Friday News Roundup — May 12, 2023

This week in Washington, the focus was on the debt ceiling negotiations and the southern border. President Biden and Congressional leaders met on Tuesday to begin debt ceiling negotiations, and a follow-on meeting scheduled for today has been postponed to next week, as aides cited limited progress in their talks. The upside is, at least that they are talking, and there seems to be agreement on the perilous danger of default (unless you ask former President Trump during his CNN town hall). At the same time the expiration of Title 42 has authorities braced for a surge of migration at the southern border. As Republicans have moved forward in the House with their immigration bill, there are murky prospects for its progress in the Senate. Both of these scenes unfolding before us reflect the human and economic cost of the dysfunction of our politics and our failure to find common sense solutions for our nation’s finances and its immigration system.

Overseas, violence escalated between Israel and Gaza as strikes on terrorist targets continued. In Pakistan, unrest abated after courts ordered the release of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who was dramatically seized by paramilitary police following a court hearing earlier in the week. Khan blames the corruption charges he faces on Pakistan’s army.

Ukraine faced a series of Russian drone attacks this week, with over three dozen drones aimed directly at Kyiv. Ukraine successfully shot down all of the drones headed towards the capital, but the attack successfully hit a Ukrainian Red Cross warehouse in the Odesa region. Ukraine has made small advances in Bakhmut, but Zelensky says they need more time (and equipment) before launching their counteroffensive.

Joshua C. Huminski, the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs reviewed Daniel Knowles’ “Carmageddon” for the Diplomatic Courier. An impassioned critique of the automobile and its impact on society and the environment, Knowles ambitiously suggests that small changes can add up to a significant result. The challenge, Huminski outlines, is chiefly politics and the sheer scale of the problem. Small changes may have small impacts, but absent widespread political change (itself unlikely to happen), the urban and societal redevelopment he advocates will not happen.

In this week’s roundup, Dan Mahaffee covers how Chinese officials have cracked down on due diligence and consultancy firms as they seek to control information and data flows. Ethan Brown covers how the Marine Corps is looking at novel logistics solutions. Robert Gerber looks at the latest Indo-Pacific Economic Framework talks in Singapore, while Sophie Williams analyzed the Moscow Victory Day Parade. Cara Arnoldi, joining us as the Nevins Fellow from Pennsylvania State University, provides her inaugural roundup contribution with a brief on the continuing backlash women in Iran face. Hidetoshi Azuma analyzes US Ambassador Rahm Emanuel’s influence on the ongoing debate on the proposed LGBTQ+ legislation in Japan.

Doing Business in China? Don’t Ask Questions

Dan Mahaffee

A screenshot of Chinese police officials on state TV describing how consultancy work threatens national security (South China Morning Post)

Recently, leaders in Beijing have engaged in an effort to encourage business to return to China. Following the pandemic concerns regarding supply chains, the global response to Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and the growing tension between China and the United States, companies have had to navigate complex choices. Considering their future in China some have hedged by creating supply chains in other countries, while other companies seem to hope to ride out the tensions and maintain the status quo. However, the future of doing business in China faces another challenge, as the CCP, striving for ever greater control over China’s data, moves to limit foreign investors’ ability to do due diligence, financial auditing, and other measures needed to ensure commercial trust.

Beyond the changing tenor of business in China, the economic impact of the Covid lockdowns has pushed China towards commercial charm offensive. Among the major reasons for the U-turn in the Covid lockdown policy was the pressure from Chinese businessmen warning the upper echelons of the CCP that China risked its position in the global supply chain if the lockdowns continued. Observers in the west too often saw the street protests as pressure, but it was the dire economic picture that swayed the party leadership.

However, increasingly in China, you cannot have any data that counters the party narrative, or hold data in a way that allows you to have a clearer picture of what is going on in China than China’s leaders. We noted this in previous columns here regarding the crackdown on China’s tech companies, and how the CCP moves to protect user data and privacy actually have more to do with weakening potential corporate rivals to the state surveillance apparatus. Additionally the state cannot risk having a company say, in the micro case, tracking officials using rideshare to visit their mistresses, nor in the macro case, revealing that the Chinese economic numbers reflect something far from reality.

