FRIDAY NEWS ROUNDUP - NOVEMBER 3, 2023
Friday greetings from Washington, D.C., where House Speaker Mike Johnson, R-Louisiana, has crossed his first legislative milestone by passing a $14 billion Israel aid package offset by cuts to IRS funding. Now this legislation has no hope in the Senate, but the optimists’ take is that this is the Speaker’s opening gambit at the beginning of deal-making and legislating on Israel aid, Ukraine assistance, the southern border, and possibly more to come. The cynics’ take is that the Speaker’s precarious majority means that any action will have to be paired with some form of GOP priority, making legislating with the Senate and White House difficult at best. However, as Speaker Johnson floated the idea of a “laddered” approach to Continuing Resolutions (CRs) and potential agency-by-agency shutdown deadlines, there was a little more cynicism than optimism about the looming budget deadline.
On the Senate side, GOP Senators escalated their opposition to colleague Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Al., and his hold on military promotions, resulting in more tension but little action on moving senior military nominations. A staffer of Tuberville’s even later threatened primary challenges supported by pro-life groups to Republican Senators who tried to lift the blockade—though Senator Tuberville walked this threat back. One nomination that was successful was Admiral Lisa Franchetti, who became the 33rd Chief of Naval Operations, and the first woman to hold that job.
In tech policy, the Biden administration unveiled its Executive Order on artificial intelligence (AI). CSPC Vice President Dan Mahaffee breaks that down more in this week’s roundup.
Joshua C. Huminski–the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs – offered his thoughts on Phase Three of the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) for SpaceNews. Arguing that it is a step in the right direction and works to address both the Space Force’s launch needs and the changing commercial space launch market, he suggests that additional action is necessary., and outlines three potential courses of action for Phase Four, which remains some way off.
Huminski, who is on assignment in Europe, also penned a piece for Breaking Defense on the need for the United States and its allies to invest in Ukraine’s defense industry as a means to strengthen the country’s armed forces, regardless of the pace of its accession to NATO, and to ease the palatability of long-term Western support.
Following Dan Mahaffee’s breakdown of the AI order, CSPC’s Kory Yueh continues his examination of the U.S.-China naval balance with a look at the CCP’s maritime reforms. CSPC Senior Fellow Ethan Brown analyzes how the challenge of sustaining morale and political support for Ukraine becomes ever more important in the next phase of this war. CSPC Senior Fellow Hidetoshi Azuma reflects on the last two years of the Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s foreign and defense policy accomplishments.
Biden Announcement Marks Major Step in AI Regulation; Faces Similar Tech Policy Pitfalls
Dan Mahaffee
Vice President Harris makes remarks introducing President Biden at Monday’s AI policy announcement (White House video screenshot)
On Monday, the Biden administration announced an Executive Order regarding artificial intelligence (AI). In an event featuring the President and Vice President, the executive order was announced with fanfare similar to a major legislative victory. The 111-page executive order is an expansive attempt to address concerns about AI, while also recognizing the potential of this technology. Drawing from a wide range of discussions and inputs, it is also an attempt to balance the various sides of the AI debate, while also limited by what an executive order can do compared to legislation—particularly where AI overlaps with existing conundrums in tech policymaking, e.g. privacy, antitrust, and labor law, just to name a few. Still, the action is a step forward at a time when there are concerns about a broader international race to set precedents and standards for this revolutionary technology.
The White House released an extensive summary of the Executive Order with foremost attention going to the safety and security of AI. The order uses the Defense Production Act to require that companies developing AI that might pose a risk to national security, economic security, or public health share their developmental information with the government such as notifying the government when they are testing the AI or the results of any red-team testing for security risks. Benchmarks for this red-team testing are to be developed by NIST, with the Department of Homeland Security and Energy working to address AI safety vis-à-vis critical infrastructures. Other measures will look at the ability of AI to develop dangerous biological materials or agents; denote standards for protecting from AI-created fraudulent content; utilize AI for cybersecurity and network security augmentation; and set military standards for AI use and security via the NSC process.
