Friday News Roundup — March 10, 2023
Friday greetings on what has been a busy, news-filled week, in Washington and around the world. In the District, we’ve been tracking President Biden’s proposed budget, and a range of Congressional hearings on global threats, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and what the Fed will do next. Lawmakers, including several Republican Senators, as well as the chief of the Capitol Police, expressed their anger over the airing of January 6th videos by Fox News personality Tucker Carlson in a segment designed to rewrite the history of that violent day.
Zooming in on the president’s budget, with Republican control of the House, the 2024 $6.9 trillion budget proposal from the White House is more a list of political priorities heading into 2024 than the likely spending plan for 2024. Significant expansions of government programs and support for child care, community college, green energy, and other progressive priorities are offset by significant increases in corporate and capital gains taxes. The administration also proposed $842 billion in defense spending. Still, as the parties are unable to find solutions for inflation and deficits — as well as the looming debt ceiling showdown — the fiscal burden on future generations remains unchanged. As the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget noted, national debt would rise from 98% of GDP at the end of this year, to hit new records of 106% of GDP in 2027 and 110% of GDP in 2033.
Americans were viscerally reminded of the danger and instability in Mexico as four Americans were attacked and kidnapped, with two and a Mexican bystander being killed in Matamoros, Mexico, across the border from Brownsville, Texas. The four had entered Mexico seeking cosmetic surgery but were attacked by Gulf Cartel gunmen. The cartel has delivered the gunmen, along with an apology note, hoping to fend off further reprisals from authorities — as U.S. lawmakers call for action, including labeling cartels as terrorist organizations. All of this is likely to raise the political volume regarding the border, the narcotics epidemic, immigration, and the growing tensions with Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador.
Further afield, scenes from Israel demonstrated growing unrest over the radical judicial reforms put forward by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s far right coalition. This affected Secretary of Defense Austin’s abbreviated visit to the country. Protests have seen Israeli police using water cannon, stun grenades, and other violent methods against protesters; inflammatory rhetoric from Netanyahu’s ministers; and growing refusals to report to training by IDF reservists in elite units related to cybersecurity, air strike missions, and commando forces (who are largely more educated and secular given their high-tech skills). An undercurrent of resentment between the ultra-Orthodox in Netanyahu’s coalition, who forgo military service for torah study, and more secular Israelis who complete IDF service and work in the country’s financial and high-tech industries continues to fuel the tensions underlying these protests and creates a broader fault line in Israeli society. Israeli President Isaac Herzog gave an emotional address asking Netanyahu to shelve the proposed reforms in favor of a compromise, citing the risks the country now faces in terms of its economy, security, and shape of its democracy.
This week, Joshua C. Huminski, the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs reviewed Paul Scharre’s “Four Battlegrounds” about the national security implications of artificial intelligence. A smart, must-read book, Scharre focuses not on the technology itself, but the titular battlegrounds, over which policymakers will have a measure of control and influence. CSPC will host Scharre in April for a literary salon discussion about his book.
Huminski also offered his take on what Washington will look for in the United Kingdom’s update to the Integrated Review, which is expected in the coming days. Alignment on China, sufficient resourcing, and a re-focus on European security would, according to Huminski, improve the political capital of Prime Minister Rishi Sunak within Washington.
In this week’s roundup, Dan Mahaffee contrasts Xi Jinping’s remarks on “U.S. containment” with the opening hearing of the new House Committee on Competition with the Chinese Communist Party to look at questions for China strategy. Ethan Brown looks at the escalation of the air war in Ukraine. Robert Gerber dives into whether Russia’s frozen reserves can fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. Hidetoshi Azuma covers how the United States helped Japan and South Korea find a solution to historical grievances, and what comes next for the Tokyo-Seoul dialogue.
Containment or Competition?