Where China is cracking down now, however, is on the ability of foreign companies to do their due diligence about doing business in China, developing partnerships with suppliers, and meeting the increasing foreign regulatory requirements banning trade related to the Uyghur genocide or doing business with the Chinese military and intelligence agencies. At the same time, officials in Beijing apparently watched with alarm as western think tanks were able to use open source data to map things like China’s Military-Civil Fusion, ties between companies and Uyghur slave labor, or other information that might counter or merely tarnish the CCP narrative — or force western companies to answer difficult questions about their business arrangements. All of this has resulted in a crackdown on the outgoing data from China, as well as an ever-broadening expansion of what data or information is related to national security or state secrets.

Accompanying this shift has also been a series of raids on western due diligence and advisory firms. On Monday, Chinese state security services carried out televised raids on multiple offices of Capvision, a consultancy that aids foreign analysis of the Chinese marketplace and business opportunities. This comes following other recent raids on the Chinese offices of consultancy Bain & Company and due diligence provider Mintz — both U.S. companies. Combined with the more sinister applications of exit bans, indefinite detention of executives, and hostage diplomacy all employed by Beijing, businesses have even more risk to consider about doing business in China. Conversely, these actions hurt the ability of Chinese companies to list and raise funds in U.S. equity markets — which require accurate company data and transparency.

For U.S. policymakers, the challenge is not to out-China, China, as always, and avoid the further retaliatory tit-for-tat that drags down doing business with and in the United States. Allies in Europe and Asia will also come to see the risk of doing business in China, and we do not need to add to the uncertainty they already face — but we can be clear to them and our own companies about the growing risks they do face in Xi’s China. For the U.S.-China relationship, it becomes harder to do business, and the economic ties of interdependence between our countries will remain, but ever more precariously. Furthermore, the brake on war that commerce has provided is weakening, but the United States must make it clear that the shift in doing business is coming not from our policies, but China’s move back to a secret, party-controlled economy. While this is counterproductive for China’s economic future, we should be concerned about what it means for the course of our economic ties and prospects of conflict.

The Corps wants same-day delivery

Ethan Brown

A Marine utilizing a test drone for short-range immediate resupply (Photo: Cpl. Tyler Andrews/USMC)

Solving the challenges of future conflicts in denied areas comes down to a few simple, though very difficult challenges. These include system denial (command-and-control operability), the tyranny of distance (especially in the Indo-Pacific theater), and related to both of those circumstances, vulnerable and lengthy logistics and supply lines needed to sustain a fighting force.

So the Marines are exploring some creative options for altering that status quo, nestled tightly into the budget requests for the forthcoming year and aimed at addressing those very challenges. These include the Tactical Resupply Unmanned Aerial Systems, or TRUAS, and the Corps needs but $13 million for an initial investment to finalize development and building of such a capability, having solicited and vetted a multitude of commercial designs.

There is nothing particularly fancy or gizmo-driven about the TRUAS platforms, of which the Corps intends to acquire 41 total on initial purchase. They are much closer to the Amazon delivery drones than anything else, but ruggedized for the rigors of combat and austere sustainment. Each quad-copter design is reported to be capable of hauling upwards of 150 pounds of various cargo (stowed in ruggedized shipment boxes) as far as nine miles.

Of course the Marine Corps is pursuing some innovative solutions, because that is precisely what one should expect from the prestigious and resilient branch who is all but certain to be a key tool in any future conflict. The drones are not (yet) feasible for crossing vast swaths of Ocean, but in a future campaign where beachheads, littoral warfare, and close-in high-mobility will be critical, these TRUAS platforms are likely to be a decisive capability for resupply of immediate needs like ammo, water, batteries and medical sustainment over short range.

The Corps vision of itself in the future fight are small, independent units operating at great extensions from support bases, and while evolving rotary and tilt-rotor maneuver platforms like the V-22 Osprey and forthcoming entries like the Army’s next Vertical-lift assets, the Corps expects to be pursuing strategic objectives, achieving deterrence, attack-in-zone, and other ambitious maneuver objectives in places where such airborne assets would be far too easy of a target for adversaries operating denial systems.

Drones, however, are far more difficult to interdict, track, and are not a cost-effective target strictly speaking, especially when adversaries are investing fortunes in deterring the vaunted offensive firepower capabilities of a Carrier Strike Group or strategic bombing assets. This simply means diversifying the target array for enemy trackers, giving them too many things to sort and prioritize, and making them too small to be a valuable engagement. It’s one small component of futurized drone combat applied to the challenge of sustainment.