Beyond the security-focused measures, the executive order attempts to provide some privacy protections while the White House statement acknowledges that legislation in this area must come from Congress. With concerns about how AI might amplify existing biases, the EO aims to address possible discrimination by AI via programs designed for real estate, government benefits, or criminal justice. Efforts will also be undertaken to determine how AI functions in healthcare and education, while also seeking to develop worker protections and determine long-term impacts of AI on the workforce. Concerns about competitiveness and early market consolidation in the AI field led to the EO’s instructions to expand small business support in the field as well as encouraging the FTC to exercise its authorities that might apply to AI. Given the potential importance and immensity of the technology the final orders are to bolster U.S. participation in international decision-making regarding AI, while bolstering the federal government’s utilization of AI and hiring of those with AI expertise.
The EO reflects and balances what Bruce Schneier and Nathan Sanders call “the three factions'' of AI: the “doomsayers” believing in Terminator/Skynet, or at least an internet overrun with deepfakes; the “reformers” who see AI as both an opportunity to right past wrongs or a danger when fed previous biases; and the “warriors” who see AI as an important tool for national security and economic competitiveness but a threat in the hands of strategic competitors or rogue actors. In the 111-page document, there is something for each of these constituencies. At the same time, the executive order still faces the same political and legislative reality—despite the importance of AI policy and the global race for leadership. Some of the measures could very well be challenged in the courts, while things like privacy policy, data management, and antitrust policy—issues that predate artificial intelligence—require legislative action. However, these processes of reviewing AI testing and training are implemented, it is critical that there be firewalls from the day-to-day of our polarized politics. If there is opposition forming to the administration’s efforts, it is because of claims that the Biden administration seeks to control or manipulate AI training.
While it is important to consider the domestic precedent set by the EO and the obstacles/pathways for its implementation, it is a significant difference from other major technology questions where U.S. policymakers have been reticent to intervene at first. Coming as world AI leaders met in the UK to discuss AI safety and standards. While the summit has been noted thus far for the agreement reached by the U.S., UK, Japan, EU, China, and others highlighting the promise and peril of AI, it also marks what could be a more heated race to set the standards for global AI policy.
It is important now to set clear lines of the role of government and the role of the private sector as this technology moves forward. Precedents about the federal role will be especially important in our system. In the field of privacy, for example, U.S. inactivity, even if driven by a well-meaning light touch to regulation, has resulted in the global standard being set in some ways by the European GDPR and in others by the market power of California regulators or even more fragmented state laws like Illinois’ specific approach to biometrics. Inaction by the government will allow other entities to set precedents for better or worse for AI, be they strategic competitors, major companies, or state and local governments. While skepticism of government efforts to regulate new technologies are well warranted, the precedents set will be important to establish guardrails around the powers of both AI and bureaucrats as this technology expands and matures.
Part II: A Sleeping Dragon in the Indo-Pacific: Xi Jinping’s Maritime Reforms and Modernization of the PLA Navy
By Kory Yueh
Above: Shanghai, China (Feb. 25, 2004) – Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Navy) Sailors assigned to the Chinese frigate Lian Yun Gang (FFG 522) stand watch during a ship's tour for USS Blue Ridge.
In the waning years of China’s Han Dynasty in the early third century, a famous general had long been known for his reputation as a cunning strategist. Despite often being outnumbered, overmatched and outgunned, this strategist remains a paragon of military genius for observers of Chinese history: Zhuge Liang of Shu, the “Sleeping Dragon.” A proverb often attributed to this strategist held that “The loss of any army is always caused by underestimating the enemy. Therefore, wait and gather intelligence—study your enemy carefully.”
