Friday News Roundup — February 10, 2023
Friday greetings from Washington, D.C., where a burst of early warmth has it feeling more like April than February — but maybe we are just feeling the heated responses at the State of the Union. This week’s political focus has been on the president’s annual address, the stagecraft, and tour to key battlegrounds to highlight what the administration sees as successes. Meanwhile, in the partisan split screen coverage, now holding the gavel, Republican-controlled House committees have launched a range of investigations — with notable hearings already over Twitter and tech censorship and a growing back-and-forth between lawyers over requests for information on Hunter Biden. While critiques have continued over the response, the House did stand together in a 419–0 vote to condemn the spy balloon incursion.
The international focus was on the growing tragedy in Türkiye and Syria, as more than twenty thousand are dead following a massive earthquake, with fears that the toll will only rise. For now the emphasis is on the domestic and international aid response, as cold temperatures and limited supplies compound the suffering of those who survived collapsed buildings and caved-in homes.
Joshua C. Huminski, the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs reviewed “No Limits” by Andrew Small for the Diplomatic Courier. A timely look at how China’s behavior turned many of its most vocal supporters in Europe into its strongest critics, Small shows that the outcome of strategic competition may well be decided in the boardrooms of Brussels and Berlin as opposed to the wardroom of the U.S.S. Nimitz.
For the Hill, Huminski also critiqued the president’s State of the Union address noting that it was a missed opportunity to reinforce the importance of America’s support to Ukraine. Domestic support is a precursor to allied assistance to Kyiv, and it is critical that the American people understand not just why the U.S. is supporting Ukraine, but how the war could well proceed, and the fact that it may not decisively end.
In this week’s Roundup, Ethan Brown covers the Chinese spy balloon fallout. Veera Parko covers the international response to the earthquake in Türkiye and Syria. Dan Mahaffee responds to the State of the Union asking where the foreign policy element is. Hidetoshi Azuma analyzes the political significance of the Governor of Bank of Japan appointee, Professor Emeritus Kazuo Ueda. Zach Moyer’s essay on Myanmar/Burma reveals how Russia and China pursue leverage and profits in rogue states.
Fallout from #Balloongate
Ethan Brown
Unless you were living under a rock last week (in which case, even then you wouldn’t be safe from orbital observation), there was a Chinese surveillance balloon which transited over the United States, presumably performing collection operations and otherwise signaling how our skies were not safe from the rising Chinese military titan. On Saturday, a U.S. Air Force F-22 scored the vaunted stealth jets first confirmed air-to-air kill, downing the balloon just off of the coast of South Carolina. Which is just about the most American gesture imaginable: sending a $150 million fighter jet to destroy a giant balloon. Following the successful strike, salvage efforts by the Navy and Coast Guard have been underway, collecting debris from the wreckage for analysis by intelligence experts.
There is a significant volume of fallout emanating from this bizarre series of events, pun not intended, but sort of. First, there has been a firestorm of rhetoric and vitriol after it was publicly made known that this has happened before, including incidents under the Biden administration as well as the Trump White House, although personnel from the latter, including Mike Pompeo, were quick to politically charge this situation with comments about how it wouldn’t, didn’t, couldn’t happen.
Here are some sobering facts which are not in the broader discussion about state-level surveillance, and some considerations to keep in mind before this relatively insignificant issue becomes overblown, though rightly demanding some changes to our national defense and security readiness.
First: This sort of thing happens all the time. It may not always be “weather balloons”, as the Chinese state apparatus would like to claim, more like the thousands of satellite constellations that pepper the low- and Medium-orbit networks which the U.S., China, Russia, Iran and many others have launched over the past few decades as we become more dependent on LEO and MEO orbital networks. And far be it from the U.S. to fault a national power from calling a sensitive reconnaissance or experimental device a “weather” function: we’ve done it before, back in the 1950’s with “PROJECT GENETRIX”, where the U.S. intelligence agencies floated “weather balloons” over the Soviet Union to collect spy data. And while that’s old hat, it remains an option which the U.S. military and intelligence agencies are exploring today: balloons, small satellite fleets, and drone swarms remain a key future collection capability in our arsenal.
