Friday News Roundup — February 3, 2023
The big headlines in Washington this week focused on searches. In meetings in Washington, President Biden and Speaker McCarty searched for a debt ceiling compromise. The FBI moved to search the homes of President Biden and former Vice President Pence as investigations continue into mishandled classified materials. Market traders searched the statements of Federal Reserve Chair Powell as the markets responded to a 0.25% rate hike, while also peering ahead for signs of cooling inflation or potential recession. And, finally, the military searched the skies of North America, as the Chinese espionage balloon story broke. Dan Mahaffee covers that more in this week’s roundup.
On Thursday, Dan Mahaffee and Michael Farr wrote for CNBC how the brinkmanship over the debt ceiling allows China to call into doubt U.S. financial and economic leadership. They argued that addressing our debt and deficits is also vital to our economic strength — but that holding the full faith and credit of the United States hostage only undermines a key tool of national power.
This week Joshua C. Huminski, the director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs, reviewed Keir Giles’ “Russia’s War on Everybody” for the Diplomatic Courier. Giles’ book is a timely look at the wide range of tools Moscow uses to influence global affairs, but also how it affects not just high politics, but average people. He writes with a moral clarity that pairs well with strategic empathy, both of which are necessary to making better policy towards Russia. Huminski also hosted Giles for a book talk last week, which was both well attended and well received.
Huminski also offered his thoughts for the Cipher Brief newsletter on what the real impact of continuing and expanded arms to Ukraine will have on the battlefield ahead of anticipated offensives by both Kyiv and Moscow.
The Center hosted Andrew Small of the German Marshall Fund to discuss his new book “No Limits” about the West’s response to China’s behaviors, and how Europe could well be a linchpin in efforts to stymie Beijing’s ambitions. Huminski’s review of Small’s book goes live this Saturday in the Diplomatic Courier.
In this week’s roundup, in addition to Dan Mahaffee’s coverage of the espionage balloon response, Ethan Brown covers the limitations being considered when connecting AI to military systems. Hidetoshi Azuma examines the political implications of the reports on Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida’s expected visit to Ukraine in February. Gracie Jaime looks at what it means for the Biden administration to be ending the pandemic emergency invoked for COVID. We wrap with news you may have missed.
Responding to the Chinese Balloon Incursion
Dan Mahaffee
The stories began to break on Thursday evening that the Department of Defense had been tracking a high-altitude surveillance balloon over North America. According to the Pentagon, all signs indicate that it had been launched from China with the purpose of intelligence gathering over the United States and had been tracked over the Aleutians, Alaska, and into Canada. On Thursday evening, it was believed to be over Montana and the Dakotas. After a period of no-comment, Beijing responded this morning that the balloon was a civilian meteorological platform that had blown off course. Coming days before a now-postponed trip to Beijing by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the incident comes at a perilous time for U.S.-China relations.
First, why balloons? Of course, some say that it was the Chinese who first used balloons in warfare, with fire balloons used for military signaling — but balloons have a long military history, mainly as surveillance platforms. In the early Cold War, the United States had its own balloon surveillance programs over the Soviet Union with names like “Project Skyhook” or “Project Moby Dick”, and some programs went so far as to explore whether balloons could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. In their statements about the Chinese balloon over the United States, the officials noted that this was not the first time such a balloon had been spotted, but that the duration of this incursion warranted a response.
The Pentagon informed the media that military leaders had advised the president against shooting it down, given the risk of debris falling to the ground. Its extreme stratospheric altitude puts it above civil air traffic. However, precautions were being taken to protect U.S. intelligence assets. The course over northern Rockies and Great Plains states takes the balloon over strategic assets such as ICBM fields and bases for Strategic Air Command bombers. It is also a relatively low-cost reminder of the capabilities that China has.
I say that this comes at a perilous time for U.S.-China relations because it is a clear reminder of the capabilities that China has — and it comes at a time when the mood of the American people and their elected representatives towards Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is already febrile. The Chair and Ranking Member of the newly formed U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Communist Party of China, Mike Gallagher (R-WI) and Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) released the following joint statement:
The Chinese Communist Party should not have on-demand access to American airspace. Not only is this a violation of American sovereignty, coming only days before Secretary Blinken’s trip to the PRC, but it also makes clear that the CCP’s recent diplomatic overtures do not represent a substantive change in policy. Indeed, this incident demonstrates that the CCP threat is not confined to distant shores — it is here at home and we must act to counter this threat.