However, this proverb does not apply to Zhuge Liang alone. In fact, the military value of intelligence has proven invaluable since the first recording of organized warfare in human history. Nevertheless this simple rule of warfare has often been neglected by states that falter into complacency. What does this have to do with the conversation on naval capabilities in today’s Indo-Pacific? For Xi Jinping, “gathering intelligence” and “studying your enemy carefully” requires seeing to the future prosperity and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
It comes as no surprise that Xi Jinping’s rise in 2012 as China’s head-of-state has propelled China’s ascension as a more powerful and coercive Indo-Pacific power. Previous Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping heavily focused on developing coastal defenses and naval forces to protect China’s shores and inland security. Rather than focusing on projecting Chinese power globally, Xi’s predecessors laid the groundwork for developing Chinese defenses to avoid a catastrophic repeat of the Opium Wars, or another invasion from an adjacent neighbor such as Japan.
Xi Jinping’s reign has introduced profound reforms of that defensive posture. Since 2012, when China seized Scarborough Shoal, the nation has dredged and created over 3,200 acres of artificial islands throughout the South China Sea to strengthen its unrecognized claim to that international body of water. In the process, these islands have been developed into “unsinkable aircraft carriers”—hosting airstrips, missile silos, artillery batteries, and supply depots as forward-operating-bases for the Chinese navy.
Xi’s strategies were reflected in his speech at the 19th National People’s Congress in 2017, which called for restoring China’s “national rejuvenation, national security, and national pride.” His envisioned rejuvenation required an aggressive military modernization, and an urgent need for the Chinese military to be “combat-capable” — goals that Xi Jinping insisted must be met by 2049.
Which brings us to discussion of the Chinese Navy itself.
Above: Unclassified — China People’s Liberation Army Navy, Coast Guard, and Government Maritime Forces. 2022-2023 Recognition Guide. US Navy.
To clarify, Xi’s policies have only accelerated a process of naval reform that had already begun in the 1990s. Since then, the Chinese Navy has been recognized by the United States as a formidable adversary in the Indo-Pacific, forcing the U.S. military to pivot to the Pacific Ocean with more ships and personnel. Xi’s policies have gone further, supplementing the Chinese fleet with anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities via its man-made islands, and more modern warships. Naturally, there is no transparent documentation of the PLA Navy’s composition and capabilities aside from outside observation, but it is well known that the Chinese have developed the ability to:
Establish local naval supremacy via A2/AD-supported surface ships in critical areas such as the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and to the first island chain.
Threaten and deter U.S. Navy forces from penetrating this defensive line.
The PLA Navy has also fielded a few aircraft carriers that are intended to close the disparity of naval-aviation forces in the Indo-Pacific, especially compared to the U.S. Navy. Xi’s strategy has also entailed expansion of the Chinese Coast Guard and a maritime militia (mostly composed of fishing vessels) to help enforce Chinese maritime claims. For reference, Chinese Coast Guard vessels are known to be larger than U.S. destroyers, and the Coast Guard fleet is now known as the world’s largest Coast Guard. Equipped with armaments that render them light surface ships in naval combat, these vessels have been a vital instrument in projecting power to contested island chains also claimed by Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
Xi’s policies have also focused on countering the U.S. Navy’s greatest advantage: aircraft carriers. The U.S. Defense Department’s 2023 annual report to Congress analyzing China’s military capabilities emphasized China’s growing capabilities to target and potentially disable U.S. aircraft carriers and surface warships with the DF-21D missile. Fired from inland China, these missiles possess enough range to travel to the Western Pacific at high speeds and enough accuracy to hit moving targets. Beyond an ever-evolving and growing arsenal of surface-to-surface missiles, the Chinese have also launched their first nuclear-powered submarines, signifying a milestone in the PLA Navy’s modernization. In addition to modernization of subsurface vessels, missile systems, and naval assets, the PLA continues to improve its fighter aircraft arsenal, extending its range such that it now regularly threatens and violates Taiwan’s airspace.
Any future Sino-U.S. conflict would most likely center on a Taiwan invasion or blockade scenario. China’s military expansion has been specifically focused on making it more dangerous and costly for the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense in a crisis. The PLA Navy already outnumbers the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. qualitative edge in terms of warship capabilities and personnel training is dissipating by the day. If the U.S. military is to compete with its Chinese counterpart in a scenario centered in China’s backyard, it must fully understand Chinese strategy and seek to counter it both conventionally and asymmetrically.
