Friday News Roundup — March 3, 2023
Friday greetings to you from Washington. While there was not one story that dominated the headlines, a lot is still going on. At the Supreme Court, the Justices heard arguments over the Biden administration’s plan to relieve student debt. Conservative justices expressed skepticism over the action, though technical questions over standing and injury were also discussed. While the court can surprise, observers suggest that the administration’s move is in legal jeopardy as the court continues to appear ever skeptical of bold uses of executive power.
The origins of COVID returned to the headlines as the FBI and Department of Energy indicated, albeit with medium and low confidence, respectively, that the virus escaped from the now-infamous Wuhan Institute of Virology. While investigations on the handling of the pandemic continue, it adds further fuel to those arguing for greater China decoupling.
Political observers watched the Chicago mayoral election as incumbent Mayor Lori Lightfoot — dragged down by the pandemic’s economic impact on downtown and surging crime — failed to advance to the runoff election. Paul Vallas, the city’s former schools administrator, and Brandon Johnson, a former teacher and Cook County Commissioner, advanced to the April 4 runoff election. The showdown between Vallas, endorsed by the Fraternal Order of Police and denounced as “secretly Republican,” and Johnson, endorsed by the Chicago Teachers’ Union though distancing himself from past “defund the police” commentary, illustrates the Democratic Party’s split between the “law and order” approach and the more progressive priorities of the party’s activists.
On the global stage, Secretary of State Blinken and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov met on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in New Delhi for the first time since Russia’s wholesale invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile the fighting in the east of Ukraine has intensified, as mobilized and questionably-equipped Russian forces hope sheer numbers will help them prevail over the Ukrainian defenders. How quickly the west can get more advanced military equipment to the Ukrainians — as well as demonstrate the political and industrial will at home to ensure Ukraine prevails — will determine the next phase of this conflict.
We invite you to join us Tuesday evening for an in-person special event, followed by reception, with FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr and Vice Minister Hiroshi Yoshida of the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs & Communications to discuss cooperation on promoting digital freedom and secure digital infrastructure.
On the one-year anniversary of Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine, Joshua C. Huminski, the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs, reviewed Luke Harding’s “Invasion” and Owen Matthews “Overreach” for the Diplomatic Courier. Writing the first histories of the war in Ukraine would never be an easy task, but both authors offer superb entries reflecting on the origins of the war, and its human and political consequences.
The Hill also published Huminski’s commentary on the need for President Biden to spend as much time reminding the American people why Washington’s support to Ukraine is both right and necessary, as he is conveying this to Kyiv and European capitals.
In this roundup, Dan Mahaffee looks at some of the strings attached to the CHIPS Act money and what that means for industrial policy. Joshua Huminski covers the deal between London and Brussels on Northern Ireland. Robert Gerber analyzes the prospects for restarting the trade agenda. Hidetoshi Azuma analyzes the political dimension of Japan’s emerging debate on security clearance. Veera Parko provides an update on Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession, and Gracie Jamie analyzes the latest protests in Moldova, which have Russian fingerprints on them. We close with News You May Have Missed.
The Politics of Industrial Policy
Dan Mahaffee
On Tuesday, the Department of Commerce unveiled the full list of requirements and criteria that would go into selecting the projects to be funded by the CHIPS Act. Combined with the Vision for Success detailing the goals for the CHIPS Act funds, we are seeing the push by the Biden administration to move this policy forward and promote U.S. semiconductor development and manufacturing. However, despite the large price tag of $52.7 billion for semiconductor programs, this is likely just the very start of what is a larger push into industrial policy for semiconductors — and other advanced technologies. Therefore, as we dive into how the administration will allocate these funds and set other industrial policy, how political goals are balanced with economic priorities could be a concern for industry and policymakers.
Certainly many will argue that the CHIPS Act deserves its fanfare, and it is indeed representative of U.S. policymakers’ bipartisan efforts to address the innovation leadership and tech manufacturing that is key to economic prosperity and success in the current and future technological competition. Along with other measures to promote broadband coverage being run through the department, as well as its traditional role in managing the U.S. export control regime, it has also raised the profile and budget of the Department of Commerce and its leadership — particularly Secretary Gina Raimondo. Secretary Raimondo has a historic opportunity to reshape the department for the future, as well as to set a new course in U.S. industrial policy. “Gina Raimondo Becomes China Player in a Job Where Her Predecessor Used to Nap” is the headline Bloomberg Businessweek chose, contrasting her with former Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross.
