The CSPC Dispatch - APR. 4 2025
Welcome to The CSPC Dispatch!
This edition features insights into the sweeping tariffs announced by President Trump on April 2. CSPC Senior Fellow Robert Gerber take a critical look at the new American trade strategy. In other articles, Bridget Peach looks at the fight between free speech and money in political campaigns and Caleb Mann asks whether partnerships between autocracies are actual alliances or simply marriages of convenience? Finally, Senior Fellow James Kitfield warns in Foreign Policy that US policymakers are not yet taking necessary steps to prepare for the gathering geopolitical storm on the horizon.
CSPC is also proud to present our new report “Integrated Deterrence in a Time of Upheaval”. The United States finds itself in a new and challenging geopolitical norm—Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has seen conflict return to the European continent; the People’s Republic of China continues to desire the recapture of Taiwan; additional tensions with Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the partnerships between all of these countries are introducing new complications to long-held and long-understood strategic dynamics, most notably deterrence.
Over the last nine months, working with the British Embassy Washington, British Defence Staff, and UK Strategic Command, the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress convened a robust and diverse group of experts from government, military, intelligence community, and academic, and key diplomatic partners to discuss how the changing geopolitical landscape and technological environment is transforming aspects of deterrence, yet fundamental commonalities with past experiences remain.
This report captures the high-level thematic elements of what is a lively and active discussion on what deterrence means in the light of new actors, new alignments amongst existing actors, and new technologies.
As always, we hope that you will find the newsletter useful and would be delighted to receive your feedback or thoughts on how we can improve going forward.
Tariffs: The Day After
By Robert W. Gerber
President Trump signs an Executive Order on the Administration’s tariff plans at a “Make America Wealthy Again” event on Wednesday, April 2, 2025.
The day after his Rose Garden tariff announcement on April 2, President Trump fielded a reporter’s question about the stock market’s sudden 1400-point drop. Trump said that his Administration had inherited a “terrible economy” that required surgery. The President predicted, “It’s going to be a booming country. We have trillions of dollars committed to coming in… we’ll let (the tariffs) settle in.” He also said he was open to negotiations.
President Trump’s enactment of a 10% tariff on all imports with higher “reciprocal” tariffs on several dozen target countries, paired with new duties on imported steel, autos, and auto parts, is a big gamble. The purported goal is to boost U.S. manufacturing, raise revenue, and to bring more fairness into the trading system. These are ideas that politicians on both sides of the political spectrum support. But there are potentially dire side effects from the heavy dose of tariff medicine the President is prescribing. Inflation will likely reignite, disproportionately hitting medium income and lower income workers, and making the Federal Reserve less likely to cut interest rate cuts. The levels and scope of tariff rates – unprecedented in modern times – boost uncertainty in the business climate. This has the effect of dissuading capital investment, regardless of whether company CEOs have announced new factories in the United States. These secondary effects of the Trump tariffs will be hard to avoid.
Long ago, Trump correctly discerned that a new approach to reducing foreign trade barriers was overdue, and his supporters want him to correct the failings of globalization. Traditional trade negotiations are arduous, and they have frequently under-delivered for American manufacturing. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has likewise been unable to spur meaningful market openings in developing and middle-income countries, nor has it been effective in solving trade disputes. Trump used national security grounds to impose tariffs on steel, aluminum, washing machines, and more during his first term, with a public comment process. He raised tariffs on Chinese goods – which no prior president had been willing to do - and successfully concluded an upgraded U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement with bipartisan support. President Biden’s “trade frameworks” failed to resolve longstanding Congressional trade priorities vis-a-vis the EU, UK, India, and the Indo-Pacific. President Trump’s new trade remedy for 2025 is designed to disrupt, leveraging the full heft of the U.S. economy. However, this rushed initiative seems to overlook some key U.S. strategic interests.
Australia, South Korea, and Japan – all bilateral trade agreement partners and defense allies – were all hit with higher tariffs. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand, who want to diversify away from China and depend to a large degree on exports to the United States, now face tariffs over 37%. Taiwan will see a 35% tariff plus additional future tariffs on semiconductor exports. These tariffs will come into effect without a phase in period, delivering an economic shock that seems incongruent with broader U.S. foreign policy goals in the Indo-Pacific. Countervailing duties against China make sense given Beijing’s decades long flouting of international trade rules. But China will retaliate against the latest tariffs (over 50%) and it will find ways to exploit the rupture Washington has caused with the EU and other likeminded trading partners.