Dan Mahaffee
Over the past two weeks, we see more of the contours of the U.S.-China competition coming into focus. First, the kick-off hearing on February 28 of the U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party demonstrated how one of the few things, if any, that the parties agree on is the importance of addressing the threat of China’s communist regime. Then, in a speech to industry leaders on March 6, Xi Jinping lashed out at the United States, blaming a Washington-led campaign of “containment, encirclement and suppression” for China’s economic woes and technological hurdles.
On one hand, the House hearing reflected a careful effort by the committee members to craft a distinction between China, the country, the people, the civilization, from the Chinese Communist Party and its aims at home and abroad. The name of the committee itself reflects this, but Ranking Member Ro Khanna (D-CA) reiterated this in his opening comments. Chair Mike Gallagher (R-WI), reminded the audience, still, of the scope of the challenge, saying “We may call this a ‘strategic competition,’ but this is not a polite tennis match…This is an existential struggle over what life will look like in the 21st century — and the most fundamental freedoms are at stake.”
Covering a range of topics from the regime’s human rights abuses, to job losses to Chinese manufacturing, to the purchase of sensitive U.S. real estate by Chinese companies, to even a handful of questions about the origins of Covid, the opening hearing looked back with an indictment of China’s leaders. To be fair, it was an opening hearing designed to lay out the strategic challenge posed by the CCP’s plan. What will be needed, and the committee has the opportunity, is to lay out the vision not of what Beijing is doing or plans to do, but what the U.S. strategy is to be better prepared, more resilient, and more dynamic.
What we heard from Xi Jinping, on the other hand, was a stark response to the policies that the United States and other countries have adopted, having seen the economic, security, and political consequences of Beijing’s current path. As Xi has made clear, Beijing’s approach demonstrates a different model of economic development and authoritarian political control that it believes stands as a better model than the west. As we have chronicled in these very pages, the CCP has embarked upon a range of policies — internal crackdowns (Hong Kong, Xinjiang, COVID protests), South China Sea militarization, rapid military technological advancements via IP theft and “Military-Civil Fusion”, Belt and Road Initiative, Digital Silk Road, other debt trap diplomacy, and so on and so forth — that now has the west and other countries understanding that our relationship with Communist China is on a far different course than we realized in the 1990s and early 2000s. Hawks would say that it is merely our perception of the CCP that has changed, not their underlying nature. But it is realistic, not dovish, to also acknowledge that we must manage the significant economic interdependence between both countries — and aim to deter, not seek, conflict between our countries.
At the same time, the reality of this competition is that we cannot contain China in the sense that we sought to contain the Soviet Union. China, with its rich history, cultural contributions, and billions of people cannot be contained or isolated. That said, the policies of the CCP cannot go unanswered, and we must in turn be nuanced and focused in our approach. Part of that is not seeking unnecessarily provocative actions — demonstrated by Speaker McCarthy meeting Taiwanese President Tsai here rather than traveling to Taiwan — while leaving the CCP’s policies to speak for themselves. In this vein, it is worth noting that Xi made these remarks about the United States during comments designed to assuage private sector concerns. As he continues to tighten the economic and political reins, Xi’s policies will have their impact on China’s dynamism and the world’s perception of that country. Even in trying to encourage private capital, it is clear that the party sees private enterprise as subordinate to the party’s interests. It was clear in Xi’s remarks and many new and recent policies, but if you could, just ask the latest detained billionaire tycoon.
Ultimately, perception will matter alongside the other metrics of national power — military might, economic prosperity, diplomatic influence — as the wider world, beyond China and the West, does not want to be drawn into an either-or competition. Here, the challenge will be for us not to respond to China’s policies, looking backwards, but rather to demonstrate how our system — political, economic, legal, and technological — can deliver better results than the vision of the Chinese Communist Party. In his remarks, Xi demonstrated clearly just how China sees this competition, and its growing Cold War nature. We cannot shy away from what is needed to deter aggression, nor can we turn back on the range of policies that recognize the technological competition we face. Beyond this, the opportunity now for the House China Committee is to start to fill in what that strategy is for further dynamism and out-competing China, rather than continuing to be responsive. In being responsive we do only appear to be trying to contain China, and failing.