For the tech enthusiast, this is an exciting time to watch how militaries utilize emerging technology, something that the Ukraine conflict has most certainly been a boon for. But there are some drawbacks to consider as the Corps, and almost certainly the remainder of the defense enterprise, is continuously looking to optimize and automate its ecosystem of support systems.

For one thing, deploying steel-nerved Marines to the hinterzones of the wide-open Pacific is constrained by a Naval fleet going through something of a inventory overhaul — a shrinking amphibious fleet, places more emphasis on those vulnerable rotary- and tilt-rotor wing platforms for delivering Marines to the fight. The Marines have asked for more deployment platforms, but the Pentagon has balked at the request. The TRUAS system isn’t going to offset the need for personnel-delivery platforms, it merely addresses a short-range, myopic need for immediate sustainment.

The next issue, and one which has been a grand-strategy topic of mine for some time now, is the increasing dependence on technology that continues to drive the defense enterprise. The future conflict, be it in the vast climes of the Pacific Ocean, or in the heart of Africa, or the frozen Poles, will be absolutely ruthless in terms of equipment durability and operability. No single system, system of systems, or connectivity is going to react in a similar manner between those dramatically different environments either. Building such tech requires some basic components, things like semiconductors which, unless one has been hiding under a rock for the last few decades, are rather important and in short supply (peep our Geotech work on those fronts).

Our increasing dependence on soft technology (read, not durable tech, no matter the branding or advertising) is going to resolve the issue of competition or confrontation with adversaries who strategize around undermining our tech supremacy. And while the Marines have certainly embraced the concept of austere, agile combat operations, perhaps more so than any other branch, we remain rooted in a GWOT mentality: our superior tech wins out because it gives an advantage. The paradigm here is that cool gadgets are certainly useful when they work, but our dependence on them creates a disadvantage when such capabilities are deterred, interfered with, or severed entirely.

So this effort (one among many) to make our fighting forces more technologically advanced is a two-edged sword. On one edge, things like resupply drones streamlines basic needs like logistics and resupply, while complicating the targeting and engagement parameters of an adversary; simple cost-reward analysis which slows their killchain sequence. The other edge, however, and one which carries great risk, lies in fielding combat forces who cannot operate without the tech that has begun to shape the force writ large, a dependency created in Afghanistan and Iraq, but unsuitable for the vast distances of the next conflict.

Trade Update: Observers Await Outcomes of IPEF Negotiations

Robert W. Gerber

Cargo depot in New Jersey with New York City in background (Photo: Author)

This week U.S. negotiators from the Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative are meeting with foreign counterparts of 14 nations in Singapore under the aegis of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) — the Administration’s signature trade initiative in Asia. Back home in Washington, members of Congress, industry associations, and other observers (like CSPC) await the White House release of portions of the draft text of the agreement, which the Administration hopes to conclude by the end of 2023. The word “observers” is appropriate because Congress is not actively involved in this endeavor: the White House has neither requested trade promotion authority from Congress nor does it plan — at this time — to submit the IPEF text for Congressional approval. As we have previously reported, this “go alone” approach has caused consternation among some leading Republicans and Democrats on the House and Senate committees responsible for trade. They cite Congress’ Article I authority to regulate foreign trade as well as the argument that codifying trade agreements makes them more durable. Some members who are concerned about labor and environmental aspects of trade, including Representative Debbie Dingell (D-MI) according to Politico, have announced they would participate in a rally on the margins of the next IPEF negotiating round, which is scheduled to take place later this month in Detroit. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-NY) has accused the Administration of conspiring with Big Tech to craft IPEF text in a way that would undermine Congress’ authority to regulate competition in the digital economy.