On the eve of America’s entry into World War II, the Imperial Japanese Navy was also a powerful peer competitor. Yet as Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto wrote in his diary in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor’s attack, “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.” The United States would do well to remember that historical example, because today a “sleeping dragon” in the Indo-Pacific has similarly awakened, and it is closely studying its opponent and waiting for the opportune moment to strike.
Ukraine Confronts Political Fatigue and Morale Challenges
Ethan Brown
Zelensky visiting a trench in 2021 Donbass
A variety of military and defense strategists (myself included) have been saying for the past 21 months that the sustained duration of the conflict in Ukraine favors Russia, which has made every effort to turn the conflict into a meat grinder. As the Ukraine summer offensive has slowed to a crawl, with another winter season coming on, and Russia anchored within the lines it built earlier in the year along the Eastern edge of the battlefield, Ukrainian soldiers are now contending with burnout, waning morale and fear that Ukraine does not have enough soldiers to successfully seize a clear and indisputable victory.
Politics inevitably rears its ugly head in Western states who are involved in the conflict, as the United States faces upcoming elections,as do several key European states, including Slovakia, Germany, and Austria. Meanwhile, refugees, security aid, and political alignment are providing Moscow with an opportunity to exploit division and strife as only it can. The change in political winds has become Ukraine’s new adversary as it continues to deter Russian ambitions of violent annexation.
Tragically, Russian conventional military doctrine seems to have scarcely evolved from the days of the Red Army, where sheer numbers were thought to win the day, albeit their attempts at battlefield shaping and gray zone operations certainly adapted and evolved into a 21st century paradigm. Saying that the Russia military wantonly throws bodies at a battlefield problem is perhaps too macabre, or vulgar, but therein lies a harsh truth that the world is relearning after the low-intensity coddling that the Global War on Terror fomented: war is brutal, horrific, and it requires that a lot of people on both sides die before someone’s political will to fight breaks. That’s the way a major conflict ends. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky understands this all too well, as he noted in a recent nightly address that “the modern world is designed in such a way that it gets used to success too quickly.”
Russia has seemingly found means of circumventing the comprehensive stranglehold of global economic and sanctions-based pressure in order to sustain its continued aggression within the conflict, having reportedly received over a million artillery shells by way of North Korean exchange. In return, Pyongyang received technological expertise and support for the development of spy satellite technology. Russia has heavily relied upon mass artillery barrages--another tactic dating back to the days of Stalin and his ruthless panache in warfare--and was firing as many as 40-50,000 rounds per month as late as April of this year. Even if those estimates are high, regarding both the volume of fire and the total aid package provided by North Korea, one can project that the bolstered supply of fresh artillery provides several months of sustainment which has a greater impact on the psychological component of the war than anything else.
The West writ large has certainly done its part in enabling and supporting Ukraine’s defense of its sovereign territory, continually upping the ante in terms of military equipment, although with some signaling flaws and shortcomings that are now manifesting amidst the flagging morale and tenacity. Artillery and long-range missile systems, satellite communications, even tanks, have become the increasingly prolific means by which NATO, EU, and the United States have enabled the Ukrainian defense forces in this conflict. The inclusion of modern fighter jets--like the F-16 promised to Ukraine earlier this year--were not necessarily a bad offering once the information paradigm allowed for the ability to avoid the idea that NATO was sending its actual forces to participate in the fighting. But as I noted at the time, it takes far too long to train pilots on the advanced avionics and flight controls of the nimble US-built fighter jet, and think of the value today of announcing that supplied tool to the conflict in the near future? At a time when Ukrainian morale is flagging, and those Ukrainian pilots are nearing readiness for utilizing the F-16s in combat, timing is everything. I still stand by my assertion that a low-tech, cheaper, and more resilient platform (as I said two summers ago) would have been a viable option, and it’s not yet beyond the realm of legitimate offering today.