The risks of the air war in Ukraine
Ethan Brown
The churning dirt amidst artillery bombardment in Ukraine remains a fixture on the front lines of this ongoing conflict, to the point where trench warfare has become the status quo as the battlefield eerily reminds Western observers of the haunting images of the First World War.
Two forces churning dirt and mud against one another, some are close enough that they can clearly see their opponents faces amidst rockets and automatic gunfire. This was the least-preferable scenario to this new chapter in the war, for all intents and purposes a stalemate. Ukraine certainly won’t back down from its own regained territory, and the Russian forces are tragically willing (forced) to stand and die for this unjustifiable endeavor, while making marginal gains of their own through extreme brutality in places like Bakhmut.
How do you break a stalemate like this one? One option — which wasn’t available the first time European states engaged in complex trench networks in extreme close proximity more than a hundred years ago — is air power. Airstrikes, when called in from a forward position by a trained controller, are among the most devastating and lethal capabilities in the modern military.
Ukraine’s lionized leader, President Volodimir Zelensky, has been pressuring his Western benefactors to quickly and decisively provide aircraft and pilot training to Ukrainians airmen in order to effectively turn the tide of this war. Military aid to Ukraine has been an inarguable necessity since the invasion more than a year ago, but guided artillery, loitering munitions, and even tanks like the German Leopard II and American M-1 Abrams were all considered the qualitative “game-changers”, and yet the War drags on without a clear end in sight despite those packages being provided.
Yet the West is now very seriously considering what aircraft options are available to provide to Ukraine as the war continues apace. Italy has already excused itself from providing its 4th-generation AMX fighter to Kyiv, on account of the gap that would result before Rome receives its F-35s. The U.K. has not closed any such doors, with Defence Secretary Ben Wallace telling the media “don’t rule anything in, don’t rule anything out.” The United States, as it has done since this war’s opening shots, seems to be leading the initiative to explore potential advanced aircraft options for Ukraine.
A bipartisan group of lawmakers have penned a letter to President Biden urging him to provide fighter aircraft to Ukraine which would “prove decisive for control of Ukrainian airspace this year.”
The risks in this next step
There has been ongoing and inherent risk in continuing to provide blank-check support for Ukraine, and consistently reneging on reserved or off-the-table options like long-range artillery, tanks and the like. The risk over the past twelve months has been the reality that no one on Kyiv’s side of the fight has defined the end state, and continued sponsorship of this war risks escalation into the penultimate conflict between Russia and the West that rational thinkers fear.
There is an individual risk in this singular analysis, as support for Ukraine — like most other things, has become a politicized and volatile issue in debate forms.
There is no reasonable argument for leaving Ukraine to fend for itself; the United States has every just reason to deter Russian aggression and ensure a stable, peaceful Europe, hopefully one which will expand in institutionalized cooperation. But failing to control the scope of money and aid into Ukraine without an endgame in mind is the overriding risk in this endeavor.
When it comes to aircraft — and this is an issue I raised back in the Summer when Western military leaders first opined sending advanced aircraft to Ukraine — giving Kyiv F-16s or A-10s just took this conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, and painted it as a fight between Moscow and Washington. It makes no difference if a brave Ukrainian is flying the F-16, or if the F-16 carries precision-guided weapons sourced from the U.K., or if the jet-fuel powering the aircraft came from Germany.
It’s an American warplane bombing Russian forces on the frontlines of Ukraine. The information and propaganda potential is incalculable.
And despite Zelenskys assurances to the American congress a few months ago: “I assure you that Ukrainian soldiers can perfectly operate American tanks and planes themselves”, the truth is, flying a fighter jet is one of the most difficult jobs in the world. The pilots of the Ukrainian Air Force ‘grew up’ flying MiG-29s and Sukhoi Su-27 aircraft — Russian built, and with dramatically different avionics, flight control systems, and system integration.