What we know about IPEF is that its goals do not include traditional market access provisions, specifically tariff reductions. There are pros and cons to this approach. On one hand, tariff reductions have contributed to the decline of U.S. manufacturing jobs over the past two decades, as National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan argued in a speech at Brookings last week. Certainly, government subsidies and protectionism have also boosted China’s comparative advantage, as CSIS Chair Bill Reinsch argued recently, but the lopsided U.S.-China trading relationship began with low tariff privileges afforded to China through a WTO membership card. Secondly, there’s not much tariff left to eliminate — at least on the U.S. side (Section 301 and 230 tariffs on China goods are the exception). Furthermore, “behind the border” factors such as standards, product regulations, and investment rules undoubtedly play an increasingly important role in determining trade flows than do tariffs. IPEF aims for commitments on supply chain security, digital trade, labor and environmental standards, and anti-corruption, and a common set of high standard rules in these areas would both increase trade and would level the playing field, ostensibly ensuring “fairer trade.” On the other hand, if China is successful in brokering tariff advantages in Indo-Pacific markets, U.S. exporters would be at a disadvantage. This is one of the key reasons why some members of congress have specifically called U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai on the Administration to include market access in IPEF negotiations, and some have called for the United States to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (now called CPTPP), which the U.S. abandoned in 2017. Putting tariffs on the table undoubtedly would create greater incentive for trading partners to undertake the legislative changes that IPEF will demand of them. And adding tariffs to the equation gives the U.S. something to take away if a signatory breaches his or her commitments.

What could the Administration do to make IPEF more impactful and durable and to appease Congressional skeptics? We propose three ideas. First, U.S. negotiators could go bold on supply chain provisions. This is new territory that has not been tried in previous trade agreements. The Asia Society has put forth a set of recommendations that could break new ground and have the potential to strengthen supply chains while reducing dependency on China — something that is very appealing for both parties in Congress. Included among these recommendations: an early warning system and “crisis response mechanism” and a critical minerals agreement similar to the one recently negotiated with Japan. Second, the Administration could signal its support for making the temporary tariffs (mentioned earlier) on China imports permanent — or at least extending them for five years. There is solid rationale for doing this given China’s continued abuse of international trading rules, threats to U.S. national security, and appalling human rights practices within the PRC. IPEF could then guarantee signatories that they would be exempt from such tariff hikes — essentially locking in current tariff rates for IPEF members — for a period of five years if they maintain strict rules of origin and comply with the other obligations in the final agreement. USTR could ask Congress to pass such a measure during negotiations or once IPEF negotiations are complete. Third, the Administration could signal that IPEF is a springboard/first step to something more comprehensive. This would help engender business support, which is key to the success of any agreement. Fourth, IPEF could be linked to other remedies/incentives that address Beijing’s debt-trap diplomacy and economic coercion, which are major concerns for many smaller U.S. trading partners.

We’ll soon know if IPEF is “a show about nothing,” to quote TV show Seinfeld, or if our Indo-Pacific trading partners make binding commitments to implement legislative changes that strengthen supply chains and increase goods and services trade among like-minded partners. An innovative and ambitious supply chain provision that involves Congress in its implementation would help boost the impact and enforceability of the pact. Although, as Dan Mahaffee points out in this week’s roundup, companies already have a number of motivations to dial back their business in China in favor of friendshoring in more stable lower-risk countries — with or without the IPEF.

Putin’s Parade Underperforms

Sophie Williams

In past years, Russia’s Victory Day celebrations have been full of grandiose expressions of military might and nostalgic patriotism. By comparison, this year’s celebration was timid. Over 20 major cities throughout Russia canceled their May 9th parades altogether. Moscow’s parade, usually the largest of all, featured a single World War II-era tank and no Immortal Regiment March — typically a significant portion of the parade where family members march while holding up pictures of ancestors who fought in World War II.

During the 15 months that Russia has waged war on Ukraine, Putin has drawn countless parallels between World War II and the current conflict in his speeches. In connecting the war in Ukraine to Russia’s great victory over fascism, Putin has tried to pull at patriotic heartstrings, calling Russian civilians to care about global glory once more. And yet the celebrations on May 9th were the smallest they have been in years, likely due to recent drone attacks on the Kremlin and other safety concerns. The diminished celebrations didn’t seem to bother Russian civilians, mostly because they didn’t seem to care about the event at all. In a video posted by the Moscow Times, an interviewer asked Muscovites on the street for their thoughts on the holiday cancellations. “What an uninteresting question,” one man whose face was blurred in the video responded. The majority simply answered that they aren’t interested in politics. When asked about the Immortal Regiment March, a few said they had never been, or that they didn’t have ancestors who fought in the war, so it made no difference to them.

