s official invitation of the governor to a courtesy call in Japan. Desantis is widely regarded in Japan as a “level-headed Trump” capable of enhancing the US-Japan alliance without imposing liberal values on Japan. LGBTQ and other liberal issues are so divisive in Japan that Kishida finds himself in a quandary of having to satisfy his predominantly conservative base on the one hand and Biden and US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel on the other. A Desantis presidency would effectively relieve Kishida from his predicament and allow him to single-mindedly focus on China and other bilateral challenges.

In this sense, Desantis’ inaugural Japan trip was a resounding victory for Kishida. The Florida governor assuaged Tokyo by guaranteeing his commitment to the US-Japan alliance, especially in boosting deterrence against China. This occurred while Desantis called the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War a “territorial dispute” and criticized European countries for their lack of resolve. In other words, Desantis is essentially a Trump espousing an interventionist approach to the Indo-Pacific, including Japan. This alone is a major foreign policy victory for Tokyo as Trump often demonstrated veiled hostility toward Japan, ironically driving Abe to court Russia and even China to hedge against what he perceived to be an isolationist leader in Washington.

Kishida’s courtship of Desantis revealed Tokyo’s emerging vision for the US-Japan alliance. Such a vision is fundamentally pragmatic in nature and revolves around the original imperative of the alliance of deterring adversaries rather than promoting values. Indeed, the significance of the Desantis-Kishida courtesy call was that the two leaders focused almost exclusively on substance rather than abstraction. Moreover, the cordial way in which the meeting ended underscored the unmistakable fact that they see eye to eye on bilateral challenges without any presence. After all, Kishida is no liberal in the American sense and finds himself increasingly constrained, if not pressured, by Biden’s value-promotion agenda.

Desantis virtually received a presidential treatment in Tokyo earlier this week. This was part of Kishida’s game plan as he looked to the next US president for a more robust personal relationship. Kishida has sacrificed a significant portion of his domestic political capital just to align himself with Biden on the US-Japan alliance. Indeed, despite the budding bilateral alliance itself, the Biden-Kishida relationship has yet to reach the level of earning the appellation of “Joe-Fumio relationship” as in the case of the “Ron-Yasu relationship” under President Ronald Reagan and prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in the 1980s. History holds that the US-Japan alliance grew stronger whenever there was a robust personal bond at the leadership level. Kishida currently lacks a US president to bond with without presence. In this respect, the inaugural Desantis-Kishida meeting demonstrated possibilities for what could be expected of the US-Japan alliance after 2024.

News You May Have Missed

Democrats Urge Progressive Policies Be Included in Indo-Pacific Trade Pact

First-term Democrats of the 118th Congress told the Biden Administration in a letter that trade negotiations, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, should contain labor commitments that build on the text of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement, and should feature strong environmental and climate elements. Members also called for digital trade precepts that protect consumers, promote fair competition and data privacy rules. Meanwhile, Senators Elizabeth Warren, Amy Klobachar, Sherrod Brown and a handful of house members sent a letter on April 21 to U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo urging them to ensure that digital trade negotiations produce rules that “complement — rather than conflict with — our efforts to promote competition in the digital economy, regulate artificial intelligence, and protect online privacy.” Such efforts are ongoing in Congress.

Bhutan Finds Border Deal with China Difficult Given Sino-Indian Tensions

Tiny Bhutan is positioned between India and China near some of the strategic high ground of the Himalayas. While Bhutan has yet to formally demarcate disputed borders with China, the broader issues surrounding the China-India border and Delhi’s support for Bhutan complicate the potential solutions. The example of Bhutan demonstrates the intractable difficulties of the Himalayan borders and their growing strategic importance.

Philippine Vessel Blocked by Chinese Military

On April 27, a Chinese military ship blocked a Philippines vessel in contested waters in the South China Sea and nearly caused a collision. The encounter sparked an intense exchange of warnings with Chinese coast guard radio callers claiming that the waters are “undisputable territories” of China. The Philippines is dispatching patrol vessels with journalists on board to expose aggressive Chinese maneuvering and has claimed that China is violating international law. In the past, the United States has maintained that it would defend the Philippines if its vessels are attacked in the South China Sea. The United States has warships deployed in the South China Sea and performs military exercises with the Philippines Navy.

The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.