I spoke with an Air Force instructor pilot, who has hundreds of hours training partner nation airmen on basic flying mechanics, and the issue is not whether or not Ukrainians can learn to fly an airplane. That skill is relatively easily developed. The greater challenge lies in training a Russian-theorem learned pilot on a much more advanced and nimble dart like the F-16, which is so maneuverable that Lockheed-Martin had to develop a correctional computer and “fly-by-wire” control system to make it something that a human being can handle. It’s the difference between driving a 1980’s pickup truck with a massive steering column and hydraulic power-steering and a brand-new Tesla with electronically-corrective power-steering gearboxes.
There is no reason to not plan for training Ukrainian pilots — at a future date of hopeful stability in Eastern Europe, post conflict — on F-16s, F-18s, or even an F-35. But today, what Ukraine needs is an ability to secure its own airspace. The time it would take to retrain the battle-fatigued aircrews on an entirely new and dramatically different type of Western aircraft is not a feasible endeavor for giving Ukraine a chance at air superiority.
Giving Ukraine air security
Instead, improving the airspace coverage over the front lines — denying Russian air power integrated against those trenches and future objectives — is a better path to turning this tide. That means air defense, early warning, and radar-defeating Electronic warfare capabilities which are a) cheaper than a fleet of F-16s (which would clock in at roughly $3 billion for a mere three dozen of the fragile aircraft), and b) much easier to train Ukrainian personnel to operate and maintain. Putting American aircraft in combat over Ukraine would prove to be a further boon to Russian: the diverse Russian air-defense systems would now have a chance to collect intelligence and targeting data on Western aircraft in ways previously unachievable, albeit that is a minor side-tale in this hyper-complex conflict.
Making the skies unflyable for the Russian air force opens up the potential for Ukrainian forces to press an advantage of mobility on the ground — and continuing to employ new weapons systems like throwaway drones and loitering munitions to further erode Russian air-defense systems. This is a war of attrition, but also adaptability, and so long as Ukraine continues to adapt faster than Russia, the aggressor’s defeat remains all but certain, regardless of the increasing timeline for that outcome.
Curiously, Russia has not pressed its air inventory advantage in this war, which speaks to the lack of professionalism and poor integration of the Russian joint force writ large. But their warplanes have effectively bombarded Ukrainian positions, civilian locations, and make for some chilling twitter threads on open-source intelligence feeds. Taking away the threat of the enemy air power is decisive on its own, and comes at much less cost. American lawmakers like Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) from the House Armed Services Committee, as well as Pentagon policy chief Colin Kahl have expressed rightful skepticism about shipping American warplanes to Ukraine suddenly, haphazardly, and without a definitive roadmap for bringing the Ukrainian logistics alone up to par for a advanced Western warplane and it’s ecosystem.
Ukraine is indeed at an inventory disadvantage when it comes to aircraft, so much so that the desperation of the last twelve months makes the request for American fighter jets a seemingly reasonable effort from Kyiv. But the risks of widening the air war over Ukraine’s skies are tremendous, far more so than continued ground support, and there are better paths for the West to tread as it seeks new aid vectors for Kyiv.
Could Russia’s Frozen Reserves Be Used to Fund Ukraine Reconstruction?
Robert W. Gerber
Shortly after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, G7 leaders (plus Switzerland, Australia, and a few others) took collective action to freeze some $300 billion in Russian reserves, i.e. foreign currency holdings that were located in banks within the member states’ jurisdictions. This effectively meant Russia could not convert these holdings into rubles to use them for the war effort. In May 2022, German Finance Minister Christian Linder told reporters he would be open to the idea of seizing these assets and deploying them to serve Ukraine’s reconstruction. A spokesperson for the Russian government expressed outrage over the suggestion, saying it would be “illegal.. and outright theft.” Last week, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers tweeted: “I think the easiest judgment is that the G7 should be moving collectively to use #Russian state assets to finance the ongoing expenses in #Ukraine, made necessary by Russia’s aggressive war. That is what has happened in all past wars.”