The overall effect of the day was dismal at best. A pathetic parade with a single tank, Putin surrounded by “veterans” who turned out to be colleagues from his days in the KGB, Putin’s paranoia on display more than anything else, and a nation who didn’t care either way.

In several ways, this year’s May 9th festivities succinctly symbolize Putin’s fears, ambitions, and Russia’s current state. Putin’s rhetorical appeals to World War II nostalgia fall on apathetic ears of a nation that feels increasingly disconnected from the Soviet Union’s glory days. This apathy is in part a product of Putin’s design. The Kremlin has spent years launching disinformation campaigns in their own country that effectively confuse, overwhelm, and disengage the public from politics and current affairs. That strategy has perhaps been too effective; apathy seems to be spreading from politics to history, a reciprocal exchange with a disengaging overall effect.

Although it’s tempting to view the dismal Victory Day celebrations as a sign of hope, a signal of Putin’s decaying regime, the parade communicated one clear message: the show will go on because Putin says so. Seated with only supportive leaders from Central Asia and Eastern Europe and former KGB officers, Putin surrounds himself with people who will not stand in his way, and insists that the dismal parade — and a depressing war in Ukraine — presses on.

Iranian Women Continue to Face Violent Backlash for Protest

Cara Arnoldi

On May 11, the Atlantic Council held an event titled “Woman, Life, Freedom: Eight months of ongoing protests in Iran,” in which they hosted Iranian activists Azam Jangravi, Dr. Mehrangiz Kar, and Nazanin Nour. The discussion examined the ongoing protests by women in response to harsh laws set in place by the Iranian regime, as well as the violent backlash these protestors endured. Support for the movement remains strong within Iranian society, but protestors have had to adapt their tactics in the face of the crackdown, according to Western media reports. While global media have increased their coverage of the struggles of Iranian women, these problems — including violence against women — continue. Between oppressive head-covering laws, the poisoning of over 13,000 Iranian school girls, and executions used to smother women’s activism, Iranian women face a regime that remains unphased by protest.

Dubbed as “gender apartheid,” the violence perpetuated or ignored by the Iranian government requires a remedy of united intervention by domestic and global human rights organizations, according to lawyer and activist Dr. Kar. Jangravi and Nour suggest an additional approach: making the internet and mass media readily available to the Iranian people. Jangravi notes that the internet is often unavailable to the Iranian people, making calls for widespread activism more difficult to disseminate. Nour adds that with a more active media, as seen with the recent video of Iranian women dancing to “Calm Down,” Iranian women can capture the attention of the world and enact a greater response.

Nour would like to see nations condemn the actions of the Iranian government, rather than reward the government. The United Nations recently appointed Iran a leadership role within the Human Rights Council, a blatant “slap in the face” amid the executions. Rather than reward the regime for its violent behavior, Nour calls for the immediate passing of the MAHSA Act by the U.S. Congress. This legislation, named after Iranian protester Mahsa Amini died in police custody in September 2022, would sanction certain entities in Iran. In addition, Nour applauds the efforts of Afghan women and Iranian men in their support of the protests, suggesting the need for a greater response from the rest of the world.

How to Alienate An Ally

Hidetoshi Azuma

US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel leads the Tokyo Rainbow Pride parade in Tokyo, Japan on April 23, 2023 (Photo Credit: The Official Twitter Account of Ambassador Rahm Emanuel)

Over the last few weeks, the Japanese public has increasingly been voicing rage at an unlikely target: the US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel. In a marked departure from his original focus on security issues last year, Emanuel’s promotion of LGBTQ+ rights in recent months has invited a growing public backlash as the Japanese Diet finalizes the legislative debate on the proposed LGBTQ+ bill for approval expected later this month. Brandishing rainbow flags with local activists across Tokyo, Washington’s top diplomat in Japan has earned notoriety with his perceived condescension toward the country stemming from his mounting pressure on the Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida to pass the LGBTQ+ legislation ahead of the Group of Seven (G7) summit beginning on May 19. In doing so, Emanuel has breached Washington’s unspoken diplomatic rule of avoiding social justice issues in Japan long honored by his post-WWII predecessors and could potentially spawn long-term unintended consequences eclipsing the future of the US-Japan relations.