The “reciprocal” tariff rates also lack a logical rationale. Rates are not based on an exporting country’s “applied” or average tariff rates. Instead, the White House used a formula that divided the bilateral goods trade deficit by the value of Country X’s exports to the United States – divided by two. (The White House spokesperson also suggested that other factors were taken into account.) This rather arbitrary methodology appears to omit the value of services trade – where the United States has a surplus – and the size of Country X’s direct investment into the United States. The result is that a foreign trading partner subject to “reciprocal” tariffs will not know what concessions they would need to make to satisfy Washington. Furthermore, if a country reduces its tariff rate on U.S. products outside of a trade agreement, WTO rules oblige it to do the same for all countries (including China), which means the United States will not necessarily see any net gains.
What happens next? The EU and China will retaliate, while other countries without sizeable economic leverage will try to adapt and pursue other markets. The White House will also need to manage domestic push back. On April 2, the Senate passed a resolution to end President Trump’s national emergency declaration under which he imposed 25% tariffs on Canadian imports. The following day, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) introduced legislation that would require Congressional notification and approval of new tariffs. Heritage Foundation senior policy analyst Andrew Hale told Bloomberg News on April 3, “these duties harm America’s global leadership… if these remain in place, we will get a recession and higher inflation… The President needs better advice.” Mayor of Columbia (S.C.) Daniel Rickenmann said on NPR that there were “deep concerns” in South Carolina – a major manufacturing and export hub - and that the tariffs could cost the state $3 billion per year. The President’s use of emergency law to impose tariffs could also be subject to court challenge.
The President’s strategy will continue to foster domestic and international resentment from important stakeholders like the business community, states, and overseas allies and attract legal challenges. President Trump still has the option abandoning the pursuit of tariffs for tariffs sake, and instead, direct his Administration to pursue strategic measures to deepen critical supply chains with friendly countries while containing China’s worst trade abuses. By doing so, he could fulfill his promise to strengthen American manufacturing, with much less collateral damage to the economy and our relationships with likeminded trade and security partners.
The Fight Between Free Speech and Money in Political Campaigns
By Bridget Peach
Wisonsin’s then-Attorney General Brad Schimel delivers remarks at the Department of Justice. Elon Musk funneled upwards of $20 million into Brad Schimel’s state Supreme Court seat campaign, which he ultimately lost to Susan Crawford.
Reforms around campaign financing have bounced in and out of the Supreme Court as lawmakers continuously seek better measures to regulate the billions funneled into election campaigns and political parties each year. However, after Citizens United v. FEC in 2010, spending on political campaigns, by individuals and groups alike, has skyrocketed and shaped elections for years.
In 1976, the Supreme Court used the case of Buckley v. Valeo to impose regulations on the Federal Elections Commission (FEC), which had been created in 1971. The Supreme Court case distinguished between “hard money” and “soft money,” the former denoting money given to support a campaign or candidates and the latter meaning money donated to indirect organizations. Soft money can also refer to funds contributed in order to strengthen a political party, but not necessarily the campaign itself. Under Buckley v. Valeo, the FEC is allowed to regulate hard money to campaigns, but soft money is not allowed to be regulated. In addition, there are no limits to the amount that can be spent on a campaign. The case of Buckley v. Valeo was determined through an interpretation of the First Amendment regarding free speech.
Almost 30 years later, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), also referred to as the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform Act, was signed into law in early 2002 by President George W. Bush in an attempt to once again solve pressing issues regarding money in politics. Democratic Senator Russ Feingold and Republican Senator John McCain worked together to sponsor the act, which would effectively subject soft money to regulation in politics as well. Instead of simply regulating hard money that was donated directly to political campaigns, BCRA sought to constrain all soft money directed towards political parties, state and local officials, party committees, and individuals linked to federal elections through FEC regulations. Further, McCain-Feingold required that all advertisements related to political campaigns include an endorsement following the party-approved message.
In 2008, however, issues related to the BCRA arose after the creation of a film on then-Senator Hillary Clinton. The film, titled Hillary: The Movie, was created by Citizens United in order to inform voters prior to the 2008 presidential election. However, Citizens United is a conservative organization, and Hillary: The Movie turned out to be a documentary aimed at exposing corruption and controversy. Citizens United wanted to use donations given to the organization to broadcast the documentary and make it widely available but was concerned over FEC laws and regulations that made “electioneering” illegal so close in date to the election. They argued that because the film did not directly tell viewers to vote a certain way, it should not be subject to FEC regulations.
In the case Citizens United v. FEC that took place in 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that Citizens United could in fact air Hillary: The Movie and did not have to comply with FEC restrictions on electioneering and political timelines. The decision was once again made on the basis of free speech, citing that spending on political campaigns, whether it be from individuals or organizations, cannot be limited as it is a form of speech.