Can the United States legally do this, and should we do this? Opinions are divided. At recent panel hosted by the Atlantic Council, Mr. Summers, former USTR Bob Zoellick, and former State Department Counselor Philip Zelikow all agreed that the U.S. government could seize and route up to $300 billion in frozen official Russian government assets (not oligarch assets — that’s a different basket) to the effort to rebuild Ukraine — immediately. Notably, they said that this would be “administratively simple” and that there are no major legal obstacles to doing so. They cited last year’s International Court of Justice ruling on Ukraine and three UN General Assembly resolutions over the past 12 months, which declared that Russia is liable for paying for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Mr. Zoellick said, “Russia has no right to due process.” Some twitter personalities have said Summer’s plan would violate centuries of “customary international law” that has treated reserves with diplomatic immunity. But there are historic precedents: Iraq compensation for Kuwait in the first Gulf war, and the United States seizure of Afghanistan government assets to pay victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks are among the exceptions.
Summers said the UK, Canada, and the EU would support such an effort but that they were waiting for the U.S. to act. Zelikow said “They could start transferring money next week” if they wanted to, but noted that the Biden administration was divided on the matter- hinting that some Treasury officials are likely concerned about the precedent of seizing central bank assets as well as unknown risks to global appetite for U.S. government debt and by extension the dollar itself. The worry he alluded to is that buyers of debt or foreign currency might be less likely to do so if there is a risk their foreign assets will be seized by a foreign government. This increased risk could hurt the value of the dollar as well as the ability of the U.S. government to find buyers for its bonds, and even precipitate a flight to the digital yuan or cryptocurrencies, according to some bloggers. Certainly, the last thing the U.S. government needs is higher costs of debt financing right now.
Last year Congress held several hearings on the matter which resulted in a half dozen bills that would have given the President explicit authority to turn Russian reserves into reparations for Ukraine. However, Harvard Law Journal opined that none of the legislation satisfied concerns related to U.S. “international legal obligations” or constitutionality. It is likely that Treasury made this case to legislators as well. Still, conditions have changed over the past 12 months. It’s 2023 and war rages on. There is an argument to be made that sanctions alone have not had the desired goal (expressed by U.S. policymakers) of “degrading” Russia’s capabilities — and its will — to wage war against Ukraine, and so further financial pressures should be on the table. An interesting question emerges: will Members of Congress revert to pushing the cause of seizing and diverting Russian reserves to Ukraine? This seems increasingly likely given a) that the conflict will continue and b) Congressional support for more funding is not infinite in these times of record budget deficits. Here is a suggestion: G7 members act in concert and at the request of Kyiv to seize a portion of frozen Russian assets which would be diverted into an escrow account overseen by a UN body and which shall be used for future Ukraine reconstruction to be supervised by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). One would not need to use all $300 billion and one could then gauge the reaction of the international financial markets — i.e. test the theory of a collapse in the Treasurys market. There is some risk to the dollar, and Beijing would complain loudly as would some of the UN “abstainers” — but the West would send a clear message that the free world holds Russia — and any other international aggressor — liable for the physical damages it causes to a sovereign neighbor in an unprovoked war. Summers also said if we don’t take this action, there’s a chance “Ukraine war effort will cannibalize other global development needs” i.e., climate and food insecurity. Something to think about.