Washington has historically sent Japan high-profile political figures with deep ties to the White House, and Emanuel is no exception. This underscores the enduring importance of Japan for US regional strategy. An influential Member of Congress, Chief of Staff for President Barack Obama, and later Mayor of Chicago, Emanuel unmistakably ranks among the historical luminaries who represented the US Embassy in Tokyo, ranging from General Douglas MacArthur’s nephew, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, to the former U.S. president John F. Kennedy’s top adviser on Japan, Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer. In fact, his stellar political credentials appeared even more pronounced after years of vacancy of the ambassadorial post in Tokyo due to US domestic politics. The veteran Democrat himself recognized the sui generis advantage of his own background and fully leveraged it for his mission in Japan. Indeed, his arrival in Tokyo in January 2022 was widely touted in Japan as the establishment of a direct line to President Biden himself.

Against this backdrop, Emanuel initially appeared to perpetuate the professional legacies of his predecessors. US ambassadors to Japan have historically focused on building bridges to advance the White House’s agendas for the country without compromising the political durability of the US-Japan alliance. This often meant making stark choices between respectability and ruthlessness amid conflicting bilateral interests and therefore required subtlety for success. Demonstrating such a skill was imperative in Japan’s face-saving culture. This matters especially in engagement with the Japanese political establishment, the center of gravity of domestic Japanese politics.

Recognizing this imperative long allowed US ambassadors to succeed in accomplishing some of the most difficult missions. For example, having previously had the dishonor of losing face after literally being struck in the face by an Imperial Japanese Army private during his time as the Chief Consul in Nanjing, China in 1938, Ambassador John Allison singularly focused on deepening ties with the Japanese political establishment and earned virtually universal respect during his tenure in Tokyo in the early 1950s. Building on his newly-earned face in postwar Japan, he went on to engineer the establishment of the ruling conservative party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in 1955 without exposing his hand by relying heavily on clandestine political action led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Despite the Eisenhower administration’s controversial agenda for Japan, Allison achieved the mission impossible and earned even more respect, if not appreciation, from the Japanese political establishment.

Similarly, Emanuel began his diplomatic career in Tokyo by focusing on deep engagement with the Japanese political establishment. In fact, Allison and Emanuel found themselves in an eerily similar political environment in Japan overshadowed by the growing threat of communism. Inevitably, Biden’s ambassador in Tokyo sought to cultivate the Japanese political establishment to make Japan closely aligned with Washington’s regional strategy of deterring China’s growing influence. To this end, Emanuel forged solid bonds with the LDP leadership, such as Kishida and former prime minister Taro Aso, and even the Opposition, leading Tokyo to dramatically reform its national security policy in 2022. With the Economic Security Promotion Act passed and the new National Security Strategy approved in a single year, Emanuel completed task after task with unusual speed and undeniably contributed to the essential upgrade of the US-Japan alliance. He even complemented his main mission with his robust public relations campaign appealing to the Japanese public by touring across Japan by train.

The unwritten rule established by decades of successful US diplomacy in Japan was the conscious avoidance of addressing social issues. The Japanese political establishment remains largely traditionalist and averse to progressivism in general. Indeed, as Allison’s experience demonstrated, some US ambassadors even went as far at times as to reverse Japan’s social progress and ironically received applause from the Japanese political establishment. This by no means signified Washington’s lack of concern for social justice in Japan. Rather, such a concern itself would be unnecessary because Japan is far more progressive than the US ironically by virtue of its US-drafted post-WWII constitution.

The US occupation of Japan was essentially a seven-year long cultural Marxist experiment led by the New Deal Left who found a safe haven for their progressive agenda in a defeated country. For example, Beate Sirota Gordon, the then-22 year-old feminist serving at General MacArthur’s left-leaning General Section, admitted to drawing inspiration from the Stalin Constitution of 1936 when incorporating the progressive clause of “the essential equality of the sexes” in Article 24 of the Japanese Constitution. Article 24 even became the legal basis for the launch of the Gender Equality Bureau in 2001. Therefore, the traditional avoidance of social justice issues by historical US ambassadors reflected both deference to Japan and pragmatism of policy prioritization.