Despite all this, if you ask industry whether the CHIPS Act is revolutionary or a start to a longer process — the answer is often simply “yes”. The CHIPS Act is a sea change in how the U.S. approaches policy towards the semiconductor industry, and potentially for future industrial policy, but in terms of the resources provided and the impact, it will be just the start in the longer development and evolution of the industry and its supply chains. As illustrated by the details leaked from Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last year and her conversations with Morris Chang, the nonagenarian founder of chip manufacturing giant TSMC, Chang saw it as a good start, but questioned whether U.S. politicians had the will to continue such support.
If this CHIPS Act is just the start and we agree on the importance of addressing our nation’s semiconductor needs, then it is important to keep a bipartisan consensus on this and avoid unnecessary politicization. From industry’s perspective, if you want to attract industry to use these government incentives and funds, the process should also be streamlined and avoid too many unrelated or tangentially-related political priorities. Here is where the CHIPS Act implementation may face some of its first challenges, and some of them may be self-inflicted.
First and foremost, the guidance addresses how the administration will allocate funds and how companies may present projects for selection. Some of the strictures reflect the sound policy goals of protecting U.S. supply chains and taxpayer dollars. For example, firms will not be able to expand semiconductor manufacturing in “countries of concern” (read China) for 10-years after the award of U.S. funds. Perhaps more controversial is the guidance that firms can complement their plans for reinvestment in semiconductor manufacturing — one of the criteria on which plans will be evaluated — by also pausing any stock buybacks for five years. Given the political divisions on the issue of stock buybacks, it will further politicize the implementation of CHIPS. This could also give CEOs, CFOs, and shareholders pause about aligning with the broader goals outlined by the department.
What is proving to be the most controversial in some quarters, however, is the requirement that plans submitted for CHIPS Act funding also account for “affordable, accessible, reliable, high-quality child care” for the construction and facility workforce. While this is a laudable goal for a range of reasons, including the needed expansion of the workforce, this is not what the CHIPS Act was meant to address. Adding things like this could make the implementation of the legislation even more contentious, or invite further legal challenges in the future. It threatens the pipeline for further funding or other industrial policy measures regarding related or similar supply chains and innovation ecosystems if other political goals start to muddy the waters. More broadly, if we want to have the debate on child care policy in this country, have an open legislative debate rather than weaving it into executive policies.
The success of the CHIPS Act is critical to the future of the American semiconductor industry and how this foray into industrial policy turns out. The danger is if this gets bogged down with too many political priorities and arrives with policy goals at cross-purposes — i.e. protecting our critical supply chains versus reshaping the child care model in the United States. The more priorities that the Commerce Department has to pursue and oversee, the greater the burden on the administration of the CHIPS program. Critics of industrial policy will use this complexity and any failure to justify orthodoxy that no politicians can be trusted with any economic intervention — and if the public sees the process as more politically driven than economically impactful, it will be short-lived.
The Windsor Agreement and the Future of Northern Ireland
Joshua C. Huminski
This week, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of the United Kingdom and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced that an agreement had been reached to resolve the open question of a post-Brexit Northern Ireland. Since the United Kingdom formally withdrew from the European Union two years ago, the future status of Northern Ireland and its connections with the Common Market remained unclear.
As part of the Good Friday Agreement, which resolved the long-running conflict between the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the United Kingdom, there was effectively no border between the two countries. Indeed, prior to Brexit, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland shared the same trade rules. After Brexit, the situation became far more complex. Northern Ireland, as part of the United Kingdom, would no longer be part of the European Union after Brexit. This would necessitate some form of border, customs inspections, border posts, or other barriers, all of which were anathema to the free flow of goods and people across the Irish border, and on which post-“Troubles” stability was not insignificantly based.
In 2021, the United Kingdom implemented the Northern Ireland Protocol, which added customs checks for goods coming from the United Kingdom not at the border, but at ports in Northern Ireland. This added considerable costs and delays to cross-border trade, especially as it applied unilaterally to any goods that were due to stay in Northern Ireland. Effectively, all goods coming from the United Kingdom were subject to the same checks.
Under the Windsor Agreement, reached by Sunak and von der Leyen, two categories of trade will be established. A “green” lane of good destined for Northern Ireland alone, which will not require additional EU-standard inspections or rules, and a “red” lane of goods due to proceed into the Republic of Ireland. These will require added checks and meet EU-standards.