Congress was already gearing up with a tough-on-the-CCP approach, and we’d already noted the 365–65 vote establishing the select committee and demonstrating its bipartisan backing. The American public will also be rightly enraged by this, and despite the low-tech nature of the balloon, the headlines and social media response demonstrate how this is grabbing attention.
Any news story that warrants my younger cousin texting me a balloon story and “whats the tea on this danny” has clearly blown outside the Washington national security and foreign policy bubble. We await the 2023 Gallup data, but in 2022, the net favorable-unfavorable for China stood at 20–79, respectively. From the pandemic to Hong Kong and Xinjiang to the perception that trade with China has left Americans with the short end of the deal, this only adds fuel to a simmering public mood.
China has embarked upon a charm offensive of late, and it will be interesting to see how Beijing attempts to defuse this — and the weather balloon explanation may be a start — or if hawks in Beijing seize upon this as a success of demonstrating China’s capabilities.
The U.S. response should be measured. Some extreme concepts may be floated, like banning Chinese civil aviation from U.S. airspace — but banning FedEx and UPS from airports in China would bring vital supply chains to a screeching halt. Instead of acting rashly, track the balloon, recover it if feasible, dissect it, and return the parts to the Chinese with an invoice for shipping. At the same time, develop the means to track and intercept these, cost-effectively, before they enter American, Canadian, or other allies’ airspace.
More broadly on the military deterrence side, it’s another reminder of the nexus of high-tech/low-tech, old-platform/new-sensors/new-weapons mashups that will increasingly be seen in intelligence ops and on the battlefield — and doctrine and R&D must adapt to match. There is something extremely on the nose with this whole situation when billion dollar stealth fighters are being used to find a balloon that likely cost in the hundreds, if not tens of thousands of dollars.
This however, is a reminder of the kind of multifaceted challenges that will arise in managing an increasingly tense U.S.-China relationship where national security concerns push up against continued economic interdependence. Policymakers will have to manage the relationship with China and these confrontations — look back to the EP-3 incident in the early days of the George W. Bush administration for an example of a tense moment even when underlying relations were calmer. Demonstrating strength while managing tensions will be the statesmanship challenge for U.S. leaders now — both in the White House and Congress — because this is the future of the U.S.-China relationship on display, now.
Limitations of AI in defense networks
Ethan Brown
“(1) A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm; (2) a robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law; (3) a robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second law;
Isaac Asimov’s “Three laws of robotics”.
“What may not be as well known to the common enjoyer of science fiction is Asimov’s fourth, or zeroth law: “a robot may not harm humanity, or, by inaction, allow humanity to come to harm.”
Those guiding principles in fictional mediums have a reverberating influence on the growth of our thinking machines in today’s world, yet are certainly not a binding legality when it comes to the American military developing the technologies upon which our defense networks will rely in the future. A “Robot”, by Asimov’s reckoning, could include anything from a partially-automated device of convenience — a toaster, perhaps — to the thinking-reasoning creations of the “I, Robot” story, and far more complex and deadly. Frank Herbert fans and enthusiasts of Warhammer 40ks “dark age of technology” already presume the risks inherent in failing to curtail the expansion of artificial intelligence in warfare. Indeed, the use of intelligent non-human entities — autonomous weapons systems, algorithm-driven command and control networking, and thinking machines — will become far more dominant in defense architectures than we may have ever imagined possible.
As such, the defense department recently released its policy revisions to DoD Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapons Systems”, intended to account for the role which artificial intelligence (AI) will play in the application of kinetic and non-kinetic systems. The striking thing about the policy revisions (this will be change II to the original policy posted on November 21, 2012) is that the elimination of Artificial Intelligence from the development, control, guidance and recommended application of lethal effects is not prohibited.