Tools and gadgets aside, the risk of waning morale and resilience within the Ukrainian forces is a major issue in the conflict, even as the potential decline of Russian institutional health and assurance remains delicate and pending, the immediacy of the Ukraine conflict isn’t able to wait for Moscow’s federal apparatus to crumble under external and internal pressures, because somehow, inexplicably, the authoritarian state is managing to endure under such international pressures. Instead, as the experts of this organization have argued at length over the preceding months, American support for Ukraine is critical, and failing to do so will only breed greater instability and enable aggression by malicious actors like Moscow. It is critical that the American populace understands as much, despite the seemingly insulation we feel at home due to the lack of American troops involved. A foreign war never stays foreign, and the impact of Russia winning the psychological war against Ukraine could and likely would become a touted victory in domestic Russia, even if the battlelines don’t change that much before the end of the year.
In the same vein, this is an opportunity to engage Russia on the information domain of morale and certitude in this conflict, which is especially critical at a time when European support for aiding Ukraine has decreased dramatically since August of this year: falling by nearly ten percent (the polled Europeans who “totally agreed” with financing the purchase of military equipment and training to Ukraine” dropping from 33% to 24% as of October according to Eurobarometer Poll). The United States remains a key actor in this grand competition, but Europe is an increasingly important player in this gambit, and despite the impact of upcoming elections in both arenas, support for Ukraine is critical. The increasingly populist political narratives which favor Russia are of concern, to be certain, which is why it is so critical that support for Ukraine be articulated in domestic issues as well as looking through the conflict through the lens of foreign policy. Shoring up support and continuing to build a coalition of philosophical and literal lockstep against Russian aggression would have an impact on those Ukrainian soldiers experiencing frontline burnout, as well as undermining Russian efforts to seize upon the political undertones that threaten the assurance of Western support for Ukraine.
Fumio Kishida’s Big Stick Policy
Hidetoshi Azuma
The Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida confers with a US Navy aviator aboard USS Ronald Reagan during the International Fleet Review in November 2022. (Photo Credit: The US 7th Fleet)
The Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida entered the third year of his premiership on October 4. In retrospect, domestic politics has invariably, if not unfairly, been unkind to his administration, constantly threatening its internal cohesion with scandals after scandals, ironically including his own. Indeed, two administration officials abruptly resigned in disgrace following the embarrassing revelations of their indecent deeds last month alone. In marked contrast to his plunging popularity at home, Kishida’s foreign and defense policy track record is all but praiseworthy due to its unprecedented acceleration of Japan’s security normalization unseen even during the slain former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s long tenure. A sober reflection on Kishida’s last two years in office reveals his painstaking groundwork for Japan’s new national security policy comparable to the US President Theodore Roosevelt’s Big Stick Policy. Yet, his inexorable progress alone does not guarantee his effective wartime leadership, casting doubt on his ability to wield the big stick in times of need.
Kishida’s single most consequential achievement on the foreign and defense policy front has been the virtual removal of self-imposed constitutional constraints on the scope of Japan’s military interventions around the globe. Not only did Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) recognize the so-called “counter-strike capabilities,” it also de facto allowed for first strikes thanks to the document’s ambiguous wordings. To be sure, such a doctrinal about-turn does not necessarily lead to another Pearl Harbor-like surprise attack tomorrow on Kishida’s watch. Indeed, there is virtually no political will, let alone appetite, for such jingoism in Japan, although the future may of course unfold in unpredictable ways. Despite its political constraints at home, Kishida’s drastic national security reform was a coup of unprecedented magnitude, essentially torpedoing post-WWII Japan’s decades-long pacifism with a single executive action followed by a historic double increase in defense spending.
This watershed moment in Japan’s national security policy occurred while Kishida had been busy globe-trotting from one world capital to another to expand the country’s growing network of alliances. Indeed, while the US-Japan alliance remains Japan’s only formal military alliance, Kishida has succeeded in transforming the United Kingdom and Australia into the country’s de facto allies by forging reciprocal access agreements designed to boost logistical cooperation. This week, he is traveling to the Philippines where he will seek to sign a similar agreement, leading the Southeast Asian country to become Japan’s first de facto military ally in Asia. The Philippines' emergence as Japan’s de facto military ally symbolizes the transformation of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision largely as a rhetorical device under Abe to a tangible network of regional alliances among democracies under Kishida.