The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision changed the face of political campaigns. Since the decision, controversy over spending in politics has arisen as scholars debate the trade-off between favoring the wealthy and powerful while also giving a voice to all. Following Citizens United v. FEC, super PACs (political action committees) have grown in power and influence. Despite regulations on transparency in finance rules between the relationship of super PACs with political parties, lines have been blurred over the years as their goals continue to be interwoven.
The recent special election in Wisconsin provides just one example of the role that money plays in politics, and how large the amounts can be when few to no restrictions are enacted. The state’s Supreme Court seat between Democrat Susan Crawford and Republican Brad Schimel caught the attention of the American public, as Elon Musk personally funneled over $20 million to support Schimel. For example, in Green Bay, Wisconsin, Musk offered $1 million to those attending a town hall linked to a campaign. This resulted in the most money spent on state Supreme Court seat campaigns throughout history, with the total amounting to over $81 million.
With a number of motions to overturn Citizens United v. FEC already attempted and failed, the future of political campaign financing regulations appears static moving forward. However, with increased polarization and rising stakes with each coming election, there is no limit on what money can do to influence voters.
Bridget Peach is an intern at CSPC and junior at the University of Georgia majoring in International Affairs and Russian.
The Axis of Autocracies: Adversaries with a Common Goal or a Marriage of Convenience?
By Caleb mann
Much has been written and said about the axis of autocratic nations that the United States and its democratic allies now confront, the very name recalling the “axis” that provoked the worst bloodletting in human history during World War II (Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan). The current iteration has been given many ominous sounding names, including the “axis of upheaval,” the “quartet of chaos,” “CRINK” (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea), or simply the “axis of autocracies.” Whatever the chosen moniker, the current axis is not a formal alliance with a mutual defense agreement like NATO or the former Warsaw pact. Instead, the current axis is informally bound by a common desire to challenge U.S. global hegemony and the rules-based international order that it underwrites. Successfully countering this block thus requires understanding the nature of the ties that bind the members and the fissures in their relationships, and above all, separating fact from hyperbole.
That was the focus of the latest Hauser Symposium hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), which examined the deepening connections between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Experts gathered in New York noted that while cooperation among America’s chief adversaries was indeed concerning, the notion of an ironclad “axis” is often overstated, especially given that these countries share few intrinsic similarities.
There was general agreement at the symposium that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was the fulcrum for elevated cooperation between the axis countries. The dynamic underlying their interactions, however, is less an equitable four-way partnership and more like a complex web of bilateral relationships. Russia’s outreach to the other members of the axis is undoubtedly deeply rooted in the war. The three-year conflict has pushed Russian resources to the brink. Yet cooperation with Moscow remains almost entirely bilateral.
Iran has supplied Russia with thousands of unmanned drones, for instance, while North Korea has sent munitions as well as troops. China has provided mass amounts of dual-use technology. Russia, in turn, has shared critical technologies with the junior partners in the axis, creating long term security concerns. Most notably, Russia has promised to provide Iran and North Korea with 4th generation fighter aircraft- representing technology long sought by the diplomatically isolated states. Despite the significant aid being sent back and forth, however, military cooperation among the axis states still pales in comparison to the joint military operations routinely conducted between the United States and its allies. On the other hand, recent trilateral naval operations between China, Russia, and Iran in the Middle East have caused significant concern as tensions between Washington and Tehran rise.
While military cooperation among the axis countries has been the focus of Western intelligence agencies, the strengthening economic and diplomatic ties may prove even more worrisome. Economic partnership between China and Russia is of particular concern, with the two powers signing a ‘no limits’ partnership in 2022. As a result, bilateral trade between the two countries reached a record high of nearly a quarter-trillion dollars in 2024, with Russia also usurping Saudi Arabia as China’s largest oil supplier. This has allowed Moscow to weather what were initially seen as potentially crippling Western economic sanctions.
Significant attempts have also been made by China and Russia to legitimize Iran, bringing Ayatollah Khamanei's Islamic state to the table for negotiations among world powers. China, and Russia have also signaled support for North Korea on the international stage, vetoing a United Nations Security Council resolution that would have prolonged investigations into the Hermit Kingdom, and unfreezing millions of dollars' worth of assets. Through construction of ports and trade routes impermeable to U.S. intervention, the axis has further circumvented the impact of Western sanctions.
Efforts to fashion the axis into an ever-more coherent security block, however, will undoubtedly be hampered by their profound differences. A Marxist-Leninist state (China), a personalist-dictatorship (Russia), a militant Islamic theocracy (Iran), and a family dictatorship (North Korea) make for strange geopolitical bedfellows. They are bound by few written agreements and almost no cultural similarities. The shared vision of opposition to the United States that unites them may prove a questionable foundation for a sustainable partnership in the long run.