In practice this, however, means that Northern Ireland would be subject to some EU-standards and law, but have no voice in the European Parliament now that the United Kingdom is no longer part of the Union. The Windsor Agreement addresses this with the creation of the “Stormont brake” under which the Northern Ireland Assembly can veto EU legislation if 30 members of the assembly from two or more parties sign a petition.
Resolving the Northern Ireland protocol was one of the few British political issues for which there was a constituency within the United States. President Biden, Irish by ancestry, had declared his concern about the protocol and it was intimated that Washington would not sign a trade deal with London unless the issue was satisfactorily resolved. The White House expressed approval that the United Kingdom and European Union reached an agreement, which should — if approved — remove one a sticky political wicket from bilateral relations.
That approval is, however, an open question. Whilst the Windsor Agreement technically does not require parliamentary approval (it is not a new treaty or change to an existing treaty), Sunak indicated that he will seek a vote on the accord. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland opposes any agreement that sees Northern Ireland in the common market and several Tory backbenchers (and former Prime Minister Boris Johnson) are staunchly opposed to any linkages with the European Union. The DUP, for its part, has boycotted sitting in Northern Ireland’s government, but pressure is growing from the other parties to resume their role in government and support the agreement. Their support and participation in government is critical to restoring the power-sharing agreement in Northern Ireland.
Johnson still retains hopes of returning to 10 Downing Street and is courting the hard-Brexiteers in his opposition to Sunak and the Windsor Agreement. On Thursday he said that the deal is “not about the UK taking back control”. He continued, “I’m going to find it very difficult to vote for something like this myself, as I believe we should have done something different.” Whilst in government, Johnson proposed a controversial Northern Ireland Protocol Bill that the European Union said would violate international law.
The process behind the Windsor Agreement and negotiations between the European Union and United Kingdom were remarkably civil and productive, a marked contrast from the post-Brexit turmoil and acrimony between the two parties. Sunak does deserve credit for reaching the agreement and for his management of the process. Indeed, an unnamed MP said, “Just shows what we can achieve with an adult in the room.”
The open question, as noted above, is whether he will be able to secure the agreement within parliament. Sir Keir Starmer, the leader of the Labour Party, offered his party’s support to secure the approval of the Windsor Agreement, but Sunak would, ideally, like to secure approval without their vote, or at least relying on their vote to overcome backbench opposition within his own party.
It is, however, a chance for Sunak to mark out his leadership and, potentially, steer the Tories and the national conversation away from the hard Brexiteers and groups like the European Research Group, which have exercised outsized influence on the party in recent years. Indeed, a good portion of the United Kingdom’s recent political challenges can be seen as the eruption of an intra-party fight within the Conservatives that have dramatically affected the United Kingdom’s politics.
Does this presage a more stable relationship between the United Kingdom and European Union? Quite possibly. Provided Sunak can bring the agreement across the line, he will find himself in a much stronger position both domestically and internationally. If he cannot, or if the hard Brexiteers and Johnson stir up enough opposition — even if it is all sizzle and no substance — it could further erode the United Kingdom’s standing with the European Union.
Restarting the Trade Agenda
Robert W. Gerber
There is growing Congressional sentiment that the United States should be pursuing ambitious trade agreements — the kind that involve tariffs, market access, and Congressional authorization. This message is coming from both Republican and Democratic members of the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee. This is a challenge to the White House, which so far has eschewed traditional trade agreements in lieu of initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). These programs seek commitments from our trading partners in dozens of areas from supply chain security to clean energy to digital trade — but they are not traditional trade agreements that involve “market access” or tariff commitments, nor do they — in the view of the Administration — require Congressional approval. The Biden Administration has also allowed trade promotion authority to lapse and it suspended the U.S.-UK trade negotiations that began under President Trump.
There are prominent voices in Congress saying that the United States is missing an opportunity in forgoing new trade agreements, particularly with our Pacific partners. Japan and Singapore, two of the United States’ top Asian trading partners, have urged the United States to show bold leadership on trade in the Pacific. Senate Finance Committee ranking member Senator Mike Crapo (R-ID) recently said that the United States has been on the sidelines while China aggressively pursues trade agreements. He stated that there was bipartisan interest in pursuing new trade agreements as a means to compete with China and to open foreign markets to U.S. goods. (He added though that Congress would not authorize trade promotion authority unless the Biden administration asked for it.) New legislation provides further evidence of Congress’ interest in restarting the trade agenda: Senator Bill Cassidy (R-LA) introduced a bill that would invite countries within the Americas to join the U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) regional trade agreement if they meet certain requirements. Senator John Thune (R-ND) and Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) introduced legislation March 2 that would grant trade promotion authority for the Administration to conclude a U.S.-UK trade agreement. Senator Lisa Murkoswki (R-AK) introduced legislation expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should negotiate a trade agreement with Iceland — a non-EU NATO member. In the previous Congress, Senators Rob Portman (R-OH) and Chris Coons (D-DE) led an effort to pass a trade bill that included renewal of Trade Adjustment Assistance (funding for trade-displaced workers), reauthorization of the Generalized System of Preferences (trade benefits for least developed countries) and a new Miscellaneous Tariff Bill, which allows companies to petition for specific tariff reductions on imports. There is reportedly a chance this legislation could be reintroduced in the current congress.