Kishida's other noteworthy accomplishments include Japan’s economic security policy. Economic security has been his signature agenda ever since his administration began in October 2021 and has led to the ongoing fundamental restructuring of the Japanese economy for the first time since the former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s neoliberal reforms in the 2000s. Kishida’s economic security policy seeks to promote Japan’s strategic autonomy and indispensability in today’s global geotechnology competition driven by growing challenges to the rules-based world order from the authoritarian powers led by Russia and China. The upshot has been the resurrection of the Cold War-era industrial policy as symbolized by the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) which allows for state interventions in economic life. Indeed, Tokyo has been flexing its muscle in the economy with full blessing from Kishida himself, leading to growing state involvement in Japan’s semiconductor industry and even the private sector’s procurement plan for critical resources, such as oil and gas, in anticipation of a possible war in the near future.
These successive developments on Japan’s foreign and defense policy front bear a striking resemblance to the ways in which Theodore Roosevelt pursued his Big Stick Policy. Roosevelt spearheaded America’s imperial expansion abroad following the closure of the frontier at home in the 1890s and promoted interventionism beginning in the Western Hemisphere with a particular focus on naval power. Likewise, Kishida has quietly awakened Japan from its decades-long slumber by enabling interventionism and is bent on defending the Indo-Pacific at all costs. He has been speaking to the world softly while carrying a big stick hardened by a series of national security reforms at home. For him, the Indo-Pacific is to Japan in 2023 what the Caribbean was to the US in 1904. Economic security is to Kishida what naval might was to Roosevelt.
However, Kishida’s indefatigable push for Japan’s security normalization does not necessarily mean effective leadership especially in times of war. In fact, domestic politics has been sapping much of Kishida’s energy for the last two years, and his seemingly remarkable foreign and defense policy track record is largely a product of his staff’s initiatives. Indeed, Kishida had repeatedly remarked prior to his premiership that he would like to “lead personnel management” as a prime minister with “right people in right positions.” Moreover, he has resurrected factionalism in Japanese politics in a bid for consolidating his own power. Therefore, Kishida is essentially a technocratic administrator rather than a visionary leader, and his political style is a far cry from Roosevelt’s zestful leadership. This was evident in his recent diplomatic faux pas of not publicly condemning the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas for its acts of terrorism against Israel putatively in deference to Tokyo’s longstanding policy of supporting the two-state solution.
If American history is any guide, Roosevelt’s successor, Woodrow Wilson, shared Kishida’s administrative bent and led the US to victory in WWI. Wilson’s experience underscores the power of institutions weathering the vicissitudes of politics. The institutional reforms undertaken by Kishida have so far proven transformational and look to withstand reversals of fortune in the future. Moreover, an organized opposition threatening Kishida’s tenure is markedly absent and will likely remain so in the foreseeable future. At this rate, the incumbent Japanese prime minister will likely find himself in what he tacitly believes to be the inevitable of wartime leadership as China overshadows Taiwan. Having uncharacteristically honed and carried the Big Stick thus far, Kishida increasingly confronts the inescapable reality of having to play Wilson to make the world safe for democracy and, most importantly, Japan.
News You May Have Missed
Russia’s Envoy at Chinese Forum Accuses the US of Fueling Tensions
By Kory Yueh
This past Monday, China hosted its annual Xiangshan Forum in Beijing, a gathering attended by dozens of countries that is the largest event centered on military diplomacy in China. At the forum, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu predictably lobbed accusations against the NATO alliance, stating that "Washington for years has deliberately undermined and destroyed the foundations of international security and strategic stability, including the system of arms control agreements.”