The Virtue of American Power in the Japan-South Korea Relationship
Hidetoshi Azuma
Earlier this week, Tokyo and Seoul announced the de facto resolution of their lingering dispute over the issue of wartime conscripted labor. The dispute long represented the arrested relationship between the two US allies in East Asia, perennially frustrating Washington’s vision for a regional trilateral alliance. While the latest bilateral agreement ultimately underscored the transcendental nature of American power in influencing the resolution of one of the world’s most troubled relationships, the new reality in Japan and South Korea hardly appears capable of weathering the vicissitudes of politics in the long term. After all, the two countries reluctantly agreed to shake hands for the moment, essentially trading their respective national pride for their perceived common geopolitical imperatives largely driven by the simmering great power competition. In other words, under the veneer of rapprochement, the new deal has installed a political time bomb in the two countries waiting to explode the moment the current bilateral dynamics change. Such a new reality merits an analysis of the peculiar geopolitical dynamics driving two of America’s most important allies in the region in light of the latest agreement.
The root cause of the perennial regional antagonism between Japan and South Korea is to be found in their competing geostrategic imperatives. While Korea long remained China’s key tributary state within the Sinocentric system, Japan issued its own version of the Declaration of Independence to the Chinese emperor as early as in the 6th century AD. Such divergent national experiences have influenced their geostrategic imperatives for centuries. Because Korea remained firmly anchored in the Sinocentric system, it looked up to China as its civilized guardian while looking down on Japan as an eastern barbarian. By contrast, Japan sought to check China’s regional influence by thrusting its geopolitical influence via the Korean Peninsula, a key geostrategic imperative which was even chronicled in Japanese mythology. As a result, Korea has perpetually held Japan in low regard and underestimated its power often to their own detriment. Indeed, Japan invaded Korea several times throughout its history, culminating in Imperial Japan’s annexation of its regional neighbor in 1910.
US victory in WWII fundamentally changed the bilateral relationship. Indeed, Japan came under the Allied occupation and subsequently became rebranded as a key US ally in Asia. This transformation essentially removed geostrategy from Tokyo’s strategic calculus, halting Japan’s expansionist impulse almost indefinitely. Meanwhile, Japan became Washington’s key regional logistical hub from which to project power into the Eurasian continent. In this sense, the Korean War epitomized American power in post-WWII East Asia, leading the US to ultimately thrust its geopolitical influence over the southern half of the Korean Peninsula. In other words, the US ironically inherited Imperial Japan’s geostrategic imperative for Korea, despite their divergent political visions. As a result, American power in East Asia enabled South Korea to emerge to gain political independence arguably for the first time in the history of the Korean Peninsula, despite the continued US military presence.
The advent of American power in East Asia unexpectedly created bizarre bilateral dynamics. Washington’s key regional vision has invariably been a trilateral alliance unifying Japan and South Korea within the US regional alliance architecture. This has forced the two regional allies to see eye to eye despite their deep-seated mutual antagonism only rivaled by the Arab-Israeli rivalry. The immediate upshot was their historic reconciliation in 1965 in which both countries established an agreed framework for a full-fledged normalization of relations. Because of their altered power relations, a peculiar pattern soon set in whereby Japan would de facto continue to fund South Korea’s economic reconstruction as a token of atonement for the past. Indeed, such was the rationale for the 1965 treaty which concluded the process of redemption once and for all as clearly indicated by the agreed provisions. Yet, Article 3 of the agreement on economic compensations for South Korea contained a crucial loophole vulnerable to abuse in pursuit of additional financial aid from Japan. Indeed, exploiting this loophole became Seoul’s key policy for Japan, fueling bilateral antagonism further. As a result, a wide array of history issues, especially the comfort women problem, emerged to engulf the two US allies, stifling alliance cooperation while accruing massive profits for certain elements in South Korea.
In fact, the issue of wartime forced labor suddenly emerged to the fore after the slain former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe achieved a major financial solution to the comfort women problem in 2015. Moreover, it even became the top item on the former South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s agenda for Japan, leading Abe to respond with economic sanctions to Seoul’s policy about-turn. The upshot was the historic low in the history of Japan-South Korea relations despite the pressing common imperative of meeting great power challenges in the region. Ironically, Moon’s policy reversal occurred in the context of American power presiding over the two countries. Indeed, Tokyo essentially resigned to the fate of a reluctant financier of South Korea while Seoul found its own niche of anti-Japanese policy for indefinite economic gains. Such an uneven relationship colored the US alliances in Asia for the last several years.