Adding tariff and market access provisions to the Administration’s trade approach would make agreements more durable, impactful, and enforceable, goes the argument. It could also provide incentive for our trading partners to engage in negotiations in a more meaningful way. Critics say that without these provisions, the U.S.-EU TTC and IPEF will not amount to much. At the same time, it is important to consider that pursuing comprehensive trade agreements is frequently an arduous process that does not guarantee success. The U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations ran aground under the weight of intractable regulatory obstacles, differences over agricultural market access, and opposition from European civil society. And in 2016, both presidential candidates came out in opposition to the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership after labor and environmental groups raised concerns about the Obama-era negotiated text. On the other hand, USMCA passed the Senate with overwhelming bipartisan support during the Trump Administration.
U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai did not mention free trade agreements during her interview this week with Foreign Policy magazine. Commerce Undersecretary for International Trade Marisa Lago, speaking on behalf of the Biden Administration at a Washington DC trade conference, said the Administration was conducting robust commercial engagement in the Pacific but that the “current environment was not conducive to signing traditional trade agreements.” Certainly the Administration has a role to play in shaping this environment. Congress wants to play a greater role in trade policy and is asking for much closer consultations on the IPEF and TTC talks. While there is nothing new about Congress demanding a bigger say in trade policy, the White House would be wise to explore how it can team up with Congress to pass modern trade legislation that is fit for the 21st century and designed specifically for the dual purpose of a) helping U.S. businesses compete against Chinese competitors and b) shoring up our alliances.
Latest on Finland, Sweden, NATO — and Hungary
Veera Parko
On March 1, NATO invitee Finland’s parliament approved legislation on accession to NATO by a large majority, with 184 MPs for, 7 against and one abstaining. Finnish politicians wanted to complete national proceedings to prepare the country for membership before general parliamentary elections on April 1. (An interesting election by the way, with three political parties — populist True Finns, PM Sanna Marin´s Social Democrats and center-right National Coalition Party neck-to-neck in polls).
On Monday, Türkiye’s President Erdogan announced negotiations with Finland and Sweden on their NATO bids would resume on March 9. Meanwhile, Hungary — the other NATO country still to ratify the Nordic neighbors’ accession — has begun discussing Finland and Sweden’s accession in parliament and will, according to the latest announcement, vote on March 20. On March 1, Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his ruling party Fidesz announced support for Finland and Sweden’s accession, but also voiced concerns over the risks of creating a new 800-mile NATO border with Russia, and accused the two countries of spreading “blatant lies” about Hungary. Supposedly, the comments reflected Finnish and Swedish criticism in the European Union toward Hungary’s rule of law issues, especially the independence of its judiciary. Some have speculated that Mr. Orban will use leverage gained by stalling NATO bids to achieve a more favorable outcome in talks with the EU on rule of law issues — and receiving grants from the EU’s COVID-19 recovery fund, for example. A delegation of Hungarian MPs will visit the two countries next week.
In other news, Finland started constructing a 200 km (124 mile) border fence between Finland and Russia. According to the Finnish Border Guard, the fence is essential for situations involving “instrumentalized or extensive entry into the country.” NATO accession and talks with future Allies might take time, but Finland is clearly on its way to becoming a full member of a collective defense organization, and willing to do its part.