In his fierce criticism of Western powers for their unified reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Shoigu cited Western provocation as the underlying reason for Moscow’s aggression. As if on cue, China's second-ranking military official and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, similarly criticized "certain countries [that continue] stirring up troubles around the world" without explicitly citing the United States. Despite China's self-described “neutral” position in terms of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing and Moscow have continued to strengthen their bilateral partnership “without limits” in recent months, aligning their interests in opposition to the U.S.-led coalition of nations supporting Ukraine.
Second Cadre of Royal Australian Navy Officers Graduate from U.S. Nuclear School
By Kory Yueh
On October 27th, three Royal Australian Navy (RAN) officers graduated from the demanding U.S. Navy Nuclear Power School (NPS). This milestone highlights the growing pace of cooperation between the United States and Australia, specifically in their commitments to the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS).
Having begun in April 2023, this trio are the second group of Australian naval officers to attend and successfully complete the Nuclear Power School. The curriculum prepares them to be nuclear-qualified commanding officers, specifically on nuclear-powered submarines that Australia is striving to obtain, whether through the sale of U.S. Virginia-class submarines or domestically produced nuclear-powered submarines. By the end of this year more than 15 additional Australian navy personnel will be enrolled in the U.S. nuclear training. Vice Adm. Jonathan Mead, the Director-General of the Australian Submarine Agency, noted: “Today marks yet another step forward in building the Royal Australian Navy’s sovereign nuclear-powered submarine capability.” It is noteworthy that a nuclear-capable Australian Navy is one of the first key initiatives of the trilateral AUKUS partnership.
Kory Yueh is a student intern at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress.
Russia’s “Storm-Z Squads” Resurrect Stalin’s Punishment Battalions
By Julian Mancillas
Over the course of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government has taken many measures to sustain their troop numbers. It has increased recruitment benefits for soldiers, and implemented a partial mobilization that saw hundreds of thousands of young Russians flee the country to avoid military service. However, with the increasing rate of attrition on the front line it has become more difficult to find the manpower necessary to throw into the Ukraine meat grinder.
To solve this issue the Russian military has created penal units known as “Storm-Z squads.” These units are composed mostly of convicts recruited from prisons, but they also include insubordinate soldiers being punished for breaches in military discipline. The Storm-Z squads are comprised of about 100 to 150 troops, which are placed within regular army units before they are sent to the frontlines and largely used as cannon fodder.
There is a precedent for the use of such disposable units in Russia: During World War II Soviet Premier Josef Stalin forced soldiers who left their post into the aptly named “punishment battalions,” which served a similar grim purpose. However, there is a possibility that Russia may not be able to continue fielding Storm-Z units. In early October Russian Deputy Justice Minister Vsevold Vukolov disclosed that the Russian prison population, which before the invasion of Ukraine was about 420,000 people, has been reduced to a historic low of 266,000. Such a massive decrease is almost certainly a result of the Russian military’s recruitment of convicts into the war effort. With Russia’s prison recruitment pool shrinking dramatically, it will be interesting to see how long they can maintain the existence of punishment battalions in the field.
U.S. Military Buying Bulk Japanese Seafood to Counter Chinese Ban
By Julian Mancillas
The United States has begun to purchase Japanese seafood to supply its military forces stationed there in response to China’s ban on Japanese seafood products. China claims that the ban, which was implemented following the release of treated water from the damaged Fukushima nuclear plant into the ocean, is in place due to food safety concerns. However, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has vouched for the safety of the water, discounting China’s food safety claims. On October 29, the G7 trade ministers called for a repeal of the restrictions on Japanese food, denouncing China’s economic coercion. By buying Japanese seafood the United States aims to alleviate the economic impact that the Chinese ban will have on the Japanese fishing industry. Rahm Emmanuel, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, has stated that there will be a “long-term contract between the U.S. armed forces and the fisheries and co-ops here in Japan." The seafood will feed American soldiers and sailors in mess halls and aboard naval vessels, while also being available for purchase in shops or restaurants on military bases.
Julian Mancillas is a student intern at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.