Second, while the sight of a foreign collection device flying over our domestic shores is indeed unnerving, only because it’s so readily discernible by casual observers, it is not as if this spy balloon was frolicking over our airspace unmolested. There is inherent value in both its detection and our public acknowledgement that the device was there at all. For the former, rest assured that the prolific signals intelligence apparatus of the U.S. intelligence community was collecting on the balloon just as certainly as it was snapping pictures of our farmlands and grassy plains (where many of our nuclear defense facilities enjoy well-known haunts near the grocery stores of Middle America). So congratulations to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army for taking pictures of places the world already knows exist. Now of course, there is the high probability that Chinese intelligence capabilities which may have been effective were being employed as well: soil analysis, density scans of key locations (places like Malmstrom and Offutt AFB’s in Montana, and Whiteman AFB in Missouri), and other infrastructural analysis that may serve strategic targeting purposes. But Google Earth provides much of this data, if one knows how to mine the meta-data inherent in imagery analysis.
Third, and perhaps most rhetorically significant: we shot the darn thing down. There is strategic, informational value in this action, though potentially volatile. While spy balloons are now known to have been a risk to American airspace in recent years, defense officials have admitted that their increasing use and presence represent a “domain awareness gap”, one that is better to have discovered now than gone unresponded to, as it appears to be the case in previous incidents.
It’s one thing to talk tough and make innocuous assertions about being strong on China policies, it’s another thing to back up the rhetoric on China competition with actions. Again, to be explicit: we shot down a balloon that belongs to China, which they claim was for meteorological research, but is almost certainly a collection asset, and then advertised it to the world. It’s a timely sequence of events, when the President of the United States can order that a next-generation fighter jet can shoot down a competitor’s spy device, and then declare explicit intentions in his state of the union speech: “Make no mistake: as we made clear last week, if China threatens our sovereignty, we will act to protect our country. And we did.” The President went on to try and quantify the U.S.-China dynamics, asserting that we are not in conflict with Beijing, but direct competition with it. And he can say all of this while American intelligence experts are poring over the recovered debris and detritus from the spy balloon and its hardware at the FBI academy at Quantico. And there is little Beijing can do to paint themselves as victims here. “Red-handed” is an old affectation about being caught doing something insidious.
In summary, the balloon is a big deal, but as with most complex national security issues, this one is largely misunderstood by the broader public who see an immediate threat, and desire immediate action. But there was implicit value in letting the balloon waft gently on its Southeasterly course, and in the deliberate decision to shoot it down as soon as it reached our Eastern shore, and even greater implicit value in the timing and reaction in public discourse after the fact. We seized an opportunity to pressure our competitors and managed to crack a proverbial egg on their face, and for as much as they could have possibly hoped to gain from this gambit, we gained more.
A once-in-a century earthquake and its many consequences
Veera Parko
By Friday February 10, Monday’s devastating magnitude 7.8 earthquake in Türkiye and Syria had claimed over 20,000 lives. Amid horrific scenes of destruction and human suffering, rescue workers are running out of time to find survivors. From the point of view of search and rescue teams working to rescue people from under the rubble, the first three days after such a disaster are the most crucial. After that, the chances of finding people alive diminish dramatically. Harsh winter conditions and restricted access to damaged areas further exacerbate the situation on the ground. The death toll will surely rise as the true extent of the natural disaster — the deadliest in a hundred years in the region — unfolds. Already now, the earthquake’s death toll has reportedly outstripped that of a 7.8 magnitude quake in Nepal in 2015, with 8,800 fatalities. For comparison, the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan killed nearly 20,000 people.
A catastrophic natural disaster such as this one gives rise to solidarity and concerted efforts to help the victims, but also to political tensions — and even political opportunism.
The worst hit region has already suffered from consequences of the Syrian 10-year civil war, including vast displacement of people. In opposition-held northwestern Syria, the greatest challenge in delivering much-needed humanitarian aid has been gaining access to the region. Damage to roads and other infrastructure, cold weather, a cholera epidemic and fuel shortages pose further problems. Syrian President Al-Assad has, again, demanded all aid flow through his government, and blamed other countries for hampering aid deliveries with existing sanctions. In addition, humanitarian access requires the approval of the Turkish government through the only border crossing point on the Syria-Turkish border authorized by the UN — an authorization facing a possible Russian veto in the UN Security Council every six months. The first significant UN humanitarian convoy entered the region on Thursday, three days after the earthquake. Further international assistance is on the way, but, sadly, delayed.