At the overview, the directive requires all autonomous and AI-enabled systems to be subjected to “rigorous hardware and software V & V (verification & validation) and realistic system developmental and operational T & E (test and evaluation), including analysis of emergent behavior.” This verification will be applied against vulnerabilities in the cyber domain, where sabotage is most likely to occur and frankly, far more complicated than kinetic interference with defense systems. Every new iteration of autonomous machine thinking will “include testing to confirm that their autonomy algorithms can be rapidly reprogrammed on new input data”, meaning that every new system designed to be managed by AI, or machine learning, will be subjected to this rigorous review and vetting procedure before those capabilities are integrated into the DoDs network of networks.
All such reviews will verify that the systems have been “demonstrated to allow commanders and operators to exercise the appropriate levels of human judgment and use of force and to employ systems with the appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapons system safety rules, and ROE (rules of engagement) that are applicable or reasonably expected to be applicable.”
Some key takeaways, which are fascinating to consider in this context: the review and screening of AI in future DoD systems is based on the subjection of these automated technologies to adhere to established policies and rules of warfare — humane use of kinetic effects, military necessity, strategic objectives and the like. All of these things shape and inform commanders and warfighters in the delicate and complicated endeavor of choosing what lethal tool to use against an adversary. To put it bluntly, these systems will be tested in simulated environments in order to, quite simply, harm or break the enemy’s stuff in order to win a fight.
So the question here is where does assurance and reliability start and end? As AI and machine learning are folded deeper and deeper into defense architecture, we invariably give up responsibility for a task or activity and assume its automation by the machines we have assigned the job to. We haven’t imprinted Asimov’s laws into our defense systems, but at some level, we have programmed (and certainly will program) protocols to dictate their expected behavior and…autonomy to act.
If these systems were guided by science fiction philosophers, we wouldn’t find them managing surface-to-air missile systems, or enabling rapid target acquisition on something like an F-35 or Nuclear submarine, nor would these machines be charged with ensuring that command and control networks are streamlining battlefield data from the front to the command levels of the force. So that means something foundational is still missing from the programming and vetting of these systems when it’s applied to combat.
Discernment and that damnable ‘reasonable assurance’ is what’s missing from the development of AI in defense systems. This is where AI gets really complicated, especially when automation of force maneuvers and resource allocation could become increasingly reliant on non-human systems to see American and coalition service members into and out of a fight. In today’s application, AI can be used to ensure logistics, maintenance, and force management is at peak efficiency, where human error can largely be eliminated (redundancies, typos, etc). But tomorrow, when a fleet of Marines are storming a beachhead to take back key terrain and are entrusting their ships and lives to a autonomous system to pilot their crafts, what if the system reverts course based on the liberties its programming allows, in contrast to the human-directed course of action?
These are the inherent risks in reliance on AI and machine learning-driven technology on the warfighting force. The fleet of Marines taking a beachhead is one example, and one which may be extrapolated across the force in countless other paradigms. This includes defense and deterrent networks, like Iron domes and missile defense networks of increasing popularity and relevance today.
How will the DoD ensure that AI-driven systems do not invert commander’s intent because the assigned task or job exceeds an explicit set of parameters for a given mission? And technology has one common trait, which has been the bane of its existence in the hands of warfighters for millenia: the new gadget becomes one more point of failure in the machine, either because it can be interfered with by the adversary, or it simply doesn’t work as intended for unpredictable reasons.
Warfare is a wholly subjective experience. There are countless manuals, doctrines, TTPs guides, but at the end of the day, it comes down to decisions made by warfighters who make snap decisions with the outcome in doubt. AI is a system meant to predict and ensure outcomes based on probabilities, programming, and summary data. And this new policy has yet to establish coherent guardrails on machine autonomy when the real warfighting occurs.
Japan’s Ukraine Affair
Hidetoshi Azuma
Rumors emerged over the last few weeks in Tokyo regarding Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida’s potential visit to Ukraine’s capital Kyiv sometime in February. This author was privy to such insider rumors before Japan’ leading newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, appeared to confirm them when they reported the scoop on January 22. The very publicity of the Japanese leader’s ongoing planning for a visit to a war zone is odd due to its corollary logistical issues and its impact on his own physical security during the trip. Inevitably, it invited a significant backlash from the public, leading numerous anonymous Japanese government officials to float the possibility of cancellation of Kishida’s expected visit to Kyiv. The enigmatic saga of Kishida’s de facto about-turn on his visit to Kyiv in fact revealed Tokyo’s lingering strategic ambiguity toward Russia which threatens the solidarity of the Group of Seven (G7) countries on Ukraine despite Japan’s chair status in the upcoming summit in Hiroshima in May.