The latest agreement which emerged earlier this week was a major breakthrough in light of the recent history of the bilateral relationship. Indeed, the new South Korea president Yoon Suk Yeol is slated to meet Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo next week, marking the first visit to Japan by a South Korea leader in several years. Yoon even called Japan “a partner”, and Kishida reciprocated with unusual enthusiasm for dialogue, departing from his previous position of non-engagement. After all, both Kishida and Yoon share the same imperative of charting their respective countries in the era of great power competition and recognize the need for bilateral cooperation along with their American ally. The significance of their new deal was that the US did not directly broker it, although it provided a context for it. In other words, Kishida and Yoon leveraged American power in the region for their own common agenda. Such a joint initiative was perhaps the first of its kind in the perennially-troubled history of the Japan-South Korea relations.
Yet, all these developments do not wholly eliminate the future possibility of yet another policy about-turn. Indeed, the current trajectory is an exception to the rule of the Japan-South Korea relationship driven more by mutual mistrust than by shared values. At issue is the question of South Korea’s right to demand reparations from Japan. The latest deal did not abrogate it, essentially leaving the very problem of wartime forced labor unresolved and open to exploitation in the future. South Korea is rife with extreme anti-Japanese elements, mostly from the Left, which also take a pro-North Korean position. They are widespread across the general public and wield enormous political influence with numerous non-government organizations (NGOs) advancing their agenda most likely as part of North Korea’s influence operations against South Korea. In such a skewed political environment, the new bilateral arrangement is merely a political time bomb waiting to explode as soon as radical anti-Japanese elements reclaim power in Seoul. While they may not necessarily threaten the US-South Korea alliance per se, they could undo any progress toward a trilateral regional alliance currently being advanced by Kishida and Yoon as during the Moon years.
American power is the only force enabling Japan and South Korea to overcome their past and work toward a common aim. It has served as a benevolent force transcending history and even geostrategy constraining the two regional allies. Yet, it has produced unintended consequences in the form of an unequal relationship in which Japan found itself invariably having to pander to South Korea’s de facto blackmail exploiting the legal loophole inherent in the 1965 bilateral treaty. The latest agreement earlier this week did not fundamentally remedy this reality and is open to future exploitations. As the US seeks to finally unify its two regional allies toward a trilateral alliance, Washington would be best served to address Seoul’s frequent exploitations of the legal defect, which could ironically threaten South Korea’s own place in the rules-based international order.
News You May Have Missed
Georgia Shelves “Foreign Agents” Law After Protests
Mass protests in the Republic of Georgia forced a U-turn by that nation’s government on a proposed “foreign agents” law. Thousands poured into the streets of Tbilisi to protest a legislative package modeled after Russia’s similar laws. Many were concerned that the law would target civil society groups and international NGOs. Similar to laws in other post-Soviet states, these laws utilize an interpretation of foreign agent that makes it far similar to foreign espionage rather than activism or political and/or cultural exchange.
EU publishes new Space Strategy
On Friday March 10, the European Commission announced a new EU space strategy for security and defence. The first-ever strategy of its kind is based on the EU’s so-called Strategic Compass on security and defence. The strategy identifies space as a strategic domain, especially in the current geopolitical situation. According to the Commission, the EU is taking action to “protect its space assets, defend its interests, deter hostile activities in space and strengthen its strategic posture and autonomy”. The strategy proposes, among other initiatives, setting up an Information Sharing and Analysis Centre, and making better use of existing tools and assets, for example expanding the current space threat response mechanism. The strategy also claims to deepen existing space security cooperation with partners, in particular with the United States. EU member states will start discussions on the strategy later this month.
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.