Meanwhile, an impressive international assistance operation is underway in Türkiye. Dozens of governments have offered to help. More than 20 European countries (including, I might add, Sweden and Finland), the U.S., Russia and Pakistan are sending rescue teams, equipment, and in-kind assistance to support Turkish authorities on the ground. Türkiye immediately asked for international assistance on Monday, through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, a system of international assistance coordinated by the European Commission. In response to the Turkish government’s request, foreign governments have deployed thousands of experts to help the victims, including urban search and rescue teams trained for international deployments and complete with dogs and structural engineers, as well as experts specialized in coordinating assistance. In a disaster of this scale, establishing logistics and communications is absolutely essential.
The devastating earthquake happened at a difficult time for Turkish President Erdogan, with Türkiye’s economy already plagued by inflation and national elections due in May. The government has faced criticism for responding too slowly after the earthquake and for poor preparedness efforts beforehand. According to critics, proceeds from a natural disaster tax introduced after the last catastrophic earthquake of 1999 have been spent on other projects, not preparing infrastructure for earthquakes. It remains to be seen what the impact on upcoming election results — and Türkiye’s foreign policy positions — will be. In any case, the consequences of the earthquake will be far-reaching. Already now, experts are warning of a “secondary catastrophe” on the ground both in Türkiye and in Syria after immediate rescue efforts are over: thousands of people without food and shelter, having lost their families and possessions. Above all else, it is these people the world should be focused on.
The Foreign Policy Address that’s Needed
Dan Mahaffee
As my colleague Joshua Huminski pointed out in his as always perspicacious analysis in The Hill, the domestic focus of the Biden 2023 State of the Union left it lacking in detail and needed political inspiration given the magnitude of the foreign policy challenges we face. Biden’s speech did focus on domestic policy accomplishments — understandable given the need to sell significant legislative achievements that have seemingly yet to reflect in public opinion. At the same time, the decorum, or lack thereof, in the chamber, played into White House hopes to paint the GOP caucus as ungovernable and beholden to its extremes. Through all that, foreign policy got short shrift — so why is this separate speech needed?
First, as I mentioned, there is the magnitude of the global challenge we face. Joshua provides excellent detail on the changing nature of the war in Ukraine and how invading Russian forces are adapting. What the American people need to hear, as he notes, is why this fight, the defense of the global order, matters.
The defense of this order is at the heart of America’s global leadership and role as the guarantor of international stability. Why this fight matters to not just Europe, but the United States should be made abundantly clear — instability abroad leads to instability at home.
Meanwhile, the political faults over the response to the Chinese spy balloon (Ethan describes some of the technical details in greater detail below) is actually a brief break in what has otherwise been a largely bipartisan consensus on reorienting the whole of government to address the U.S. competition with the Chinese Communist Party. A major part of this shift had been the bipartisan embrace of the U.S. House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party — which could be more succinctly called the Select Committee on Strategic Competition given the global, cross-sector, cross-disciplinary nature of competition with Beijing.
While we may be collectively understanding the challenge from Xi and Putin — with some outliers, of course — what hasn’t been made clear is the broader strategy tying these various threads together. For those of us in the think tank community, we begin to see this in the Biden administration’s policies — but the “Biden doctrine”, if it exists, has never been clearly stated. Sure there have been many strategic documents and briefs. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s September 2022 speech on technology competition was the clearest announcement of the strategic shift on technology controls and a clear desire to halt China’s technological forays. The military continues to see China as the pacing threat, though the conflict in Ukraine is testing our logistics and defense industrial base.
Still, there is not a sense of the immediacy of this global competition across other policies. While there are many laudable green goals being pushed forward by the administration — which will also create domestic and friend-shored supply chains — but Senator Joe Manchin is the most prominent of many who express frustration that there is not the same emphasis on the energy security measures in the legislation. Balancing domestic economic goals and relationships with allies further adds to the complexity of this. Biden’s more protectionist tone in the State of the Union certainly does not help at a time when allies and partners want more reassurance on economic and trade ties with the United States — and while Beijing offers attractive trade deals of its own.
These economic threads and elements can be tied together in the sense of this competition as well, and fit largely within what the Biden administration has already prioritized: new models for economic engagement such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework could lead to trade and market access re-engagement, as the United States cannot turn its back on economic and trade leadership; good jobs can come from a reinvigorated defense industrial base, “the arsenal of democracy”, as much as they can come from green energy; new export controls and industrial policy can help to secure future supply chains and technological innovations for national security and economic prosperity; and yes, fixing our immigration system and investing in education are a national security priority, because we need the talented workforce to win in this competition.