It all began when Kishida received a request for his visit to Kyiv from Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy during their regular phone summit on January 6. Zelenskyy’s request reflected Kyiv’s frustration with Japan as the only G7 country which had yet to send its government leaders since Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine began last February. Following the phone summit, Kishida told the press corps with his quintessential equivocation that he “would consider a visit in light of various factors.” In Japanese politics, such a remark would be immediately followed by an official statement turning down the expected event with the all familiar mantra of “sincere regret.”
What happened this time was rather unusual. Instead of Kishida appearing before the public to utter the routine words of remorse for canceling his trip, he essentially had internal logistical information on his Ukraine trip leaked to the insiders in Tokyo and finally the media. The upshot was the growing circulation of sensitive information which ironically had the purported effect of boosting Kishida’s image as a leader bent on visiting the war zone despite the insurmountable difficulties. Expectedly, the public increasingly accused Kishida for taking unnecessary risks and even questioned Japan’s commitment to Ukraine. Reflecting such a public sentiment, numerous anonymous officials in Tokyo suggested to the media one after another that Kishida’s potential Kyiv visit would be canceled with “a 99.9 probability.” Kishida thus played nice to almost everyone at home and abroad by letting external factors virtually undo his planning.
Beyond Japan’s mundane internal politics, Kishida’s latest Ukraine affair reflected Tokyo’s perennial strategic ambiguity toward Russia. While Japan and Russia continue to remain at war ever since 1945 absent a peace treaty, Tokyo has done little about Ukraine beyond the rhetorical denunciation of Moscow’s aggression. In fact, many in Tokyo remain skeptical of the need for supporting Ukraine due to Japan’s entrenched economic ties to Russia, particularly the energy projects in Sakhalin. Such a sentiment has been evident in Tokyo’s questionable Russia policy revolving around its agenda of signing a peace treaty with Moscow. Remarkably, this has been the case although the Kremlin itself walked away from the negotiating table last March, leading Tokyo to essentially court Moscow’s favor. Indeed, Kishida himself reiterated his commitment to a peace treaty with Russia last October even when the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation was in Tokyo.
While the ongoing developments in Tokyo do not entirely negate the slim possibility of Kishida’s visit to Kyiv in February, they have already shaped the contours of what is almost inevitably to come. For Kishida, the expected legacy of signing a peace treaty with Russia would far outweigh the burden of supporting Ukraine on what it perceives as the dubious grounds of democratic solidarity. Ironically, the ongoing war in Ukraine has inadvertently solidified his desire to pull off the impossible his predecessors, including former prime minister Shinzo Abe, successively failed to achieve. Tokyo’s lingering reservation on Ukraine is a major foreign policy victory for Russia, which has been consistently pursuing a strategy of sowing divisions between Japan and other democratic allies, especially the US. In any event, Kishida has dealt his hand and will unlikely visit Kyiv next month. By blaming external factors for his possible aborted Ukraine visit, the Japanese leader would be more interested in appearing as a peacemaker with his lofty rhetoric in praise for democracy at the G7 summit in his hometown of Hiroshima this coming May.
Biden Administration Plans to End Covid-19 as a National Emergency
Gracie Jaime
The White House plans to end the public health emergency status for Covid-19 on May 11. House Republicans introduced measures this week to end emergency declarations immediately. This sets up a battle between the White House and Congress. In response to Republicans’ actions, the administration stated an “abrupt end” to emergency benefits would create “wide-ranging chaos and uncertainty throughout the health care system.”