Pro-Russia Party Stages More anti-Government Protests in Moldova
Gracie Jaime
Anti-government protests resumed in the Moldovan capital Chișinău on February 28. Thousands of protestors demanded that the government subsidize citizens’ winter energy bills and “not involve the country in war.” Police in the region checked vehicles coming to the capital as buses brought protestors from all over the country. The protests appear to be organized by the pro-Russia Shor Party, and it is widely believed that party leader Ilan Shor paid many of the protestors to travel by bus to Chișinău. Shor is an exiled oligarch now living in Israel who has been on the U.S. Treasury Department sanctions list since late 2022. The Shor Party sparked anti-government protests in the fall of 2022 over the country’s severe energy crisis. The protests followed President Maia Sandu’s declaration last month that Russia was trying to undermine Moldova’s democracy. Moldova’s government has asked the Constitutional Court to outlaw the Shor Party, which currently has six seats in Moldova’s legislature.
Meanwhile, Moldova’s new Prime Minister Dorin Recean met with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Prime Minister Nicolae Cuica in Bucharest. The leaders discussed strengthening bilateral economic ties and Cuica pledged to support Moldova’s EU candidacy.
The latest protests have contributed to an already tense political, economic, and security environment in Moldova. Some airlines recently suspended flights to Moldova due to flight safety concerns after two Russian missiles passed over Moldova. Russia maintains two battalions in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria. According to the U.S. Embassy in Chișinău, the United States has provided approximately $267 million in emergency support “to help Moldova address the economic, energy, security, and humanitarian impacts of Putin’s war against Ukraine, while maintaining progress on its economic and democratic reform agenda.”
The Politics of Japan’s Security Clearance Debate
Hidetoshi Azuma
Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida issued a decree on a year-long internal preparations for the highly-anticipated launch of a security clearance system at the fourth Economic Security Promotion Council session on February 14. The Economic Security Minister Sanae Takaichi, Tokyo’s top advocate of security clearance, received the mandate and has been leading the legislative efforts toward the establishment of Japan’s first security clearance system, beginning with her chairwomanship at the first experts committee meeting on security clearance on February 22. While these internal developments in Tokyo would certainly be a welcome boost for Japan’s economic security policy which currently lacks a security clearance system, the real significance of the events last month was the growing ascendancy of Takaichi overshadowing Kishida within the country’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The simmering rivalry between the two politicians could risk derailing the emerging debate on security clearance away from national security.
In fact, Tokyo’s emerging debate on security clearance would have been unthinkable only several months ago. In August 2022, Kishida reshuffled his cabinet ostensibly to restore party unity following the assassination of the former prime minister Shinzo Abe in July and appointed Takaichi as the new Economic Security Minister. This was an unexpected move on Kishida’s part given the second-tier status of the Economic Security Minister post. Indeed, Takaichi had been a populist rising star in Abe’s neoconservative faction with a solid track record of having assumed key party and ministerial posts, even leading her to mount a redoubtable challenge to Kishida’s bid for premiership in September 2021. In this sense, Takaichi’s current post was a poisoned chalice accorded by Kishida who desperately sought to hold his own administration together due to his plunging popularity rate amid the political fallout of the Abe assassination. Indeed, Takaichi reluctantly accepted the new job and even publicly exposed that Kishida had ordered her “not to mention ‘China’ or seek an amendment to the Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) to include a security clearance system during the 2023 Diet sessions’’ at a live talk show in September 2022.
Takaichi’s de facto coup against Kishida reflected the key policy differences between the two leaders. Kishida, the incumbent head of the classical-liberal, pro-US Kochikai faction, is known for his dovish approach to the great power competition, although he has played an instrumental role in realigning Japan’s overall grand strategy with that of the US. In other words, he favors continued engagement with China and Russia and only seeks gradual, partial decoupling from these countries out of respect for Washington’s strategic imperatives. The upshot has been Tokyo’s lingering strategic ambiguity in areas which could even threaten Japan’s national security, such as its continued dependence on energy imports from Sakhalin. By contrast, Takaichi is a national security espousing a muscular vision for Japan with enthusiasm for confronting China and Russia in particular. Her abiding interest has been China’s untoward influence within Japan, leading her to muster considerable populist support for her agenda of undermining the pro-China elements within the Kishida administration, such as the Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi. Indeed, the pro-China elements under Kishida have been a significant obstacle to the realization of a security clearance system in Japan.
Takaichi’s September 2022 revolt against Kishida overshadowed the trajectory of Tokyo’s economic security policy. Curiously, the subsequent debate on security clearance gained momentum, leading the LDP and its pro-China coalition partner to agree on a mention of the agenda in the December 2022 National Security Strategy document. Moreover, even the Opposition, particularly the National Democratic Party, pushed for the institutionalization of a security clearance system. In other words, after Takaichi’s rhetorical putch, Kishida suddenly found himself willing and even supported for the very security clearance agenda he had previously sought to avoid. His de facto policy about-turn obviously had the effect of deflecting Takaichi’s challenge, even leading the two politicians to suddenly see eye to eye on security clearance.