While the American public may largely tune out foreign policy matters, such an elucidation of a Biden Doctrine would reassure many who wonder what is the U.S. strategy for facing an increasingly unstable world. It would provide a needed emphasis on how the economic and technological elements of this competition will be as important as the military and political competition of which we are already well aware. It will help too with the complicated and perhaps never-ending process of cooperating, corralling, and occasionally cajoling allies and partners. (Re-read your Cold War history if you think U.S. allies were always lock-step with Washington against the Soviets.)
So yes, given the public focus on economic and pocketbook matters, it is understandable how the State of the Union moved quickly through foreign policy. However, in this day and age, foreign policy has its effect on our pocketbooks — and beyond the dollars and cents, our security and values are being tested like never before. The Biden administration has undertaken significant action to reorient our government’s approach to a multifaceted, global competition. It’s time for the communication to begin to the American people, so that we can reorient ourselves to this new reality.
A Coup de Théâtre in Bank of Japan’s Gubernatorial Race
Hidetoshi Azuma
In a last-minute plot twist in the Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s gubernatorial race, the Japanese government decided to ditch the highly anticipated Deputy Governor Masayoshi Amamiya for an obscure academic, Professor Emeritus Kazuo Ueda of the University of Tokyo, as the next BOJ Governor on February 10. According to the author’s high-level political contacts in Tokyo, Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida and his patron, former prime minister Taro Aso, met on February 8 to finalize their decision on Ueda’s appointment. Indeed, their smoke-filled-room dealing defied the growing public speculation for Amamiya’s expected appointment fueled by multiple leaks from Kishida’s own Kantei. This suggests that the duo, the two of Tokyo’s leading proponents of fiscal austerity, have effectively thrown down the gauntlet to their rival pro-fiscal expansion faction within Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) previously led by the slain former prime minister Shinzo Abe. Therefore, Ueda’s unexpected rise to governorship is largely a product of the emerging political fault line overshadowing Japan’s future for years to come.
Ueda’s appointment is largely a reaction to the unmitigated quantitative easing led by the incumbent BOJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda. Kuroda was Abe’s point man at the helm of BOJ with the mandate to implement drastic quantitative easing largely in service of the then-prime minister’s agenda of fiscal expansion. Indeed, Kuroda himself became synonymous with quantitative easing and even continued the policy despite the rapid depreciation of Japanese yen beginning in early 2022. The upshot was the unbridled printing of Japanese government bonds (JGB) putatively supporting the much-touted economic growth of Abenomics. Meanwhile, Japan’s debt skyrocketed to the point of reaching over 200% of GDP, increasingly casting doubt on Tokyo’s ability to restore its fiscal imbalance. Despite this, Kuroda has remained incontestable and achieved unprecedented longevity thanks largely to Abe’s long reign and his own faction promoting fiscal expansion.
Abe’s assasination in July 2022 fundamentally changed the internal dynamics between the two opposing camps supporting divergent fiscal policies, providing Kishida with unexpected opportunities for his fiscal austerity agenda. Indeed, Abe’s demise followed by the ongoing scandal related to the Korean Christian cult of the Unification Church has had a crushing impact on his faction. The changing political landscape in Japan allowed Kishida to lay the foundation for his fiscal austerity agenda by exploiting Tokyo’s imperative for a defense spending increase as a means to raise taxes in December 2022. Kishida’s rush to a tax hike has invited a considerable backlash from the Abe faction, leading the former prime minister Yoshihide Suga to suddenly emerge as the incumbent leader’s archnemesis. This has effectively led fiscal policy to emerge as the new faultline of Japanese politics for the foreseeable future.
In this context, Ueda’s emergence from nowhere signified Kishida’s subtle political maneuvering against his rising opposition within the LDP. While Ueda was quick to emphasize his support for Kuroda’s quantitative easing agenda, he himself has demonstrated a proclivity for fiscal austerity in the past. Moreover, his obscure academic background suggests Kishida’s care for entrenched institutional interests which might impede fundamental policy changes in case of appointment of BOJ officials, such as Amamiya. Finally, Kishida’s pick of Ueda underscores the ascendancy of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which has been advocating fiscal austerity revolving around a tax hike. Indeed, Kuroda previously emerged in the context of Abe’s rivalry with the MOF, and the departure of the Abenomics duo would allow the ministry to drastically expand its influence aided by a prime minister sympathetic to its agenda.