At no charge, many Americans were able to receive treatments, tests, and vaccines. Medicaid, private insurance plans, and Medicare have covered many of these services. Certain individuals covered by Medicare and Medicaid could receive treatments such as monoclonal antibodies. Recipients of Medicare will soon have to face individual costs for treatments and home testing. State Medicare programs will still cover vaccines and lab testing. Also, Covid-19 vaccinations will still be available to individuals with insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid due to various federal laws. The uninsured can currently access testing, treatments, and vaccines through federal funding, but this is subject to change due to the end of emergency declarations. Additional funds that hospitals have received during the pandemic due to the 20% increase in Medicare’s payment rate for Covid-19 patients will also disappear. Also, Medicaid enrollment will lose millions expecting coverage as states can begin cutting off recipients, according to the Department of Health and Human Services. Several states have stopped providing additional assistance leading to stamp recipients losing additional aid.
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) stated on January 31 that Covid-19 vaccines, tests, and treatments would not be affected as the FDA can continue to issue emergency authorizations. On September 18, 2022, the President stated in a 60 Minutes interview, “The pandemic is over. We still have a problem with Covid. We are still doing a lot of work on it.” Covid-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths are declining. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) said on January 25 that, “the current 7-day average of new deaths has decreased by 4.9% compared to the previous 7-day average.” The CDC reported the overall death toll in the United States due to Covid-19 was 1,103,615.
On January 30, the World Health Organization released a statement that Covid-19 remains a global health emergency. WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus stated that “we remain hopeful that in the coming year, the world will transition to a new phase in which we reduce hospitalizations and deaths to the lowest possible level, and health systems are able to manage Covid-19 in an integrated and sustainable way.” However, Ghebreyesus added, “We have never been in a better position to end the pandemic. We are not there yet, but the end is in sight.”
News You May Have Missed
Over 60 Killed in Taliban Suicide Bombing in Pakistani Mosque
On January 30, at least 61 people were killed and 157 injured in Peshawar, Pakistan after a suicide bombing. The Pakistani Taliban has since claimed responsibility for the attack and cited the reason for the attack as revenge for the killing of Taliban militant Khalid Khorasani last year. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif challenged the role of Islamic extremism in the attack:
“The brutal killing of Muslims prostrating before Allah is against the teachings of the Quran… targeting the House of Allah is proof that the attackers have nothing to do with Islam… Those who fight against Pakistan will be erased from the page.”
This attack resembles the March 5, 2022, bombing of a mosque also in Peshawar, Pakistan, that claimed the lives of about 60 people with about 200 injuries attributed to the blast. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for this attack. Following this most recent attack, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan addressed growing terrorist threats in Pakistan, calling for increased measures:
“it is imperative we improve our intelligence gathering & properly equip our police forces to combat the growing threat of terrorism.”
Pope Francis Visits Congo-Kinshasa
On January 31, Pope Francis visited Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on a goodwill tour beginning in the Congo and set to end in South Sudan. The wheelchair-bound Pope received a jubilant welcome on his trip to call for peace and to re-invigorate enthusiasm for Catholicism in the country. In his opening speech, Pope Francis spoke regarding the beleaguered history of the Congo:
“We cannot grow accustomed to the bloodshed that has marked this country for decades, causing millions of deaths that remain mostly unknown elsewhere… May the world acknowledge the catastrophic things that were done over the centuries to the detriment of the local peoples, and not forget this country and this continent.”
On the continuing extraction of resources in Africa, Pope Francis spoke clearly on the influence of foreign powers:
“Hands off the Democratic Republic of the Congo! Hands off Africa!”
Protests in India Over Supreme Court Opinion Labelling “Immigrants”, “Foreigners”
January 30, Gangtok, the capital of Sikkim, India, was the site of a mass rally led by the state-ruling party Sikkim Krantikari Morcha (SKM). This comes after a January 13 opinion by the Supreme Court of India which labeled Gorkhas in the state of Sikkim as “Foreigners” and “Immigrants” regarding income tax exemption for “old settlers” of the State. In 1975, India annexed Sikkim, which borders Nepal, and included many citizens of Nepali ethnolinguistic origin called Gorkhas. Sikkimese Gorkhas are Indian citizens who have occupied many positions of leadership in Sikkim and India at-large. Darjeeling MP Raju Bista, a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) spokesperson, expressed worry over the implications of this opinion:
“I am most fearful that the careless words used by the highest court in the land, can very well be made to be the basis for further discrimination and ethnic cleansing of Gorkhas in the coming days. I stand with the people of Sikkim in seeking these offensive opinions expunged from the order.”
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.