Despite their seeming policy consensus on security clearance, they have quietly shifted the focus of the mutual agenda to one of addressing Japan’s economic competitiveness on the global stage. To be sure, the establishment of a security clearance system would inevitably encompass the private sector, which has long lost its former glory from the days of the proverbial “Japan Inc.” of the 1980s. Indeed, the Japanese private sector is not privy to classified information related to emerging technologies precisely due to the lingering absence of an indigenous security clearance system. Japan’s various business associations, such as the Keidanren, have increasingly been voicing such concerns in recent months. While addressing the Japanese private sector’s grievances would be conducive to the debate, what has likely spawned in the simmering rivalry between Kishida and Takaichi recently is their compromise solution of focusing on economic competitiveness in consolidating Japan’s security clearance system.
Such national security avoidance would likely have unintended consequences. Indeed, the most fundamental objective of security clearance is to constrain access to secret information and therefore inevitably has intelligence implications. In other words, security clearance must above all else protect intelligence informing decision makers from those not in the know. Enhanced economic competitiveness would merely be a byproduct of a sound security clearance system. This point was raised when the former Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera recently deplored the arrested intelligence sharing process with the US due to Japan’s lack of its own security clearance system. According to Onodera, Washington refused to share intelligence on Russia’s impending full-scale invasion of Ukraine and informed Tokyo after the fact. His concern is valid given the porous nature of Tokyo’s information security rife with frequent leaks of state secrets. Therefore, while Tokyo’s present focus on economic implications may win domestic support for the legislation of a security clearance system, its misguided perspective could fail to address a more important, pressing issue threatening the US-Japan alliance itself.
While the emerging debate on security clearance in Tokyo is certainly a step in the right direction, politics overshadows its future. Compromise may be a necessary virtue on the floor of the legislature, but geopolitics demands otherwise. The present focus on Japan’s economic competitiveness is a diversion from the original imperative of protecting intelligence. In a country which has neglected intelligence for decades, such a sensible perspective could easily yield itself to a populist appeal. Indeed, the very term economic security could inevitably stifle holistic thinking at the expense of an overly economic focus. In other words, Tokyo’s economic security policy stands at a historic crossroads, and the ongoing debate will be the touchstone for thinking about the future trajectory of Japan’s security normalization.
News You May Have Missed
TV Anchors Telling Positive Stories of Life in Venezuela are Deepfakes
“Noah” and “Darren” may appear like normal TV hosts, telling stories of economic recovery in Venezuela, the economic benefits of a baseball tournament, and increased tourism demand — despite the international sanctions on and economic mismanagement by the nation’s socialist regime led by Nicholas Maduro. These positive news stories, viewed on social media, YouTube, and Venezuelan state television are, however, not being delivered by human anchors. Despite their highly realistic appearance, Noah and Darren were created by the company Synthesia, which allows clients to create content with deepfake characters for subscription fees that can be as little as dollars a month.
Canada Acknowledges Chinese Surveillance in Canada’s Arctic
A spokesperson for the Canadian Armed Forces said that Canada had tracked and stopped Chinese attempts to conduct surveillance within Canada’s Arctic waters and airspace months before the recent balloon incursion over North America. Notably, Canada has discovered Chinese buoys in Canadian waters, according to recent press reports. The buoys could be used to monitor U.S. nuclear submarine traffic and/or mapping seabeds and sea ice thickness, according to a Canadian military expert. Foreign Affairs Minister Melanie Joly called China an “increasingly disruptive power” and she underscored Canada’s ongoing work with NORAD to protect Canada’s sovereignty.
Controversial Change to Elections in Mexico
On February 26, tens of thousands of protestors gathered in Mexico City’s Zócalo public square to protest new election laws introduced by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The laws, once enacted, will reduce salaries and funding for local election offices, training for citizens who oversee polling stations, and reduce penalties for candidates who do not report campaign spending. The protesters have expressed optimism that the Supreme Court will overturn the law. López Obrador has widely criticized the Chief Justice as being corrupt. Brian A. Nichols, representing the U.S. State Department had to say about the law: “Today, in Mexico, we see a great debate on electoral reforms that are testing the independence of electoral and judicial institutions.” López Obrador responded bitterly saying: “there is more democracy in Mexico than could exist in the United States… I have evidence to prove there is more liberty and democracy in our country.”