In this sense, Emanuel’s sudden social justice advocacy is detrimental to his engagement with the Japanese political establishment. His violation of the unspoken diplomatic rule has so far proven to be highly counterproductive, leading to significant internal divisions engulfing the Japanese political establishment. Despite Emanuel’s inexorable pressure on Kishida backed by his robust public relations efforts, the US Ambassador’s own actions have merely exacerbated the internal divisions in Nagatacho, hindering the necessary efforts to pass the bill in time for the G7 summit. More significantly, the Kishida administration is now facing an existential crisis fueled by the LDP’s emerging factional strife over the ongoing legislative debate on the LGBTQ+ legislation.

Indeed, this immediately follows Kishida’s purge of many of the slain former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s conservative allies last year following the outbreak of a major political scandal related to the Korean Christian cult, the Unification Church. Kishida now finds himself under enormous pressure from Emmanuel to forge ahead with the passage of the LGBTQ+ bill despite the growing resistance from LDP’s conservative elements. This is no recipe for internal political unity urgently needed for Japan’s national security reform as tensions with China grow. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, Emanuel is essentially undoing the LDP and undermining the Japanese political establishment with his advocacy.

Equally important, Emanuel’s advocacy creates a larger problem in alienating the Japanese public. A growing number of Japanese constituents, mostly conservatives, are against the LGBTQ+ bill and view the US ambassador’s pressure on Kishida as meddling in Japan’s internal affairs. Contrary to Emanuel’s perception of Japan as the only G7 member state lacking legal protection of sexual minorities, the Japanese society has traditionally embraced them and is free from the history of their oppression by state, unlike Nazi Germany.

Indeed, numerous sexual minorities, such as the popular media personality Matsuko Deluxe, achieved social recognition in Japan long before gender politics took root in the West. The complexity of Japanese culture is another reason Emanuel’s predecessors chose to refrain from addressing Japan’s social justice issues. In this sense, many in Japan increasingly view Emanuel’s actions as those of another arrogant American uninterested in understanding, let alone respecting, Japanese culture. Now is not the time to lose Japanese public affinity.

Many in Japan sarcastically compare Emanuel to General MacArthur due to his inexorable pressure on Kishida. In reality, however, such a comparison is moot as MacArthur put security above all else and even rolled back the left-leaning agenda advanced by some of his colleagues. After all, MacArthur was a seasoned Asianist of the era with deep respect for Japanese culture, especially its warrior traditions, and laid the foundation for what would later become America’s most important alliance in the world. By contrast, Emanuel essentially behaves as if he is a colonial governor general with a carte blache over Japanese life. In doing so, Biden’s top diplomat in Japan is sowing divisions and alienating the host country. His record as the Mayor of Chicago notwithstanding, Emanuel still has the opportunity to lead the U.S.-Japan relationship at a pivotal moment in history. Japan’s present need is not nostrums, but normalcy. Only a strong, united Japan could prevail in today’s great power competition and contribute to the future of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

News You May Have Missed

Norway Takes over Arctic Council Chairmanship from Russia

On May 11, Norway took over the chairmanship of the Arctic Council from the Russian Federation in a subdued online ceremony. The change comes amid concerns over the viability of the intergovernmental body and its work in the geopolitically and environmentally important Arctic region. In March 2022, the other seven Arctic Council countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States) suspended activities in the Council as a protest against Russia´s unlawful war in Ukraine. As the new chair, Norway faces the challenge of trying to go forward with the work of the Council, while continuing to suspend cooperation with Russia. The Arctic Council has been one of the few — if not the only — intergovernmental bodies where NATO members and Russia could sit at the same table. A forum traditionally focused on non-security policy issues such as climate and scientific cooperation and indigenous peoples, the Arctic Council must now find a balance in furthering the new Chair Norway’s priorities (the oceans, climate and environment, and sustainable economic development) without cooperating with Russia, at least on a political level.

South Africa seeks to defuse U.S. diplomatic row over Russian arms

The South African government has responded to US allegations of arm sales to Russia with anger and concern. The US ambassador during a press conference earlier in the week claimed that South Africa had shipped arms to Russia when a Russian ship mysteriously anchored in South African waters in December. South African officials responded with diplomatic protests, and they subsequently announced an inquiry into the incident with the Russian vessel. Relations between the United States, and South Africa have been strained following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as South Africa has resisted efforts to isolate Russia.

The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.

Guest UserJune 6, 2023