Ueda’s sudden rise to BOJ governorship reflected the ongoing factional struggle within the LDP. While the new BOJ governor will unlikely abandon his predecessor’s longstanding agenda in the near future, his next moves will be largely inextricable from the ebbs and flows of competing factions in Nagatacho. Kishida now finds himself increasingly besieged due to mounting criticism at home for his support for a tax hike. His predecessor, Suga, has been rapidly unifying an anti-Kishida coalition on a tax reform platform. Yet, Kishida has already dealt his hand with his appointment of Ueda at BOJ, frustrating any efforts by the pro-fiscal expansion faction. The most immediate climax of this saga will likely occur after the upcoming Group of Seven (G7) summit in Hiroshima in late May. If Kishida survives beyond the G7 summit, Ueda will likely begin to steer BOJ toward fiscal austerity followed by a tax hike and spending cuts on social welfare. Contrary to the alarmist criticisms against such a scenario, it may well become a much-needed domestic boost ushering in a new, truly post-Abe Japan.
Russia and China Make Moves in Myanmar
Zach Moyer
On January 7, Russia and Myanmar (still referred to as Burma by the U.S. government) signed memorandums of understanding for the installation of nuclear energy facilities in the Southeast Asian country. Myanmar/Burma is severely constrained with energy infrastructure and has reached an agreement negotiated by Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and the director general of the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation, or Rosatom, Alexey Evgenievich Likhachev. The process began in 2015 with a preliminary agreement and has now set forth plans to build and operate a nuclear reactor.
Since February 2021, Myanmar/Burma has been ruled by a military junta under the direction of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Authoritarian rule and state-directed violence against the Rohingya and Karen peoples of the country mean that humanitarian concerns alongside the collapse of democratic rule have largely barred diplomacy with the West. The United States has imposed sanctions and coordinated with allies to pressure the military regime. (The U.S. Embassy remains open and functioning.) Myanmar/Burma, which the West regards as a pariah state, has since grown its relations with China and Russia.
In 2018, China and Myanmar/Burma signed a memorandum of understanding for the construction of a deep seaport in Kyaukphyu, Rakhine State. In 2020, three more projects were agreed to: a railroad spanning across the country, three customs stations on the border with China, and the “New Yangon City Development Project” which seeks to create a “model city” and a harbor. Chinese investment began in 2009 with the Myitsone Dam in the north of the country, but disputes between the Burmese and Chinese governments have led to the indefinite suspension of the project.
The status of these development projects remain officially unclear since the military coup in 2021. The agreement reached with Russia demonstrates that the current regime is open to continuing plans made under the previous government. Despite the failure of the 2009 Myitsone Dam project, China’s infrastructure projects in Burma/Myanmar remain critical to its Belt and Road Initiative. For China, Myanmar remains a hole in the Southern Corridor that could serve to connect to other transportation and economic infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka.
Myanmar/Burma represents an unpredictable unit of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and a key component of China’s greater transportation infrastructure in Southeast Asia. At the same time, Russia has made a noteworthy step in the Indo-Pacific with a development project that complements infrastructure plans with China; Russia now must also be considered in the greater Indo-Pacific context. Whether the investment of Russia and China will be a source of cooperation or tension between the two countries remains to be seen. The United States must balance its insistence on humanitarian concerns and democratic governance with the cold realities of strategic competition.
News You May Have Missed
Former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf Dies at Age 79
Pakistan’s former President General Pervez Musharraf passed away in Dubai on February 5 after a long-term illness. Pakistan’s prime minister Shehbaz Sharif stated, “I offer my condolences to the family of General Pervez Musharraf. May the departed soul rest in peace.” Musharraf’s tenure as president was controversial to say the least. A former special forces commando, and he became President in a military coup in 1999. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, he nominally enlisted Pakistan to join the “war on terror,” drawing in billions in U.S. aid and allowing U.S. forces to use Pakistan military bases and logistics routes for the fight in Afghanistan. At the same time, credible rumors circulated that Pakistan’s intelligence services were playing both sides by supporting anti-coalition militants in Afghanistan. During his presidency, Musharraf declared a state of emergency, overthrew Pakistan’s constitution, appointed a new chief judge, and banned independent TV outlets. There were two attempted assassinations of Musharraf in 2003. Musharraf stepped down in 2008 and had lived in Dubai after a self-imposed exile in 2016.