The war in Ukraine has proven the glue that currently unites the axis, but the end of fighting will likely see the partnership tested by underlying tensions. The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran will undoubtedly test the limits of China and Russia’s support, for instance, given their own ambivalence about Tehran’s suspected nuclear weapons program. The partner nations in the axis also have divergent interests abroad, with Russia competing with China in Africa; Iran’s confrontation with Israel looming over Russian and Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East; and North Korea’s always unpredictable behavior complicating Beijing’s hegemonic goals in the Indo-Pacific.
There’s no doubt that the war in Ukraine has heightened connections between these nations to far more worrisome levels. Once the guns in Ukraine finally fall silent, however, it’s an open question whether upending the global alliance of democracies is a sustainable goal for uniting the “axis of autocracies,” or whether it will ultimately prove simply a marriage of convenience.
Caleb Mann is an intern at CSPC and junior at Virginia Tech majoring in History with a minor in Political Science.
Originally published in Foreign Policy on March 26, 2025:
Geopolitical storm clouds are gathering at the far reaches of Pax Americana, and yet there is remarkably little sign that the U.S. government or the American people have awoken to the mounting dangers. The threat posed by China and Russia and their rogue nation allies rated only passing mention in last year’s presidential campaign, for instance, which in typical fashion revolved around domestic issues such as the economy and inflation. Asked to choose among five issues in an NBC exit poll, only 4 percent of the voters surveyed during last year’s presidential election named foreign policy as a priority.
President Donald Trump has talked a lot about restoring strong U.S. leadership in an increasingly unstable world, but in its first two months, his administration has mostly sown chaos at home and doubt abroad about the reliability of the United States as an ally.
The administration’s ready-fire-aim approach to national security and world affairs stands in stark contrast to the sense of very real urgency felt at the United States’ geographic military commands, which are positioned forward around the globe.
In essence, these military headquarters are sentries on the far battlements of the U.S.-led, post-World War II international order. From their vantage point, Washington’s military and security forces already find themselves stretched thin by intense combat operations, hybrid and proxy warfare, and tense military standoffs with an increasingly cohesive “axis of autocracies” that is spread out over six time zones that span the globe.
Listen closely to the warnings from these outposts, and you can detect the sound of alarms clanging while the United States continues listing even as geopolitical storm clouds darken. Read the full article here.
Special Episode: Coffee & Conflict Interview with General H.R. McMaster
Originally released by Coffee & Conflict Podcast on March 26, 2025:
CSPC Senior VP of National Security and Intelligence Joshua Huminski speaks with General H.R. McMaster (ret.) about the emerging axis of aggressors—Russia, China, and others—and what their coordinated challenges mean for American power and global stability. They discuss how these regimes are pushing for a return to a multipolar world, exploiting perceptions of American weakness, and contesting U.S. leadership. He also examines whether America’s 20th-century institutions are equipped for today’s geopolitical competition and why strategic empathy is essential for understanding our adversaries.
andy keiser discusses canada’s upcoming elections on Fault lines, NSI podcast
Originally released by NSI on March 21, 2025:
CSPC Senior Fellow & NSI Senior Fellow Andy Keiser joins Morgan Viña and Lester Munson dive into Canada’s upcoming federal election, expected as early as the end of April. With Liberal leader Mark Carney gaining ground over Conservative Pierre Poilievre, this race could be the first major international political test of the "Trump effect." Trump’s recent trade attacks on Canada—and his unexpected openness to a Liberal government—appear to be reshaping the political landscape.
How are tariffs and rising Canadian nationalism impacting the race? Will this lead to more defense spending and deeper cooperation with Europe? And as U.S. support for Ukraine wavers, could Canada step up its military and intelligence leadership on the global stage? Watch the full episode here.
Latest CSPC Report
Integrated Deterrence in a Time of Upheaval
Spring 2025
The Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress (CSPC) is pleased to release its latest report “Integrated Deterrence in a Time of Upheaval”.
The United States finds itself in a new and challenging geopolitical norm—Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has seen conflict return to the European continent; the People’s Republic of China continues to desire the recapture of Taiwan; additional tensions with Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the partnerships between all of these countries are introducing new complications to long-held and long-understood strategic dynamics, most notably deterrence.
Over the last nine months, working with the British Embassy Washington, British Defence Staff, and UK Strategic Command, the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress convened a robust and diverse group of experts from government, military, intelligence community, and academic, and key diplomatic partners to discuss how the changing geopolitical landscape and technological environment is transforming aspects of deterrence, yet fundamental commonalities with past experiences remain.
This report captures the high-level thematic elements of what is a lively and active discussion on what deterrence means in the light of new actors, new alignments amongst existing actors, and new technologies.
To read the full report, click here.
